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A  UTHOR : 


TCHELL  ELLEN 


TITLE: 


STUDY  OF  G 
PHILOSOPHY 

PLACE: 

CHICAGO 

DA  TE : 

1891 


EEK 


COLUMBIA  UNIVEI^ITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


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182 
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WW 


MitcheU,  EUen  M. 

A  study  of  Greek  philosophy,  by  EUen  M.  MitcheU. 
W  ith  an  introduction  by  William  RounseviUe  Alger.  Chi- 
cago,  b.  C.  Gnggs  and  company,  1891. 

xxviii,  282  p.    19^*". 

"A  list  of  reference  books":  p.  cviii-viii. 


j-  Philosophy,  Ancient. 


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GRIGGS'S 

GERMAN    PHILOSOPHICAL    CLASSICS 

FOR  ENGLISH  READERS  AND  STUDENTS. 

Under  the  Editorial  Supervision  op  Professor  G.  S.  Morris,  Ph.D. 

DEVOTED    TO  A   ^«I™AL^EXP0SIT10^^^  MASTER-PIECES 

^'    ^Hn^ ^RvS^'^^^^'^c  ^  P^^^^^  REASON.     A  critical  Exposi- 
tion.   By  George  S.  Morris,  Pli.D.  n  05 

II.  SCIIELLING'S  TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEALISM.  A  Critiral 
SSpn'iT,;,-  By  John  Watson,  LL.D..  Prof essor  of  Philosophy 
Queen  s  L  niversity,  Kingston,  Canada.    .       .  1  25 

™-    ^K?;?E;,S  SCIENCE  OF  KNOWLEDGE.    A  Critical  Exposition: 

^LS;J^-  ^^E««=TT,  D.D.,  Professor  of  Theology,  Harvard  Uni- 
veiMij J  2g 

IV.    "EGELS  ESTHETICS..  A  Critical  Exposition.    Bv  J.  S.  kEi^ 
bault  Minn  ^^^^^^^^^  ^°  ^^^  Seaburj'  Divinity  School,  Fari- 

^"    ^PoS,  dT,S?L  d"^  ^"'''^'^  ^''^'^'^"^^^^     By  President  Noah 
VI.    HEGEL'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  IUSTOKy" 

A  Critical  Exposition.    By  Geok(;e  S.  Morris,  Ph  I)  "     1  25 

LNDERSTANpiNG.    A  Critical  Exposition.    By  John  Dewey, 
Ph.D.,  of  the  I  niversity  of  Michigan.      .       .       .       .       .       ]     1.25 

^"'    ^FiH^i-^,}'^^}^.    A  I^?«k  on  the  Genesis  of  the  Categories  of 
{r^n^'r'^a  n    ^''^■'''^^  Exposition.    By  William  T.   IIarris 
L.L.L».,  L.  b.  ComnnssioiitT  ot  Education  150 

THE  WORLD  ENERGY  AND  ITS  SELF-CONSERVATION.    By  Wil- 

LiAM  M.  Bryant,  author  of  "Philosophy  of  Art,"  etc.    l:»nio,  cloth.  81  50 

^^  ompnnri"^n^-^?"T>K^^''.^^">^»^^^  ntimate  Social  and  Scientific 
Outcome  of  Original  Christianity  in  its  Conflict  wi»h  Surviving  An- 
cient Heathenism.     By  Philip  C.Friese.    12mo.  cloth  100 

^^P^f  "r7"^V'"T  ^^'?  THINKERS.    Introductorv  Studies.    Criti- 

MoRR^rSo;*?loth"^  Philosophical.      By  Professor  Georoe   S.     ^^ 

nn'rlMl^  flUl^^^  ^V""^.^  ?^  the  leading  features  and  development  of 
our  great  schools  of  philoi^ophy r-£dinburgh  Scofsrtian 

DEMOSTHENES.  A  Study  of  Political  Elonnence  in  (;rooce.  With 
^xtractsfrom  his  Orations  and  a  Critical  Discussion  of  the  "Trial 
on  the  Crown/'  From  the  French  of  Professor  L.  Bukd.f,  of  the 
L  niversity  of  France.    Octavo,  cloth,  gilt  top  '  2  50 

orator/'-L%yX'r  ''"^'''  "^''  ^"^'"  ^'  ''''  ^'^"'  ^'^"^^ 
A  MANUAL  OF  ('LASSICAL  LITERATURE.  Comprising  Bi<.grai.hi- 
wYth  m,fs?riful^v 'i''%^^'^"  Principal  Greek  an?l  Honian  Author  , 
^f  thl  li^^'^^'^'^f  Extracts  from  Their  Works.  Also  a  Brief  Survey 
of  the  Rise  and  Progress  of  the  Various  forms  of  Literature  with 

So  3i«''°'  ""^  ^^^  ^""^'  Authors.    By  Charles  Morris     i?mo 

I/6U  pages.  •••.......  1  fSO 

S.  ().  GRIGGS  AND  CO.,  Publishebs! 


A  STUDY  OF 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY 


3Y 


ELLEN  M.  MITCHELL. 


WITH  AN   INTRODUCTION 


By  WILLIAM   ROUNSEVILLE  ALGER. 


CHICAGO: 
S.  C.  GRIGGS  AND  COMPANY. 

1891. 


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Copyright,  1891, 
By  S.  C.  GRIGGS  &  COMPANY 


THE   KANT   CLUB   OF   DENVER 


THIS  VOLUME   IS   DEDICATED. 


PRESS  OP  KNIGHT,    LEONARD  A  CO.,   CHICAGO. 


PREFACE. 


IT  may  be  interesting  to  my  readers  to  know  some- 
thing of  the  genesis  of  this  book.  Twelve  years 
ago,  in  St.  Louis,  a  little  band  of  women  used  to  as- 
semble every  week  to  study  and  discuss  the  problems 
of  philosophy.  I  led  the  circle  as  teacher  and  learner. 
Beginning  with  the  study  of  Greek  thought,  and  apply- 
ing myself  diligently  to  the  works  of  its  great  masters, 
and  the  commentaries  to  be  found  in  English,  German 
and  French,  I  sought  continually  to  make  clear  to 
others  what  became  clear  to  mvself.  At  the  end  of 
two  years,  the  circle  in  St.  Louis  was  exchanged  for 
one  in  Denver,  but  with  unabated  interest  and  enthu- 
siasm on  my  own  part  and  that  of  my  co-workers.  At 
their  request,  the  verbal  exposition  became  a  written  one, 
and  finally  developed  into  its  present  form.  Whatever 
merit  it  possesses  is  due  in  part  to  those  who  have 
helped  me  towards  the  light  by  their  eager  questions, 
tlieir  hesitation  at  the  obscure,  their  quick  appreciation 
of  spiritual  truth  hidden  beneath  abstruse  phraseology, 
their  loving  fellowship  and  sympathy. 

Above  all  other  teachers  I  am  indebted  to  Dr.  Wil- 
liam T.  Harris.  From  him  I  first  learned  to  seek  phi- 
losophy in  the  history  of  philosophy,  and  to  find  it  every- 
where as  the  spiritual  interpretation  of  the  universe.  I 
have  also  received  help  and   stimulus   from   the  exposi- 


m 

1 


vi 


PREFACE. 


.  tions  and  lectures  of  Prof.  F.  Louis  Soldan,  of  St.  Louis; 
Prof.  D.  J.  Snider,  of  Chicago;  Prof.  Thomas  Davidson, 
of  New  York;  from  the  Concord  School  of  Philosophy, 
and  the  Kant  Club,  of  Denver. 

I  have  consulted  all  the  accessible  authorities,  but 
have  relied  chiefly  on  the  histories  of  Greek  philosophy 
byZeller  and  Hegel.  The  quotations  are  from  the  ori- 
ginal German,  except  where  I  have  availed  myself  of 
those  of  Dr.  Harris,  in  his  translation  of  Hegel's  chap- 
ters on  Plato  and  Aristotle,  published  in  The  Journal  of 
Speculative  Philosophy.  The  greater  part  of  Zeller's 
work  is  to  be  found  in  an  English  translation,  but  not 
that  of  Hegel,  with  the  above  exception. 

In  order  not  to  encumber  my  pages  with  notes  and 
quotation  marks,  I  here  acknowledge  my  general  indebt- 
edness to  Zeller  and  Hegel,  and  append  a  list  of  the 
most  important  worl^  that  I  have  read  and  studied  in 
the  prosecution  of  my  task. 


Ellen  M.  Mitchell. 


Syracuse,  N.  Y.,  August,  1891. 


f 

1: 


A  LIST  OF  REFERENCE  BOOKS  ON  GREEK 

PHILOSOPHY. 


Die  PniLosoPHiE  der  Griechen,  eine  Untersuchung  uber 
Character,  Gang  und  Hauitmomente  ihrer  Entwickelung. 
By  Ed.  Zeller.  English  translation  of  a  part  of  this  work  by  Sarah 
F.  AUeyne,  0.  J.  lleiehel,  Alfred  Goodwin,  and  Evelyn  Abbott. 

Vorlesunoen  uber  die  Gesciiichte  der  Philosophie.  By  G. 
W.  Hegel.  English  translation  of  the  chapters  on  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle by  Dr.  William  T.  Harris,  in  The  Journal  of  Speculative 
Philosophy. 

Geschichte  der  Philosophie  im  Umriss.  By  Albert  Sehwegler. 
Two  English  translations,  the  first  by  J.  H.  Sterling,  the  second  by 
J.  H.  Seelye. 

History  of  Philosophy.  From  Thales  to  the  Present  Time. 
By  Friedrieh  Ueberweg.  English  translation  by  Proi.  George  S. 
Morris. 

Geschichte  der  Philosophie.  By  J.  E.  Erdmann.  English 
translation,  edited  by  Prof.  Williston  S.  Hough. 

Introduction  a  l'Histoire  de  la  Philosophie.  By  Victor 
Cousin.     English  translation,  by  0.  W.  Wight. 

Lectures  on  Greek  Philosophy.     By  James  Frederick  Ferrier. 

Ancient  and  Modern  Philosophy.  By  Frederick  Denison 
Maurice. 

Christianity  and  Greek  Philosophy.    By  B.  F.  Cocker,  D.  D. 

The  Science  of  Thought.     By  Charles  Carroll  Everett. 

The  Fragments  of  Parmenides.  Translated  by  Thomas  David- 
son, The  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy. 

vU 


Vlll         REFERENCE    BOOKS   ON   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 

Plato's  Works,  translated  into  German,  with  Introductions,  by 
F.  Schleierniacher. 

Plato's  Dialogues.     Translated  into  English,  with  Analyses,  by 
Prof.  B.  Jowett. 

Aristotle.    By  Sir  Alexander  Grant. 

Aristotle's  De  Anima.     English  translation,  with  introduction 
and  notes,  by  Edwin  Wallace. 

Aristotle's  Ethics.    English  translation,  with  notes  and  essays, 
by  Sir  Alexander  Grant. 

Aristotle's  Politics.    English  translation,  with  notes,  by  Prof. 
B.  Jowett. 

Outlines  of  the  Philosophy  of   Aristotle.     By  Edwin  Wal- 
lace. I 

EssAi  suR  LA  Metaphysic^ue  d'Aristotle.     By  Felix  Ravaisson. 

Prolegomena  to  Ethics.     By  Thomas  Hill  Green. 

The   Journal  of   Speculative   Philosophy.      Edited   by   Dr. 
William  T.  Harris. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

THE  CLAIM   AND  CHARM   OF  PHILOSOPHY  AS  A 
STUDY.     By  William  Rounseville  Alger. 


Page 


CHAPTER  I. 

PHILOSOPHY  AND  HISTORY.  Philosophy  a  progressive 
process  of  knowledge  comprehending  the  progressive 
process  of  culture;  philosophy  a  history  of  philosophy; 
self-knowledge  and  knowledge  of  the  world;  philosophy 
the  self-knowledge  of  the  human  race. 

CHAPTER  II. 

CHARACTER  OF  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY.  Greek  being 
the  unity  of  the  spiritual  and  the  natural;  the  stage  of 
Greek  consciousness  the  stage  of  beauty;  the  classic  style 
in  philosophy;  contrast  between  Greek  and  modern 
philosophy 

CHAPTER  in. 

PRE-SOPHISTIC  PHILOSOPHY.  The  rise  of  philosophy 
in  Greece;  perception  of  nature  its  basis;  the  Ionian  phi- 
losophers, the  Pythagoreans,  the  Eleatics,  Heraclitus,  the 
Atoraists,  Anaxagoras 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   IONIC   PHILOSOPHERS.    Thales;  his  proposition 
that  water  is  the  originative  principle  of  all  things  an  at- 

i5 


CONTENTS. 


CONTENTS. 


XI 


tempt  to  trace  multiplicity  back  to  unity;  Anaximander; 
Anaximenes ;  the  philosophic  significance  of  Ionic  philos- 
ophy  

CHAPTER  V. 

PYTHAGORAS  AND  THE  PYTHAGOREANS.  Pabu- 
lous  stories  of  Pythagoras;  the  Pythagorean  Order;  Aris- 
totle's explanation  of  the  Pythagorean  principle;  numl)er 
both  form  and  substance,  but  the  two  not  yet  definitely 
separated;  mathematics  and  music;  metempsychosis;  the 
Doric  character  of  Pythagoreanism 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  ELKATICS.  Thought  freed  wholly  from  the  finite 
affirms  its  own  infinity;  Xenophanes  declares  that  Gotl  is 
pure  spirit;  the  principle  of  Parmenides  pure  being;  the 
contradiction  between  Being  and  Appearance;  Zeno  the 
inventor  of  dialectic;  his  arguments  against  the  possibil- 
ity of  motion;  the  importance  of  the  Eleatic  principle 
and  its  influence  upon  language 

CHAPTER  VII. 

HERACLITUS.  The  principle  of  the  Becoming;  fire  the 
symbol  of  the  Becoming;  the  consciousness  of  truth  a 
consciousness  of  the  universal ;  the  principle  of  the  Becom- 
ing antithetical  to  that  of  Being,  but  both  alike  valid. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

EMPEDOCLES.  A  mediator  between  God  and  men;  doc- 
trine of  the  four  elements;  two  moving  forces,  love  and 
hate;  belief  in  metempsychosis;  value  of  his  philosophy. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  ATOMISTS.  Leucippus  and  Democritus;  the  full  and 
the  void,  or  atoms  and  empty  space;  atoms  an  object  of 


10 


14 


19 


27 


31 


thought,  not  of  sensuous  experience;  the  Atomistic  philos- 
ophy a  mediation  between  the  principles  of  Heraclitus  and 
of  the  Eleatics 


CHAPTER  X. 

ANAXAGORAS.  Athens  and  Sparta;  the  principle  of  Anax- 
agoras  intelligence  (vovf);  its  mechanical  application; 
individualized  atoms;  Anaxagoras  closes  the  old  period 
and  opens  the  new 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  SOPHISTS.  Influence  of  democracy  upon  philosophy; 
the  true  meaning  of  culture ;  theoretical  and  practical  ego- 
ism; definition  of  the  sophist;  method  of  Greek  education; 
rhetorical  skill  of  the  Sophists;  their  final  criterion  of 
judgment  "particular  subjectivity,"  the  individual  self; 
relativity  of  truth  and  goodness;  the  Sophists  the  Ency- 
clopaedists  of  Greece 

CHAPTER  XII. 

INDIVIDUAL  SOPHISTS.  Protagoras;  his  fundamental 
proposition,  "Man  is  the  measure  of  all  things;"  its  one- 
sided interpretation,  truth  is  relative,  not  absolute;  the 
three  propositions  of  Gorgias;  based  on  the  contradictory 
nature  of  sensuous  phenomena  they  are  unanswerable  from 
that  point  of  view 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

SOCRATES.  The  teaching  of  Socrates  the  positive  comple- 
ment of  the  Sophistic  philosophy;  one  principle  repre- 
sented at  different  stages  of  growth  by  Socrates,  Plato, 
and  Aristotle;  the  philosophy  of  Socrates  closely  connect- 
ed with  his  life;  his  mode  of  instruction;  his  character  a 
model  of  virtue;  his  friendship  for  young  men;  Xanthippe; 
his  inner  absorption;  different  interpretations  of  his  "d»- 


86 


40 


45 


55 


xii  CONTENTS. 

mon,"  or    "genius;"   the    characteristics  of   Greek  and 
modern  consciousness  united  in  Socrates. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  FATE  OF  SOCRATES.  His  trial;  his  fate  the  trag- 
gedy  of  Athens  and  Greece ;  his  last  hours;  Socrates  and 
Aristophanes;  the  teachings  of  Socrates  misunderstood; 
Socrates  the  precursor  and  founder  of  our  moral  view  of 
the  world;  the  truth  of  Subjectivity  not  the  exclusive 
feeling  of  self,  but  the  universal  idea  of  self. 

CHAPTER  XV. 

THE  SOURCES  AND  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE 
SOCRATIC  PHILOSOPHY.  The  union  of  the  ethical 
and  the  scientific,  morality  and  knowledge  ;  an  absolute 
moral  authority  at  the  basis  of  self -consciousness ;  true 
knowledge  derived  from  correct  concepts;  the  Socratic 
method;  the  Socratic  irony;  the  Socratic  Eros;  the  So 
cratic  process  of  induction  and  definition  ;  the  relation 
between  the  universal  concepts  of  Socrates  and  the  Ideas 
of  Plato 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  SOCRATIC  ETHICS.  Virtue  true  knowledge  ;  self- 
knowledge  morally  essential;  the  attainment  of  moral 
independence;  the  concept  of  the  Good  and  its  abstract 
character;  the  office  of  friendship  ;  the  state,  the  family, 
and  the  individual;  an  ideal  view  of  nature  ;  the  Socratic 
trinity,  knowledge,  virtue,  happiness 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

THE  PARTIAL  DISCIPLES  OF  SOCRATES.  Varied 
character  of  the  impression  produced  by  Socrates;  Euclid 
and  the  Megarian  School;  Antisthenes  and  the  Cynics; 
Aristippus  and  the  Cyrenaics;  the  only  complete  Socratist 
Plato 


61 


70 


78 


85 


93 


CONTENTS.  xiii 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

PLATO'S  LIFE  AND  WRITINGS.  Early  influences; 
acquaintance  with  Socrates;  travels;  the  Academy;  per- 
sonal character;  quotation  from  Goethe;  arrangement  of 
his  dialogues io2 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

CHARACTER  OF  PLATO'S  PHILOSOPHY.  Socratic 
basis  of  Plato's  philosophy;  idealism  the  deepest  principle 
of  all  sjieculation ;  form  of  Plato's  exposition;  employ- 
ment of  myths;  knowledge  the  activity  of  the  soul  itself 
in  the  sphere  of  Ideas;  virtue  based  upon  knowledge;  ex- 
altation of  Love ;  Dialectic ;  Idea  of  the  Good  ;  allegory 
of  the  cave ;  meaning  of  cdiication ;  philosophy  the  royal 
science ;  quotation  from  Emerson 109 

CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  PLATONIC  DIALECTIC.  Dialectic  the  science  of  true 
Being,  the  inquiry  into  Ideas;  Ideas  the  eternal  prototypes 
of  Being;  the  laws  of  thought  objective  as  well  as  sub- 
jective;  opinion  the  middle  ground  between  ignorance  and 
knowledge ;  knowledge  as  opposed  to  perception  considered 
in  the  TheiPtetus;  the  ideas  of  movement  and  rest,  of  Being 
and  non-Being,  investigated  in  the  Sophist;  Being  defined 
in  the  Parmenides  as  a  unity  which  includes  multiplicity; 
the  distinction  between  the  absolute  and  the  relative  in 
the  Philebus;  dialectic  inseparably  united  with  moral 
culture;  the  Divine  reason  identified  with  God.        .        .        119 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

THE  PLATONIC  PHYSICS.  Views  of  nature  in  the  Tim- 
aeus;  creation  of  the  world;  the  world-soul;  Hegel's  in- 
terpretation of  Plato's  thought;  matter;  the  human  soul; 
the  doctrine  of  reminiscence;  immortality;  retribution 
after  death;  ethics  the  central  point  of  Platonic  philoso- 
phy  137 


/ 


XIV 


.  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

THE  PLATONIC  ETHICS.  The  good  the  endeavor  of  the 
soul  to  become  like  God ;  philosophy  a  means  of  purifica- 
tion ;  virtue  the  internal  harmony  and  health  of  the  soul ; 
virtue  its  own  reward,  vice  its  own  punishment;  justice 
the  fundamental  principle  of  Plato's  ethics;  his  ideal  Re- 
public; his  communistic  views;  violation  of  subjective 
freedom;  Science  of  the  Beautiful;  the  basis  of  Plato's 
philosophy  the  substantial  Idea ;  the  older  Academy.  147 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

LIFE  AND  WRITINGS  OF  ARISTOTLE.  Early  influ- 
ences; relation  to  Plato;  tutor  of  Alexander  the  Great; 
school  in  Athens;  technical  and  popular  lectures;  style  of 
exposition;  stupendous  achievements  in  science  and  phi- 
losophy; strange  fate  of  his  manuscripts;  Aristotle's 
writings  the  basis  of  Scholasticism  ;  their  influence  upon 
modern  thinkers 1^ 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

GENERAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  ARISTOTELIAN 
PHILOSOPHY.  Philosophy  the  knowledge  of  final 
causes;  Aristotle  not  an  empiricist,  but  unites  scientific 
observation  with  dialectic  ;  his  style  severely  logical ;  the 
Platonic  idea  the  Aristotelian  form  toward  which  the 
sensuous  strives  with  inner  necessity;  Aristotle's  philoso- 
phy original  and  independent,  though  resting  on  a  So- 
cratic-Platonic  basis 170 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

ARISTOTLE'S  LOGIC.  The  formal  activity  of  the  pure 
understanding  described  by  Aristotle  for  all  time  ;  the 
categories;  the  nature  of  the  concept;  the  judgment  and 
the  syllogism;  the  theory  of  scientific  demonstration;  a 
necessary  limit  to  mediatory  knowing;  the  '*  prior  in 
nature  "  and  the  "  prior  for  us; "  proofs  of  probability ;  the 


CONTENTS. 

laws  of  the  understanding  formal  laws,  to  attain  specula- 
tive truth  its  logic  must  become  the  logic  of  Reason. 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 

ARISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  First  Philosophy,  or  Wis- 
dom ;  Being-in-itself  the  common  basis  of  categories  and 
pro[)ositions ;  earlier  theories  examined  and  criticized  by 
Aristotle;  agreement  and  disagreement  with  Plato;  the 
Idea  with  both  related  to  an  objective  reality,  but  Plato 
emphasizes  its  transcendence,  Aristotle  its  immanence  ; 
the  relation  of  form  to  matter;  the  becoming,  or  the 
nature  of  change;  the  substrate  of  change  matter;  matter 
pure  potentiality  ;  motion  the  energy  of  matter ;  motion 
presupposes  a  moving  cause  itself  unmoved,  Absolute 
Spirit;  the  universe  a  continuous  system  of  ascending 
progression ;  Absolute  Good  the  final  end  of  everything  ; 
the  Divine  activity  the  activity  of  pure  thought ;  God  not 
mere  abstract  Being,  but  living,  eternal  Energy. 

CHAPTER  XXYII. 

ARISTOTLE'S  PHYSICS.  Nature  as  a  whole  a  gradual 
overcoming  of  matter  through  form;  motion,  space,  time; 
life  the  jwwor  of  self-motion;  the  soul,  entelechy,  the 
unity  which  embraces  life,  sense-perception,  and  thought ; 
the  vegetative,  the  sensitive,  and  the  cognitive  soul ;  dun- 
amis  &nd  energeia;  free-will;  the  active  and  the  passive 
reason 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

ARISTOTLE'S  ETHICS.  Happiness  the  chief  good  for  man; 
its  highest  realization  participation  in  the  blessed  life  of 
God;  the  moral  significance  of  dunamis  and  energeia; 
natural  tendencies  the  basis  of  morality,  but  morality  their 
transformation  through  rational  insight  and  will ;  the  law 
of  moderation ;  moral  and  intellectual  virtue;  the  relation 
of  happiness  to  self -consciousness ;  the  distinction  between 


XV 


176 


182 


197 


XVI 


CONTENTS. 


happiness  and  pleasure;  the  highest  virtue  an  excellence  of 

the  intellect ;  friendship 210 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

ARISTOTLE'S  POLITICS,  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ART,  ETC. 
Politics  the  presupposition  and  completion  of  ethics;  the 
relation  of  the  family;  prejudice  against  trade  and  traffic; 
opposition  to  Plato's  communism;  Aristotle's  ideal  state; 
his  views  on  education;  wise  men  rather  than  wise  laws; 
the  ultimate  identification  of  politics  with  ethics;  Art 
closely  connected  with  spiritual  development;  purification 
(katharsis) ;  the  Peripatetic  School 


217 


CHAPTER   XXX. 

TRANSITION  TO  THE  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PHILOS- 
OPHY. The  affirmation  of  self-thinking  Reason  the  cul- 
mination of  Greek  philosophy;  thought  the  unity  of  the 
subjective  and  objective  with  Aristotle;  later  schools  neg- 
lect the  objective  and  emphasize  the  subjective ;  abstract 
universality  of  thought  in  Stoicism;  abstract  individuality 
of  feeling  in  Epicureanism;  the  negation  of  this  one- 
sidedness  in  Scepticism;  the  final  attempt  to  solve  the 
dualism  between  subjective  and  objective  in  Neo-Plato- 
nism. 


225 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

STOICISM.  Life  and  character  of  Zeno;  aim  of  Stoic  phil- 
osophy the  exercise  of  virtue;  virtue  depends  upon 
knowledge;  Stoic  view  of  nature  dynamic;  Destiny  and 
Providence;  the  human  will  identified  with  universal  law- 
through  self-conscious  obedience;  pleasure,  not  the  aim, 
but  a  result  of  moral  activity,  different  from  virtue  in 
essence  and  kind;  duty  for  its  own  sake  a  categorical  im- 
perative; the  ideal  wise  man;  self-culture  and  the  social 
well-being  of  the  community;  a  universal  human  brother- 
hood.  


229 


CONTENTS. 


XVll 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

EPICUREANISM.  Personal  influence  of  Epicurus;  the  aim 
of  philosophy  to  promote  happiness;  theoretical  interests 
subordinated  to  practical ;  the  test  of  truth  sensuous  per- 
ception; Epicurus  the  inventor  of  empirical  physics  and 
empirical  psychology;  the  supreme  good  not  to  suffer; 
virtue  never  an  end  in  itself,  but  a  means  to  pleasure; 
the  highest  form  of  social  life  friendship;  one  and  the 
same  principle  viewed  from  opposite  sides  in  Stoicism  and 
Epicureanism 


245 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

SCEPTICISM.  Philosophy  contains  in  itself  the  negative  of 
Scepticism  as  its  own  dialectic ;  the  New  Academy  ;  the 
contrast  between  thought  and  being;  Pyrrho  of  Elis;  the 
ten  tropes;  the  consciousness  of  the  negative  and  the  defi- 
nition of  its  forms  of  the  highest  importance  in  philosophy. 


254 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

ECLECTICISM.  Character  of  Eclecticism ;  Cicero  the  repre- 
sentative lioman  Eclectic;  the  softened  Stoicism  of  Sen- 
eca, Epictetus,  and  Marcus  Aurelius ;  Plutarch's  aim  in 
philosophy  to  create  moral  character;  the  union  of  Hellenic 
philosophy  and  Hebraic  theology  in  Philo. 


261 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

NEO-PLATONISM.  The  aim  of  Neo-Platonism ;  Platonism 
posits  the  One  only  as  the  primitive  source  of  all  being; 
the  One  produces  nous,  pure  reason;  pure  reason  pro- 
duces the  world-soul ;  the  human  soul  once  a  part  of  the 
world-soul;  its  descent  into  the  sensuous  from  which  it 
must  be  freed  to  regain  its  original  purity;  the  perfect  life 
the  life  of  thought;  the  highest  knowledge  the  self-intu- 
ition of  reason  ;  mystical  union  with  God  the  final  aim  of 
philosophy;  the  doctrines  of    Platonism  popularized  by 


XVlll 


CONTENTS. 


Porphyry ;  the  speculative  basis  of  religion  sought  by 
Jamblichus;  Proclus  the  representative  of  Scholasticism 
in  Greek  philosophy ;  the  creation  of  the  finite  and  its  re- 
turn to  the  Infinite  conceived  as  a  spiral  descent  and 
ascent;  the  ways  to  God  three,  love,  truth,  faith;  the 
altar  of  the  Absolute  One  a  luminous  centre  in  whose 
flame  all  is  consumed  and  united ;  Neo-Platonism  a  high 
idealism 265 

CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

THE  CLOSE  OF  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY.  The  great 
work  achieved  by  human  reason  in  Greek  philosophy ;  the 
propaedeutic  office  it  fulfilled  for  Christianity;  its  affirma- 
tion of  the  existence  of  God  and  of  the  soul :  its  identifica- 
tion of  faith  and  knowledge,  God's  revelation  to  man  and 
man's  discovery  of  God 279 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE    CLAIM    AND   CHARM    OF    PHILOSOPHY  %AS   A   STUDY. 

THE  REASON  that  so  many  persons  study  the  less 
important  and  less  attractive  branches  of  knowl- 
edge, while  so  few  turn  their  attention  to  its  supreme 
department,  is  that  a  multitude  perceive  the  value  and 
the  interest  of  the  inferior  parts  where  one  appre- 
ciates the  claim  and  charm  of  the  all-commanding 
whole.  In  the  special  domains  of  study  the  materials 
lie  open  to  the  senses  and  the  understanding,  in 
tangible  form,  to  be  experimentally  dealt  with,  and 
to  be  mastered  by  efforts  easily  made,  little  by  little. 
But  in  that  universal  field  of  principles,  laws  and 
processes,  which  philosophy  covers,  the  appeal  is  made 
to  the  reflective  faculties  and  speculative  insight ;  and 
these,  with  the  vast  majority  of  persons,  are  not 
keenly  alive  but  undeveloped  and  disinclined  to  exer- 
tion. 

For  every  student  of  philosophy,  without  doubt, 
there  are  a  hundred  students  of  botany.  Aside  from 
utility,  there  is  a  strong  attraction  to  the  investiga- 
tion of  the  structure  and  life  of  plants  and  flowers ; 
for  they  comprise  one  of  tlie  chief  domains  of  material 
beauty.  But,  both  in  dignity  of  range  and  intensity 
of    interest,  how  incomparably  superior    is    the    study 

xlx 


XX 


A   STUDY    OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


of  metaphysics ;  since  this  explores  the  very  ground 
and  nature  and  operation  of  beauty  itself,  not  merely 
in  its  physical  manifestations  but  also  in  its  intel- 
lectual and  moral  forms,  and  in  its  constituent  es- 
sence as  the  living  revelation  of  the  perfection  of 
God! 

So  there  ^re  a  thousand  avid  devourers  of  poetry 
and  romantic  literature  where  there  is  one  earnest 
reader  of  philosophical  dissertations  and  treatises.  This 
is  because  the  pictures  and  narration  of  the  former 
delight  the  craving  sensuous  powers  of  the  mind,  and 
exact  no  costly  effort;  while  the  profound  discrimi- 
nation and  sustained  stretch  of  the  latter  overtask 
the  attention  and  interest  of  all  except  serious  and 
robust  spirits.  And  yet  what  an  immense  advantage 
the  ripe  philosopher  has  over  the  mere  poet  or  roman- 
ticist, in  the  solid  service  and  joy  yielded  by  the 
exercise  of  their  respective  gifts  and  discipline  !  For 
while  poetry  pleases,  with  the  rich  loveliness  and 
freedom  of  its  productions,  philosophy,  not  content 
with  an  empty  enjoyment  of  them,  lays  bare  the 
innermost  secrets  of  those  productions,  and  of  their 
origin,  by  expounding  the  fundamental  nature  and 
offices  of  the  imagination  and  rhythm  and  metaphor, 
whereby  their  matter  is  given  and  their  spells  are 
woven.  All  other  modes  of  inquisitive  spiritual  activ- 
ity are  partial  and  preliminary ;  philosophy  alone  final 
or  complete. 

The  etymological  force  of  the  word  philosophy  is 
the  love  of  wisdom.  Seizing  this,  we  grasp  a  de- 
scriptive phrase,   not  a  definition;  we  take  possession 


INTRODUCTION. 


xxi 


of  the  practical  substance  but  miss  the  dialectic  es- 
sence. Nevertheless  this  fructiferous  ethical  aspect  is 
almost  as  valuable  as  the  constitutive  procedure  itself. 
For  the  keenest  metaphysical  analysis  or  synthesis  is 
no  more  than  a  vacant  gymnastic  of  abstractions,  if 
it  do  not  begin  and  end  in  the  love  of  wisdom. 
Wisdom  is  knowledge  enriching  experience  with 
blessed  fruits.  Wisdom  is  assimilative  insight  in 
fruition  at  its  goal.  And  to  the  pursuit  of  this 
man  has  an  integral  vocation  lodged  in  the  generic 
core  of  his  being.  Luminous  demo'  ration  of  the 
accuracy  of  this  statement  is  easy,  and  may  be  given 
in  a  single  sentence. 

As  the  transcendent  paragon  of  animals,  the  only 
one  who  caps  the  climax  of  animality  with  the  sur- 
passing crown  of  rationality,  nian  fulfills  his  destiny 
by  the  progressive  attainment  of  applied  and  enjoyed 
truth.  And  that  is  the  real  definition  of  wisdom. 
What  is  wisdom  but  truth  happily  realized  in  a  liv- 
ing experience  of  its  uses  ?  All  knowledge  that  falls 
short  of  this  is  mere  information  in  a  storehouse. 
Wisdom  is  the  term  or  end  in  which  alone  a  rational 
nature  reposes  with  satisfaction.  Familiarity  with  it, 
according  to  a  wonderful  passage  of  Scripture,  is 
friendship  with  that  Divine  Playfellow  whose  delight 
is  in  the  children  of  men.  Thus  understood,  is  it 
not  obvious  that  the  study  of  philosophy  presents  both 
a  claim  and  a  charm  of  the  supreme  order? 

But  let  us  leave  the  surface  of  description,  and 
enter  the  depth  of  definition.  What  is  philosophy? 
It  is  that  form  of  thinking  wherein  all  the  parts  imply 


XXll 


A  STUDY  OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


one  another,  and   every  part  implies  the   whole.     It  is 
that  kind  of  knowledge  which  has  its  presuppositions 
in  itself,   and  is,   therefore,   independent  of    all  other 
knowledge,   while    all    other    knowledge    is  dependent 
on  it.     It  is  the  self-seizure  of  the  idea  in  reflective 
consciousness.     It  is  the  science  of  self-activity.     It  is 
the  pure  search  after  the  First   Principle,  the  finding 
of  it,  and  the  deduction  thence  of  all  else.     It  takes 
for  its  province    those    elements  and    methods    which 
are  common  to    all    the    special  sciences,  and    groups 
them  in  a  sovereign   unification.      Hence,   with  entire 
justice,  it  has  generally  been  designated  the  science  of 
sciences,   queen   of  all  the   rest. 

The  definition  of  philosophy  given  by  the  great  mas- 
ters  of  thinking  are  all  in  substantial  agreement  under 
their  verbal  differences.     For  example,  Ueberweg  form- 
ulates it  as  the  Science  of  Principles;   Fichte,  as  the 
Science  of  Knowledge;  Rosmini,  as  the  Science  of  Ulti- 
mate  Grounds.      In   response  to  every   why  asked   by 
the  'human    mind   the  philosopher  undertakes  to  reach 
an  answer  so  comprehensive  and  final  that  it  cannot 
be    transcended.      The    aim    of    philosophical    study, 
then,  is  the  conquest  of  truth  in  its  universal  essence, 
aspects,  relations,   source  and  end.     And  so  it  is  the 
specialty  of  its  royal  prerogative   to   forerun,   pervade 
and    follow,   all    the    other    sciences    which  are    sub- 
divided under  its  universality,  and  subordinated   to  its 
authority.     Its   cultivators   study   the   nature  and   pro- 
vidence of  God,  in  theology;   the  character  and  exper- 
ience of  man,  in  psychology;  the  phenomena  ard  laws 
of  the  universe,  in  cosmology;  and  the  varied  treasures 


INTKODUCTION. 


xxni 


of  the  other  special  domains  of  knowledge,  under 
their  several  rubrics.  In  all  these  departments  the 
laws  of  consciousness,  observation,  cognition,  discrimi- 
nation, classification,  congruity,  are  the  same;  and  they 
can  be  furnished  -by  philosophy  alone.  It  is,  then, 
plainly,  unrivaled  in  its  importance. 

Strenuous  efforts  have  recently  been  made  in  several 
elaborate  lectures  to  show  that  ethical  science  does 
not  depend  either  on  religion  or  philosophy,  but  is 
every  way  competent  to  itself.  This  is  a  shallow  con- 
fusion of  thought,  and  an  unwarrantable  use  of  lan- 
guage. The  case  may  be  conclusively  stated  in  a  nut- 
shell thus :  Philosophy  is  the  science  of  ultimate 
grounds.  Morality  is  the  science  of  right  and  wrong 
in  human  conduct.  Every  concept  that  enters  into  it, 
such  as  causation,  duty,  conscience,  motive,  sanction, 
vice,  crime,  penalty,  derives  its  significance  from  cer- 
tain principles,  theoretical  and  practical.  If  moral 
science  furnishes  these  principles  from  its  own  resources, 
it  is  itself  a  philosophy.  If  it  looks  elsewhere  for 
them,  it  presupposes  a  foundation  deeper  and  broader 
than  itself.  By  consequence,  ethics  necessarily  rests  on 
philosophy. 

There  is  another  consideratioil  which  places  the 
importance  and  the  attractiveness  of  this  study  in  a 
still  more  striking  light.  The  highest  intellectual  power 
and  dignity  of  which  our  nature  is  capable  can  be 
realized  only  through  the  cultivation  of  philosophy, 
which  deals  directly  with  the  sublimest  thoughts  con- 
ceivable by  any  minds  created  or  uncreated.  Consider, 
for  instance,  the  content  of  the  idea  of  absolute  per- 


XXIV 


A    STUDY    OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


INTRODUCTION. 


XXV 


fection  indicated   by  the  word   God.     Tlie   meaning  of 
this   word,  the  greatest   in  human   language,  is  a  com- 
pletely self-determined  Person,  who  is  a  free  infinitude 
of  love,  wisdom,  power,  holiness  and  bliss,  forever  giv- 
ing  himself  to  a  boundless  number  of  persons,  whom 
he  creates  for  the  purpose  of  multiplying  his  perfec- 
fection  by  them!      Such    is    the    developed  Christian 
idea  of  God.     Pure  act   is  a  self-distinguishing  unity, 
which   has  no  potentialities.     That  is,  all  possible  pre' 
suppositions  are  actualized  in  it.     This  is  at  once  the 
realized  experience  of  God  and  the  offered  destiny  of 
man.      Being    is    knovvableness;    and     man   is    a    free 
power  of  determining   it   for   himself.     His  determina- 
tions of  pure  being  are  ideas,  which  are  universal  and 
infinite  in   their  nature.     There  is  nothing  real  apart 
from   thought ;  for  the  thinking  of  God  originates  all 
that  is.     And   thought  can   comprehend  all  else  while 
nothing  else  can    comprehend    thought.      Knowledge, 
without  which   ignorance  could   not  be  known,  is  par- 
ticipation of  omniscience;   as   duration,  without   which 
time  could  not  be  known,  is  participation  of  eternity. 
And    knowledge    is    possible    only  as    the   progressive 
actualization  in  us  of  a  self-consciousness  in  itself  com- 
plete, and  in  itself  including  the  universe  as  its  object. 
That  is  to  say,  all  true  knowledge  in   man  is  his  par- 
ticipation of  the  creative   thinking  of  God.     Thus  we 
become,  as  the  New  Testament   says,  '*  partakers  of  the 
divine  nature.^'    What  other  dignity  is  worthy  of  com- 
parison   with   this?    But  clearly  it  cannot  be  bestowed 
by  any  degree  of  familiarity  with  the  physical  sciences, 
or  with  the  political  sciences,  or  with  historic  or  liter- 


ary lore.     It  is  to  be  achieved  by  the  development  of 
the  spirit   in   the   study  of  philosophy. 

It  is  astonishing  how  materialistic  science  is  over- 
rated and  ideal  philosophy  underrated  at  the  pres- 
ent time.  It  is  as  if  one  should  put  a  high  value 
on  a  pebble  because  he  can  clutch  it,  and  despise 
a  star  because  he  cannot.  A  popular  declaimer, 
whose  name  rings  through  A  erica,  says,  ''Darwin 
contented  himself  with  giving  to  his  fellowmen  the 
greatest  and  the  sublimest  truths  that  man  has 
spoken  since  lips  uttered  speech  I"  What  are  those 
truths  ?  That  all  through  nature  there  is  a  struggle 
for  existence,  from  the  lowest  vermin  to  the  highest 
animals;  and  that  in  that  struggle  a  law  of  natural 
selection  causes  the  survival  of  those  best  ntted  to 
their  environment.  Whatever  value  may  be  assigned 
to  these  formulas,  surely  they  cannot,  for  purity, 
grandeur,  beauty,  inspiring  power,  stand  in  any  com- 
parison with  the  cardinal  doctrines  of  philosophy, 
such  as  the  perfection  of  God,  the  infinity  of  intel- 
lect, the  immortality  of  the  soul,  the  absolute  au- 
thority of  right.  The  weightiest  sentences  Darwin 
ever  wrote  are  utterly  insignificant  when  set  along 
side  of  any  one  of  hundreds  of  sentences  which  may 
be  quoted  from  the  really  sovereign  thinkers  repre- 
sented by  Plato,  Aristotle,  Augustine,  Aquinas,  Leib- 
nitz, Kant,  Hegel. 

'No  one  able  to  appreciate  them  can  pay  even 
passing  attention  to  such  statements  as  the  following, 
without  seeing  that  the  study  of  philosophy  is  the 
sublimest   and   worthiest  of  all  studies.     Infinite  being 


XXVI 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


is  the  object  of  thought,  and  personal  spirit  is  the 
thinking  subject  capable  of  distinguishing  it  into  in- 
finite determinations.  Being  is  one  and  personalities 
are  innumerable :  but  the  whole  of  the  object  is  for 
every  one  of  the  subjects.  Consciousness  is  a  poten- 
tial infinite ;  because  it  cannot  be  limited  by  any- 
thing of  which  it  is  unconscious.  Therefore  it  is 
exclusively  self -limited ;  and  self -limitation  is  the 
definition  of  the  true  infinite.  Consciousness  is  a 
self -determinable  mirror  which  becomes  whatever  it 
reflects.  For  certainly  nothing  can  enter  conscious- 
ness save  as  this  from  its  own  substance  creates  a 
representation  of  that  which  enters  it.  Here  is  mat- 
ter for  one  to  muse  over  with  worshiping  wonder  as 
long  as  he  lives. 

Finally,  in  illustration  of  the  claim  and  charm  of 
philosophy  as  a  study,  we  must  say  that  it  is  not 
only  the  most  comprehensive  and  exalted  of  all  studies, 
but  it  is  also  the  purest,  the  freest,  the  most  beau- 
tiful and  delightful.  The  subject  is  self-contained 
and  the  student  is  self-sufficing.  Stimulants  and  aids 
may  be  attained  abroad,  from  books  and  from  teachers. 
But  all  the  essential  data  are  in  the  student  himself. 
The  learning  faculties,  being,  nature,  life,  humanity, 
God,  are  all  within  his  immediate  reach,  just  as  they 
were  with  Fichte  or  with  Pythagoras.  And  great  attain- 
ments were  as  easy  for  the  ancient  masters  of  insight 
as  they  are  for  the  latest  student,  because  all  that 
they  did  for  themselves  he  must  now  do  for  himself 
in  his  own  psychical  work-shop.  If  the  deepest 
thoughts  have   been  thought  many  times  already  it  is 


INTRODUCTION. 


XX  vn 


none  the  less  necessary  that  each  new  comer  think 
them  again.  He  never  can  obtain  them  from 
another. 

And  nothing  can  be  imagined  cleaner,  lovelier,  or 
more  precious,  than  the  task  whose  triumphant  ac- 
complishment initiates  the  performer,  even  in  this  dim 
world,  into  that  sacred  hierarchy  of  intelligences  who 
contemplate  the  divine  archetypes.  The  differential 
and  integral  calculus  is  the  science  of  continuous 
being  and  its  determinations,  in  the  mathematical  or 
formal  order.  The  dialectic  is  the  science  of  contin- 
uous being  and  its  determinations,  in  the  moral  or 
substantial  order.  Leibnitz  began  the  unification  of 
these  two  and  Swedenborg  wished  to  continue  it. 
When  some  inspired  genius,  in  the  future,  shall 
complete  this  unification  of  the  mathematical  and  the 
metaphysical  dialectic,  and  simplify  it  for  popular 
communication,  the  epoch  of  illumination  and  re- 
demption for  which  travailing  humanity  waits  so  long 
will  dawn. 

In  the  meantime  what  matchless  privileges  wait  on 
the  secluded  employment  of  the  philosopher !  That 
the  study  of  metaphysics  is  repulsively  dry,  barren, 
knotty  [and  wearisome,  is  a  vulgar  prejudice  of  ig- 
norance and  frivolity.  Earnestness  and  patience  will 
find  it  no  more  difficult  than  the  other  chief  disci- 
plines of  wisdom.  It  deals  with  the  ideal  realities  of 
good,  truth,  right,  use,  beauty,  immortality,  in  their 
origins  and  ultimates.  And  these  are  the  substantial 
thoughts  of  God  by  whose  means  the  thinking  sub- 
ject,— under  the  lights  of  nature,  reason,  and  divinity, 


XXVlll 


A    STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


—changes  itself  from  natural  shadow  through   rational 
reflection  into  divine  substance. 

This  is  a  province  of   culture   preeminently  suitable 
for  women,  it  is  so  pure  a  domain  of  beauty. 

How  charming  is  divine  philosophy  I 

Not  harsh  and  crabbed  as  dull  fools  suppose; 

But  musical  as  is  Apollo's  lute, 

And  a  perpetual  feast  of  nectared  sweets 

Where  no  crude  surfeit  reigns. 

The  accomplished  and  amiable  writer  of  the  present 
work  herein  sets  an  excellent  example  which  it  is  to  be 
hoped  a  multitude  of  her  sisters  will  be  quick  to  follow. 
Nothing  can  become  them   better  or  profit  them  more. 
It  is  an   employment   without  any  compromises  either 
of    modesty,   refinement  or  aspiration.      No   perishable 
tpols  are  needed.     No  filthy  experiments  with  furnaces 
and    retorts  or  earths  and   smuts  and  moulds  and  rots 
are   called   for.     And    however   arduously   the   workers 
toil   they   make   no   noise   and    leave   no  chips  or  dust 
or  slag.     The   material    is   spirit,    the  labor   is   silence, 
the  course  is  intelligence  and   affection,  the  product  is 
wisdom  and  character,  the  path  of  advance  is  infinity, 
the  goal  is  God.     And  if  that  goal  be  a  retreating  one 
the  pursuer  carries  at  every  step  a  substantial  reflex  of 
it  in  his  own  breast. 

William  Rounseville  Alger. 


A  STUDY  OF  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER    I. 

philosophy  and  history. 

rriO  understand  what  is  meant  by  philosophy  we  must 
-■^  understand  what  is  meant  by  development,  that  it 
implies  not  only  potentiality  but  reality.  One  may  say 
that  man  is  reasonable  by  nature,  but  in  the  child,  reason 
is  a  possibility  not  yet  realized.  Education  must  develop 
and  bring  it  to  consciousness.  Our  potentialities  as 
spiritual  beings  are  infinite,  but  are  transformed  into 
realities  only  through  an  active  cooperation  which  makes 
them  objects  of  conscious  endeavor  and  aspiration.  As 
the  seed  under  favorable  conditions  produces  the  plant, 
the  blossom,  the  fruit,  and  returns  again  to  seed,  the 
spiritual  germ  in  man  expands,  unfolds,  and  produces  its 
fruit.  But  here  the  comparison  ceases,  for  the  spiritual 
fruit  becomes  matter  for  a  higher  form  of  growth,  a 
higher  grade  of  development.  Each  age  inherits  the 
culture  and  experience  of  preceding  ages,  and  though  a 
particular  race  or  people  may  retrograde  by  reason  of 
external  conflicts  or  inner  exhaustion,  humanity  as  a 
whole  steadily  and  consistently  develops  its  latent  possi- 
bilities. Progress  is  not  in  a  straight  line,  but  in  a 
series  of  widening  circles.     *'  Philosophy  looks  through 

1 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


the  totality  of  circles,  comprehending  in  a  progressive 
process  of  knowledge  the  progessive  process  of  culture/' 
says  Kuno  Fischer. 

What  else,  then,  is  philosophy,  except  a  history  of 
philosophy?  Are  we  to  look  for  reason  only  in  the 
products  of  nature,  and  not  in  those  of  spirit  ?  He  who 
considers  the  diiferent  systems  of  philosophy  as  mere  acci- 
dents instead  of  a  necessity,  doubts  the  rule  of  reason. 
If  the  universe  is  divinely  governed,  each  great  system  of 
thought  must  possess  historic  worth  and  "historic  truth. 
For  the  object  of  knowledge  in  philosophy  is  the  human 
spirit  itself,  and  truth  is  a  living  process  which  develops 
and  advances  in  the  civilizing  course  of  humanity. 

^*But  does  not  philosophy  embrace  in  its  problems 
something  more  than  the  human  spirit?''  asks  Kuno 
Fischer.  We  call  it  self-knowledge ;  it  calls  itself 
knowledge  of  the  world.  Only  a  few  times  in  the 
course  of  its  history  has  the  Delphic  word,  ''Know 
thyself,''  appeared  at  the  head  of  philosophy,  as  the 
first  of  all  problems.  Whenever  this  has  happened 
there  has  come  a  turning  point  in  its  history ;  as  with 
the  Socratic  epoch  in  ancient  times,  the  Kantian  in 
modern  times.  These  epochs  would  not  so  clearly  illu- 
minate the  way  on  all  sides  if  they  did  not  bring  to 
light  the  nature  of  the  matter  in  its  whole  extent. 

Human  self-knowledge  is  not  only  the  deepest  but 
the  most  comprehensive  of  all  problems,  including  in 
itself,  if  carefully  analyzed,  knowledge  of  the  world. 
Does  this  statement  appear  incredible  ?  Surelv  it  is 
not  difficult  to  see  that  the  world  as  an  object  of  thought 
is  only  possible  under  the  condition  of  a  self-conscious 


PHILOSOPHY   AND   HISTORY. 


being  who  makes  it  such  an  object,  such  a  problem. 
Here  we  reach  the  great  riddle  of  things.  What  is  the 
world  independent  of  our  thought,  our  representation 
of  it  ?  Is  there  any  knowledge  of  it  distinct  from  and 
independent  of  human  self-knowledge?  Is  not  philos- 
ophy the  self-knowledge  attained  by  the  human  race 
in  its  successive  stages  of  development  ?  Does  it  not 
seek  to  comprehend  the  innermost  motive  of  every 
form  of  culture,  to  make  clear  to  the  human  spirit 
its  own  strivings  ? 

What  lies  in  the  act  of  self-knowledge  applied  to 
our  individual  consciousness  ?  We  draw  back  from  the 
external  world,  make  the  life  we  have  hitherto  lived 
an  object  of  reflection,  regard  it  critically  and  perceive 
its  defects.  Can  we  return  to  the  old  condition  ?  No, 
we  are  freed  from  it  in  a  measure,  we  are  no  longer 
what  we  were ;  earnest  self-knowledge  is  a  renewal 
and  transformation  of  our  life.  It  is  a  crisis,  a  turn- 
ing-point in  our  spiritual  career,  preparing  us  for  new 
interests  and  higher  forms  of  culture  than  those  we 
have  outlived.  We  begin  to  philosophize  so  far  as  we 
are  able,  and  our  philosophy  is  a  fruit  of  our  culture, 
however  ripe  or  unripe.  This  is  the  significance  of 
self-knowledge  in  the  experience  and  development  of 
individual  life.  Similar  crises  occur  in  the  collected 
life  of  humanity,  and  are  expressed  in  the  great  systems 
of  philosophy,  which  work  as  historic  factors  in  the 
culture  of  successive  ages,  defining  and  influencing 
progress,  identical  on  one  side  with  the  spirit  of  their 
time,  but  introducing,  on  the  other,  a  new  form  of 
development. 


CHAPTER  II. 


CHARACTER   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 

/^NE  people  above  all  was  philosophic  in  antiquity, 
^-^^    the    Greek.     Their  philosophy  sprang  from   the 
basis  of  their  national   life,  and   can   only  be  compre- 
bended   by  studying  the  peculiarities  of  Greek  being. 
They  received  the  beginnings  of  their  religion  and  their 
culture  from  Asia  and  from  Egypt,  but  so  transformed 
and   enriched   the  foreign   material   that  all  which   we 
recognize  and  value  in   it  is  essentially   Greek.     They 
breathed   into  it  the  breath   of  spiritual   life,  the  soul 
of  freedom  and  beauty.     They  even  forgot,  ungratefully, 
the  foreign   sources  of  their  culture,  and  looked  upon 
It  wholly  as  their  own  merit  and  achievement.     Hegel 
calls   the   Greek   spirit  the  plastic  artist,    forming   the 
stone  into  a  work  of  art.     The  stone  does  not  remain 
stone  in  this  formative  process,  but  is  transfigured  by  the 
idea    shining    through     it;    nevertheless,    without    the 
stone,  the  artist  could  not  embody  the  idea.     Herein  lies 
the  distinctive  character  of  Greek  being,  that  unbroken 
unity  of  the  spiritual  and  the  natural,  which  constitutes 
at  once  its  glory  and  its  limitation. 

Breaking  through  the  Oriental  dependence  on  the 
powers  of  nature,  the  Greek  subordinates  the  sensuous 
to  a  tool  and  sign  of  the  spiritual,  and  supplants  his 
own  natural  condition  by  the  higher  one  of  a  morally 


CHARACTER  OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY.  5 

free,  beautiful  human  culture.     The  happiness  he  strives 
for  he   wishes  to    attain  through   the   development   of 
his  bodily  and  spiritual  powers,  through  vigorous  par- 
ticipation in  the  thoughts  and  activities  of  his  fellow- 
citizens.     His  morality  rests  upon  the  basis  of  natural 
disposition.     From  the   old   Greek   point   of  view  man 
is  not  required  to  renounce  his  physical  desires  and  be 
changed  in  the  depths  of  his  being  ;  the  natural  inclina- 
tions as  such   are  justified,    virtue   consists  in  the   de- 
velopment of  every  faculty,  and  the  highest  moral  law 
is  to  follow  the  course  of  nature  freely  and  reasonably, 
observing  the  right  measure  and  proportion.     The  cus- 
tom of  his  people  is  to  the  Greek  the   highest   moral 
authority,  life  in  and  for  the  State  the  highest  duty  ; 
beyond  these  limits  he  scarcely  recognizes  moral  obliga- 
tion.     This   very  limitation,  the   narrowness   of   Greek 
relations  and  sympathies,    was   fitted   to  produce  great 
individualities,  classic  characters. 

The  stage  of  Greek  consciousness  is  the  stage  of 
beauty.  There  is  no  contradiction  present  between  the 
sensuous  appearance  and  the  idea ;  one  completely  real- 
izes and  interprets  the  other.  Thus  the  Greeks  remain 
unrivaled  masters  for  all  time  in  sculpture,  in  the 
epic,  the  classic  form  of  architecture.  Religion  and 
art  are  identified.  ^*The  Greek  divine  service,"  says 
Mr.  Denton  J.  Snider,  ''  was  an  act  of  the  poetic  im- 
agination ;  worship  was  a  poem  conceived,  if  not  sung ; 
therein  was  the  worshiper  elevated  into  the  presence 
of  the  beautiful  God,  into  whose  image  he  was  to  trans- 
form himself,  and  be  a  living  embodiment  of  the  Re- 
ligion of  Beauty." 


b  A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 

This  plastic  spirit  characterizes  Greek  activity  even 
in   the   domain   of   philosophy.      Nothing  is   forced   or 
artificial   in  the  development   of  its  problems;  nowhere 
is   there  a   break   in   the   advancing  course  of  ideas;  a 
connection  of  the  most  vital  kind  unites  the  members 
of  this  far-extended  series  into  one  harmonious  whole. 
''That  plastic  quiet  with  which  a  Parmenides,  a  Plato, 
an    Aristotle,   treat  the   most   difficult  problems/'   says 
Zeller,    ''  is  the  same  thing  in   the  domain  of  scientific 
thinking  that  we  call  the  classic  style  in  that   of  art." 
The  Greek  philosopher  directs  himself  simply  to  the 
matter,  and  accepts  what  appears  to  him  as  true  and 
real.      This   immediate   relation   to   the    object    of    his 
thought  was  only  possible  because  it  proceeded  from  a 
more  imperfect  experience,    a  more   limited    knowledge 
of  nature,  a  weaker  development  of  inner  life,  than  our 
own.      The    modern   philosopher    has    to    deal   with   a 
greater  mass  of  facts  and  laws,  facts  carefully  examined, 
laws  strictly  defined.     Hence  his  critical  attitude.     He 
begins  with  doubt,  and  is  forced  by  his  starting-point 
to  keep  the  possibility  and  the  conditions  of  knowledge 
in  continual  sight. 

At  the  beginning  of  Greek  philosophy,  it  is  the 
external  world  which  first  draws  attention  to  itself,  and 
suggests  the  question  as  to  its  causes.  What  lies  at 
the  basis  of  all  the  changes  which  the  senses  perceive  ? 
What  is  the  substance  out  of  which  the  world  is  made  ? 
This  question  is  followed  by  another.  How  is  the 
world  made?  These  two  taken  together  express  the 
main  problem  of  Greek  philosophy:  How  do  matter 
and  form  unite  ?  The  character  of  the  answers  I  shall 
seek  to  interpret  in  the  following  pages. 


CHAPTER  III. 


PRE-SOPHISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 


THIS  division  includes  the  Ionian  philosophers, 
Thales,  Anaximander,  and  Anaximenes ;  Pytha- 
goras and  his  disciples ;  the  Eleatics,  Xenophanes,  Par- 
menides,  and  Zeno  ;  Heraclitus,  Empedocles,  Leucippus, 
Democritus,  and  Anaxagoras. 

Greek  philosophy  began  in  the  sixth  century  B.  C, 
born  in  the  Ionian  colonies  of  Asia  Minor  at  the  time  of 
their  political  decadence.  KroDsus  and  the  Lydians  had 
first  imperiled  Ionian  freedom  ;  later,  the  Persians  de- 
stroyed it  wholly.  Dissatisfied  with  the  world  of  reality 
which  lay  in  ruins,  thought  fled  to  an  ideal  realm  of  its 
own  creation. 

Perception  of  nature  is  the  basis  from  which  this  early 
philosophy  proceeds.  The  universal  is  conceived  in  a 
material  form,  as  water,  air,  etc.  But  water  as  the  fund- 
amental element  of  things,  the  primitive  substance  un- 
derneath nature's  manifold  changes,  can  only  be  an  object 
of  thought,  not  of  sensuous  perception.  To  say  that  all 
things  are  made  of  water  is  to  say  also  that  these  many 
appearances  of  nature  perceived  by  the  senses  proceed 
from  one  cause.  Multiplicity  is  traced  back  to  unity ; 
the  Many  are  comprehended  in  the  One. 

Thought  makes  a  farther  advance  when  the  Pythago- 
reans conceive  the  essence  of  things  as  number.    Without 

7 


8 


A    STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


matter  there  could  not  be  number,  since  we  could  have 
neither  extension  nor  division  in  space  and  time.  But 
number  itself  is  immaterial,  lifted  above  the  world  of  the 
senses,  though  not  independent  of  it  wholly. 

The  Eleatics  go  a  step  farther;  abstract  their  principle 
from  everything  material,  and  call  it  pure  Being.  Change 
is  impossible,  they  say  ;  how  is  anything  to  pass  from  an 
unchangeable  to  a  changeable  condition  ?  How  did  the 
world  begin  ?  Beginning  implies  movement ;  how  coukl 
the  immovable  move  ?  Fixing  their  gaze  oh  the  unity  of 
thought,  they  deny  the  multiplicity  of  nature,  deny 
nature  altogether.  They  first  make  the  great  discov- 
ery that  contradictions  are  contained  in  our  natural 
thinking,  that  the  sensuous  representation  of  the  world 
is  not  the  true  one — a  discovery  rich  in  results  for  all 
time. 

Heraclitus  regards  the  problem  from  another  point  of 
view.  To  him,  also,  it  is  incomprehensible  that  the  un- 
changeable should  change.  But  he  does  not  therefore 
deny  change  ;  he  affirms  it  as  the  fact  of  all  facts,  and 
believes  that  it  is  eternal,  that  **  everything  flows,"  that 
the  essence  of  things  is  itself  the  Becoming.  He  makes 
energy  the  primal  principle  instead  of  the  Ionic  matter. 
Becoming  is  the  unity  of  being  and  non- being  ;  some- 
thing is,  and  at  the  same  time  is  not.  The  whole  world 
of  experience  is  in  a  state  of  transition  from  one  condi- 
tion to  another.  All  finite  existences  are  changing,  pass- 
ing away.  Transitoriness  belongs  to  the  nature  of  finite 
being.  Hence  the  Eleatics  denied  it,  denied  the  world  of 
matter,  and  affirmed  the  reality  of  the  infinite  —  the 
world  of  thought.     The  principle  of  Heraclitus  implies. 


PRE-SOPHISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 


9 


on  the  other  hand,  the  infinite  within  the  finite,  as  the 
divine  activity  producing  change. 

Empedocles  and  the  Atomists  offer  another  explana- 
tion. Matter  itself  is  considered  as  the  abiding,  the 
unchanging.  What  we  call  change  is  produced  by  the 
union  and  separation  of  numberless  primordial  elements 

or  atoms. 

Anaxagoras  took  the  next  step  in  philosophy.  Whence 
come  the  order  and  arrangement  of  the  world,  if  the 
atoms  are  only  drawn  together  by  a  mechanical,  blind 
movement  ?  What  is  it  that  directs  the  movement  ?  It 
must  be  an  intelligent  principle,  says  Anaxagoras.  The 
essence  of  the  world  is  mind,  not  matter. 

Here  the  first  period  of  Greek  philosophy  closes.  The 
problems  of  nature  have  been  so  far  investigated  that 
from  their  solutions  spirit  proceeds  as  the  moving,  direct- 
ing thought — self -creative  activity. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE   IONIC   PHILOSOPHERS. 


rpHALES.— With  Thales  we  begin  the  history  of  phi- 
-■-  losophy.  He  was  a  native  of  Miletus,  born  about 
640  B.  C,  a  contemporary  of  Krcesus  and  Solon.  His 
position  at  the  head  of  the  Seven  Wise  Men  proves  that 
he  was  greatly  esteemed  for  practical  wisdom  by  his  fel- 
low-citizens. He  is  supposed  to  have  studied  mathematics 
in  Egypt,  and  was  the  first  to  teach  geometry  in  Greece. 
Diogenes  Laertius  relates  an  anecdote  illustrating  his 
interest  in  astronomy.  Looking  up  to  observe  the  stars, 
he  fell  into  a  ditch,  and  the  people  mocked  him  that, 
seeking  to  comprehend  heavenly  things,  he  could  not  see 
what  lay  at  his  feet.  This  is  an  old  version  of  the  com- 
mon reproach  brought  against  philosophers  and  philoso- 
phy. One  critic  remarks  that  the  mockers  could  not 
stumble  and  fall  into  the  ditch  because  they  lay  there 
already  and  never  looked  upward. 

Thales  left  no  writings.  All  we  know  of  his  philoso- 
phy is  the  proposition  that  all  things  arise  from  and 
consist  of  water.  Aristotle  suggests  that  Thales  was  led 
to  this  thought  by  observing  that  dampness  belongs  to 
the  nature  of  seeds  and  nutriment ;  that  warmth  itself 
comes  from  moisture,  and  thereby  life  itself.  So  far  as 
we  know,  Thales  did  little  more  than  enunciate  his  prin- 
ciple.    Wherein,  then,  lies  his  philosophic  significance  ? 

10 


THE    IONIC    PHILOSOPHERS. 


11 


Why  does  philosophy  begin  with  Thales  ?    Because  he 
first  makes  the  attempt  to  explain  natural  appearances 
from  their  universal  ground.     He  draws  back  from  the 
world  of  nature,  where  he  sees  only  change  and  multipli- 
city, and  seeks  to  reduce  all  things  to  one  simple  sub- 
stance, uncreated  and  imperishable.     This  substance  he 
calls  water,  giving  it  a  physical  form,  but  meaning  by  it 
the  essence  of  things,  that  which  is  not  perceived  by  the 
senses,  the  unity  underlying  multiplicity.    It  wa^  a  grand 
aftirmation  of  the  human  spirit,  this  affirmation  of  the 
One  made  by  Thales  in  that  old  Greek  world  where  the 
very  gods  had  a  theogony  and  were  many  and  changing. 
Anaxmander.-An^ximandev  of  Miletus,  some  years 
younger  than  Thales,  appears  to  have  been  his  friend  and 
disciple.     He  was  the  first  to  apply  the  word  principle 
(apxv)  to  the  original  essence  which  he  assumed.     What 
he  meant  by  this  essence  which  he  defined  as  -  unlim- 
ited,    eternal   and   unconditioned,"   is  not   clear  to  his 
commentators.      It   was  neither   -water   nor   air,"   but 
-contains  in  itself  and  rules  everything,"  and  is  -di- 
vine, immortal,  imperishable."     The  parts  of  the  infinite 
change,  but  it  is  itself  unchangeable.     It  is  farther  said 
to  be  infinite  in  magnitude,  but  not  in  number.     Anaxi- 
mander  affirmed   its    absolute    continuity,   but    not   its 
absolute   discretion,   as  was   afterwards    maintained    by 
Anaxagoras,    Empedocles,   and  the  Atomists.     Aristotle 
is  supposed  to  have  been  alluding  to  Anaximander  when 
he  speaks  of  a  principle  which  is  neither  water  nor  air, 
but  -thicker  than  air  and  thinner  than  water."    It  is 
certainlv  material,  and  seems  to  have  been  matter  gener- 
ally, since  Anaximander  separates  from  it  the  elemental 


12 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


opposites,  warm  and  cold,  moist  and  dry,  and  brings  to- 
gether the  homogeneous  in  such  a  way  that  what  is  gold 
becomes  gold,  what  is  earth  becomes  earth,  and  yet  noth- 
ing arises  or  begins  to  be,  but  all  is  contained  potentially 
in  the  original  substance.  This  imperfect  attempt  to 
trace  back  natural  appearances  scientifically  and  to  ex- 
plain the  world  from  physical  grounds  denotes  a  great 
advance  of  thought  in  comparison  with  the  myths  of  the 
old  cosmogonies. 

Anaximenes. — Anaximenes  was  younger  than  Anaxi- 
mander,  and  is  supposed  to  have  been  one  of  his  disci- 
ples. Like  Thales  he  represents  the  absolute  under  a 
physical  form,  but  as  air  instead  of  water.  Air  seems 
less  material  than  water  ;  we  do  not  see  it,  but  feel  its 
motion.  *' As  our  soul,  which  is  air,  holds  us  together, 
so  spirit  and  air,  which  are  synonymous,  animate  the 
universe.'"  He  thus  compares  his  essence  to  the  soul, 
and  seems  to  form  a  transition  from  the  natural  philoso- 
phy of  his  predecessors  to  the  philosophy  of  conscious- 
ness. 

Diogenes  of  Apollonia,  Idaeus  of  Himera,  and  Arche- 
laus,  are  also  called  Ionian  philosophers,  but  we  know 
little  of  them  except  their  names,  and  that  they  sup- 
ported in  part  or  wholly  the  views  of  their  predecessors. 

Aristotle  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  earth  is 
not  assumed  as  a  first  principle  by  any  of  these  early 
philosophers,  because  it  appears  like  an  aggregate  of 
many  single  parts,  and  does  not  represent  unity  in  a 
sensuous  form  as  completely  as  water,  air  or  fire.  The 
greatness  of  their  thought  consisted  in  their  conception 
of  oue  universal  substance,  expressed  as  a  form  of  mat- 


THE   IONIC    PHILOSOPHERS. 


13 


ter,   but  uncreated   and    imperishable,    at   the  basis  of 
nature's  changing  and  manifold  appearances. 


CHAPTER  V. 


PYTHAGORAS  AND  THE  PYTHAGOREANS. 


THE  next  step  in  philosophy  was  taken  by  Pythago- 
ras of  Samos,  who  lived  between  540  and  500 
B.  C.  He  is  the  hero  of  many  fabulous  stories,  and 
the  accounts  we  possess  of  his  life  and  achievements 
are  so  interwoven  with  the  fanciful  inventions  of  his 
later  adherents  that  we  cannot  tell  what  is  or  is  not 
historical.  He  is  supposed  to  have  traveled  in  Egypt 
and  through  intercourse  with  its  priestly  caste  to  have 
conceived  the  idea  which  he  afterwards  executed,  the 
foundation  of  a  society  or  order  devoted  to  man's 
moral  regeneration.  Upon  his  return  he  settled  at  Cro- 
tona,  in  Lower  Italy,  or  Magna  Graecia,  where  he  ap- 
pears to  have  distinguished  himself  not  only  as  a  states- 
man, a  warrior,  and  a  political  law-giver,  but  as  a 
teacher  of  morality  and  personal  culture.  He  is  said 
to  have  possessed  great  personal  beauty  and  a  majestic 
presence,  which,  added  to  his  eloquence,  inspired  his 
listeners  with  awe  and  admiration.  He  was  the  first 
to  give  himself  the  name  of  ^^A^tro^c  (lover  of  wisdom), 
instead  of  (yo<p6g  (the  wise  man). 

He  not  only  instructed  his  friends  but  associated 
them  together  in  a  peculiar  form  of  life,  which  de- 
veloped into  what  is  known  as  the  Pythagorean  order, 
similar  in   character  to  the  voluntary    monasticism    of 

14 


PYTHAGORAS   AND   THE    PYTHAGOREANS. 


15 


modern  times.  Whoever  wished  to  join  this  order 
was  subjected  to  a  novitiate  of  five  years,  during 
which  period  he  must  preserve  strict  silence.  It 
is  claimed  by  a  modern  philosopher  that  it  is  an 
essential  condition  of  true  culture  to  receive  at  first 
without  question  the  thoughts  of  others.  The  mem- 
bers of  this  order  wore  a  uniform  dress  of  white 
linen  and  led  a  regular  life,  each  hour  of  the  day  hav- 
ing its  appointed  task.  It  was  enjoined  upon  all  that 
they  should  reflect  night  and  morning  upon  the 
events  of  the  preceding  day  in  order  to  determine 
wherein  their  actions  had  been  right  or  wrong.  They 
ate  in  common  ;  their  chief  food  was  bread  and  honey, 
their  only  drink  water.  They  abstained  from  meat 
on  account  of  their  belief  in  the  transmigration  of 
souls.  Among  vegetables,  beans  were  forbidden  as  an 
article  of  diet,  for  what  reason  is  not  clear. 

Notwithstanding  its  high  moral  significance  in  the 
history  of  Greek  culture  and  of  humanity,  it  was  im- 
possible that  an  order  like  this  having  no  connection 
with  the  public  and  religious  life  of  the  Greeks  should 
be  long  maintained.  Hence  we  find  no  trace  of  its 
existence  as  a  formal  union  of  individuals  after  the 
death  of  Pythagoras,  which  is  variously  stated  as  oc- 
curring in  his  eightieth  or  one  hundred  and  fourth 
year.  That  any  select  number  of  citizens  should 
distinguish  themselves  either  by  a  peculiar  mode  of 
dress  or  of  life  was  foreign  to  the  idea  of  the  Greek 
state,  whose  members  stood  on  a  perfect  equality  one 
with  the  other.  Even  the  priests  who  guarded  the 
Mysteries  did   not   form  a  caste  as  in   Egypt,  but   took 


16 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


an  active  part  in   public  affairs,   and    were  in  no  way 
set  apart  from  their  fellow-citizens. 

Turning  to  the  Pythagorean  system  of  philosophy  we 
find  it  to  have  been  the  work  of  different  men  and 
times.  Its  principal  thoughts  came  probably  from 
Pythagoras  himself,  but  history  leaves  the  point  un- 
certain. Aristotle,  who  is  our  chief  authority  in  the 
matter,  speaks  of  the  Pythagoreans,  never  of  Pythagoras. 
The  principle  they  affirmed  was  number;  ''number  is 
the  essence  of  all  things.''  How  did  they  reach  this 
thought  ?  Did  it  spring  from  their  love  of  law  and 
order  in  the  life  of  man,  leading  them  to  observe  the 
regularity  of  natural  phenomena  in  the  movements  of 
the  planets  and  the  relations  of  tones  ?  Aristotle  says 
that  they  believed  there  was  greater  resemblance  in 
number  to  that  "which  is,  and  happens,  than  in  fire, 
water,   or  earth.'' 

But  what  did  they  mean  ?  Did  they  regard  num- 
bers as  things  themselves,  or  as  their  archetypes,  sep- 
arated from  them  as  the  thoughts  of  an  artist  from 
his  work  ?  Aristotle  explains  their  theory  in  this 
way;  number  is  both  form  and  substance,  but  the 
two  are  not  yet  definitely  separated  in  thought.  This 
was  an  advance  beyond  the  Ionic  point  of  view,  from 
a  principle  purely  sensuous  to  the  abstract  relation 
of  quantity.  Aristotle  quotes  Plato  as  saying  that  the 
mathematical  attributes  of  things  belong  neither  to  the 
world  of  the  senses,  nor  to  that  of  ideas,  but  mediate 
between  both ;  different  from  the  sensuous  because 
they  are  eternal  and  unchangeable,  different  from  ideas 
because  they  contain  multiplicity. 


PYTHAGORAS  AND  THE  PYTHAGOREANS. 


17 


Pythagoras  applying  his  philosophic  theory  to  music, 
argued  that  although  there  might  be  qualitative  differ- 
ences as  between  men's  voices  and  wind  instruments,  the 
peculiar  relation  of  tones  to  each  other  upon  which  har- 
mony depends  is  a  relation  of  numbers.  He  also  sought 
to  construe  mathematically  the  heavenly  bodies  of  the 
visible  universe.  They  are  represented  as  ten,  which 
was  regarded  as  the  most  perfect  number  :  the  Milky 
Way,  or  the  fixed  stars;  Saturn,  Jupiter,  Mars,  Venus, 
Mercury,  the  Sun,  the  Moon,  the  Earth,  and  the 
Counter- Earth.  It  is  uncertain  whether  this  Counter- 
Earth  meant  the  opposite  side  of  our  planet,  or  one 
wholly  distinct  from  it.  Aristotle  thinks  it  was  in- 
vented to  complete  the  number  ten.  The  earth  was 
supposed  to  revolve  around  a  central  fire,  which  was 
called  the  Watch  of  Zeus.  Each  heavenly  body  as  it 
moved  produced  a  different  tone,  according  to  its  size 
and  speed,  and  thus  arose  that  harmonious  world-chorus, 
the  *'  music  of  the  spheres,"  which  we  do  not  hear,  say 
the  Pythagoreans,  because  it  is  identical  with  our  own 
substance  and  being. 

A  similar  theory  was  applied  to  the  soul.  It  was 
conceived  as  a  harmony,  a  counterpart  of  the  heavenly 
system,  dwelling  in  the  body  as  in  a  prison.  To  this 
was  added  the  belief  in  metempsychosis,  a  doctrine 
stretching  far  back  to  India,  but  borrowed  from  Egypt 
by  Pythagoras.  Pythagoras  claimed  to  possess  a  dis- 
tinct recollection  of  having  passed  through  various 
stages  of  existence— as  the  son  of  Hermes,  and  Euphorbus 
in  the  Trojan  war. 

To  comprehend  Pythagoreanism  we  must  study  the 


18 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


conditions  of  Greek  culture  in  the  sixth  century  B.  C. 
As  a  reformatory  movement  it  belongs  to  that  series  of 
ethical  strivings  which  we  trace  in  the  works  of 
Epimenides,  in  the  rise  of  the  Mysteries,  in  the  teach- 
ings of  the  Gnomic  poets  and  of  the  Seven  Wise  Men. 
It  also  bears  the  stamp  of  the  Doric  race  character  and 
the  Doric  institutions.  Its  aristocratic  politics,  its 
music,  its  gymnastic,  its  admission  of  women  to  the 
culture  and  society  of  men,  its  severe  morality,  its 
regard  for  the  traditional  customs  and  laws,  its  venera- 
tion of  the  old  and  of  superiors— all  were  essentially 
Dorian.  But  it  received  from  Ionic  physiology  the  im- 
pulse towards  a  scientific  explanation  of  the  world. 
Pythagoras  transplanted  philosophy  from  its  old  Ionic 
home,  in  Asia  Minor,  to  Italy,  that  it  might  there  develop 
under  new  conditions. 


CHAPTER    VI. 


THE   ELEATICS. 

THE  Eleatics  carried  the  process  begun  by  the 
Pythagoreans  to  its  ultimate  limit,  and  abstracted 
their  principle  from  matter  altogether.  Thought  frees 
itself  wholly  from  the  bondage  imposed  upon  it  by  the 
senses,  denies  the  finite  world,  and  affirms  its  own 
infinity.  It  declares  that  change,  beginning  and  end- 
ing, genesis  and  decay,  are  unthinkable,  therefore  im- 
possible. How  can  that  which  is  not  begin  to  be  ? 
How  can  that  which  is  cease  to  be  ?  The  world  in 
which  we  live  is  a  delusion  of  the  senses ;  its  changing 
and  manifold  forms  are  a  mere  appearance,  and  have  no 
real  existence;  only  being  is;  there  is  no  becoming 
(therefore  no  progress). 

Xenophanes,  the  founder  of  the  school,  expressed  its 
principle  theologically  as  the  one  God,  in  opposition  to 
the  polytheism  of  his  age  ;  Parmenides,  a  disciple  of 
Xenophanes,  and  a  deeper  thinker  than  his  master, 
developed  the  doctrine  metaphysically  ;  Zeno,  a  disciple 
of  Parmenides,  perfected  it  dialectically.  Thus  three 
generations  worked  together  in  the  formation  and  devel- 
opment of  this  system. 

Xenophanes.— Xeno^hmea  was  born  at  Colophon,  in 
Asia  Minor,  but  in  what  year  is  uncertain.  We  know 
from    his   writings    that    he    was    a    contemporary    of 

19 


20 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


Pythagoras,  whom  he  outlived.  It  is  said  that  his  re- 
moval to  Elea,  in  Lower  Italy,  where  he  died  at  an 
advanced  age,  gave  its  name  to  the  school. 

He  wrote  in  verse,  like  all  the  older  philosophers; 
but  only  a  few  fragments  of  his  poems  remain.  In 
these  he  enunciates  the  doctrine  that  one  God  rules 
the  world,  for  Deity  is  the  highest,  and  the  highest 
can  only  be  One  :  ''  One  God  there  is,  among  gods  and 
men  the  greatest;  neither  in  body  like  to  mortals, 
nor  in  mind.  .  .  .  With  the  whole  of  him  he  sees', 
with  the  whole  of  him  he  thinks,  with  the  whole  of 
him   he  hears.    .    .    .  Without   exertion,  by  energy  of 

mind,    he   sways   the  universe That  he  abides 

forever  in  the  same  state,  without  movement  or  change 
from  place  to  place,  is  evident.  .  .  .  Rut  mortals 
fancy  that  gods  come  into  being  like  themselves,  and 
have  their  senses,  voice  and  body.  But  of  a  truth,  if 
oxen  and  lions  had  hands,  and  could  draw  with  tlieir 
hands,  and  make  what  men  make,  then  horses  would 
paint  the  images  of  gods  like  unto  horses,  and  oxen  like 
unto  oxen,  and  shape  their  bodies  also  after  the  simili- 
tude of  their  own  limbs.'' 

To  comprehend  what  this  meant  in  that  old  Greek 
world,  we  must  reproduce  for  ourselves  its  conditions, 
sensuous  and  intellectual  ;  must  go  back,  if  possible,  to 
its  consciousness.  To  us  it  seems  little  to  say  that  God 
is  pure  spirit  ;  we  have  grown  up  in  that  belief  and 
conviction.  But  it  was  a  grand  utterance  to  make  in 
the  face  of  Greek  polytheism  and  anthropomorphism. 
Xenophanes  censures  Homer  and  Hesiod  for  pre- 
senting the  gods  like  human   beings,  with  the    voices 


THE   ELEATICS. 


21 


and  faces,  the  virtues  and  vices,  of  men.     Limitation  of 
any  kind,  physical,  intellectual   or  moral,  is  unworthy 

of  Deity. 

It  is  possible  that  Xenophanes  meant  to  affirm  the 
unity  of  the  world  at  the  same  time  with  the  unity  of 
God"^  As  he  could  not  harmonize  likeness  to  men  with 
his  conception  of  Deity,  so  in  natural  appearances  he 
would  seek  the  ground  of  their  similarity  and  connection 
in  a  force  which  could  not  be  separated  from  tlie  world 
itself.  If  Deity  is  One,  all  things  are  one,  and,  in  the 
words  of  Zeller,  ''  Polytheistic  religion  becomes  philo- 
sophic pantheism." 

Pame^urf^s.— Xenophanes  does  not  see  the  difficulty 

that  lies  in   the  acceptance  of  his  point  of  view  ;  it  is 
.  Parmenides  who  recognizes  it  first.     The  date  of   this 
philosopher's  birth  is  also  unknown,  but  Socrates  says 
in  Plato's  dialogue  of  -The  Sophist:"    -I  was  present 
when  Parmenides  uttered  words  of  exceeding  beauty.     I 
was  then  a  young  man,  and  he  already  advanced  in  years." 
Parmenides    is    the   most    important    figure    in   the 
Eleatic  school,   and   was  revered  by   antiquity  for  the 
purity  of  his  character  and  the  depth  of  his  thinking. 
He  exerted  great  influence  in  his  native  city,  improving 
its  morals  and  legislation.     He  disseminated  his  philo- 
sophic doctrines  by  means  of  public  lectures  and  discus- 
sions, and  embodied  them  in  a  poem  on  Nature,  frag- 
ments of  which  are  preserved  in  the  works  of   Plato, 
Sextus  Empiricus,  Proclus,  and  Simplicius.     They  have 
been    translated    into     English    by    Professor    Thomas 
Davidson,  and  published  in  the  fourth  volume  of  The 
Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy. 


22 


A   STUDY   OF   GKEEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


The  poem  opens  with  an  introduction  wherein  Par- 
menides  represents  himself  as  borne  aloft  in  a  chariot 
drawn  by  coursers  that  are  guided   by  the  daughters  of 
the  Sun  to  the  seat  of  the  goddess,  who  teaches  him  how 
to  distinguish  between  the  -  Truth^s  unwavering  heart 
that  IS  fraught   with   conviction,"  and   the   -deceptive 
no^;ons  of  mortals."     Professor  Davidson  inclines  to  the 
belief  that  Themis,  the  personification  of  Justice  or  Law 
IS  the  goddess  to  whom  allusion  is  made.     She  discourses 
farst  on  Truth,  which  consists  in  the  knowledge  that  only 
Being  IS,  that  there  is  no  Non-Being,  no  Becoming. 

"  OnI!f  ''r^'  ""'  '^""  ^^  '  ^"'  '^^  '^"  Simultaneously  now  ia 
One  contmuous  one;  for  of  it  what  birth  shalt  t hou  search  L  v 

":;;:"  to  thinrof'  T.  -^^"'"^^ '  ^^^"  "«^  ^--^^  ^'-«' «"  ^  -«, 

r^either  to  think  of  what  is  not.  for  none  cau  say  or  imaelne 
How  Not-is  becomes  Is ;  or  else  what  need  shou  d  have  fi  red  It 
After  or  yet  before  its  beginning  to  issue  from  nothing  ? 
Thus  either  wholly  Being  must  be  or  wholly  must  not  be." 

From  this  principle  of  pure  Being,  which  Parmenides 
sets  up  as  absolute,  he  excludes  all  change,  all  relation  to 
space  and  time,  all  divisibility  and  movement.     It  was 

time'*  ""'"  ''''^  ^''  '^  ''  '"^  *^'  "^"'"'''^  P'"'"''^'  annulling 

"Same  in  the  same  and  abiding,  and  self  through  itself  it  reposes 
Holds  rr  l^"^^^-^--^h'  f-  -ighty  Necessity  holds  1^  '' 
Holds  it  within  the  claims  of  her  bounds  and  round  doth  secure  it." 

The  ^^  mighty  Necessity  which  holds  it"  implies  a 
kind  of  self-limitation  on  the  part  of  the  infinite  Being 
of   Parmenides. 

"One  and  the  same  are  thought,  and  that  whereby  there  is  thinkine  • 
Never  apart  from  existence,  wherein  it  receiveth  expression 

mhl'  J^*^!^/^^^^:;^''  'he  action  of  thinking,  for  naught  is  or  shall  be 
Other  besides  or  beyond  the  existent." 


THE   ELEATICS. 


23 


Thinking  produces  itself  in  a  thought,  which  is  iden- 
tical with  its  being,  for  outside  of  this  great  affirmation 
it  is  nothing.  All  thinking  is  thinking  of  Being  ;  the  is, 
either  expressed  or  implied,  is  contained  in  every  affir- 
mation. Being  is  a  thoroughly  undivided,  homogeneous, 
perfect  whole,  which  Parmenides  compares  to  a  well- 
rounded  sphere,  because  it  holds  and  comprehends  every- 
thing, and  because  thinking  is  not  outside  but  inside  of 
itself.  The  senses,  therefore,  which  perceive  change 
and  plurality,  are  deceptive  ;  only  thought,  which  recog- 
nizes the  necessity  of  Being,  and  the  impossibility  of 
Non-Being,    conducts   man   to  the  truth. 

To  the  first  part  of   his  poem  Parmenides  added    a 
second,  devoted  to  the  doctrine  of  Opinion,  wherein  he 
seeks  to  explain  the  existence  of  the  gods  and  of  the 
universe  from  physical  grounds.     He  introduces  it  with 
the  remark  that  having  finished  his  discourse  *' touching 
the   truth,"   he   will   now   deal   with    the    '' notions   of 
mortals."        Aristotle   says  that   '*  being  compelled    to 
follow  the  phenomena,   and  assuming  that  the    One  is 
according  to  reason,  and  plurality  according  to  sense," 
Parmenides  again  lays  down  the  two  causes  as  his  first 
principles,  hot  and  cold— meaning,  for  example,  fire  and 
earth.     The  former  of  these,  the  hot,  he  arranges  on  the 
side  of  Being,  the  other  on  that  of  Non-Being.      The 
light,  the  fire,  is  the  active  principle  ;  the  night,  the  cold, 
is  the  passive.     The  ^*  mixing''  of  these  contraries  is 
effected  by  the  all-controlling  Deity,  who  ''  gave  birth 
unto  T^ve,  foremost  of  all  the  gods."     Supposing   the 
other  principle  to  be  Hate,  as  Cicero  asserts,  we  have  an 
approach  to  the  doctrine  of  Empedocles,  whose  two  great 


24 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


physical  principles  are  Friendship  and  Strife  ;  or,  in 
other  words,    attraction   and   repulsion. 

Parmenides,  seeking  to  explain  the  many  and  the 
changeable,  that  which  has  no  existence  according  to  his 
fundamental  principle,  only  succeeded  in  developing 
more  completely  the  contradiction  between  Being  and 
Appearance,  between  the  eternal  and  the  transitory, — a 
contradiction  that  led  Zeno,  one  of  his  disciples,  to 
attempt  the  dialectical  anniliihition  of  the  sensuous 
world,    the   world   of  appearance. 

Zeno. — Zeno  i-s  said  to  have  been  loved  by  his  master 
like  a  son.  He  was  the  first  Greek  philosopher  who 
wrote  in  prose,  and  was  so  renowned  as  a  teacher,  says 
Plato,  that  many  came  to  him  for  instruction  and  culture 
from  Athens  and  other  Greek  cities.  It  is  reported  that 
he  made  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  free  his  country 
from  political  tyranny,  and  was  put  to  death  amid 
tortures   which   he   endured    steadfastly. 

Aristotle  calls  him  the  inventor  of  dialectic.  This 
dialectic  is  well  described  in  Plato's  dialogue  of  Parmen- 
ides,  where  Socrates  says  :  "  I  see,  Parmenides,  that 
Zeno  is  your  second  self  in  his  writings  too  ;  he  puts 
what  you  say  in  another  way,  and  half  deceives  us  into 
believing  that  he  is  saying  what  is  new.  For  you,  in 
your  compositions,  say  that  all  is  one,  and  of  this  you 
adduce  excellent  proofs  ;  and  he,  on  the  other  hand,  says 
that  the  many  is  naught,  and  gives  many  great  and  con- 
vincing evidences  of  this." 

Zeno  replies  that  his  writings  were  meant  to  protect 
the  arguments  of  Parmenides,  and  were  addressed  to  the 
partisans  of  the  Many,  and  intended  to  show  that  greater 


THE  ELEATICS. 


25 


or  more  ridiculous  consequences  follow  from  their 
hypothesis  of  the  Many,  if  carried  out,  than  from  the 
hypothesis  of  the  existence  of  the  One. 

Zeno  sought  to  prove  that  the  many,  the  changing, 
all  that  has  relation  to  space  and  time,  is  in  itself  contra- 
dictory, and  does  not  possess  true  being.     His  most  cele- 
brated arguments  are  those  wherein  he  denies  motion, 
resting  his  proofs  upon  the  infinite  divisibility  of  space 
and  of  time.      He  says  first  that  motion  is  impossible, 
because  a  body  cannot  move  or  arrive  anywhere  without 
passing   through   an    infinite    number  of    intermeduite 
places.     Suppose  the  space  to  be  traversed  a  mile  ;  this 
mile  can  be  divided  into  two  parts,  and  again  into  two, 
and  so  on  infinitely.     The  moving  body  must  pass  over 
these  infinite  divisions,  but  the  infinite  is  never-ending  ; 
hence  it  can  never   reach  its  goal.     It  is  known   that 
Diogenes  the  Cynic  answered  this  argument  by  walking 
back  and  forth  in  silence,  regarding  this  action  as  a  prac- 
tical refutation  of  its  truth.     But  Zeno  did  not  deny  the 
sensuous  certainty  of   motion  ;   what  he  sought  was  to 
comprehend  it  through  thought. 

His  second  argument,  which  I  have  not  space  to 
elaborate,  maintains  that  the  pursuer  can  never  overtake 
the  pursued,  however  swift  the  one  or  slow  the  other. 
It  rests  upon  the  infinite  divisibility  of  time,  as  the  first 
rests  upon  the  infinite  divisibility  of  space.  Aristotle 
answers  both  arguments  by  showing  that  time  and  space 
are  not  made  up  of  separate  points,  but  are  continuous, 
and  that  the  dimensions  of  the  one  must  correspond  with 
the  divisions  of  the  other  ;  that  the  infinite  in  division 
must  be  distinguished  from   the  infinite  in  extent. 


26 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


Zeno  adduced  other  proofs  against  the  possibility  of 
motion.  The  contradictions  that  he  developed  we  meet 
again  in  modern  philosophy,  in  the  antinomies  of  Kant. 

Melissios  of  Samos  is  also  mentioned  by  the  ancients 
as  a  member  of  the  Eleatic  school.  Several  fragments  of 
his  writings  are  found  in  Simplicius.  His  thoughts  and 
arguments  resemble  those  of  his  master,  Parmenides,  but 
are  worked  out  more  in  detail. 

The  Eleatic  doctrine  forms  the  chief  turning  point  in 
the  history  of  older  speculation.  Greek  philosophy 
advanced  gradually  towards  the  most  abstract  of  all  con- 
ceptions, that  of  pure  Being.  From  this  point  of  view 
it  was  impossible  to  explain  plurality  or  change,  or  the 
phenomena  of  nature.  We  first  see  land,  according  to 
Hegel,  in  Heraclitus,  who  affirms  that  the  truth  lies 
neither  in  Being  nor  Non-Being,  but  in  both,— in  the 
Becoming. 

''  The  importance  of  the  Eleatic  principle  introduced 
into  the  fabric  of  European  thought  influenced  our 
language  through  such  words  as  entity,  existence, 
essence.  The  Eleatics  may  claim  as  their  own  coinage 
the  title  of  all  metaphysics — Ontology,  or  the  Science 
of    Being.''—/.  A,   Symonds, 


CHAPTER  VII. 


HERACLITUS. 

HERACLITUS,  called  by  later  writers  '^The  Ob- 
scure/' was  born  at  Ephesus,  about  500  B.  C.  He 
was  but  slightly  esteemed  by  his  fellow-citizens,  and 
esteemed  them  as  slightly  in  return.  The  banishment  of 
his  friend  Hermodorus,  whose  personal  superiority  was 
his  chief  offence  in  the  eyes  of  the  Ephesians,  filled  the 
soul  of  Heraclitus  with  scorn  and  indignation.  It  was 
the  same  principle  that  led  the  Athenian  democracy  to 
ostracise  their  greatest  men. 

Heraclitus  wrote  a  work  *^  Concerning  Nature,"  and 
deposited  it  in  the  temple  of  Diana  at  Ephesus.  Soc- 
rates said  that  what  he  understood  of  it  was  excellent, 
and  he  had  no  doubt  that  what  he  did  not  understand 
was  equally  good,  but  it  required  an  expert  swimmer. 

Heraclitus  was  the  first  to  assert  that  Being  and  Non- 
Being  are  the  same.  *^  Everything  is  and  also  is  not." 
''  Into  the  same  stream  we  descend  and  at  the  same  time 
we  do  not  descend  ;  we  are  and  also  we  are  not.  For 
into  the  same  stream  we  cannot  possibly  descend  twice, 
since  it  is  always  scattering  and  collecting  itself  again,  or 
rather,  it  at  the  same  time  flows  to  us  and  from  us." 
There  Is  nothing  firm  and  enduring  in  the  world,  every- 
thing is  comprehended  in  continual  change.  The  visible 
passes  into  the  invisible,  the  invisible  into  the  visible; 

97 


28 


A  STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


one  is  replaced  by  the  other  as  light  succeeds  darkness. 
Upper  and  under,  beginning  and  end,  mortal  and  im- 
mortal are  the  same  ;  everything  is  one,  everything  be- 
comes all.  From  the  living  come  the  dead,  from  the 
dead  the  living ;  from  the  young  the  old,  from  the  old 
the  young  ;  the  stream  never  stands  still ;  the  clay  of  ex- 
istence is  continually  moulded  into  new  forms. 

Heraclitus  compares  the  world  to  a  mixture  which 
must  be  constantly  sliaken  to  prevent  decomposition. 
'*  Strife  is  the  father  of  things,"  he  says.  Everything 
exists  only  in  change,  and  change  is  a  transition  from 
one  state  to  its  opposite.  From  conflict  comes  existence  ; 
from  contradiction,  union  ;  from  discord,  harmony  ;  one 
being  produces  all,  and  in  the  play  of  conflicting  activi- 
ties maintains  all  as  one.  *'  Unite  the  whole  and  the 
not-whole,"  says  Heraclitus;  ''the  coalescing  and  the 
non-coalescing,  the  harmonious  and  the  discordant,  and 
thus  we  have  the  One  becoming  from  the  All,  and  the 
All  from  the  One." 

Heraclitus  set  up  fire  also  as  a  first  principle.  But  he 
must  not  be  ranked  with  the  Ionian  physicists.  Fire  to 
him  is  the  symbol  of  the  Becoming,  the  soul  as  well  as 
the  substance  of  the  natural  process,  existing  only  in  con- 
stant change  and  movement,  and  thus  producing  the 
restless  pulse-beat  of  nature.  '*  The  universe  always  was, 
and  is,  and  will  be  an  ever-living  fire,  which  is  kindled 
and  extinguished  according  to  its  own  law."  Water  and 
earth  are  but  modes  of  fire ;  fire  passes  over  them  in  the 
''downward  way,"  and  they  pass  over  into  fire  in  the 
*'  upward  way,"  but  the  two  ways  are  inseparable. 

Man,  like  everything  in  the  world,  comes  from  fire. 


HERACLITUS. 


29 


But  it  is  in  the  soul  alone  that  the  divine  flame  is  pre- 
served in  its  purity.  Heraclitus  regards  the  body  by  it- 
self M  an  object  of  horror.  The  purer  the  fire,  the  more 
perfect  the  soul;  "the  dryest  soul  is  the  wisest  and  best." 
U  the  fire  is  polluted,  reason  is  lost,  and  thus  madness  is 
explained  ;  the  drunkard  is  not  master  of  himself  because 
his  soul  is  damp.  During  this  earthly  life  our  souls  are 
dead  and  buried  in  us,  but  at  the  death  of  the  body  they 
live;  and  thus,  says  Heraclitus,  life  and  death  are  indis- 

solubly  united. 

Wisdom  consists  in   recognizing  reason,  which   rules 
everything  ;  '*eves  and  ears  are  poor  witnesses  to  men  in 
80  far  as  they  have  barbarous  souls."     What  our  senses 
perceive  is  only  the  fleeting  appearance,  not  essence  ;  the 
ever-living  fire  is  concealed  from  us  by  a  hundred  veils  ; 
that  which  seems  to  us  dead  and  mute  is  in  truth  the 
most  living  and  active.     The  human  mind  has  insight 
only  so  far  as  it  participates  in  divine  reason.     Most  men 
live  like  cattle,  says   Heraclitus ;   they   are  born,  beget 
children,  and  die  without  finding  in  life  any  high  aim  or 
significance.     He  who  is  wise  will  recognize  that  it  only 
depends  on  himself  to  be  happy;  that  the  world  is  always 
as  it  ought  to  be,  and  that  he  must  place  himself  in  har- 
mony with  its  divine  arrangement.     He  must  follow  not 
his  own  individual  opinions,  but  the  common  law,  the 
universal  reason  which  rules  everything,  sacrificing  peculi- 
arities and  subordinating  himself  to  the  idea  of  the  whole. 
Heraclitus  reaches  the  grand  thought  that  conscious- 
ness of  truth  is  a  consciousness  of  the  univei-sal,   and 
that  error  consists  in  the  separation   of  thinking  from 
the  divine  reason  in  which  it  participates.     He  affirms 


30 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


that  man  must  withdraw  from  the  sensuous  world,  where 
*' everything  flows/'  into  the  depths  of  liis  own  spirit,  ii' 
he  would  find  the  steadfast  and  abiding,  the  necessity 
and  universality  of  Being,  the  essence  of  thought  and  of 
the  world.  This  is  what  Spinoza  terms  ''  contemplating 
things  under  the  form  of  eternity. '' 

Zeller  says  that  Heraclitus  was  the  first  philosopher  to 
set  up  common  points  of  view  for  the  total  contemplation 
of  nature.  To  the  changeableness  and  transitoriness  of 
single  things  he  opposed  the  unchangeable  similarity  of 
universal  relations,  the  one  divine  law,  absolute  and  un- 
conditioned, throughout  the  universe. 

His  principle  of  the  Becoming  is  antithetical  to  that 
of  Being  as  held  by  the  Eleatics  ;  but  both  are  alike 
valid  and  demand  a  conciliation.  How  is  this  to  be 
effected  ?  Heraclitus  does  not  solve  the  problem,  for 
he  does  not  explain  why  everything  is  comprehended 
in  a  continuous  flow,  except  by  saying  that  '*  every- 
thing is  fire,"'  which  is  but  another  way  of  expressing 
the  Becoming.  Like  the  Eleatics,  he  considers  the 
senses  unreliable,  and  appeals  from  their  testimony  to 
that  of  thought.  Like  them,  he  regards  the  world  of 
nature  as  a  contradiction  ;  but  he  affirms  its  reality, 
which  they  denied,  and  finds  in  this  very  contradiction 
the  reason  of  its  existence. 

To  assert,  however,  is  not  to  prove,  and  the  question 
returns:  Why  is  all  Being  Becoming?  How  are  we 
to  harmonize  the  two  principles,  and  explain  the  world 
of  nature  and  its  manifold  transformations?  This  is 
the  problem  offered  to  philosophy  which  Empedocles 
and   the  Atomists  seek  to  solve. 


CHAPTER  VIH. 


EMPEDOCLES. 


EMPEDOCLES  was  born  at  Agrigentum,  in  Sicily, 
490  B.  C,  and  was  renowned  among  the  ancients 
as  a  philosopher,  poet,  physician  and  prophet.     Unlike 
Heraclitus,  he  took  an  active  part  in  public  affairs,  and 
gained   such   esteem   among  his   fellow   citizens  by  his 
efforts  towards  establishing  a  free  government  that  they 
wished  to  elect  him  their  king,  but  he  refused  the  honor. 
The    following  lines,   translated   from  his  writings  by 
Symonds,    show  the   spirit   in  which   he  received   their 
proposition:     **  Friends  who  dwell  in  the  great  city  hard 
by  the  yellow  stream  of  Acragas,  who  live  in  the  Acropo- 
lis, intent  on  honorable  cares,  harbors  revered  of  stfangers, 
ignorant  of   what  is  vile,   welcome  ;    but   I   appear   be- 
fore you  an  immortal  god,  having  overpassed  the  limits 
of  mortality,  and  walk  with  honor  among  all,  a«  is  my 
due,  crowned  with  long  fillets  and  luxurious  garlands. 
No  sooner  do  I  enter  their  proud,  prosperous  cities  than 
men  and   women  pay  me  reverence,  who  follow  me  in 
thousands,  asking  the  way  to  profit,  some  desiring  ora- 
cles, and  others,  racked   by  long  and   cruel   torments, 
hanging  on  my  lips  to  hear  the  spells  that  pacify  disease 
of  every  kind.'' 

Empedocles  refused  to  be  king  because  he  wished  to 
be  looked  upon  as  a  god.  That  he  possessed  great  medical 

31 


32 


A   STUDY  OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY 


skill  for  that  age  and  wrought  some  wonderful  cures  is 
certain.  He  is  said  to  have  delivered  the  people  of  Se- 
linus  from  a  fearful  pestilence  caused  by  the  fetid  exhala- 
tions from  a  marsh,  which  he  drained  at  his  own  expense. 
Upon  his  appearance  afterward  at  a  public  banquet  he 
was  hailed  by  the  nobles  of  the  city  as  a  god,  the  friend 
of  Phoebus,  the  mediator  between  angry  Deity  and  suf- 
fering men.  The  manner  of  his  death  is  differently  re- 
lated. According  to  one  legend  he  suddenly  disappeared 
after  a  banquet ;  according  to  another  he  Jumped  into 
iEtna,  but  the  crater  cast  up  one  of  his  brazen  slippers, 
and  this  being  found,  revealed  what  he  meant  to  hide — 
the  manner  of  his  death. 

The  fragments  of  his  writings  which  we  possess  are 
mostly  from  a  poem  concerning  Nature,  addressed  to 
Pausanias  in  these  words:  ''First  learn  what  are  the 
four  chief  roots  of  everything  that  is  —  fiery  Zeus  and 
Here,  and  Nest  is  with  her  tears,  who  is  the  fount  of 
moisture  in  the  world."  He  thus  expressed  figuratively 
the  doctrine  of  the  four  elements,  which  he  was  the  first 
to  adopt.  In  another  passage,  he  calls  them  '*  fire,  water, 
earth,  and  air's  innumerable  height."  . 

These  four  primal  substances,  which  he  regarded  as 
eternal  and  unchangeable,  constitute  the  material  part  of 
the  world.  What  appears  to  us  as  birth  and  decay  is  not 
so  really,  but  only  a  mixture  and  separation.  How  this 
mixture  and  separation  are  produced  is  the  problem. 
For  life  no  longer  resides  in  matter,  as  with  the  old 
lonians ;  and  the  world  of  change  must  be  denied,  or  its 
phenomena  explained  by  separating  a  moving  force  from 
immovable  substance. 


EMPEDOCLES. 


33 


Empedocles  assumes  two  moving  powers  or   forces, 
which  he  personifies  as  love  and  hate,  or  attraction  and 
repulsion.      One  tends  to  life,  the  other  to  death  ;  one  to 
unity,  the  other  to  discord.     They  reign  alternately  at 
fixed  intervals  of  time,  the  elements  originally  forming 
one  including  sphere,  where  love  is  supreme.     But  hate 
gradually  asserts  its  power,  and  the  phenomenal  world 
comes  into  existence.     '*  When  hate  or  strife  has  reached 
the  very  bottom  of  the  seething  mass,  and  love  assumes 
her  station  in  the  centre  of  the  ball,  then  everything  be- 
gins to  come  together  and  to  form  one  whole— not  in- 
stantaneously,   but     different     substances     come    forth 
according  to  a  steady  process  of  development.     Now, 
when   these   elements  are  mingling,  countless  kinds  of 
things  issue  from  their  union.     Much,  however,  remains 
unmixed,  in  opposition  to  the  mingling  elements,  and 
these  malignant  Hate  still  holds  within  his  grasp.     For 
he  has  not  yet  withdrawn  himself  altogether  to  the  ex- 
tremities of  the  globe  ;  but  part  of  his  limbs  still  remain 
within  its   bounds  and   part   have  passed  beyond.     As 
Hate,  or  Strife,  however,  step  by  step  retreats,  mild  and 
innocent  Love  pursues  him  with  her  face  divine  ;  things 
which  have  been  immortal  instantly  assume  mortality  ; 
the  simple  elements  become  confused  by  interchange  of 
influence.     When  these  are  mingled,  then  the  countless 
kinds  of  mortal  beings  issue  forth,  furnished  with  every 
sort  of  form— a  sight  of  wonder."     Empedocles  asserts 
that  human   beings  were  first   produced  in  amorphous 
masses  containing  the  essence  of  male  and  female,  but 
that  being  afterward  divided  the  two  parts  yearned  for 
reunion,  hence  desire  and  love— a  theory  worked  out  by 
Plato  in  the  Symposium. 


34 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


Empedocles  believed  in  metempsychosis.  lie  thought 
that  all  human  souls  were  fallen  spirits,  banished  to  earth 
for  some  crime,  to  be  restored  to  their  heavenly  birth- 
right by  purity  of  life  and  expiatory  rites.  '*  From  what 
glory,  from  what  immeasurable  bliss, '*  he  says,  *'  have  I 
now  sunk  to  roam  with  mortals  upon  the  earth  ! ''  The 
following  eloquent  passage,  translated  by  Symonds,  oc- 
curs in  the  exordium  of  the  poem  :  **It  stands  decreed 
by  fate,  an  ancient  ordinance  of  the  immortal  gods,  es- 
tablished from  everlasting,  ratified  by  ample  oaths,  that 
when  a  spirit  of  that  race  which  has  inherited  the  length 
of  years  divine  sinfully  stains  his  limbs  with  blood,  he 
must  go  forth  to  wander  thrice  ten  thousand  years  from 
heaven,  passing  from  birth  to  birth  through  every  form 
of  mortal  mutability,  changing  the  toilsome  paths  of  life 
without  repose,  even  as  I  now  roam,  exiled  from  God,  an 
outcast  in  the  world,  the  bondman  of  insensate  strife. 
Alas,  ill-fated  race  of  mortals,  thrice  accursed !  from 
what  dire  struggles  and  from  what  groans  have  ye  been 
born  !  The  air  in  its  anger  drives  them  to  the  sea,  and 
ocean  spues  them  forth  upon  the  solid  land,  earth  tosses 
them  into  the  flames  of  the  untiring  sun,  he  flings  them 
back  again  into  the  whirlwinds  of  the  air ;  from  one  to 
the  other  are  they  cast  and  all  abhor  them.  *  *  *  * 
Weak  and  narrow  are  the  powers  implanted  in  the  limbs 
of  men  ;  many  the  woes  that  fall  on  them  and  blunt  the 
edge  of  thought ;  short  is  the  measure  of  the  life  in  death 
through  which  they  toil ;  then  are  they  borne  away;  like 
smoke  they  vanish  into  air;  and  what  they  dream  they 
know,  is  but  the  little  each  hath  stumbled  on  in  wander- 
ing about  the  world  ;  yet  boast  they  all  that  they  have 


EMPEDOCLES. 


35 


learned  the  whole— vain  fools !  for  what  that  is  no  eye 
hath  seen,  nor  ear  hath  heard,  nor  can  it  be  conceived  by 

mind  of  man.*' 

Like  Xenophanes,  Empedocles  revered  Deity  as  omni- 
present and  omnipotent,  the  God  of  gods,  pure  mind, 
holy  and  infinite,  darting  with  swift  thought  through 
the  universe  from  end  to  end.     He  does  not  appear  to 
have  made  any  attempt  to  reconcile  this  intuition,  or  his 
belief  concerning  transmigration,  with  his  physical  views. 
There  is  a  conflict  of  opinion  regarding  the  value  of 
his  philosophy,  but  it  is  held  in  slight  esteem  by  Plato 
and  Aristotle  among  the  ancients,  and  by  Hegel  among 
the  moderns.    He  struck  into  a  way  where  physics  followed 
him  later  when  he  asserted  that  the  primitive  elements  of 
things  are  incapable  of  qualitative  change.     He  is  to  be 
regarded  with  Leucippus  as  the  founder  of  a  mechanical 
explanation  of  nature.    But  his  system  has  serious  faults. 
He  did  not  explain  why  there  arc  four  elements,  or  why 
one  force  could  not  at  the  same  time  unite  and  separate 
substances.     Nor  could  he  prevent  the  two  forces  that  he 
assumed  from  encroaching  each  upon  the  limits  of  the  other, 
because,  as  Schwegler  says,  **  The  complete  separation  of 
a  dividing  and  unifying  power  in  the  movement  of  the 
Becoming  is  an  unwarrantable  abstraction."    The  Atom- 
ists  were    more    consistent    and  logical,  though    their 
point  of  view  resembled  that  of   Empedocles,  and   was 
based  upon  the  same  general  presuppositions. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


THE   ATOMISTS. 


LEUCIPPUS  and  Democritus  were  the  founders  of 
the  Atomistic  philosophy.  Little  is  known  con- 
cerning the  life  of  the  first ;  but  Democritus,  his  friend 
and  disciple,  was  born  about  4G0  B.  C.  in  Abdera. 
According  to  the  statement  of  Diogenes  Laertius,  he 
was  forty  years  younger  than  Anaxagoras.  He  is  said 
to  have  been  very  rich,  and  to  have  travelled  extensively 
in  search  of  knowledge.  He  wrote  numerous  works,  of 
which  we  possess  only  fragments.  His  style  was  praised 
by  Cicero  for  its  clearness  and  elevation,  and  compared 
to  that  of  Plato.  He  lived  to  a  great  age,  ninety  or 
one  hundred  years. 

Aristotle,  in  the  first  book  of  the  Metaphysics,  describes 
the  general  point  of  view  of  the  Atomists  as  follows  : 
*'Leucippus  and  his  friend  Democritus  affirm  that  the 
full  and  the  void  are  elements,  calling  the  first  Being, 
and  the  second  Non- Being,  and  asserting  that  one  is 
no  more  than  the  other."  The  fullness  is  composed  of 
atoms,  infinite  in  number  and  indivisible.  Between 
them  is  empty  space,  or  the  separating  intervals  which 
prevent  their  mutual  contact. 

Democritus  adduced  many  arguments  in  support 
of  his  doctrine,  among  others  the  following:  *' Motion 
requires    an  empty  space,   for  that  which  is  full  can- 

36 


THE   ATOMISTS. 


37 


not    receive    into    itself    any   thing   else.      Multiplicity 
and  change  are  thus  rendered    possible,   while    at    the 
same    time    nothing   is   ascribed  to    the    atoms   which 
the    Eleatics    denied    to   being.     They    are    absolutely 
simple  and  homogeneous,   substance  a^   such  destitute 
of  quality.  T  Atoms  can  only  be  an  object  of  thought, 
not  of  experience  L   for  all  which    we    perceive   sensu- 
ously   is  capable  of    division.     Their  only  difference  is 
quantitative.     -They    differ    in   form,''  says    Aristotle, 
A  as   A.  from  N.;  in  order,   as  A.  N.  from  N.   A.;   in 
position,  as  Z.  from  N."    They  have  the  like  specific 
gravity,  but  vary  in  magnitude,  and  therefore  in  weight. 
Ill    change    is    change    of    place,    and    the    sensuous 
attributes  of  things   are  traced  back  to  a  quantitative 
relation   between   atoms. 

These   atoms    are  represented   in    constant  motion; 
but   wherefore   is  not  explained  except  by  saying  that 
the  motion  is  eternal.     Since  they  differ  in  magnitude 
and   weight,  some  are   forced   downward   more   rapidly 
than  others,   and   the  lighter  ones  are  pushed  upward, 
giving  rise   to  collisions  and  a  rotary  motion,    which, 
extending    farther    and    farther,    produces   an    infinite 
number    of  worlds.     Homogeneous  elements    come    to- 
gether in  this  process,  not  through  chance  but  through 
necessity,  which  Democritus  set  up  as  a  final  cause  m 
opposition  to  the  {vm)  nous  of  Anaxagoras.      -  He  thus 
approached  as  near  to  the  teleology  which  he  scorned, 
says  Zeller,    -as  it  was  possible  to  do  from  his  point 

of  view."  ,    ^  .. 

After  explaining  the  origin  of  the  earth,  DemocntuB 
turned   to   living  beings,  and   declared    that    the    bouI 


38 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


causes  their  movements  ;  and  is  therefore  composed  of 
the  finest  and  smoothest  atoms,  or  particles  of  fire  dis- 
tributed through  the  body.  We  inhale  and  exhale  soul- 
atoms,  and  through  this  double  process  life  is  preserved. 

Democritus  complained  that  we  know  nothing  in 
reality,  but  at  the  same  time  distinguished  between 
obscure  and  genuine  knowledge,  the  first  being  gained 
through  the  senses,  the  second  through  the  understand- 
ing ;  one  is  restricted  to  changing  appearances,  the 
other  is  an  investigation  of  principles. 

In  his  ethical  views  he  attributed  little  worth  to  ex- 
ternals, and  argued  that  happiness  can  only  be  found  in 
the  right  disposition  of  mind  and  heart.  Man  is  to 
enjoy  as  much  and  suffer  as  little  as  possible.  But  it 
does  not  follow  from  this  that  sensuous  pleasure  is  the 
highest.  Only  the  goods  of  the  soul  are  worth  seeking, 
those  of  the  body  are  perishable  and  unsatisfactory. 
Democritus  recommended  content,  moderation,  purity 
of  thought  and  deed,  as  the  way  to  true  happiness. 
Man  must  limit  his  desires  and  his  activities  to  what 
he  is  able  to  accomplish  ;  must  be  satisfied  with  what  he 
possesses,  and  not  seek  or  long  after  the  unattainable. 
Knowledge  gives  the  highest  and  purest  enjoyment,  and 
that  serenity  of  soul  which  neither  fears  death  nor 
earthly  calamity. 

Schwegler  calls  the  Atomistic  philosophy  a  '^  media- 
tion between  the  Eleatic  and  Heraclitic  principles."  It 
asserts  with  Parmenides  the  impossibility  of  the  Becom- 
ing as  a  qualitative  change,  but  on  the  other  hand  it 
affirms  with  Heraclitus  the  reality  of  movement,  and 
the  relative  truth  of  experience.     Through  its  antithesis 


THE   ATOMISTS. 


39 


of  the  fulness  and  the  void  it  expresses  the  two  move- 
ments of  the  Heraclitic  Becoming,  Being  and  Not-Being. 
It  embraces  in  its  investigations  a  wider  field  of  inquiry 
than  any  earlier  system,  and,  though  one-sided  and  un- 
satisfactory, shows  nevertheless  an  advance  of  thought 
in  its  attempt  to  collect  and  explain  scientifically  the 
empirical  facts  of  nature. 

Aristotle  praises  its  logic  and  the  unity  of  its  princi- 
ples, though  he  recognizes  the  impossibility  which  un- 
derlies every  Atomistic  system  of  deriving  the  extended 
from  that  which  has  no  extension,  indivisible  atoms. 
He  also  criticises  severely  the  necessity  of  Democritus, 
the  power  behind  the  atoms,  which,  though  distinguished 
from  chance,  is  represented  as  working  blindly  and  with- 
out design.  Anaxagoras  first  utters  the  solving  word 
in  his  principle  of  the  7ious  (povg). 


I? 


ANAXAGORAS. 


41 


CHAPTER  X. 


ANAXAGORAS. 


ANAXAGORAS  was  born  about  500  B.C.,  at  Clazo- 
meiia3,  in  Asia  Minor.  lie  took  no  part  in  public 
affairs,  but  devoted  himself  to  scientific  pursuits,  and 
soon  after  the  Persian  war  removed  to  Athens.  There 
he  lived  and  taught  until,  accused  of  impiety,  he  was 
compelled  to  flee  to  Lampsacus,  where  he  died  at  the 
age  of  seventy-two. 

Asia  Minor  or  Italy  had  been  the  seat  of  philosophy 
hitherto ;  it  was  Anaxagoras  who  first  planted  it  in 
Athens,  where  it  was  to  reach  the  zenith  of  its  glory  in 
the  systems  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  He  was  surrounded 
by  a  galaxy  of  great  men,  many  of  whom  were  his  per- 
sonal friends, — Pericles,  Thucydides,  Phidias,  ^schylus, 
Sophocles,  Aristophanes,  and  Protagoras.  Athens  was  at 
its  height  of  political  prosperity  under  the  administration 
of  Pericles,  and  the  grandeur  of  its  achievements  in  every 
field  of  intellectual  activity  has  never  since  been  equaled. 

Hegel  speaks  of  the  contrast  presented  at  this  time  be- 
tween Athens  and  Sparta.  In  Sparta  the  individual  was 
so  wholly  merged  in  the  state  that  he  could  not  attain 
free  development  and  expression,  could  not  grow  morally 
or  intellectually.  A  principle  true  in  itself  was  carried 
out  so  one-sidedly  that  its  own  essence  was  lost,  since  the 
very  idea  of  a  state  is  the  voluntary  subjection  of  the 

40 


individual  to  the  universal  will.  In  Athens,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  right  of  subjectivity  was  recognized,  and  every 
citizen  was  free  to  cultivate  and  develop  to  the  utmost 
his  peculiar  talents,  and  to  express  himself  in  whatever 
way  he  chose,  through  statesmanship,  or  history,  or 
poetry,  or  sculpture.  From  this  freedom  of  the  indi- 
vidual sprang  those  immortal  works  of  genius  which  still 
challenge  our  reverential  admiration. 

Never  did  any  other  people  in  the  world  express 
themselves  so  fully  and  completely  as  the  Athenians  in 
the  age  of  Pericles.  Pericles  himself  as  the  head  of  the 
State,  occupied  a  unicjue  position, -a  quiet,  energetic, 
earnest  man,  devoting  himself  supremely  to  the  interests 
of  Athens.  Anaxagoras  was  the  friend  of  Pericles,  and 
was  envied,  like  Aspasia,  for  enjoying  this  honor,  and 
exposed  to  persecution. 

Starting  from   the   same  point   as  his  predecessors, 
Anaxagoras  reaches  the  conviction  that  nature  can  only 
be  explained  through  the  theory  of  a  divine  intelligence 
disposing  and  governing  everything.     Hence,  even  in  the 
scientific  domain,   the  principle  of  subjectivity  makes 
itself    valid.      Aristotle    praises   Anaxagoras  for   rising 
to  the  conception  of  a  world-ordering  reason,  and  says 
that  in  comparison  with  previous  philosophers  he  ap- 
peared like  a  sober  man  among  the  drunken.     But   to 
this  praise  is  added  censure  of  the  mechanical  way  in 
which  he  applied  his  doctrine,  using  the  7ious  only  when 
he  fell    into  embarrassment  through  his   ignorance  of 

natural  causes. 

Plato  makes  a  similar  criticism  in  a  well-known  pas- 
sage of  the  Ph«do.       Socrates,  just  before  his  death. 


42 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


relates  how  rejoiced  he  was  to  hear  that  Anaxagoras 
had  set  up  reason  as  the  cause  and  principle  of  the 
world,  and  how  zealously  he  applied  himself  to  the  study 
of  this  philosopher's  writings,  expecting  to  learn  why 
things  are  as  they  are,  or,  in  other  words,  their  final 
causes.  His  hopes  were  disappointed.  Anaxagoras  used 
everything  else  in  the  way  of  explanation  except  the  nous 
— fire,  air,  water,  etc.  Socrates  ilhistrates  the  case  by 
saying  that  Anaxagoras  would  bring  forward  his  bones 
and  muscles  as  the  reason  why  he,  Socrates,  is  sitting 
there  in  person,  instead  of  the  true  cause,  which  is  his 
own  will,  the  opportunity  for  escape  having  been  offered 
him  by  his  friend  Crito.  This  opportunity  his  bones  and 
muscles  would  gladly  have  embraced,  fleeing  to  Megara 
or  Boetia,  had  he  not  held  it  better  to  remain  in  prison, 
and  submit  to  the  punishment  inflicted  by  the  laws.  He 
acknowledges  that  without  possessing  bones  and  muscles 
he  could  not  do  as  he  thinks  best;  but  to  affirm  that  they 
are  the  cause  of  his  action,  of  his  remaining  in  prison  or 
escaping  from  it,  is  to  mistake  the  matter  altogether. 

Anaxagoras  assumes  the  existence  of  an  infinite  num- 
ber of  elementary  substances,  differing  in  quality,  as  par- 
ticles of  flesh,  gold,  etc.  These  particles  he  calls  seeds, 
the  name  '^homoiimeria"  being  applied  to  them  later. 
As  there  are  numberless  things  in  the  universe,  and  not 
one  exactly  like  the  other,  so  with  these  *'  seeds. ^'  Their 
homogeneous  union  produces  what  we  call  the  genesis 
of  things  ;  their  separation,  what  we  call  decay.  Change 
is  not  qualitative,  but  mechanical ;  substance  remains 
the  same,  but  the  manner  of  its  composition  differs. 

Hegel   calls  the   seeds   of    Anaxagoras    *'individual- 


ANAXAGORAS. 


43 


ized  atoms."    Originally  they  existed  in  a  chaotic  con- 
dition, but  after  an  indefinite  period  of  time  the  nous 
came,  a  moving,  ordering  force,  uniting  them  all  into 
one  harmonious  whole.      This  process  of  formation  is 
explained  at  length ;  but  it  is  noticeable  that  mind  is 
used  only  in  order  to  move  matter,  and  is  conceived  more 
like  an  impersonal  force    than   a  self-conscious  intelli- 
gence.      Nevertheless,  Anaxagoras   defines  it  after  the 
analogy  of  the  human  spirit,  and  ascribes  to  it  thinking, 
which  can  only  be  applied  strictly  to  a  personal  being. 
Elsewhere  he  calls  it  the  finest  of  all  things,  describing 
it  with  the  attributes  of  substance  or  force.     Its  activity 
is  represented  not  as  an  activity  for  an  end,  but  ii^  a  me- 
chanical  movement  of  matter.  This  is  the  point  especially 

criticised. 

It  could  not  be  expected  that  Anaxagoras  ehouUl  see 
the  whole  bearing  of  his  principle,  or  how  completely  it 
was  to  revolutionize  the  old  way  of  thinking.  He  stands 
with  one  foot  on  the  ground  of  preceding  theories,  only 
half-conscious  how  far  he  has  advanced  beyond  their 
basis  He  separates  the  corporeal  from  the  spiritual, 
but  so  far  from  reconciling  the  contradiction  between 
the  two,  he  scarcely  recognizes  its  existence.  Matter  is 
conceived  as  the  absolutely  mixed,  and  spirit  as  the 
separating  force  ;  both  are  united  so  closely  that  we  can- 
not question  which  is  first. 

But  the  light,  though  faint,  begins  to  dawn  m  the 
system  of  Anaxagoras,  and  is  to  wax  stronger  and 
stronger  until  with  Aristotle  it  illuminates  the  whole 
domain  of  philosophic  research.  Anaxagoras  closes 
the    old    period    and    opens  the    new,  combining    the 


44 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


principles  of  his  predecessors,  and  setting  up  his  nous 
as  an  explanation.  Its  universal  character  was  not 
at  first  recognized.  It  was  conceived  by  the  Sophists  as 
the  subjective  thought  of  individual  man  instead  of 
the  divine  reason  in  which  all  participate. 


i 


CHAPTER  XL 


THE   SOPHISTS. 


UNTIL    the   middle   of   the   fifth   century   B.    C, 
the  study  of  philosophy  was  limited  to  the  few 
disciples  gathered  around  its  founders  in  single   cities. 
But  at  this  time  a  change  occurred  in  the  condition  of 
affairs.     The  brilliant  successes  attained  by  the  Greeks  in 
their  contests  with  the  Persians  had  awakened  as  their 
natural  result  a  passionate  striving  after  freedom,  glory, 
and  power.     The  men  who  had   risked  their  lives  for 
their  country  wished  to  share  in  the  guidance  of   its 
affairs,  and  democracy  became  the  ruling  form  of  gov- 
ernment.    Athens,  through  its  great  deeds,  was  placed  at 
the  ruling  centre  of  Greek  national  life,  and  united  in 
itself  more  and  more  the  intellectual  forces  and  strivings 
of  the  age.     Within  a  human   generation  it  attained  a 
degree  of  prosperity  and  power,  of  glory  and  splendor, 
unrivaled   in  history.     The  traditional  means  of  educa- 
tion   no  longer   sufficed,  the   claims  of   the  individual 
increased,  special  culture  was  required  to  lift  him  above 
the  high  intellectual  level  of  his  fellow-citizens.     Acute- 
ness  of  intellect  was  a  general  characteristic ;   all  were 
trained  through  political  activity  and  multifarious  inter- 
course  to  quick  judgment  and  decisive  acting.     Through 
the  development  of  dramatic  poetry  and  artistic  oratory, 
the  hearing  of  all  was  sharpened  for  the  beauty  of  lan- 


45 


46 


A  STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


guage  and  subtleties  of  expression.  Hence  the  increased  j) 
attention  paid  to  eloquence  and  to  rhetoric,  and  tlie  need  I 
that  arose  for  scientific  instruction  concerning  all  things  J 

useful  to  civil  life. 

Hegel,  in  treating  of  this  period,  explains  the  true 
meaning  of  culture.     It  is  a  knowledge  of  the  general 
points  of  view  that  pertain  to  an  action  or  an  event,  and 
the  ability  so  to  conceive  them  as  to  have  an  immediate 
consciousness  of  all  their  relations.     A  judge  is  acquain- 
ted with  the  different  legal  aspects  of  a  case,  the  various 
laws  applicable  to  the  particular  case  under  consideration, 
and  sums  them  up  in  his  consciousness  before  giving  a 
verdict.     In_,the  same  way,  the  cultivated   man  regards  \ 
every  object  from  different  points  of  view,  and  because    / 
he  sees  the  matter  on  all  sides  conceives  it  clearly  and  (^ 
comprehensively.     This  culture  Greece  owed  to  the  So- 
phists, who  taught  men  not  only  to  argue  but  to  think 
concerning  matters  which  they  accept  intellectually.  / 

Philosophy  had  reached  a  point  where  its  form  must 
change.  Proceeding  from  observation  of  external  nature 
it  had  gradually  advanced  to  the  discovery  of  a  spiritual 
force  in  the  soul  itself  different  from  the  body  which 
it  ordered  and  ruled.  Spirit  therefore  appeared  the 
higher  when  contrasted  with  matter,  and  man  turned  his 
thoughts  from  the  investigation  of  physical  problems  to 
those  presented  by  his  own  interior  nature. 
/^  That  the  right  way  would  be  found  at  first  could 
(  hardly  be  expected.  Self-exalted  by  his  newly  discovered 
^  spiritual  supremacy,  man  declared  himself  the  measure  of 
all  things,  not  in  the  universal  but  in  the  individual  sense. 
Every  person  could  determine  what  was  right ;  truth  and 


THE   SOPHISTS. 


47 


goodness  ceased  to  possess  absolute  validity.  Scope  was 
given  to  unlimited  egoism,  theoretically  and  practically. 
The  public  and  private  life  of  the  age  mirrors  this  prin- 
ciple. ^'  Those  party  struggles  which  racked  Athens 
during  the  Peloponnesian  war,  had  blunted  and  stifled 
the  moral  feeling,^'  says  Schwegler ;  *' every  individual 
accustomed  himself  to  set  his  own  private  interest  above 
that  of  the  State  and  the  common  weal,  and  to  seek  in 
his  own  arbitrariness  and  advantage  the  measuring  rod 
of  his  actions." 

The  most  extravagant  ideas  were  formed  concern- 
ing popular  sovereignty  and  civil  equality.  That  self- 
ishness which  is  the  curse  of  all  politics  seeking 
aggrandizement  bore  bitter  fruit ;  moral  feeling  was 
blunted,  and  individuals  applying  the  principle,  prac- 
ticed by  the  State,  towards  private  instead  of  public 
advantage,  ceased  to  regard  its  welfare  as  paramount  to 
their  own  special  interests,  endangering  at  once  the  foun- 
dations of  law  and  morality.  Frequent  changes  in  the 
laws  seemed  to  justify  the  belief  that  they  arose,  without 
inner  necessity,  from  the  caprice  of  rulers.  Advancing 
culture  itself  tended  to  weaken  the  acceptance  of  old 
institutions  and  customs,  through  keener  observation  of 
men  and  wider  knowledge   of  the  world   and   history. 

Scepticism  invaded  religion ;  there  was  much  in  the 
old  myths  opposed  to  enlightened  insight  and  morality. 
Man  recognized  himself  as  the  creator  of  the  gods  in 
their  beautiful  marble  statues,  and  discovered  in  his  own 
soul  a  divinity  higher  than  theirs.  Even  the  development 
of  dramatic  poetry  tended  to  shake  belief.  Beginning  at 
first  with  iEschylus  in  a  grand  contemplation  of   the 


48 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


^,v 


moral  whole,  it  descended  in  Euripides  to  the  analysis  of 
mental  conditions  and  emotional  states,  subjecting  the 
gods  more  and  more  to  a  human  measure.  The  spirit  of 
revolution  and  progress  which  penetrated  the  age  could 
not  be  checked  and  could  not  fail  of  expression  through 
philosophy.  Hence  the  peculiar  character  of  Sophistry 
and  the   reproaches  brought   against   it    by   Plato   and 

Aristotle. 

^lato_complains  that  it  is  difficult  tcL  dciiiiti  the  Soph- 
ist correctly..    The  name  was  first  applied  to  those  i)aid 
teacliers  who  pursued  wisdom  ((y<x}>iaTrj(;)  sls  a  calling,  _Phito 
first  and  Aristotle  afterward  narrowed  the  significance  of ^ 
The  term.     The  Sophist,  according  to  Plato,  is  a  hunter 
who  seeks  to  capture  wealthy  young  men  by  promising  to 
teach  them  virtue ;  or  a  trader  who  traffics  in  knowledge  ; 
or  a  craftsman  who   makes  gold  through  controversies, 
etc.,  etc.     Sophistry  is  an  art  of  delusion  ;  it  consists  in 
knowing  how  to  entangle  others  in  contradictions,  in  an 
assumption    of    wisdom   and   virtue   without    possessing 
either,  or  even  believing  in  their  reality.     Aristotle  de- 
scribes it   similarly  as  a  science  limiting  itself  to  non- 
essentials,  or  as  the  art  of  making  money  with   mere 
apparent  wisdom. 

This  judgment  passed  upon  the  Sophists  by  the 
two  greatest  thinkers  of  Greece,  colored  the  opinions 
of  later  writers,  justifying  the  assertion  of  Grote  that 
**few  characters  in  history  have  been  so  hardly 
dealt  with  as  the  so-called  Sophists."  Opinions  still 
differ  as  to  their  historical  importance.  Grote  excul- 
pates them  from  the  charge  of  corrupt  and  immoral 
teaching,  but  asserts  that  they  had  ''nothing  in  common 


THE   SOPHISTS. 


49 


except  their  profession  as  paid  teachers."  Hegel,  on  the 
other  hand,  finds  that  they  constitute  a  distinct  school  of 
philosophic  thought,  and  that  the  character  of  their  work 
is  positive  as  well  as  negative. 

The  previous  method  of  teaching  with  the  Greeks  re- 
quired no  teachers  except  for  writing,  arithmetic,  music 
and  gymnastics.     Individual  youths  who  desired  wider 
culture  attached  themselves  to  some  illustrious  man,  not 
for  formal  instruction,  but  simply  on  account  of  the  in- 
fluence that,  without  express  intention,  results  from  free 
personal  intercourse.     The  earlier  philosophers  had   no 
especial  school,   but   imparted  their  viev/s   to   a   narrow 
circle  composed  for  the  most  part  of  personal  friends. 
With  the  Sophists  we  see  a  new  order  of  things.     On  one 
side  it  is  clear  that  wider  knowledge  is  necessary  for    y 
those  who  wish  to  distinguish  themselves  in  public  life ;    [ 
on  the  other  side  knowledge  is  sought,  not  so  much  for 
itself    as    for   practical    utility.      Sophistry  appears  to    \ 
stand  on  the  boundary  between  philosophy  and  politics ; 
practice    is    to    be    supported    by    theory,    but    theory     / 
itself    becomes   little   more   than   a  means  of    help  for   ^ 
practice. 

The  Sophists  have  been  censured  for  their  readiness  in 
adducing  reasons  and  arguments  on  both  sides  of  a  ques- 
tion. But  this  is  not  so  much  a  peculiarity  of  theirs  as 
one  belonging  to  the  stage  of  reflection  reached  at  that 
time.  In  the  worst  action  there  lies  some  point  of  view 
from  which  it  can  be  justified  and  defended.  For  in- 
stance, the  duty  of  self-preservation  might  be  pleaded  to 
extenuate  a  soldier's  desertion  on  the  eve  of  battle.  Ex- 
cuses might  be  found  even  for  the  crimes  of  treachery 


50 


A   STUDY    OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


and  assassination,  and  some  good  motive  might  be  discov- 
ered in  every  evil  action. 

The  Sophist  knew  that  everything  can  be  proved. 
Gorgias  says  in  Plato's  Dialogues:  ''The  art  of  the 
Sophists  is  a  greater  good  than  all  arts  ;  it  is  able  to 
persuade  as  it  will  the  people,  the  senate,  and  the 
judges.''  The  Sophists  were  acquainted  with  so  many 
points  of  view  that  they  could  lift  into  prominence 
or  degrade  into  insignificance  every  duty  and  law 
hitherto  held  valid. 

The  ordinary  consciousness  is  confused,  as  frequently 
happens  with  Socrates,  when  some  opinion  or  belief 
firmly  held  is  suddenly  brought  into  collision  with  others 
equally  valid.  Thus,  in  the  instance  mentioned  of  the 
soldier's  desertion,  the  virtue  of  bravery  which  risks  life 
is  opposed  to  the  duty  of  its  preservation.  Dionysodorus 
says  :  "  You  want  Cleinias  to  be  wise.  Then  you  want 
him  to  be  what  he  is  not,  and  not  to  be  what  he  is  ? — 
not  to  be— that  is,  to  perish  ?  Dionysodorus  says : 
''  Who  lies  says  what  is  not,  but  one  cannot  say  what  is 
not — therefore  no  one  can  lie." 

These  fallacies  appear  trifling  to  us  now,  as  Jowett 
observes,  but  were  not  trifling  in  the  age  before  logic, 
at  a  time  when  language  was  first  beginning  to  perplex 
human  thought.  They  show  us,  fai'ther,  how  the  art  of 
speech  assumed  more  and  more  prominence  until  phi- 
losophy was  almost  neglected  for  rhetoric. 

Hegel  says  that  sophistry  is  a  danger  that  always 
menaces  culture.  We  moderns  admire  what  Plato  would 
have  termed  sophistic  grounds  of  action.  ''  Deceive  not 
that  you   may  not  lose  credit  and  therefore  money." 


THE  SOPHISTS. 


51 


Similar  arguments  are  brought  forward  even  in  sermons 
and   moral   discourses    to   recommend    the    practice    of 

virtue. 

Regarding  the  accusation  brought  against  the  Sophists 
that  they  used  their  talents  for  money-getting,  we  easily 
discover  its  basis  in  the  prevalent  Greek  views  on  this 
subject.  So  long  as  philosophic  instruction  was  confined 
to  friends  nothing  could  be  said  of  pay.  Plato  and 
Aristotle  regarded  it  from  this  point  of  view.  Wisdom, 
like  love,  should  not  be  sold,  says  Socrates,  but  given  as 
a  free  gift.  Plato  and  Aristotle  maintain  that  the  rela- 
tion of  teacher  and  scholar  is  not  one  of  business,  but  of 
friendship  ;  the  service  of  the  teacher  cannot  be  weighed 
with  money,  but  can  only  be  returned  with  love  and 
gratitude.  Favored  by  personal  prosperity  and  sharing 
the  old  Greek  prejudice  against  business,  they  could 
afford  to  scorn  pecuniary  reward  for  their  teaching,  l^ut 
to  call  the  Sophists  self-seeking  and  money-coveting 
merely  because  they  received  pay  for  the  instruction 
they  imparted,  is  unjust ;  unjust  even  from  their  ideal 
point  of  view,  since  Greek  custom  permitted  painters, 
musicians,  rhetoricians,  poets,  etc.,  to  win  life-subsist- 
ence through  the  work  to  which  they  dedicated  time 
and  power. 

The  masses  of  the  people,  who,  like  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
regarded  the  Sophists  with  disfavor,  were  farther  preju- 
diced against  them  as  foreigners,  ''  destroyers  of  the  old," 
innovators  and  revolutionists.  Their  gains  were  doubt- 
less exaggerated ;  only  a  few  showed  themselves  mean 
and  avaricious.  Protagoras  says  :  **  When  a  man  has 
been  my  pupil,  if  he  likes,  he  pays  my  price,  but  there  is 


rn 


/) 


52 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


THE  SOPHISTS. 


53 


no  compulsion,  and  if  he  does  not  like,  he  has  only  to 
go  into  a  temple  and  take  an  oath  of  the  value  of  the 
instnictions,  and  he  pays  no  more  than  he  declares  to 
be   their   value." 

Zeller  thinks  that  this  prejudice  against  the  Sophists 
a&  money-makers  did  more  to  injure  their  reputation 
than  anything  else.  But  he  also  notices  a  risk  which  is 
incurred  when  instruction  concerning  the  duties  of 
public  life  is  placed  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  teachers 
who  are  dependent  for  support  on  the  pay  received  ;  a 
risk  that  their  activity  as  teachers  may  be  limited  to  the 
wishes  and  needs  of  those  scholars  who  are  able  to  seek 
and  pay  for  instruction.  Only  a  few  will  see  the  neces- 
sity of  studies  whose  practical  application  is  not  im- 
mediately apparent.  If,  from  the  beginning,  Sophistry 
was  inclined  to  limit  instruction  to  the  useful  and  prac- 
tical, this  onc-sidedness  must  have  been  strengthened 
by  the  dependence  of  Sophistic  teachers  on  the  tastes 
and  wishes  of  their  listeners.  We  shall  therefore  find 
that  tlie  Sophists  do  not  teach  men  concerning  the  aim 
oj  their  activity,  but  seek  ratherfo~8K6w  the  means 
which  secure  individual   success. 

But  the  question  arises  :  Is  there  a  firm  basis  to  be 
found  anywhere  in  the  doctrines  of  the  Sophists  ?  What 
is  their  final  criterion  of  judgment,  since  to  constitute 
philosophy  there  must  be  one  ?  It  is  the  individual  self, 
this  particular  me,  which  remains  steady  when  everything 
else  wavers,  what  Hegel  calls  *^ particular  subjectivity." 
To  this  single  ^elf  of  mine,  to  my  pleasure,  to  mt/  vanity, 
to  my  g^ory,  to  wjr  h«nor»  I  refer  ovcTytliing.  ini*ll' 
jad^w^^ut,  and  al!  jxirtwular    conducts      There  i«  no 


other  <30urt  of  appeal ;  herein  lies  tlie  danger  of  So- 
phistry.  This  individual  will  of  mine  is  erected  mto 
an  absolute  principle  ;  everything  else  changes,  but  this 
remains  steadfast.  Truth  and  goodness  have  only  a 
relative  significance ;  this  thing  seems  true  to  me  and 
false  to  another,  or  good  to  me  and  evil  to  another. 
The  standpoints  are  as  many  and  as  widely  different 
as  individuals.  Hence  the  negative  attitude  of  Sophistry 
towards  knowloclgc  and  morality. 

Zeller  call*  tl>c  Sophist*  the  Kncyclop»di«U  of  Greece, 
the  Aufkluret  (cU*r«rt.op)  of  their  age,  parlicipatiiiK 
in  the  advantngee  as  mi41  as  in  tlw  dUadvantagea  of  thi« 
position.     He  contnisU  tlwir  boastfiila«s  and  a8«ira|i- 
tion,  their  unit«idy,  wandcrinK  life,  Uieir  gold-wiuning, 
their  mutual  jealoittieB,   with  the  earnest  humility  of 
Anaxa<-oras  and  Democritus.  the  unaawming  greatnc^ 
of  Socrates,  th«  noble  pnde  of  Plato ;  ho  finds  ihal  their 
eloquence  is  but  supcrlicbl  and  aearrea  lakehood  as  well 
as  truth,  that   their  scientific  views  are  shallow,  their 
moral  axioms  dangewns.     But  on  the  other  hand  he 
thinks  it  would  l)e  unjn«l  to  their  r<»l  •I'hieTemente  to 
treat  them  men^lj  as  dwtroyer^     He  agr<«  with  Hegel 
that  the  principle-  of  subjectivity  first  makee  itself  valid 
in  the  age  of  the  Soi>hi8tK[>«  wachia  the  oonscious. 
ness  that  it  is  noce«ary  to  a«t  from  poraonal  inught 
and  conviction,  he  loees  his  renoiation  for  custom  and 
tradition,  and  will  accept  nothing  m  tnie  which  he  liaa 
not  himself  tested.     But  ho  does  not  at  onco  discover 
the  right  diVMion,  the  point  where  he  is  to  place  him- 
self  in  order  to  pwforve  hia  mental  and  moral  equi- 
librium,    lie  recoguiz**  eorrvc4ly  thiU  tradition  as  such 


54 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


does  not  prove  the  truth  of  an  axiom  or  the  authority  of 
a  law  ;  but  to  conclude  therefore  that  truth  does  not 
exist,  and  that  the  individual  is  a  law  unto  himself, 
is  to  introduce  scientific  scepticism  and  moral  confusion. 

So,  too,  in  the  sphere  of  religion.  The  Sophists  are 
not  to  be  reproached  that  they  doubted  the  existence  of 
the  old  gods  of  the  Greek  world,  and  saw  in  them  only 
magnified  reflections  of  the  virtues  and  frailties  of 
human  beings.  What  they  needed  was  to  complete 
denial  by  affirmation,  not  to  lose  faith  in  religion  because 
they  lost  faith  in  polytheism. 

Nevertheless,  Sophistry,  with  all  its_shortcomings,  is 
the  fruit  and  the  organ  of  the  ttiosi  thoroagkxavolution 
which  ever  happened,  in  the  thought  and  spiritual  life 
of  the  Greek  nation,  ,1'his  people  stood  on  theihreshold 
of  a  new  era ;  the  view  opened  into  a  world,  hitherto 
unknown,  of  freedom  and  of  culture.  Is  it  strange  that 
they  became  dizzy  on  the  height  so  quickly  attained, 
that  the  feeling  of  self  overstepped  all  limits,  that  man, 
recognizing  the  origin  of  laws  in  the  human  will,  believed 
himself  no  longer  bound  by  their  authority,  that  he  held 
everything  as  subjective  appearance  because  he  saw 
everything  in  the  mirror  of  his  own  consciousness  ? 

The  one-sided ness  of  Sophistry  could  not  be  avoided. 
The  fermentation  of  the  age  drove _to  the  surface 
.many  impure  and  muddy  substances,  but  the  human 
spirit  must  pass  through  this  fermentation  before  it 
could  purify  itself  to  Socratic  wisdom ;  and  as  the 
Germans  without  a  clearing-up  period  might  not  have 
had  Kant,  so  the  Greeks  without  Sophistry  might  not 
have  had  Socrates  and  a  Socratic  school  of  philosophy. 


j 


CHAPTER  XII. 


INDIVIDUAL  SOPHISTS. 


ROTAGORAS.— There  were   many   renowned   So- 


phists, but  the  first  and  most  celebrated  is  Protagoras 
of  Abdera,  born  about  490  B.  C.  Little  is  known  con- 
cerning his  life,  save  that  it  was  devoted  to  study  and 
the  pursuit  of  his  calling  as  a  public  teacher  and  lecturer, 
first  in  Sicily,  afterward  in  Athens.  He  was  an  intimate 
friend  of  Pericles,  with  whom  he  is  said  to  have  had  an 
argument  once,  lasting  the  whole  day,  as  to  whether  the 
javelin,  or  the  one  who  threw  it,  or  the  one  who  arranged 
the  game,  is  guilty  of  the  death  of  a  man  accidentally  hit 
and  killed.  Protagoras,  like  Anaxagoras,  was  accused  of 
impiety  and  banished  from  Athens.  The  especial  cause 
of  his  banishment  was  a  writing  beginning  with  these 
words:  ''  Concerning  the  gods,  I  know  not  whether  they 
exist  or  not ;  for  there  is  much  to  prevent  the  attainment 
of  this  knowledge  in  the  obscurity  of  the  matter  itself,  as 
well  as  in  the  shortness  of  human  life.''  All  copies  of 
the  work  that  could  be  found  were  publicly  burnt  in  the 
market-place  at  Athens,  at  the  command  of  the  state, 
and  so  far  as  we  know  this  is  the  first  recorded  instance 
of  such  an  auto  da  fe,  Protagoras  was  drowned  at  sea 
on  a  voyage  to  Sicily,  either  in  his  seventieth  or  nine- 
tieth year,  authorities  differing  in  regard  to  his  age  and 
the  time  of  his  death. 


56 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


INDIVIDUAL   SOPHISTS. 


57 


#» 


His  fundamental  proposition  as  a  philosopher  is  the 
following:     Man   is   the  measure  of  all  things,  of   that 
which  is  that  it  is,  and  of  that  which  is  not  that  it  is  not. 
Taken  in  its  true  sense,  this  is  a  grand  utterance,  but  it 
is  at  the  same  time  ambiguous.     Is  it  man  on  the  side  of 
his  particularity,  the  accidental  individual,  who  is  the 
measure  of  all  things,  or  is  it  the  self-conscious  reason 
within  him,  man  on  the  side  of  his  universality,  who  is 
the  measure  of  all  things  ?    If  the  first,  then  the  centre 
of  all  striving  is  the  individual  with  his  egotism  and  self- 
ishness, his  petty  interests  and  aims.     It  was  thus  un- 
derstood by  the  Sophists,  and  it  is  the  chief  ground  of 
reproach  brought  against  their  teaching.     But  Socrates 
and  Plato  emphasize  the  deeper  truth  contained  in  the 
proposition  of  Protagoras;  that  man  as  a  thinking,  ra- 
tional being  is  the  measure  of  all  things,  that  reason, 
thought,  self-consciousness,  is  not  a  special  characteristic, 
distinguishing  me  from  my  fellow  men,  but  is  that  in 
which  all  participate,  the  universal  substance  in  which 
all  alike  have  their  spiritual  being.     The  true  measure 
of  things  is  not   my  thought,  nor  your  thought,   but 
thought  itself,  the  absolute  within  us,  miyie  and  yours, 
whose  eternal  essence  is  ever  the  same,  unaffected  by  our 
individual  will  and  opinion. 

Protagoras,  however,  according  to  Plato,  saw  but  one 
side  of  the  truth  contained  in  his  proposition.  Starting 
from  the  doctrine  of  Heraclitus,  that  everything  is  in  a 
constant  flow,  he  applied  it  to  human  thought,  and  de- 
clared that  nothing  is  in  itself  true  or  false,  but  true  or 
false  only  as  it  is  related  to  the  thinking  subject.  His 
illustrations  are  drawn  from  the  facts  of  sensuous  per- 


ception.     For    instance,   it   may  happen    that    a  wind 
appears  cold  to  one,  warm  to  another ;  we  cannot,  there- 
fore, say  of  the  wind  itself  that  it  is  either  hot  or  cold. 
Warmth  and  cold  exist  only  for  us,  the  feeling,  perceiv- 
ing subject.     We  have  first  the  assertion  that  nothing  is 
in  itself  as  it  appears  ;  and  then,  that  it  is  true  as  it  ap- 
pears, a  contradictory  affirmation.     We  can  argue  with 
equal  justice  that  the  wind  is  cold,  or  that  the  wind  is 
warm  ;  that  is  to  say,  truth  is  relative,  but  not  absolute. 
Protagoras  was  the  first  to  show  how  ''  theses  might  be 
defended  and  attacked,  and  contradictory  propositions 
maintained  on  every  subject.^'     He  made   a  scientific 
study  of  language,  distinguishing  the  gender  of  nouns, 
the  moods  of  verbs,  etc. 

The  fallacy  of  his  reasoning  and  of  Sophistic  reasoning 
generally  consists  in  giving  objective  validity  to  that 
which  is  merely  subjective,  the  sensuous  perception,  the 
accidental  opinion  or  caprice  of  the  individual.  The 
wind  is  not  cold  in  itself  because  it  appears  so ;  that 
which  is  true  of  it  is  the  appearance  only.  The  whole 
world  of  sensuous  perception  is  simply  appearance ;  we 
can  affirm  nothing  of  it  except  as  it  is  related  to  thought, 
the  thinking,  self-conscious  subject.  Here  lies  the  truth 
of  the  Sophistic  doctrine,  a  truth  developed  one-sidedly 
by  Protagoras  and  his  followers,  yet  fruitful  in  its  effects 
on  the  progress  of  philosophy. 

Gnraias.—  Another  famous  Sophist  was  Gorgias,  who 
came  to  Athens  during  the  Peloponnesian  war  as  an 
ambassador  from  his  native  city,  Leontium,  Sicily.  He 
remained  there  for  some  time,  but  passed  the  latter  part 
of  his  life  in  Thessaly,  where  he  died  at  an  advanced 


58 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


age.  The  approximate  dates  of  his  birth  and  death  are 
respectively,  483  and  375  B.  C.  He  taught  the  art  of 
rhetoric,  describing  it  as  the  ''worker  of  conviction." 
He  appears  to  have  been  greatly  admired  and  esteemed 
by  his  contemporaries,  with  the  exception  of  Plato,  who 
ridicules  his  ostentatious  appearance,  and  affirms  that 
rhetoric,  as  taught  by  Gorgias,  is  not  an  art,  but  a  form 
of  quackery,  a  mass  of  poetic  figures  and  brilliant  meta- 
phors, intended  to  corrupt  and  delude  the  mind  of  the 
listener.  It  is  possible  that  Plato,  in  his  denunciations, 
refers  less  to  Gorgias  himself  than  to  his  followers. 

The  philosophic  doctrine  of  Gorgias  is  contained  in 
his  work  ''Concerning  Not-Being,  or  Nature."  It  was 
divided  into  three  parts,  according  to  Sextus  Empiricus, 
devoted  respectively  to  the  enumeration  and  proof  of  the 
three  following  propositions:  First,  that  nothing  exists  ; 
second,  that  if  anything  existed  it  would  be  unknowable  ; 
third,  that  if  it  existed  and  were  knowable  the  communi- 
cation of  the  knowledge  to  others  would  be  impossible. 
Tiedemann  says  that  Gorgias  went  much  farther  than  any 
man  of  sound  common-sense  can  go.  Hegel  thereupon 
replies  that  one  might  say  the  same  of  any  philosopher, 
for  what  is  called  sound  common-sense  is  not  philosophy, 
and  is  often  very  unsound,  since  it  is  ruled  by  the  man- 
ner of  thinking,  the  maxims  and  prejudices  peculiar  to 
the  time.  Gorgias  did  go  farther  than  sound  common- 
sense,  but  so  did  Copernicus,  in  the  opinion  of  his  age, 
when  he  affirmed  that  the  earth  revolves  around  the  sun. 

The  propositions  of  Gorgias  are  not  so  meaningless  as 
they  appear.  He  asserts,  first,  that  nothing  exists,  be- 
cause in  order  to  exist,  its  being  must  be  derived  from 


INDIVIDUAL  SOPHISTS. 


69 


another  or  must  be  eternal.     He  then  goes  on  to  prove 
that  both  hypotheses  lead  to  contradictions.     If  derived 
from  another,  it  must  be  either  from  the  existent  or  the 
non-existent;    but  this  is  impossible  according  to  the 
Eleatic  theory.     If  eternal,  it  must  be  infinite,  but  the 
infinite  is  nowhere,  and  what  is  nowhere  is  not.     The 
proof  of  his  second  proposition,  that  if  anything  existed 
it  would  be  unknowable,  is  as  follows:    If  the  knowledge 
were  possible,  then  all  that  is  thought  must  exist,  and  we 
could  not  think  the  non-existent,  Scylla  and  Charybdis, 
for  instance.    Gorgias  here  falls  into  the  idealism  of  mod- 
ern times,  according  to  which  the   world   of  objective 
existence  is  merely  the  product  of  subjective  thought. 
He  affirms,   lastly,  that  if  anything  existed,  and  were 
knowable,  the  knowledge  of  it  could  not  be  communi- 
cated to  others.  The  eye  sees  colors,  the  ear  hears  sounds, 
but  the  notion  of  color  cannot  be  conveyed  by  sounds, 
nor  by  words,  nor  can  the  notion  of  sound  be  conveyed 
by  color.      How,   then,    if  it   is  impossible  to   express 
through  one  sense  what  is  conveyed  to  another,  can  the 
same  idea  be  in  two  persons,  as  it  must  be  in  order  to 
constitute  a  communication  of  knowledge,  if  the  persons 
are  different  one  from  the  other?  The  dialectic  of  Gorgiaa 
is  based  wholly  on  the  contradictory  nature  of  sensuous 
phenomena,  and  is  unanswerable  from  the  standpoint  of 
any  physical  theory  of  the  universe. 

Dther  Sophists.— Other  well-known  Sophists  were 
Hippias  and  Prodicus.  Hippias  is  described  as  a  man  of 
honorable  character  and  of  great  learning,  distinguished 
more  for  rhetorical  talent  than  for  his  philosophical  doc- 
trines.    Plato  ascribes  to  him  the  sentiment  that  law  is 


tM 


60 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


the  tyrant  of  men,  forcing  them  frequently  to  do  what  is 
contrary  to  nature.  Prodicus  was  greatly  admired  by  the 
ancients.  The  saying,  ''As  wise  as  Prodicus,"  became  a 
proverb.  He  wrote  discourses  on  moral  subjects,  but  his 
chief  merit  rests  on  the  distinctions  he  made  between 
words  of  similar  meaning,  synonyms. 

Of  the  other  Sophists  we  know  little,  except  from  the 
testimony  of  Plato,  who  describes  them  in  his  dialogues, 
one  as  teaching  the  law  of  the  stronger,  that  right  is 
might,  another  as  declaring  that  faith  in  the  gods  is  the 
invention  of  wise  and  cunning  statesmen,  their  dialectic 
art  deteriorating  and  their  doctrines  illustrating  more 
and  more  the  evil  consequences  resulting  from  their 
standpoint,  the  elevation  of  the  subjective  opinion  and 
will  of  the  individual  into  an  absolute  standard  of 
thought  and  action. 


^ 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


SOCRATES. 


C 


THE  age  of  Socrates  was  the  age  of  the  Sophists  ; 
Protagoras    and   Gorgias  were  his  contemporaries. 
Socrates  is  frequently  called  a  Sophist,  and  is  held  up 
to  ridicule  in  the   '^Clouds"   of   Aristophanes  as   the 
representative  of  Sophistic  doctrines.     But  his  teaching, 
in  reality,  is  the  positive  complement  of  the  Sophistic 
philosophy,  whose  destructive  tendencies  he  vanquished 
on  their  own  ground,  on  the  truth  implicitly  contained 
injheirjmii  piindpieaj*'  Socrates  did  not  grow  out  of 
the  earth  like  a  fungus,"  says   Hegel,   ''but   stands  in 
definite  continuity  with  his  time,  and  is  not  only  a  figure 
of   supreme  importance  in  the  history  of    philosophy, 
perhaps  the  most  interesting  of  all  among  the  ancients, 
but  is  a  world-historical  person.     For   he  represents  a 
turning-point   of    the   human  spirit   in  upon  itself  in 
the  manner  of  philosophic  thought." 

Pre-Socratic  philosophy  proceeded  from  observation 
of  nature  ;  the  Sophists  first  deviated  from  physical  in- 
quiries, and  made  man  himself  a  special  object  of  study. 
This  direction  is  the  ruling  one  with  Socrates ;  he  neg- 
lects nature,  occupying  himself  almost  exclusively  with 
questions  whose  solution  he  refers,  not  to  the  accidental 
will  of  the  individual,  but  to  true  knowledge,  the  ab- 
solute essence  of  spirit.     Earlier  philosophy  was  dog- 

61 


X 


62 


A   STUDY  OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


SOCRATES. 


63 


matic,  applying  itself  immediately  to  the  world  of  nature, 
and  defining  its  being  from  single  prominent  peculiar- 
ities. It  was  therefore  one-sided  and  contradictory,  and 
could  not  resist  the  attacks  of  the  Sophists,  or  satisfy 
the  need  of  the  time. 

The  basis  of  the  philosophic  structure  must  be 
laid  deeper,  contradictions  must  be  compared  and 
reconciled  through  some  common  standard,  different 
points  of  view  must  be  harmonized,  thought  must 
grasp  the  real  and  permanent  beneath  the  changing 
appearance.  How  was  this  to  be  accomplished?  Socrates 
answered  the  problem  by  developing  the  content  of 
thought  itself  through  a  dialectic  process  of  defin- 
ition and  division,  the  art  of  forming  concepts.  In 
order  to  have  a  clear  conception  of  an  object  I 
must  be  able  to  grasp  together  its  different  peculiarities, 
not  concluding  with  the  Sophists  that  they  are  mutually 
destructive  because  they  contain  opposite  determina- 
tions, but  finding  that  they  complete  each  other  through 
their  very  contradictions,  which  are  all  dissolved  in  a 
higher  bond  of  unity.  To  define  the  conception  of 
justice  or  valor,  Socrates  would  start  from  individual 
examples,  and  from  these  deduce  their  universal  char- 
acter— their  true  concepts. 

Philosophy,  according  to  this  view,  begins,  not  with 
the  observation  of  external  but  of  internal  phenomena ; 
not  with  physics,  but  with  ethics,  the  truths  revealed 
by  God  to  human  consciousness.  The  world  of  nature 
sinks  into  the  background  ;  self-knowledge  is  the 
supreme  object  of  all  striving.  In  the  place  of  dog- 
matism we  have  dialectic  ;  in  the  place  of  materialism. 


idealism.  The  problem  of  the  world  is  included  in 
the  higher  problem  of  self.  The  question  is  asked  : 
How  can  true  knowledge  be  obtained  ?  Socrates  offers 
the  first  solution,  asserting  that  the  standard  of  human 
thought  and  knowledge  lies  in  a  knowledge  of  concepts, 
which  can  only  be  gained  by  a  critical  investigation  of 
their  essence.  Plato  concludes  ihat  objective  concepts, 
ideas,  are  in  the  true  sense  the  only  reality  ;  and  Aristotle 
affirms  finally  that  the  concept,  or  form,  constitutes 
the  moving  power,  the  soul  of  things,  that  the  absolutely 
real  is  pure  spirit  thinking  itself,  that  thinking  is  the 
highest  reality,  and  therefore  the  highest  happiness  for 
man.  "It  is  thus  one  principle,"  says  Zeller,  '* repre- 
sented at  different  stages  of  growth,  by  Socrates,  Plato, 
and  Aristotle."  Socrates  may  be  called  the  swelling 
germ,  Plato  the  rich  blossom,  and  Aristotle  the  ripened 
fruit  of  Greek  philosophy,  on  the  summit  of  its  historical 
development. 

LIFE    AND     CHARACTER. 

The  philosophy  of  Socrates  is  closely  connected  with 
his  life  and  personal  character.  He  was  born  in  the 
year  4G9  B.  C.  His  father  was  a  sculptor,  and  Socrates 
himself  followed  this  occupation  for  a  time ;  three 
draped  figures  of  the  Graces,  said  to  be  his  work,  were 
seen  by  Pausanias  in  the  Acropolis.  His  mother  was 
a  midwife,  and  he  frequently  compares  his  art  io  hers, 
since  it  consists  rather  in  helping  others  to  the  birth  of 
thoughts,  than  in  producing  them  himself.  Little  is 
known  of  his  early  education,  but  he  must  have  par- 
ticipated in  all  the  elements  of  culture  to  be  found 
at   that   time   in  Athens.     In   the   dialogue  of  Phaedo, 


64 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


Socrates  is  represented  as  passing  from  the  views  of 
the  early  physicists  and  of  Anaxagoras  to  his  own  pecu- 
liar point  of  view  ;  and  although  Plato's  testimony  is 
doubtless  influenced  by  the  Platonic  doctrine  of  ideas, 
it  is  probable,  as  Ueberweg  says,  that  Plato  transfers 
from  his  own  thought  only  that  which  would  naturally 
follow  from  the  views  h'feld  by  the  historical  Socrates. 

Socrates  took  part  in  the  military  campaigns  of 
Potid^a,  Delium,  and  Amphipolis,  during  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war,  and  was  distinguished,  not  only  for  his  in- 
trepidity and  endurance,  but  for  saving  the  lives  of  his 
fellow-citizens,  Alcibiades  and  Xenophon.  He  never 
left  Athens  on  any  other  occasion,  except  once  to  attend 
a  public  festival.  He  withdrew  from  political  activity 
so  far  as  was  consistent  with  his  duty  as  an  Athenian 
citizen,  and  during  the  course  of  a  long  life  held  but 
once  a  public  office.  It  is  noteworthy  that  in  this 
position  he  displayed  that  fearless  adherence  to  what 
he  considered  right  which  characterized  all  his  conduct ; 
he  could  not  be  intimidated,  either  by  the  wrath  of  the 
rulers  or    of  the  people,    to    acquiesce    in   an    illegal 

measure. 

It  is  uncertain  at  what  time  Socrates  first  began  to 
devote  himself  to  what  he  regarded  as  his  peculiar 
mission,  the  awakening  of  his  fellow-men  to  moral  con- 
sciousness and  a  desire  after  true  knowledge.  He  is 
uniformly  represented  by  his  followers  as  a  man  already 
advanced  in  years.  His  mode  of  instruction  was 
wholly  different  from  that  of  the  Sophists.  Day  after 
day  he  went  to  the  markets  and  the  public  walks,  to 
the  gymnasia  and  the  workshops,  in  order  to  converse 


SOCEATES. 


65 


with  young  and  old,  with  citizens  and  strangers.  He 
would  begin  with  the  topic  nearest  at  hand,  the  trade 
of  the  cobbler,  perhaps,  or  of  the  blacksmith,  then  give 
the  discourse  such  a  turn  as  to  elicit  from  the  mind  of 
hia  listener  some  truth  or  thought  hitherto  undiscovered. 
This  was  the  great  vocation  to  which  he  devoted  himself 
unweariedly,  contending  against  the  self-conceit,  the 
boastfulness  and  frivolity  of  youth,  seeking  to  guide 
all  with  whom  he  came  in  contact  to  true  self-knowledge 
and  morality. 

His  own  character  is  described  as  a  model  of  virtue. 
'*No  one,"  says  Xenophon,  ''has  seen  or  heard  any- 
thing unworthy  of  Socrates ;  he  was  so  pious  that  he 
did  nothing  without  the  advice  of  the  gods ;  so  just 
that  he  never  injured  any  one  in  the  least ;  so  much  a 
master  of  himself  that  he  never  chose  the  pleasant  in- 
stead of  the  good ;  so  discerning  that  he  never  failed 
to  distinguish  the  better  from  the  worse  ;  in  a  word, 
he  was  the  best  and  happiest  man  possible.'' 

Plato  also  extols  the  simplicity,  the  moderation,  the 
self-control  of  Socrates,  whom  he  represents  as  the  best 
man  of  his  time,  the  most  just  and  full  of  insight, 
inspired  by  the  deepest  piety,  dedicating  his  whole  life 
to  the  service  of  others,  and  dying  a  martyr  in  accord- 
ance with  what  he  believed  to  be  the  will  of  God. 
Other  writers  dwell  upon  his  Athenian  polish  and 
urbanity,  his  cheerfulness  and  humor,  his  real  kindness 
of  heart,  and  describe  him  as  the  perfect  model  of  a 
highly-cultivated  man,  knowing  how  to  avoid  the  dis- 
agreeable in  his  intercourse  with  others  and  to  stimulate 
into  activity  whatever  was  best  and  most  worthy.     Ac- 


66 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


cording  to  his  own  testimony,  he  only  became  what  he 
was  after  a  long  struggle  with  lower  passions  and  im- 
pulses. 

''He  stands  before  us," says  Hegel,  ''a  finished  work 
of  classic  art,  who  has  brought  himself  to  this  height. 
In  a  work  of  art  every  feature  is  designed  to  bring 
out  one  idea,  to  represent  one  character,  that  it  may 
constitute  a  living  and  beautiful  creation;  for  the 
highest  beauty  consists  in  the  most  complete  develop- 
ment on  all  sides  of  individuality  according  to  one 
inner  principle.  The  great  men  of  that  time  are  such 
works  of  art.  The  highest  plastic  individual  as  a 
statesman  is  Pericles,  and  around  him  like  stars, 
Sophocles,  Thucydides,  Socrates,  etc.,  have  worked 
out  their  own  individuality  and  given  it  a  peculiar 
character,  which  is  the  ruling,  innermost  principle  of 
their  being  and  culture.  Pericles  lived  only  for  this 
aim,  to  be  a  statesman  ;  and  Plutarch  relates  that  he 
never  smiled  or  went  to  a  banquet  after  he  devoted 
himself  to  statesmanship.  Thus  did  Socrates  also, 
through  his  art  and  the  power  of  self-conscious  will, 
develop  in  himself  this  definite  character,  and  acquire 
this  skill  in  his  life-vocation.  Through  his  principle 
he  gained  an  influence  still  active  in  religion,  science, 
and  right,  because  since  him  the  genius  of  inner  con- 
viction is  the  basis  which  is  valid  first  of  all  to  man." 

But  Socrates  is,  nevertheless,  a  thorough  Greek,  and 
cannot  be  taken  as  the  universal  moral  standard  for  all 
time.  Plato  in  a  characteristic  scene  describes  the 
moderation  of  Socrates  in  regard  to  wine,  which  was- 
in  reality  no  moderation  according  to  the  usual   sense 


SOCRATES. 


67 


of  the  word,  since  the  simple  fact  is  that  he  can  drink 
more  wine  than  others  without  being  intoxicated.  Was 
he  able  to  do  this,  as  Hegel  intimates,  through  the 
power  of  self-conscious  will  ?  His  moderation  is  cer- 
tainly not  asceticism,  and  his  self-control  is  not  self- 
denial,  but  consists  rather  in  a  state  of  mental  freedom 
which  is  never  lost  amid  the  seductions  of  the  senses. 

Another  peculiarity  of  his  character,  purely  Greek, 
was  his  ardent  friendship  for  young  men,  and  his  neg- 
lect of  the  domestic  relation.  Whatever  may  be  the 
truth  in  regard  to  the  ill-nature  of  Xanthippe  (and 
she  has  not  been  without  her  defenders),  it  is  certain  that 
a  man  like  Socrates  would  have  tried  the  patience  of 
any  modern  wife  or  mother.  But  we  must  not  forget 
that  this  was  one  great  blemish  of  Athenian  civilization, 
— the  exclusion  of  wives,  mothers,  and  sisters  from  social 
and  intellectual  companionsliip  with  their  husbands, 
sons  and  brothers. 

On  tlie  one  side,  the  peculiarities  of  Socrates  are 
essentially  Greek ;  on  the  other,  essentially  modern. 
His  own  personal  appearance  expressed  the  contradiction 
l)etween  the  outward  and  the  inward,  so  foreign  to  the 
classic  ideal.  The  ugliness  of  his  face  and  figure,  his 
neglect  of  beauty  of  form  in  his  philosophic  discourses, 
and  the  homely  illustrations  which  he  used  drawn  from 
the  most  prosaic  trades  and  occupations,  must  have 
offended  the  artistic  instinct  of  the  Greeks,  and  en- 
hanced for  them  the  singularity  of  his  appearance.  Plato 
represents  him,  in  the  Phfedrus,  as  refusing  to  walk  out 
because  he  can  learn  nothing  from  the  trees  and  from 
the  country. 


68 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


United  with  this  indifference  to  the  external  world  was 
an  absorption  in  his  innermost  self,  whicli  at  times  seemed 
half  to  overpower  the  clearness  of  his  consciousness.  To 
this  may  be  referred  the  ecstatic  states,  described  in 
Plato's  Symposium,  and  that  demonic  revelation,  known 
as  the  ^^  Genius*'  of  Socrates,  which  he  ascribed  without 
farther  analysis  to  divine  agency. 

Plato  and  Xenophon  mention  only  demonic  signs, 
and  nowhere  speak  as  if  Socrates  believed  in  a  personal 
demon.  Hegel  compares  the  voice  heard  by  Socrates  to 
that  prophetic  knowledge  sometimes  evinced  by  the  dy- 
ing, or  those  very  ill,  inexplicable  from  the  standpoint  of 
ordinary  consciousness.  In  the  Apology,  Socrates  says : 
'*Some  may  wonder  why  I  go  about  in  private,  giving 
advice  and  busying  myself  with  the  concerns  of  others, 
but  do  not  venture  to  come  forward  in  public  and  advise 
the  State.  I  will  tell  you  the  reason  of  this.  You  have 
often  heard  me  speak  of  an  oracle  or  sign  which  comes  to 
me,  and  is  the  divinity  which  Miletus  ridicules  in  the 
indictment.  This  sign  I  have  had  ever  since  I  was  a 
child.  The  sign  is  a  voice  which  comes  to  me  and  always 
forbids  me  to  do  something  which  I  am  going  to  do,  but 
never  commands  me  to  do  anything,  and  this  is  what 
stands  in  the  way  of  my  being  a  politician.'' 

Had  the  voice  been  that  of  conscience  it  would  have 
commanded  as  well  as  forbidden,  and  would  have  been 
concerned  with  the  moral  value  and  worthlessness  of  an 
action,  rather  than  its  consequences.  One  explanation 
considers  it  as  a  kind  of  practical  insight,  or  tact,  an 
immediate  conviction  of  the  suitableness  or  unsuita- 
bleness  of    certain  actions,    resulting   partly   from   life- 


SOCBATES. 


69 


experience,  partly  from  self-knowledge,  but  transformed 
according  to  the  spirit  of  the  time  into  a  divine  revela- 
tion. 

Hegel    thinks   that  it   occupied   the   middle   ground 

between  the  external  Greek  oracle  and  the  purely  in- 
ternal oracle  of  spirit,  marking  the  transition  of  human 
consciousness  from  reliance  on  outward  to  reliance  on 
inward  authority.  The  Greeks,  with  all  their  freedom, 
did  not  decide  from  subjective  conviction,  but  in  doubt- 
ful matters  concerning  the  state,  or  mere  private 
affairs,  consulted  the  oracle.  They  had  not  reached 
the  modern  standpoint  which  demands  the  testimony 
of  the  spirit  within  for  every  decision.  It  is  the 
principle  of  Socrates  which  effects  this  world-conversion, 
and  Socrates  therefore  unites  in  himself  the  charac- 
teristics of  Greek  and  of  modern  consciousness  ;  ''distin- 
guished from  all  his  contemporaries,"  says  Zeller,  **by 
that  power  of  inward  concentration,  so  foreign  to  his 
race,  through  which  an  invisible  breach  first  took  place 
in  the  plastic  unity  of  Greek  life." 


THE   FATE  OF  SOCRATES. 


71 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


THE    FATE   OF   SOCRATES. 


I 


N  his  seventieth  year,  Socrates  was  brought  to  trial 
by  his  fellow-citizeus  in  Athens.  The  accusation 
against  him  consisted  of  two  points :  that  he  was  neg- 
lecting the  gods  of  the  state,  and  introducing  new 
deities,  and  that  he  was  corrupting  the  youth.  The 
accusers  were  Meletus,  a  poet,  Anytus,  a  demagogue, 
and  Lycon,  an  orator,— men  of  comparative  insignifi- 
cance in  the  state. 

It   was    contrary  to    the   nature    of    Socrates  to  de- 
fend   himself    by    means    of    the    artful    oratory    then 
practiced  in  Athens.      He  relied  on  the  simple  truth, 
and    left    the   issue   in   tlie   hands    of    God.      His   lan- 
guage was  not  that  of  a  criminal,  but  of  an  impartial 
reasoner  who  would  fain  dispel  erroneous  notions.     He 
would  not  condescend  to  address  the  judges  in  terms  of 
entreaty.     His  proud  and  dignified  bearing  offended  the 
membei-8  of  a  popular  tribunal  accustomed  to  deference 
and  homage  from  the  most  eminent  statesmen  and  gen- 
erals.    He  was  pronounced  guilty  by  a  small  majority. 
But  according  to  the  Athenian  laws  he  was  left  free  to 
express  an  opinion  as  to  the  punishment  he  sliould  re- 
ceive, this  expression  being  an  implied  acknowledgment 
of  guilt.     He  refused  to  name  any  punishment,  but  de- 
clared himself  worthy  of  reward  as  a  benefactor  of  the 

70 


state.  Finally,  however,  he  yielded  to  the  entreaties  of 
his  friends,  and  consented  to  a  fine  of  thirty  minae,  which 
he  could  pay  without  owning  himself  guilty.  He  was 
thereupon  condemned  to  death. 

The  execution  of  the  sentence  was  delayed  thirty  days, 
until  the  return  of  the  sacred  ship  from  Delos.  Socrates 
employed  the  time  in  social  intercourse  with  his  friends, 
retaining  through  the  whole  period  his  accustomed  cheer- 
fulness and  serenity.  He  scorned,  as  unworthy,  the 
means  of  escape  offered  by  his  friend  Crito,  believing 
that,  as  a  citizen  of  the  state,  he  ought  to  obey  its 
laws  and  submit  to  its  sentence  of  death.  This  seems 
slightly  at  variance  with  his  refusal  to  acknowledge  him- 
self guilty.  But  the  refusal  was  based  on  a  higher  law 
than  that  of  the  state,  *'  The  unwritten  laws  of  God 
that  know  no  change."  Conscious  of  the  right,  Socrates 
would  not  yield.  He  acknowledged  the  sovereignty  of 
the  people  with  this  one  exception. 

The  competence  of  the  court  is  presupposed  to-day, 
and  the  sentence  is  executed  without  farther  formalities  ; 
regard  is  paid  rather  to  the  act  than  to  the  disposition  of 
the  subject.  But  the  Athenians  required  that  the  decree 
of  the  court  should  be  sanctioned  by  the  convicted  man 
himself,  who  was  left  free  to  estimate  his  own  punish- 
ment and  thereby  acknowledge  the  justice  of  bis  sen- 
tence. Socrates,  who  stood  acquitted  before  the  bar  of 
his  own  individual  conscience,  opposed  this  acquittal  to 
the  conviction  of  the  judges. 

But  the  first  principle  of  a  state  is  this :  that  there 
is  no  higher  reason,  or  conscience,  or  justice,  than 
that   which  the   state   recognizes.      Hence  the  fate   of 


72 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


Socrates  is  truly  tragic,  like  the  fate  of  Antigone.  There 
is  a  conflict  between  his  duty  to  the  state  and  his 
duty  to  himself;  between  the  law  of  the  land  and 
the  diviner  law  within  his  own  breast.  Two  moral 
forces  come  into  collision  one  with  the  other,  and  this 
is  what  is  meant  by  the  tragic  and  tragedy.  The  fate 
of  Socrates  is  not  merely  personal  ;  it  is  the  tragedy  of 
Athens,  of  Greece.  Two  rights,  equally  valid,  are  op- 
posed to  each  other ;  the  right  of  objective  freedom 
secured  by  life  in  and  for  the  state,  and  the  right  of 
subjective  freedom,  of  the  individual  conscience.  The 
Athenian  people  had  reached  that  point  in  their  develop- 
ment when  the  state,  the  outward  manifestation  of  their 
national  spirit,  no  longer  satisfied  the  inner  needs  of  the 
individual.  In  condemning  Socrates  to  death  they  com- 
mitted the  injustice  of  making  him  pay  the  penalty  of 
that  which  was  historically  the  fault  of  all,  if  fault  it 
were. 

Plato  has  given  us  a  touching  and  beautiful  picture  of 
the  last  hours  of  Socrates.  They  were  passed  in  quiet 
converse  with  his  friends  on  the  subject  of  immortality. 
When  the  final  moment  came  he  calmly  drank  the  cup  of 
poisoned  hemlock,  conscious  that  death  would  strengthen 
his  influence  and  give  to  his  life  and  work  the  highest 
stamp  of  truth. 

Different  opinions  have  been  held  by  different  writers 
as  to  the  causes  and  the  justice  of  his  condemnation. 
Hegel  believes  that  both  Socrates  and  the  Athenian  peo- 
ple were  alike  innocent  and  alike  guilty  ;  that  Socrates 
was  the  representative  of  the  modern  spirit,  the  principle 
of  subjectivity,  the  individual  conscience,  as  opposed  to 


THE   FATE  OF   SOCRATES. 


73 


the  unreflecting  Greek  morality  resting  on  the  basis  of 

tradition. 

But  the  Athenian  people  themselves  had  advanced 
beyond  their  old  standpoint ;  they  too,  as  well  as  Socrates, 
were  in  part  children  of  the  new  time.  The  moral 
life  of  Greece  rested  originally  on  authority ;  Socrates 
substituted  instead  personal  conviction.  The  indi- 
vidual is  not  simply  to  obey  the  law,  he  is  to  discover, 
in  and  for  himself,  its  reason  and  its  justice.  Socrates 
spent  his  life  in  examining  the  current  notions  respecting 
morals,  seeking  their  causes  and  testing  their  truth.  The 
examination  led  him  to  the  same  results,  essentially,  as 
those  which  were  established  by  custom  and  tradition. 
Nevertheless,  his  attitude  towards  the  old  Greek  morality 
was  a  critical  attitude.  If  man  is  to  follow  his  private 
convictions  he  will  agree  with  the  popular  will  only  when 
it  agrees  with  his  own.  If  the  two  conflict  there  is  little 
doubt  what  side  he  will  espouse.  This  is  the  principle 
avowed  by  Socrates  in  the  celebrated  declaration  that  he 
would  obey  God  rather  than  the  Athenians. 

Plato  says  there  was  a  general  belief  that  the  teaching 
of  Socrates  was  of  a  dangerous  character,  and  he  adds 
that  it  was  then  impossible  for  any  one  to  speak  the  truth 
in  political  matters  without  being  persecuted  as  a  vain 
babbler,  a  corrupter  of  youth.  It  is  certain,  from  the 
testimony  of  Xenophon  and  Aristophanes,  that  the  preju- 
dice against  Socrates  was  not  confined  to  the  masses,  but 
was  shared  by  men  of  influence  in  the  state.  Aristo- 
phanes, an  enthusiastic  admirer  of  the  ''good  old  times," 
was  bitterly  hostile  to  the  new  ideas  introduced  into 
Athens  by  the  Sophists,  among  whom  he  classed  Socrates 
as  the  most  dangerous. 


74 


A   STUDY  OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


THE   FATE   OF   SOCRATES. 


75 


Aristophanes  and   the  Aristophanic    comedy    are    as 
much    a    product  of    the    time    as    Socrates    and    the 
Socratic  philosophy ;  both  are  stars  of  lesser  and  greater 
magnitude  in   that   brilliant    galaxy   which    constitutes 
the  glory  of  Athens.     Aristo])hanes,  though  sincere  in 
his  advocacy  of  the  old  and  his  scorn  for  the  new,  was 
himself  infected  by  the  very  spirit  which  he  attacks,  the 
spirit  of  progress.     His  representation  of  Socrates  in  the 
''Clouds"  though  an  unmistakable  likeness,  is  not  only 
exaggerated,  but  essentially  false,  -and  can  only  be  des- 
ignated,^^ says  Schwegler,  -as  a  culpable  misunderstand- 
ing, and  as  an  act  of  gross  injustice,  brought  about  by 
blinded  passion  ;  and  Hegel,  when  he  attempts  to  defend 
the  conduct  of  Aristophanes,  forgets  that  while  the  comic 
writer  may  caricature,  he  must  do  it  without  having  re- 
course to  public  calumniation." 

The  charge  brought  by  Aristophanes  against  Socrates 
was  three-fold:  that  he  devoted  himself  intellectually  to 
useless  subtleties  ;  that  he  rejected  the  Athenian  gods ; 
and  finally,  that  he  was  able  by  Sophistic  reasoning  to 
gain  for   the  wrong  side  the  victory  over  the  righr,  to 
make  the  weaker  argument  appear  the  stronger.     That 
the  comedy  of  Aristophanes  was  the  originating  cause  of 
the  persecution  directed  against  Socrates  is  improbable, 
yet  it  doubtless  expressed  what  others  thought,  and  could 
not  have  been  without  its  influence,  for  twenty-four  years 
later,  when  Socrates  was  legally  accused  and  convicted,  it 
was  upon  similar  grounds  to  those  brought  against  him'in 
the  -  Clouds." 

All  the  charges  seem  to  rest   upon  misunderstand- 
ings and    false    inferences.     For  instance,   it   was  said 


that  he  rejected  the  gods  of  the  State,  and  substituted 
in  their  place  a  deity  of  his  own,  his  demon.  This  was 
untrue.  He  worshipped  in  the  Athenian  temples  like 
his  fellow-citizens  ;  his  demon  was  not  a  new  god,  but  a 
private  subjective  oracle.  Socrates,  according  to  Hegel, 
is  the  hero  who  substitutes  for  the  Delphic  god  and  the 
Delphic  oracle  this  principle:  man  must  find  in  himself 
that  which  is  true.  The  thinking  self-consciousness,  not 
the  external  oracle,  is  the  final  authoritv.  This  inner 
certainty  was  in  truth  a  new  faith  differing  from  the  old, 
but  not  a  new  god  in  the  sense  meant  by  his  accusers. 

It  was  also  said  that  Socrates  had  corrupted  the  Athe- 
nian youth.  Here  again  he  is  identified  with  the  Sophists; 
the  charge  is  the  same  as  that  brought  against  their 
teaching.  The  views  of  Critias  and  Alcibiades  are  un- 
justly ascribed  to  his  influence  ;  and  it  is  concluded  that 
he  taught  men  to  despise  their  parents  and  relations  be- 
cause he  counselled  Anytus  to  educate  his  son  for  some- 
thing higher  than  the  leather  business.  The  inference  is 
unfair,  though  it  is  a  delicate  matter  for  a  third  person 
to  interfere  in  the  relation  between  parent  and  child. 

Nothing  in  the  shape  of  actual  deeds  could  be  laid  to 
the  charge  of  Socrates.  He  conscientiously  fulfilled  his 
duties  as  a  citizen,  and  never  transgressed  the  laws  of  the 
State.  His  political  theories  did  not  correspond  with  the 
existing  Athenian  institutions,  but  this  was  not  a  crime. 
He  did  not  believe  in  awarding  power  by  lot  or  election, 
but  according  to  the  qualifications  of  individuals.  This 
may  have  led  to  his  being  suspected  of  aristocratic  lean- 
ings by  the  Athenian  democracy.  But  it  could  not  affect 
the  purity  of  his  character  as  a  citizen.   Nevertheless,  the 


76 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


wht)le  character  of  his  philosophy,  the  demand  for  self- 
knowledge,  the  inward  turn  given  to  thought,  must  have 
weakened  in  himself,  and  in  his  disciples,  that  attachment 
to  political  life  which  was  the  soul  of  Greek  activity. 
Even  his  demon,  his  subjective  oracle,  was  dangerous  in 
a  country  where  oracles  had  not  only  a  religious  but  a 
political  significance. 

Zeller  calls  Socrates  the  precursor  and  founder  of  our 
moral  view  of  the  world  ;  but  adds,  that  to  one  starting 
from  the  old  Greek  view  of  the  state  and  of  right,  his 
condemnation  cannot  appear  altogether  unjust.  The 
truth  was  that  in  Athens  itself  the  old  morality  was  de- 
caying, and  that  Socrates  simply  entered  into  the  spirit 
of  his  time,  trying  to  reform  it  by  means  of  itself,  instead 
of  uselessly  attempting  to  bring  back  a  type  of  culture 
that  was  gone  forever.  It  was  a  mistake  to  hold  him  re- 
sponsible for  the  corruption  in  faith  and  morals  which  he 
was  trying  to  check  in  the  only  way  possible.  Zeller 
thinks  that  his  condemnation  was  not  only  a  great  in- 
justice according  to  our  conception  of  right,  but  was  a 
political  anachronism  according  to  the  standard  of  his 
own  time.  A  reformer  who  is  truly  conservative  is  at- 
tacked by  nominal  and  imaginary  restorers  of  the  good 
old  times.  The  Athenians,  in  punishing  him,  gave  them- 
selves up  for  lost ;  for  in  reality  it  is  not  for  destroying, 
but  for  attempting  to  restore  morals  that  he  is  punished. 

Aristophanes  and  his  followers  took  one  way  to  rebut 
the  Sophists ;  Socrates  took  another.  He  too,  like  the 
Sophists,  emphasizes  the  principle  of  subjectivity  ;  but  he 
shows  that  the  truth  lies  not  in  the  feeling  of  self,  which 
is  egotistic  and  exclusive,  but  in  the  idea  of  self,  which  is 


THE   FATE  OF   SOCRATES. 


77 


universal  and  comprehensive.  Confounded  with  the  So- 
phists by  his  accusers,  the  higher  principle  of  Socrates 
was  misunderstood  and  misinterpreted.  The  spirit  of 
Athens  was  divided  within  itself ;  its  internal  rupture 
was  reflected  in  its  declining  strength  and  power,  and 
finally  it  yielded  its  independence,  and  became  subject, 
first  to  Sparta,  then  to  Macedonia. 

Socrates  died  twenty-nine  years  after  the  death  of 
Pericles,  and  forty-four  years  before  the  birth  of  Alexan- 
der. He  witnessed  the  glory  and  the  decline  of  Athens, 
its  culminating  point  of  splendor  and  the  beginning  of  its 
ruin. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

THE  SOURCES   AND   CHARACTERISTICS   OF    THE    SOCRATIC 

PHILOSOPHY. 

QIOCRATES  committed  nothing  to  writing,  and  our 
^  knowledge  of  his  doctrines  is  derived  from  tlie  ac- 
counts of  Xenophon,  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Though  it  is 
doubtless  true  that  in  Plato's  Dialogues  the  thoughts  of 
Plato  himself  are  frequently  placed  in  the  mouth  of  Soc- 
rates, the  elements  peculiar  to  each  are  easily  discernible. 
Plato's  picture  of  Socrates  agrees  substantially  with  that 
of  Xenophon  in  those  dialogues  wherein  he  claims  to  be 
true  to  facts,  the  Apology  and  the  Symposium.  Socrates 
had  been  dead  six  years  when  Xenophon  wrote  the  Me- 
morabilia and  the  Symposium,  partly  from  his  own  recol- 
lection, partly  from  that  of  his  friends.  He  was  present 
in  person  at  some  of  the  scenes  which  he  describes  ;  when 
he  was  not  present  he  mentions  his  authority.  But 
Xenophon  appears  to  have  been  a  practical  man,  deficient 
in  the  philosophical  sense  ;  his  representation  of  Socrates 
is  therefore  one-sided.  He  emphasizes  the  ethical,  but 
neglects  the  scientific  side  of  the  Socratic  teaching.  It 
was  the  union  of  the  two  that  constituted  its  peculiarity. 
Socrates  recognized  that  morality  must  be  established 
on  a  scientific  basis  before  reform  is  possible.  I  must  not 
only  do  what  is  right ;  I  must  do  it  with  a  clear  con- 
sciousness that  it  is  right.    Socrates  could  not  distinguish 

78 


THE   SOCRATIC   PHILOSOPHY. 


79 


between  morality  and  knowledge  ;  in  this,  as  Zeller  ob- 
serves, he  was  the  child  of  his  age.  He  sought  to  reform 
morals  by  means  of  knowledge  ;  and  the  two  were  so 
closely  associated  in  his  own  mind  that  he  could  find  no 
object  for  knowledge  except  human  conduct,  and  no 
guarantee  for  conduct  except  knowledge.  Hence  the  deep 
importance  attached  to  the  personality  of  the  thinker, 
the  impossibility  of  considering  the  philosophy  of  Soc- 
rates apart  from  his  life  and  character. 

**  In  Socrates  commences  an  unbounded  reference  to 
the  person,''  says  Hegel,  *'to  the  freedom  of  the  inner 
life."  This  is  the  source  of  his  one-sideduess  ;  he  directs 
all  his  activity  and  striving  towards  morals,  and  neglects 
the  other  sciences.  He  teaches  each  one  to  find  as  the 
essence  of  his  own  individual  being  the  absolute  and  uni- 
versal concept  of  the  good.  Consciousness  turns  inward 
upon  itself,  and  tests  the  xalidity  of  every  moral  axiom 
by  an  inner  standard  of  right.  That  it  is  a  decree  of  the 
state  or  the  will  of  the  gods  is  not  enough  ;  the  moral 
consciousness  asks:  Is  it  true  in  itself  ?  This  return 
into  itself  is  the  highest  bloom  of  the  Athenian  spirit,  a 
point  of  culture  not  reached  by  the  Spartans.  But  it  is 
fraught  with  danger.  It  is  the  isolating  of  the  individual 
from  the  universal,  the  care  of  man  for  his  single  self  at 
the  cost  of  the  state,  a  higher  and  more  comprehensive 
self.  Morality  wavers  when  man  makes  for  himself,  in- 
dividually, his  own  laws  and   maxims. 

But  Socrates  penetrated  to  the  kernel  of  the  matter, 
and  found  at  the  basis  of  self-consciousness  an  absolute 
moral  authority.  He  taught  men  to  find  the  good  and 
the  true  within    their    own   thought.     That  knowledge 


80 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


THE   SOCRATIC   PHILOSOPHY. 


81 


is  elicited  from  the  mind  itself,  that  it  comes  from 
within  and  not  from  without,  is  a  thought  contained 
in  the  doctrine  of  Socrates,  but  developed  more  fully 
by  Plato.  No  external  power  can  force  a  man  to 
think,  he  must  think  for  and  from  himself.  To  learn 
is  only  to  become  acquainted  with  external  things 
through  experience.  But  the  knowledge  of  uuiversals, 
the  only  true  knowledge,  belongs  to  thought.  Nothing 
is  valid,  according  to  Socrates,  without  the  inner 
testimony  of  the  spirit.  Hegel  thus  expresses  it: 
"  As  it  is  said  in  the  Bible,  flesh  of  my  flesh  and  bone 
of  my  bone,  so  that  which  is  true  and  right  to  me  must 
be  spirit  of  my  spirit."  There  is  that  within  me, 
planted  by  nature,  belonging  to  me  as  a  particular 
individual,  the  selfish  self;  there  is  that  within  me, 
higher  and  holier,  a  part  of  the  divine  reason,  belong- 
ing to  me  as  an  immortal  person,  the  unselfish  self. 
Socrates  opposed  the  second  to  the  first,  man  the  uni- 
versal to  man  the  particular.  The  Sophists  insisted 
upon  the  feeling  of  self,  which  is  egotistic  and  ex- 
clusive ;  Socrates  insisted  upon  the  idea  of  self,  which 
is  universal  and  inclusive,  **the  true  equalizer  of 
the  human  race." 

His  philosophy  starts  from  the  Delphic  oracle, 
^'Know  thyself,"  and  involves  a  thorough  sifting  and 
testing  of  the  general  concepts  found  within  the  mind. 
The  majority  of  men  confine  themselves  to  supposi- 
tions and  traditionary  facts,  whose  accuracy  they 
neither  question  nor  examine.  They  think  themselves 
wise  when  in  reality  they  know  nothing.  This  is  the 
meaning  of  the  Delphic   oracle  that  calls  Socrates  the 


wisest  of  men,  wisest  in  this,  that  he  is  conscious  of 
his  own  ignorance.  To  possess  this  consciousness 
is  most  helpful  to  the  seeker  after  truth,  who  must 
have  an  open  eye,  a  single  purpose,  and  an  honest 
mind  to  receive  it   when  it  comes. 

Socrates  taught  men  to  think  for  themselves,  to 
analyze  their  language  and  thoughts,  to  test  their 
opinions,  to  reason  from  the  particular  and  contin- 
gent to  the  universal  and  necessary.  Instead  of  vague 
notions,  he  sought  to  obtain  correct  concepts  of  every 
object,  by  considering  it  on  all  sides,  under  different 
points  of  view,  that  his  knowledge  of  it  might  be 
true  instead  of  imaginary.  The  soul  of  his  teaching 
is  contained  in  the  principle  that  true  knowledge  must 
proceed  from  correct  concepts.  The  ordinary  way  is 
to  accept  things  as  they  appear  to  the  senses ;  but 
when  man  begins  to  reflect  he  begins  also  to  correct 
his  sensuous  impressions  by  means  of  thought.  What 
is  thought  ?  Can  you  think  a  single  thing,  a  maple, 
for  instance,  without  including  in  your  thought  the 
class,  or  genus  tree,  to  which  it  belongs  ?  Does  not 
the  essence  of  thinking  consist  in  having  something 
more  present  to  the  mind  than  that  which  ostensibly 
claims  the  attention  ?  This  something  more  is  what 
Socrates  seeks  to  analyze  and  define,  the  general  con- 
cept as  distinguished  from  the  particular  sensuous  im- 
pression. 

According  to  Aristotle,  in  his  Metaphysics,  Socrates 
introduced  the  method  of  inductive  reasoning  and  of 
logical  definition,  which  constitutes  the  basis  of 
scientific    investigation.      How   these    elements     stand 


82 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


related  to  his  fundamental  principle  of  self-knovledge 
will  be  shown  presently. 

Tlio  mctliod  wae  not  BomethiDg  doarij  defined  in 
his  own  ronsnion«no88,  but  ft  natqnil  manner  of  philoe- 
ophizing  und  imparting  ingtruction  pecnlinr  to  himself. 
Ho  nought  fir8t  to  convinco  men  of  their  ignoninoe. 
Nothing  is  nioro  fatal  than  to  beliere  yon  knowr  wluit 
you  do  not  know.  Nothing  18  more  eseeutinl  than  to 
igninh  between  irluii  you  know  and  what  you  only 
think  jou  know.  Self-examination  is  a  preliminary 
step  to  the  attainment  of  true  knowledge ;  <elf-deltiKton 
in  tt  frLM{uent  douroe  of  error.  Socratee  by  a  xcriea  of 
skillful  quefttions  exYVM^l  the  lait>  and  liimalated  raon 
to  attempt  the  tinii.  .Apparently  ignorant  and  eager 
to  1)0  inxtruetcd  by  tho««o  with  whom  lie  oonrerees^  he 
aecopta  their  opinions  only  to  entangle  them  aftervarda 
in  contrudictiony  and  absurdities,  dodncing  unexpected 
oonsequences^  and  confusing  tbem  more  and  more  until 
finally  their  supposed  knowledge  tanislic^.  This  is 
the  celebrated  Socratic  irony^  the  critical  factor  in  the 
Soeralio  method^  assuming  its  peculiar  form  from  the 
presupposed  ignorance  of  the  one  who  niHa*  it  luc  an 
instrument.  Tlie  subject  upon  whom  it  ix  pntctifcd 
discover  that  lu;  known  nothing,  and  rc^rds  all  his 
previous  notions  and  beliefs  dintrtiKt fully.  It  iM  not  ii 
sceptical  denial  of  knowhslgt;  on  the  part  of  Socmton^ 
but  an  acknowledgment  of  his  own  ignorance^  and  a 
discovery  of  the  ignorance  of  thoee  to  wliom  he  ap- 
plies his  testing  process.  ^^The  idea  of  knowing  was 
an  infinite  problem  to  Socrates,'*  says  Zeller,  *' opposite 
which  be  could  only  bo  conscious  of  his  own  uncertainty." 


THK  SOCttATT"   I*nTI.O'«iOPnT. 


^ 


Socfilet^  like  the  Sophi*^  *  tui  all  that  had 

IMpeviously  passed  for  tmth  <  farther,  he 

strikes  out  a  new  road  for  its  attainment,  leading  to  a 
new  world  of  thought,  whose  oonqncst  h  reaerred  for 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  but  whose  discovery  is  due  to 
Socrates  bimiielL  Not  fnuling  in  him»lf  what  he 
•ought,  he  aj>plied  to  othem;  love  of  knowltslge  is  an 
impulse  to  friendship,  and  the  blending  ol  Ibe  two 
ooDStitutiM  the  Socratic  Kros.  By  a  kirn!  of  art  that 
he  calls  intdlectual  midwifery,  be  sought  Ui  help  into 
the  world  tboughu  that  lie  laU»nt  in  every  one's  con- 
sctottsnesa.  This  u  the  positire  Ma  of  his  interrogatory 
atiidjsis,  an  attempt  to  produ<^e  rwil  knowledge,  which 
according  to  his  idea  and  method  can  only  proooed  from 

true  concepts. 

His  method  is  that  of  induetion.  Starting  from 
tbo  Amplest  object  and  the  moit  common  notioiut 
concerning  ii»  he  analyzes  them  so  thoroughly  a*  to 
bring  o«t  the  opposition  which  each  contains  within 
itself,  or  in  r  a\  to  »orae  other;  correcU  one-sided 
aisumptionM  by  additional  obaarratioiiB ;  and  succeeds 
finally  in  separating  that  which  belongs  to  tlie  esaenoe 
of  the  object  from  that  whioh  is  aoctdental  and  couUn- 
gent  It  is  a  procees  of  d  ion.  the  art  of  forming 
concepts.  It  is  also  a  culture  of  self-consciousneis.  the 
development  of  reason.  Thu  child  and  tlie  savage 
dwell  in  a  world  of  concrete  .^le  representations ;  the 
adult  and  the  civiliaed  man  live  amid  thoughia  and 
abstractions.  IlluKtrations  that  appear  tedkMis  and 
trivial  to  us  in  our  present  stage  of  reflection  were 
sawntial  to  clearness  of  expression  in  the  i^  of  Socrates. 


It 


84 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


■n 


The  important  element  in  liis  dialogues  is  their 
method,  the  fact  that  what  were  formerly  unexplained 
hypotheses  and  unconscious  guess-work  is  now  arrived 
at  by  a  process  of  thinking.  His  investigations  are 
directed  mainly  towards  the  necessity  of  knowledge  and 
the  nature  of  morality,  towards  moral  and  intellectual 
self-analysis.  The  critical  discussions  in  which  he  en- 
gages oblige  the  speakers  to  consider  what  their  notions 
imply,  and  the  aim  of  their  actions. 

The  problem  of  philosophy  for  Socrates,  according 
to  Aristotle,  is  to  seek  for  the  essence  of  virtue,  and 
virtue  is  regarded  as  a  knowing.  Socrates  seeks  to 
define  the  concept  of  temperance,  of  valor,  of  justice, 
because  according  to  his  idea  a  knowledge  of  their 
real  essence  constitutes  the  only  safe  moral  guide. 
Schwegler  characterizes  the  Socratic  method  *'as  the 
skill  by  which  a  certain  number  of  given,  homogeneous 
and  individual  phenomena  was  taken,  and  their  logical 
unity,  the  universal  principle  which  lay  at  their  basis, 
inductively  found.  This  method  presupposes  the  recog- 
nition that  the  essence  of  the  objects  must  be  compre- 
hended in  the  thought,  that  the  conception  is  the  true 
being  of  the  thing.  Hence  we  see  that  the  Platonic 
doctrine  of  ideas  is  only  the  objectifying  of  this  method 
which  in  Socrates  appears  no  farther  than  a  subjective 
dexterity.  The  Platonic  ideas  are  the  universal  concepts 
of  Socrates  posited  as  real  individual  beings.'' 


CHAPTER    XVI. 


THE    SOCRATIC    ETHICS. 


THE  leading  thought  of  the  ethics  of  Socrates  is 
expressed  in  the  sentence:  All  virtue  is  true 
knowledge.  ''  Socrates,  by  laying  down  thought,  or  more 
strictly  self -consciousness,  as  the  groundwork  of  ethics,'' 
says  Prof.  Ferrier,  '' supplies  the  truest  of  all  founda- 
tions for  a  system  of  absolute  morality,  and  contains 
the  germ  of  all  the  ethical  speculations,  whether  polemi- 
cal or    positive,    which    have  been  unfolded   since  his 

time." 

We   cannot  do    right   without   knowing  what   right 
is ;  to   know   it  and   not   to  do   it  appeared  impossible 
to  Socrates.     No  man,  according  to  his  theory,  is  vol- 
untarily vicious.      If  he  knew  that  thinking  was  his 
real  self,  his  real  nature,  and  that  appetites  and  passions 
are  enslaving  forces,  he  would  aim  at  their  restraint, 
and  at  the  preservation  of  his  true  being  and  personality. 
Man  does  not  pursue  evil  unless  he  thinks  it  good  for 
himself,  unless  he    mistakes  the  essence    of    his    own 
nature,  and  believes  that  it  consists  of  sensation  instead 
of  thought.     Right  action    follows  necessarily    from  a 
knowledge  of  the  right,  according  to  the  Socratic  prin- 
ciple ;    wrong  action,    from   an  absence   of  knowledge. 
As  regards  the  virtue  of  bravery,  Socrates  argued  that 
he  who  recognizes  the  true  nature  of  an  apparent  danger 

85 


86 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


and  the  means  to  meet  it,  has  more  courage  than  he 
who  does  not.  Nothing  is  more  essential  morally  than 
self-knowledge  ;  because  he  who  knows  himself  truly 
will  unfailingly  do  what  is  right,  while  he  who  is  igno- 
rant of  himself,  or  who  mistakes  apparent  for  real 
knowledge,  will  do  wrong.  With  Socrates,  knowledge 
is  not  merely  an  indispensable  condition,  and  means  of 
help   to   virtue,    but  it   is  the   whole  of  virtue. 

Plato  and  Aristotle  correct  this  one-sidedness.  Aris- 
totle objects  that  Socrates  does  not  distinguish  between 
the  intellectual  and  the  emotional  parts  of  the  soul,  that 
he  deprives  our  virtuous  affections  of  the  warmth  and 
spontaneity  by  which  they  are  characterized.  What  is 
wanting  in  Socrates  is  the  side  of  subjective  reality 
which  we  call  the  heart.  Knowledge  is  essential  to 
virtue,  but  is  not  the  whole  of  virtue,  or  virtue  would 
belong  only  to  thought,  to  the  intellect  alone. 

The  experiences  of  the  time  convinced  Socrates  that 
tradition  and  custom,  even  the  authority  of  the  laws, 
could  not  oppose  moral  scepticism  ;  that  the  basis  must 
be  laid  deeper,  that  the  activity  of  man  must  be  guided 
by  clear  and  definite  knowledge.  If  the  question  is 
asked.  Knowledge  of  what?  Socrates  replies.  Of  the 
Good.  But  what  is  the  good  ?  The  good,  according 
to  his  definition,  is  the  concept  of  knowledge  treated 
as  an  aim,  or  knowledge  itself  in  its  practical  applica- 
tion ;  an  explanation  indeterminate  enough  to  admit 
of  various  interpretations.  Socrates  at  one  time  ex- 
plains the  good  as  the  useful,  and  apparently  recom- 
mends virtue  because  it  is  most  richly  rewarded  by  God 
and  man.     At  another  time  he  qualifies  this  statement 


THE   SOCRATIC   ETHICS. 


87 


by  saying  that  virtue  is  useful  because  it  is  connected 
with  the  health  of  the  soul,  the  divine  part  in  man,  the 
seat  of  reason. 

It  is  certainly  a  contradiction,  as  Zeller  says,  to 
explain  virtue  as  the  highest  aim  of  life,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  recommend  it  on  account  of  the  advan- 
tages it  brings.  But  this  contradiction  proceeds  from 
the  abstract  character  of  the  concept  of  virtue,  and 
the  impossibility  of  deriving  definite  moral  activity 
from  the  general  principle  that  virtue  is  a  knowing. 
Kant  is  not  wholly  free  from  the  same  inconsistency. 
He  rejects  most  decidedly  every  moral  standard  based  on 
experience,  and  yet,  in  determining  the  maxims  suited 
to  the  principle  of  universal  legislation,  determines 
them  according  to  the  consequences  which  would  follow 
were  they  universally  adopted.  The  defect  in  the  ethics 
of  Socrates  is  not  so  much  a  want  of  moral  value  as 
of  scientific   reflection. 

Though  accident  in  a  great  measure  guided  the 
discourses  of  Socrates,  there  were  three  points,  according 
to  Xenophon,  that  he  treated  with  especial  preference. 
The  first  was  the  independence  of  the  individual  through 
the  limitation  of  his  wants  and  desires ;  the  second 
was  the  ennobling  of  the  life  of  the  soul  through  friend- 
ship;  the  third  and  most  important  was  the  further- 
ance of  the  common  weal  by  an  ordered  life  in  and  for 
the  state.  Man,  according  to  Socrates,  only  becomes 
master  of  himself  through  freedom  from  needs,  and 
the  exercise  of  his  thinking  faculty ;  if  dependent  on 
bodily  conditions  and  enjoyments,  he  is  a  slave. 

Socrates  did  not   shun   sensuous   pleasures,    but   was 


88 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


THE  SOCRATIC   ETHICS. 


89 


able  to  preserve  in  the  midst  of  them  perfect  control  of 
himself  and  of  his  thought.  A  thorough  Greek,  he 
aimed  at  moderation  and  freedom  of  mind  rather  than 
asceticism.  He  appreciated  highly  the  worth  of  true 
friendship,  affirming  that  it  was  conformable  to  man's 
nature,  and  necessary  for  mutual  help  and  interchange  of 
ideas.  So  far  as  it  proceeds  from  human  needs  and 
wants  it  is  based  on  utility  ;  but  Socrates  conceives  it  also 
in  its  ideal  form,  existing  only  for  the  sake  of  the 
good.  In  his  low  estimation  of  marriage  and  the  office 
of  woman  in  the  household,  he  agreed  with  his  fellow- 
countrymen,  and  speaks  ''  like  the  husband  of  Xanthippe 
rather  than  the  friend  of  Aspasia."  Yet  he  expressly 
acknowledges  his  indebtedness  to  one  woman,  Diotima, 
and  says  that  she  was  his  teacher  in  the  love  of  wisdom, 
or  philosophy.  His  own  conduct  shows  little  regard 
for  domestic  life.  He  considers  the  state  and  not  the 
family,  as  the  chief  object  of  moral  activity,  and  here^ 
again  he  is  purely  Greek.  He  not  only  requires  the  most 
unconditional  obedience  to  the  laws,  but  wishes  every- 
one of  ability  to  take  part  in  their  administration,  since 
the  welfare  of  individuals  depends  on  the  welfare  of 
the   community. 

This  is  in  accordance  with  the  old  Greek  view  of 
the  state;  but  he  departs  from  it  widely  in  other  re- 
spects. He  demands  that  everyone  who  aspires  to  be 
a  statesman  shall  prepare  himself  by  a  thorough  course 
of  self-analysis  and  discipline,  and  only  recognizes  a 
right  and  a  capacity  to  discharge  political  duties  when 
these  conditions  have  been  fulfilled.  He  believes  that 
where  the  rule  of  the  majority  prevails  an  upright  man    ' 


m 


can  do  nothing  but  return  to  private  life.  In  place  of 
equality,  or  an  aristocracy  of  birth  and  wealth,  he 
would  substitute  an  aristocracy  of  intelligence,  like  Plato 
in  the  Republic. 

These  ideas  brought  him  into  collision  with  the 
Athenian  democracy.  While  insisting  on  obedience  to 
the  laws,  he  at  the  same  time  tests  their  validity  by  an 
inner  standard  set  up  by  himself,  the  individual  con- 
science. This  contradiction  is  not  peculiar  to  Socrates, 
but  is  manifested  at  once  if  one  seeks  to  make  a  law 
of  the  state,  or  any  rule  of  conduct  absolute.  Even 
the  command,  ''  Thou  shalt  not  kill,"  is  conditioned  by 
circumstances.  The  same  consciousness  that  recognizes 
this  as  an  imperative  duty,  impels  one  to  battle  bravely 
in  defense  of  his  country,  or  to  slay  his  country's  enemies. 
The  laws  of  the  land  must  be  obeyed,  but  there  are 
times  and  occasions  when  disobedience  is  sublime,  and 
lifts  the  individual  to  a  height  of  moral  grandeur  ordin- 
arily unattainable.  This  was  the  case  with  Socrates 
himself,  and  the  Antigone  of  Sophocles.  But  the  in- 
dividual must  not  set  up  his  arbitrary  will  against  the 
will  of  the  state,  unless  he  possesses  an  insight  into  the 
eternal  principles  of  law  and  justice  and  morality,  and 
decides  according  to  their  dictates  instead  of  following 
his  own  subjective  liking  and  inclination. 

This  relation  between  the  subjective  will  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  his  objective  will  as  embodied  in  the  state, 
is  more  a  matter  of  conscious  reflection  to-day,  than  it 
was  in  the  time  of  Socrates.  It  was  misunderstood  by 
some  of  his  favorite  disciples,  notably  Alcibiades  and 
Critias,  one  of  whom  became  the  enemy  and  betrayer 


90 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


THE  SOCRATIC    ETHICS. 


91 


of  his  country,  the  other  its  opponent  and  tyrant.  They 
lived  in  accordance  with  a  one-sided  interpretation  of 
the  Socratic  principle  of  subjectivity,  and  cast  upon 
their  teacher  and  his  doctrines  a  discreditable  reflection 
wholly  undeserved.  For  the  aim  of  Socrates,  in  the 
self-culture  of  the  individual,  was  not  that  of  the 
Sophists,  to  advance  private  interest  and  acquire  per- 
sonal power  and  dexterity ;  but  to  attain  true  knowledge, 
and  thereby  establish  the  sovereignty  of  virtue  and  the 
well-being  of  the  community.  What  he  sought  was 
to  reform  the  state  rather  than  the  means  by  which 
it  might  be  governed. 

It  is  uncertain  whether  Socrates  went  beyond  the 
common  Greek  view  of  morality,  inculcating  good 
towards  friends,  but  permitting  evil  towards  enemies. 
In  one  of  the  earliest  dialogues  of  Plato,  he  is  made 
to  say  that  wrong-doing  cannot  be  permitted  even 
towards  one  from  whom  wrong-doing  has  been  suffered. 
Whether  this  sentiment  is  Plato's  own  or  that  of 
historical  Socrates,  is  undetermined. 

As  to  the  disgrace  that  was  generally  attached  to 
trade  and  commercial  pursuits  by  the  Greeks,  Socrates 
held  that  any  useful  activity  was  lionorable,  and  that 
idleness  alone  ought  to  call  forth  shame. 

Nahire.—ln  his  view  of  nature  he  refers  all  physical 
phenomena  to  man  as  their  highest  end.  ^'He  dwells 
on  the  Creator  rather  than  the  creation,"  and  shows 
what  care  has  been  taken  to  provide  for  human  needs 
and  wants.  He  argues  that  a  belief  in  God  and  provi- 
dence would  not  be  inborn  in  men  of  all  conditions  and 
times  if  it  were  not  true.     The  founder  of  a  scientific 


doctrine  of  ethics,  he  is  the  founder  also  of  that  ideal 
view  of  nature,  which  in  spite  of  all  abuses  and  objections 
has  proved  itself  of  value  in  the  study  of  empirical 
phenomena. 

The  adaptation  of  means  to  ends  in  the  world  of 
nature,  its  reasonable  arrangement,  led  him  to  the 
conception  of  the  one  Supreme  Being  who  sustains 
to  it  the  relation  of  soul  to  body.  Yet  he  frequently 
peaks  of  the  gods  as  many,  in  accordance  with  the 
popular  faith.  He  discussed  the  question  of  existence 
after  death,  and  considered  it  highly  probable.  *' Hap- 
piness, virtue,  knowledge,— this  was  the  Socratic  trin- 
ity," says  Dr.  Lord,  ''  the  three  indissolubly  connected 
together,  and  forming  the  life  of  the  soul,— the  only 
precious  thing  a  man  has,  since  it  is  immortal/* 


CHAPTER  XVII 


THE   PARTIAL   DISCIPLES  OF  SOCRATES. 


A  SPIRIT  like  that  of  Socrates  could  not  fail  to 
-^--^  produce  a  lasting  impression  on  his  immediate 
contemporaries  and  followers,  an  impression,  too,  of  the 
most  varied  character,  due  in  part  to  the  lack  of  sys- 
tem in  his  philosophy,  in  part  to  the  convictions 
and  beliefs  peculiar  to  individuals.  Many  simply  per- 
ceived and  were  influenced  by  his  logical  personality, 
his  pure  character  and  lofty  moral  maxims.  Xeno- 
phon,  whose  honest  integrity  and  genuine  worth  win 
our  admiration,  depicts  Socrates  in  the  most  glowing 
colors  as  a  man  and  a  moralist,  but  leaves  untouched 
the  profounder  phases  of  his  thought.  A  few  looked 
deeper;  but  even  they  conceived  the  Socratic  theories 
one-sidedly,  fastening  on  those  which  they  understood 
best,  and  adding  others  from  older  systems  of  philoso- 
phy. One  thinker  alone,  Plato,  comprehended  his 
master  fully,  and  developed  to  rich  fruition  the 
truths  explicit  and  implicit  in  the  doctrines  of 
Socrates. 

Four  Socratists  besides  Plato  founded  schools  of 
philosophy :  Euclid,  Phaedo,  Antisthenes  and  Aristip- 
pus.  Euclid  and  Phaedo  are  closely  related,  and  con- 
fine themselves  chiefly  to  questions  concerning  the 
dialectic  of  Socrates ;   Antisthenes  and   Aristippus,  on 

92 


THE   PARTIAL  DISCIPLES  OF   SOCRATES. 


93 


the  other  hand,  neglect  everything  but  the  ethical 
side  of  his  teaching,  understanding  and  expounding 
it  in  different  senses,  diverging  widely  not  only  from 
Socrates,  but  from  each  other. 

Socrates  defined  the  object  of  man's  striving  as  a 
knowledge  of  the  Good,  but  he  left  it  for  each  to 
determine  in  what  the  Good  consists  and  how  it  is 
to  be  pursued.  Different  theories  and  different  modes 
of  interpretation  naturally  followed  from  a  principle 
so  abstract.  The  mission  of  Socrates  was  simply  to 
bring  men  to  true  wisdom,  and  to  prove  that  it  be- 
gins with  knowledge  of  self,  including  but  not  in- 
cluded by  the  knowledge  of  the  world.  From  this 
time  henceforth  philosophy  no  longer  asks,  What  is 
nature  ? — but.  What  is  truth  ?  Man  becomes  conscious 
not  only  of  a  contradiction  between  himself  and  the 
outer  world,  but  of  a  contradiction  in  his  own  in- 
terior being,  in  thought  itself.  This  was  the  service 
of  Socrates,  and  it  was  impossible  for  one  man  to  do 
more  than  to  thus  prepare  the  ground  for  the  munif- 
icent harvest  afterward    reaped  by  Plato  and  Aristotle. 

THE   MEGARIAN   SCHOOL. 

The  Megarian  school  is  named  from  its  founder, 
Euclid  of  Megara.  lie  must  not  be  confounded  with 
the  Alexandrian  mathematician  who  lived  a  century 
later.  It  is  related  that  when  the  Athenians  and 
Megarians  were  at  war  with  each  other,  he  used  to 
steal  into  Athens  at  night  disguised  as  a  woman, 
risking  his  life  to  hear  and  converse  with  Socrates. 
He  was  noted  both  for  his  obstinacy  and  calmness  in 
disputing.     Once  when  an  adversary  cried  out  in  wrath: 


94 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


"I  will  die  if  I  do  not  avenge  myself  upon  you"; 
Euclid  replied,  ''I  will  die  if  I  do  not  so  soften 
your  anger  by  the  mildness  of  my  speech  that  you 
will  love  me  instead/'  Euclid  was  present  at  the 
death  of  Socrates,  but  after  that  event  returned  to 
Megara,  accompanied  by  many  of  the  Socratists,  who 
remained  abroad  until  the  tide  of  opinion  turned  at 
Athens,  and  the  accusers  of  Socrates  were  themselves 

punished. 

In  his  philosophy,  Euclid  combined  the  Eleatic 
principle  of  being  with  the  Socratic  ethics,  and 
affirmed  that  the  Good  is  one,  though  disguised  under 
many  names,  as  intelligence,  God,  thought,  etc.  The 
Good  alone  is;  what  is  opposed  to  it  is  not,  lias  no 
real  being.  The  senses  are  false  witnesses ;  they  show 
us  multiplicity,  delusive  and  changing  appearances. 
Thought  alone  is  able  to  grasp  the  immutable  essence 

of  things. 

The  Megarian  school  was  kept  up  for  a  time  after 
the  death  of  Euclid,  but  exercised  little  influence  on 
the  course  of  philosophy.  Eubulides,  one  of  its  best 
known  leaders,  and  a  disciple  of  Euclid,  was  noted 
for  his  sophisms.  The  Greeks  were  fond  of  finding 
the  contradictions  that  underlie  our  ordinary  speech 
and  representations.  Each  sentence  is  a  unit,  but  at 
the  same  time  consists  of  a  subject  and  predicate 
differing  from  each  other;  being  and  non-being  are 
contained  in  language  and  in  thought.  But  the  com- 
mon consciousness  is  confused  by  an  arbitrary  separa- 
tion between  the  positive  and  negative  elements  of  a 
sentence,  not  perceiving  that  truth  is  only  to  be  found 


THE   PARTIAL  DISCIPLES   OF   SOCRATES. 


95 


in  the  unity  of  opposites.  '^If  any  one  confesses 
that  he  lies,  does  he  lie,  or  tell  the  truth  ? "  Here 
is  a  dilemma  like  that  of  Sancho  Panza,  who  in  his 
character  of  ruler  and  judge  had  to  decide  the  fol- 
lowing case :  A  rich  man  had  erected  a  bridge  for 
the  benefit  of  travelers,  and  near  by  a  gallows,  grant- 
ing a  free  passage  to  any  one  on  condition  that  he 
would  say  truly  *  whither  he  was  going  and  agree  to 
be  hanged  if  he  spoke  falsely.  One  came  finally,  who 
in  response  to  the  question  whither  he  was  going 
answered,  to  be  hanged  on  the  gallows  near  the  bridge. 
The  owner  was  in  great  perplexity.  If  the  man  were 
hung  he  would  have  spoken  the  truth ;  if  he  were 
not  hung,  he  would  have  spoken  falsely.  Sancho 
directed  that  the  milder  interpretation  be  placed  on 
the  case,  and  that  the  man  should  be  permitted  to 
cross  the  bridge.  The  Megarians  delighted  in  similar 
puzzles,  but  did  not  solve  them  as  satisfactorily  as 
Sancho.  Carried  to  a  higher  point  of  acuteness  and 
subtlety  by  the  Sceptics,  they  finally  led  to  absolute 
negation  of  all  knowledge  and  reality. 

Stilpo  was  a  member  of  the  Megarian  school,  but 
united  with  its  doctrines  other  tendencies  belonging  to 
the  Cynics.  Diogenes  Laertius  says  that  he  so  far 
surpassed  all  others  in  acuteness  of  speech  that  the 
whole  of  Greece  contemplating  him  was  in  danger  of 
becoming  Megarians.  llis  character  was  held  in  the 
highest  veneration.  When  Megara  was  taken  and 
plundered  he  was  questioned  as  to  his  loss,  and  replied 
that  he  had  seen  no  one  carrying  away  science.  A 
condition  of  apathy  was   his  highest  moral  ideal.     He 


96 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


thought  that  the  wise  man  should  be  sufficient  to 
himself,  not  even  needing  friends  in  order  to  be 
happy.  When  made  acquainted  with  the  vicious  life 
led  by  his  daughter,  he  replied  that  if  he  could  not 
bring  her  to  honor  neither  could  she  bring  him  to 
dishonor. 

Phaedo,  a  favorite  disciple  of  Socrates,  founded  a 
school  in  Elis,  resembling  the  Megarian  in  its  charac- 
ter and  tendency.  He  is  the  person  represented  by 
Plato,  the  narrator  of  the  last  conversation  of  Socrates. 

THE   CYNICS. 

According  to  Zeller,  the  Cynical  school  was  like  the 
Megarian,  a  blending  of  Socratic  philosophy  with 
Eleatic  and  Sophistic  doctrines,  the  two  uniting  in 
Stilpo,  and  going  over  into  Stoicism  with  Zeno,  who 
was  one  of  Stilpo^s  disciples.  Antisthenes,  the  founder 
of  Cynicism,  was  in  early  life  a  disciple  of  Gorgias, 
and  himself  gave  instruction  in  the  art  of  rhetoric 
and  the  doctrines  of  the  Sophists.  Later,  he  became 
attached  to  Socrates,  and  was  one  of  his  most  en- 
thusiastic adherents.  He  taught  in  a  gymnasium 
called  Cynosarges,  and  appears  to  have  been  a  man 
of  high  moral  character,  though  Plato  and  Aristotle 
speak  of  his  culture  as  superficial. 

He  recognized  virtue  as  the  supreme  aim  of  life, 
and  thought  all  knowledge  useless  that  did  not  serve 
ethical  aims.  Virtue  needs  nothing  except  the  strength 
of  character  of  Socrates;  it  can  do  without  theories 
and  principles.  The  good  is  beautiful,  the  bad  is 
ugly.  The  wise  man  is  sufficient  to  himself ;  he  pos- 
sesses everything  which   others    only    seem   to  possess. 


THE    PARTIAL   DISCIPLES   OF   SOCRATES. 


97 


His  own  virtue  makes  him  happy;  he  is  at  home 
everywhere  in  the  world.  Happiness  is  the  final  aim, 
but  happiness  and  virtue  are  one.  There  is  no  good 
except  virtue,  no  evil  except  vice.  He  alone  is  happy 
who  is  independent  of  externals,  who  desires  nothing 
outside  of  that  which  is  absolutely  within  his  con- 
trol. He  must  be  lifted  above  poverty  and  riches, 
honor  and  shame,  life  and  death,  must  fear  nobody 
and  care  for  nothing.  He  must  be  indifferent  to  all 
that  concerns  the  public  life  of  society  and  the  pri- 
vate life  of  home;  his  feelings  must  be  deadened  to 
insensibility  ;  he  must  renounce  enjoyment  itself,  and 
find   supreme   self-satisfaction   in   virtue  only. 

The  freedom  of  the  Cynics  is  abstract  and  negative. 
True  freedom  consists  in  the  control  of  one's  needs 
and  desires,  not  in  their  complete  denial.  Nor  is  it 
the  highest  morality  to  withdraw  from  human  duties 
and  relations,  from  participation  in  the  life  and  in- 
terests of  our  fellow-men. 

One  may  admire  the  force  of  will  with  which  the 
Cynics  pursued  their  aim,  though  it  led  to  spiritual 
vanity  and  pride,  rather  than  to  Socratic  elevation  of 
character.  They  regarded  themselves  as  physicians, 
able  to  heal  the  moral  sickness  of  men,  most  of 
whom  were  fools  enslaved  by  their  desires.  They 
occupied  a  peculiar  position  in  the  Greek  world,  and 
have  been  called  the  Capuchins  of  antiquity.  In  spite 
of  their  strangeness  and  extravagance,  their  influence 
was  in  part  beneficial.  They  are  said  to  have  worn  a 
distinctive  dress,  ragged  and  dirty,  which  did  not  escape 
the  criticism  of  Socrates,  to  whom  Antisthenes  displayed 


98 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


the  holes  in  his  garment.  **Ah/'  said  Socrates, 
''through  the  hole  itself  I  see  your  vanity.'' 

Diogenes,  of  Sinope,  was  a  disciple  of  Antisthenes, 
whose  theories  he  exaggerated  to  the  point  of  absurdity. 
*'  To  have  no  needs,"  said  Diogenes,  '*  is  divine  ;  to  have 
as  few  as  possible  comes  nearest  the  divine."  He  threw 
away  his  cup  as  useless  when  he  saw  a  boy  drinking 
out  of  the  palm  of  his  hand.  He  once  entered  the 
dwelling  of  Plato,  and  walked  around  with  dirty  feet 
upon  a  beautiful  carpet,  saying,  ''Thus  I  trample  on 
the  pride  of  Plato."  "'  Yes,  but  with  a  pride  as  great," 
replied  Plato  calmly. 

The  requirements  of  Cynicism  were  too  severe  to  at- 
tract many  disciples.  It  was  incapable  of  scientific 
development.  Its  practical  activity  was  of  a  negative 
kind,  demanding  renunciation  and  the  separation  of 
the  individual  from  society.  Man  was  to  rely  simply  on 
his  single  self  isolated  from  all  other  human  selves, 
thus  opening  the  way  to  vanity  and  pride  and  arbitrari- 
ness. ''  Cynicism  thus  touched  its  diametrical  opposite — 
Hedonism,"  says  Zeller. 

THE   CYRENAIC   SCHOOL. 

Aristippus  of  Cyrene,  the  founder  of  the  Cyrenaic 
or  Hedonic  school,  was  a  disciple  of  Socrates,  though 
he  is  represented  by  Aristotle  as  a  Sophist.  He  appears 
to  have  been  a  man  of  considerable  culture  when  he 
first  met  Socrates.  Brought  up  in  the  midst  of  wealth 
and  luxury,  his  pleasure-loving  habits  contrasted 
strangely  with  the  simplicity  of  his  master.  Of  all  the 
Socratists  he  was  the  first  to  require  pay  for  his  instruc- 
tions, and  himself  sent  money  to  Socrates,  which  was 
promptly  returned. 


THE   PARTIAL   DISCIPLES  OF  SOCRATES. 


99 


Aristippus  agrees  with  Antisthenes  that  happiness  is 
the  aim  of  philosophy,  but  he  understands  by  happiness 
pleasure,  the  enjoyment  of  the  moment.  Only  the 
present  is  ours,  we  must  cease  to  concern  ourselves 
with  the  past  and  the  future;  we  can  no  longer  possess 
the  one  and  may  never  possess  the  other.  Pleasure  is  a 
sensation  of  gentle  motion  ;  pain,  of  violent  motion ; 
the  mean  between  the  two  is  indifference.  Pleasure 
is  alone  worthy  of  desire;  quiet  is  mere  insensibility 
like  that  of  sleep.  But  insight  is  needed  that  we 
may  choose  and  discriminate  between  our  various 
appetites  and  desires ;  pleasure  is  sometimes  bought  at 
the  expense  of  great  pain. 

The  Cyrenaics,  like  the  Epicureans,  are  forced  to 
consider  the  results  of  actions,  and  soon  discover  that 
there  are  pleasures  of  the  mind  that  outweigh  in  value 
those  of  the  body.  Mere  satisfaction  of  the  sensuous 
desires  will  not  produce  happiness ;  insight  must  be 
added,  and  the  right  mental  disposition.  Life  offers 
the  most  to  him  who  renounces  no  enjoyment,  but 
remains  at  every   instant  master  of  himself. 

Aristippus  led  a  life  of  self-enjoyment,  preserving 
his  serenity  under  all  circumstances.  He  knew  how 
to  use  men  and  things  for  his  own  advantage,  and 
made  it  his  principle  to  free  himself  as  far  as  possi- 
ble from  all  sources  of  annoyance  and  trouble.  He 
repels  us  by  his  superficial  morality,  and  at  the  same 
time  attracts  us  by  his  rare  equanimity  and  modera- 
tion,   which   were  purely   Socratic. 

His  principle  is  one  that  contradicts  itself.  He 
declares    that  to  be   happy   man    must  surrender  him- 


100 


A  STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


self  with  the  full  freedom  of  cousciousness  to  the  en- 
joyment of  the  present  moment.  But  that  freedom 
can  only  be  attained  by  an  elevation  above  immediate 
conditions  and  feelings.  He  bids  us  take  no  thought 
of  the  past  or  the  future,  and  yet  recommends  in- 
sight and  a  consideration  of  the  results  of  actions. 
Though  he  believes  that  pleasure  is  fixed  by  nature 
as  man's  ultimate  aim,  he  sees  that  the  aim  is  defeated 
unless  it  is  controlled  by  prudential  motives. 

It  is  said  that  his  grandson,  Aristippus  the  younger, 
first  systematized  the  doctrine  of  Hedonism.  Other 
leaders  of  the  school  were  Hegesias,  Theodorus,  and 
Anniceris. 

Hedonism,  Epicureanism,  Eudsemonism  and  Utili- 
tarianism, agree  in  considering  man  chiefly  on  the 
side  of  his  sensations,  as  a  being  susceptible  of  pleas- 
ure and  pain,  whose  proper  pursuit  is  happiness.  Op- 
posite schools  of  morality,  like  the  Cynics  and  Stoics, 
regard  man  almost  exclusively  on  the  side  of  his 
thoughts,  as  a  being  endowed  with  reason,  self-con- 
sciousness, whose  proper  pursuit  is  virtue,  the  perfecting 
of  his  higher  nature.  The  two  ends  usually  harmonize, 
but  when  they  conflict  the  question  arises :  Must  we 
strive  after  the  right  or  the  useful,  the  just  or  the  ex- 
pedient ?  It  is  certain  that  Socrates  answered  the  ques- 
tion in  favor  of  right  and  justice,  whatever  Euda?mon- 
istic  interpretation  may  be  placed  on  his  theories.  He 
was  so  many-sided  that  he  was  the  source  of  fruitful 
impulses  in  widely  different  directions,  while  at  the 
same  time  his  thought  was  so  imperfectly  systematized 
as  to  be  easily  misunderstood  and  misapplied. 


THE   PARTIAL   DISCIPLES   OF  SOCRATES. 


101 


There  is  much  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Megarians,  of 
the  Cynics,  and  of  the  Cyrenaics,  that  is  Sophistic 
rather  than  Socratic.  But  it  is  nevertheless  clear  that 
the  three  schools  proceeded  from  Socrates  as  their 
starting  point,  and  were  necessary  in  order  to  bring  to 
light  all  the  consequences  of  the  Socratic  principles. 
Their  scientific  achievements  were  slight,  but  they  were 
not  without  influence  on  the  thought  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  and  on  the  later  course  of  philosophy. 

Cynicism  anticipated  Stoicism  ;  Cyrenaicism  antici- 
pated Epicureanism.  But  Plato  is  the  complete  Socrat- 
ist,  comprehending  and  working  out  the  thought  of  his 
master,  developing  its  rich  content,  and  adding  to  it 
his  own  invaluable  contributions. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

Plato's  life  and  writings. 

nnHERE  is  no  ancient  philosopher  with  whose  life  we 
-■-  are  more  intimately  acquainted  than  with  that  of 
Plato,  yet  even  in  his  case  authorities  vary.  He  was 
born  in  the  year  429  B.C.,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  war,  the  year  in  which  Pericles  died.  His 
father,  Ariston,  was  a  descendant  of  Codrus,  the  last 
hero-king  of  Attica ;  his  mother,  Perictione,  was  a 
descendant  of  Solon.  His  mother's  uncle  was  the 
famous  Kritias,  the  most  talented  and  the  most  danger- 
ous of  the  thirty  tyrants  of  Athens. 

Born  of  this  illustrious  race  and  favored  by  wealth, 
Plato  must  have  found  in  his  surroundings  abundant 
means  for  the  highest  culture  attainable  in  Athens.  He 
received  instruction  from  the  most  famous  Sophists,  and 
one  of  his  teachers  gave  him  the  name  that  he  Jias  made 
illustrious — Plato  ;  he  was  called  by  his  family  Aristokles. 
Some  ascribe  the  name  to  the  breadth  of  his  forehead, 
others  to  the  breadth  of  his  mind  and  the  wealth  of  his 
discourse.  In  his  youth  he  cultivated  poetry  and  wrote 
tragedies,  dithyrambs  and  songs.  In  an  epigram  on 
Aster,  one  of  his  best  friends,  is  a  thought  that  reminds 
one  of  Komeo  and  Juliet : 

"  To  the  stars  thou  look'st,  my  Aster, 
O,  would  that  I  were  the  heavens, 
So  that  I  could  see  thee  with  so  many  eyes  !  " 

102 


PLATO  S   LIFE  AND   WRITINGS. 


103 


In  his  twentieth  year  Plato  made  the  acquaintance  of 
Socrates,  and  during  the  long  and  confidential  inter- 
course that  followed,  penetrated  so  deeply  into  the  spirit 
of  his  master  as  to  create  for  us  his  living  portrait  set 
in  a  frame  of  ideal  beauty.  The  night  before  they  met 
Socrates  dreamed  that  a  swan,  the  bird  of  Apollo,  flew 
towards  him  with  a  melodious  song,  nestled  in  his  breast, 
and  then  soared  upward  to  heaven.  Plato  appreciated 
the  debt  he  owed  to  Socrates  and  regarded  it  as  the 
highest  favor  of  fortune  that  he  should  have  been  born 
in  his  lifetime.  His  imaginative  nature  needed  the  log- 
ical discipline  to  which  Socrates  subjected  his  disciples, 
and  it  was,  doubtless,  this  training  that  converted  the 
poet  into  the  philosopher.  But  the  poet  in  Plato  was 
never  wholly  lost ;  truth  for  him  was  ever  one  with 
beauty.  It  is  probable  that,  at  this  time  or  earlier,  Plato 
studied  the  systems  of  other  philosophers.  Aristotle  says 
that  lie  had  been  initiated  into  the  Heraclitic  doctrines 
by  Cratylus  before  he  met  Socrates. 

The  tragic  fate  of  his  master  must  have  been  a  heavy 
blow  to  Plato,  and  could  not  but  deepen  his  reverence  for 
the  character  and  the  principles  that  met  even  the  ordeal 
of  death  unmoved.  If,  before  this  time,  he  had  been 
reluctant  to  enter  political  life  it  is  not  strange  that  after 
the  condemnation  of  Socrates  he  should  renounce  it 
entirely.  The  Athenian  state  api>eared  to  him  hope- 
lessly inefficient,  and  it  is  well  for  humanity  that  he  did 
not  sacrifice  himself  in  its  ruin,  but  fled  for  refuge  and 
strength  to  a  higher,  supersensuous  world, — the  world  of 
Ideas. 

After  the  execution  of  Socrates,  Plato  left  Athens, 


104 


A  STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


PLATO'S   LIFE   AND   WRITINGS. 


105 


and  took  up  his  abode  for  a  time  at  Megara,  with  his 
friend  Euclid,  the  founder  of  the  Megarian  School  of 
philosophy.  He  afterwards  traveled  to  Kyrene,  Egypt, 
Magna  Gr«eia  and  Sicily.  It  is  impossible  to  ascertain 
with  certainty  how  long  he  remained  in  Megara,  or 
whether  he  returned  to  Athens  and  taught  philosophy, 
before  completing  what  Schwegler  terms  his  *'  Wa)ider- 
jahre."  He  gained  from  his  travels  a  closer  acquaintance 
with  the  Pythagorean  school  of  philosophy,  and  a  deeper 
knowledge  of  mathematics,  which  he  studied  under  the 
guidance  of  the  most  celebrated  mathematicians  of  the 
time.  Zeller  and  other  authorities  regard  as  legendary 
the  stories  that  are  told  of  his  stay  in  Egypt,  and  of  the 
priestly  lore  and  mysteries  into  which  he  was  there 
initiated. 

In  Sicily,  Plato  visited  the  court  of  Dionysius  the 
elder,  whose  youthful  brother-in-law,  Dion,  embraced 
his  doctrines.  But  the  philosopher's  plain  speaking 
did  not  please  Dionysius.  Offended  at  his  declara- 
tion that  happiness  is  not  dependent  on  external 
circumstances,  he  sent  the  philosopher  to  be  sold  in  the 
slave-market  of  ^gina.  The  accounts  of  the  affair  vary, 
but  Plato  is  said  to  have  been  ransomed  by  Anniceris, 
a  Cyrenian.  Dion  and  other  friends,  as  the  story  goes, 
wished  to  repay  the  price  of  the  ransom,  but  Anniceris 
refused  the  money  for  himself,  and  applied  it  to  the 
purchase  of  the  garden  in  the  Academy.  Here  Plato 
gathered  a  chosen  circle  of  disciples  whom  he  instructed 
in  philosophy.  Among  his  auditors  were  two  women. 
The  Academy  was  a  grove  in  the  suburbs  of  Athens,  used 
as    a  gymnasium,    and   named   in    honor  of     the   hero 


Academus,  whose  fame  is  entirely  eclipsed   by  that   of 

Plato. 

Concerning  the  manner  of  his  instruction  we  know 
little  except  what  may  be  inferred  from  the  form  of  his 
writings,  and  the  decided  way  in  which  he  condemns 
the  long  speeches  of  the  rhetoricians,  who  know  neither 
how  to  ask  nor  to  answer  questions.  His  discourses  were 
doubtless  conversational  in  character,  although  according 
to  Aristotle  he  seems  also  to  have  delivered  connected 
lectures,  where  the  nature  of  the  exposition  rendered  it 
necessary. 

On  the  death  of  the  elder  Dionysius,  Plato  again 
visited  Sicily,  influenced  by  his  friendship  for  Dion  and 
the  hope  that  he  might  effect  a  reform  in  the  Sicilian 
constitution  by  winning  over  to  his  political  views  the 
heir  of  the  throne,  the  younger  Dionysius.  Dionysius 
received  Plato  politely  ;  but  the  philosopher's  expectations 
were  disappointed,  for  the  young  man  had  *'  one  of  those 
mediocre  natures  who  in  a  half-hearted  way  strive  for 
fame  and  distinction,  but  are  capable  of  no  depth  and 
no  earnestness.''  A  quarrel  breaking  out  between  Dio- 
nysius and  Dion  which  led  to  the  banishment  of  the 
latter,    Plato   returned   to  Athens. 

Some  years  afterward,  moved  by  the  solicitations  of 
Dionysius  and  the  entreaties  of  his  friends,  he  made  a 
third  voyage  to  Sicily,  hoping  to  effect  a  reconciliation 
between  Dionysius  and  Dion.  He  not  only  failed  in  the 
attempt,  but  was  so  mistrusted  by  the  tyrant  that  his  life 
was  endangered,  and  was  saved  only  at  the  intercession  of 
the  Pythagoreans,  then  at  the  head  of  the  Tarentine 
state. 


Ml 


106 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


It  is  said,  that  Plato  refused  offers  from  various  Greek 
states  to  become  their  lawgiver.  It  was  a  time  when 
they  did  not  prosper  with  their  constitutions.  But 
constitutions  to  be  effective  must  be  the  outgrowtli  of 
historical  conditions  rather  than  the  creation  of  indi- 
viduals. 

Honored  everywhere,  especially  in  Athens,  Plato  died 
on  his  birthday,  in  his  81st  year,  at  a  marriage  feast. 
He  was  buried  in  the  Ceramicus,  not  far  from  the 
Academy. 

Plato  lived  at  a  time  when  Greece  had  reached  her 
highest  point  of  splendor,  and  was  steadily  declining  in 
national  greatness.  His  own  nature  and  the  influence 
of  the  time  led  him  to  philosophy  rather  than  politics. 
His  personality  was  more  aristocratic  than  that  of  Soc- 
rates. Endowed  with  artistic  tastes  and  the  Greek  love 
of  beauty,  he  was  not  free  from  wants  and  desires,  nor 
indifferent  to  the  externals  of  life.  But  he  always  prac- 
ticed the  simplicity  and  moderation  which  he  inculcated 
in  his  philosophy.  He  was  exclusive  in  his  friendships 
and  did  not  seek  to  share  his  thoughts  with  all  ;  he  loved 
rather  to  shut  out  the  world  with  its  disturbing  clamor. 
The  aristocracy  of  intelligence,  advocated  in  his  ideal 
State,  is  deeply  rooted  in  his  own  character.  He  united 
lofty  moral  principles  with  a  rare  susceptibility  for 
beauty,  grandeur  of  intellect  with  tenderness  of  feeling, 
enthusiasm  with  serenity,  developing  himself  on  all 
sides  harmoniously,  in  accordance  with  the  Greek  ideal 
of  human  perfection. 

*'  Plato's  relation  to  the  world  is  that  of  a  superior 
spirit,"  says  Goethe,  ''  whose  good  pleasure  it  is  to  dwell 


Plato's  life  and  writings. 


107 


in  it  for  a  time.  It  is  not  so  much  his  concern  to  become 
acquainted  with  it— for  the  world  and  its  nature  are 
things  which  he  presupposes — as  to  kindly  communicate 
to  it  that  which  he  brings  with  him,  and  of  which  it 
stands  in  great  need.  He  penetrates  into  its  depths, 
more  that  he  may  replenish  them  from  the  fullness  of 
his  own  nature,  than  that  he  may  fathom  their  mysteries. 
He  scales  its  heights  as  one  yearning  after  renewed 
participation  in  the  source  of  his  being.  All  that  he 
utters  has  reference  to  something  eternally  complete, 
good,  true,  beautiful,  whose  furtherance  he  strives  to 
promote   in   every   bosom.'' 

Like  Pythagoras,  he  has  been  compared  to  Apollo, 
who  in  the  bright  clearness  of  his  spirit  was  to  the 
Greeks  the  very  type  of  moral  beauty,  perfection  and 
harmony. 

His  literary  activity  extended  over  the  greater  part 
of  his  life,  and  it  is  thought  that  none  of  his  writ- 
ings intended  for  publicity  have  been  lost.  Doubts 
have  been  thrown  upon  the  genuineness  of  some  of 
the  minor  Dialogues,  but  the  authenticity  of  the 
greater  ones  is  placed  beyond  dispute  by  the  testimony 
of  Aristotle.  It  is  impossible  to  determine  with  cer- 
tainty the  dates  of  the  several  writings,  a  point  that 
might  help  us  towards  comprehending  the  historical 
development  of  Plato's  system  of  philosophy. 

Schleiermacher  classified  the  Dialogues  according  to 
an  internal  principle  of  connection,  believing  that 
Plato  so  planned  his  inquiries  as  to  produce  upon 
the  reader's  mind  a  certain  effect,  which  would  be 
presupposed  in  the  succeeding  investigation.     He  dis- 


108 


A    STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


tinguished  three  divisions  united  in  one  organic  whole; 
the  elementary,  the  indirectly  inquiring,  and  the  ex- 
pository or  constructive  dialogues. 

Hermann  agrees  with  Schleiermacher  as  to  the 
unity  of  the  writings,  but  finds  its  cause  in  the  growth 
of  Plato's  mind  rather  than  in  any  conscious  design. 
He  also  arranges  the  Dialogues  in  three  classes.  The 
first  is  the  Socratic  elementary  class,  written  before 
or  immediately  after  the  death  of  Socrates,  dramatic 
in  style  and  full  of  specious  arguments,  but  pene- 
trating no  deeper  than  Socrates  into  the  fundamental 
problems  of  thought.  The  second  is  the  dialectic  or 
mediatory  class,  written  under  the  influence  of  the 
Megaro-Eleatic  philosophy,  distinguished  by  more  search- 
ing criticism  and  less  beauty  of  form.  The  third  is 
the  expository  or  constructive  class,  uniting  the  artis- 
tic fullness  of  the  first  with  the  philosophic  profundity 
of  the  second,  enriched  by  all  the  elements  of  an 
enlarged  experience,  and  fused  together  into  one  per- 
fect creation. 

Hegel  ascribes  little  importance  to  these  inquiries, 
believing  that  it  is  only  ignorance  of  philosophy  that 
renders  the  apprehension  of  Plato's  thought  difficult. 
His  system  exhibits  a  totality  of  the  Idea,  in  which 
the  one-sided  abstractions  of  earlier  philosophers  taken 
up  into  his  deeper  principle  attain  concrete  unity 
and  truth.  For  the  concrete,  according  to  Hegel,  is 
the  unity  of  different  principles,  each  one  of  which 
must  be  set  up  as  the  sole  truth  in  order  to  be  de- 
veloped and  clearly  conceived. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

CHARACTER  OF    PLATO'S   PHILOSOPHY. 


PLATO'S  view  concerning  philosophy  rests  on  a 
Socratic  basis,  but  he  goes  far  beyond  his  mas- 
ter in  working  out  and  perfecting  his  system  of 
thought.  With  Plato  as  with  Socrates,  right  action 
and  right  thinking  are  one  ;  philosophy  is  inseparably 
connected  with  morality  and  religion.  But  it  was 
Plato  who  first  developed  into  a  systematic  whole  the 
ethical  concepts  of  Socrates,  and  found  not  only  their 
basis  but  a  guide  for  the  explanation  of  the  natural 
universe  in  dialectic,  or  the  pure  science  of  Ideas. 
That  there  is  a  difference  as  well  as  a  connection  be- 
tween knowledge  and  action,  was  not  wholly  unobserved 
by  Plato,  although  it  was  Aristotle  who  first  clearly 
analyzed  both,  and  distinguished  beneath  all  apparent 
contradictions   an  essential  identity   in   the  activity  of 

thought  itself. 

Plato,  like  Aristotle,  entered  upon  physical  investi- 
gations, which  had  been  entirely  neglected  by  Soc- 
rates. But  Plato's  achievements  in  this  field  are  slight ; 
to  him  the  contemplation  of  pure  ideas  was  far  more 
important  than  the  study  of  empirical  data  in  the 
world  of  sense.  For  he  regarded  material  things  as 
types  of  eternal  ideas,  a  world  of  shadows  to  be  left 
behind  if  we  would  gain  spiritual  insight.     He  gladly 

109 


110 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


turned  from  the  transient  appearance  to  its  underly- 
ing reality,  from  the  infinite  in  its  finite  manifesta- 
tions to  its  revelation  in  pure  thought. 

Plato  was  the  first  Greek  philosopher  who  studied 
the  doctrines  of  his  predecessors,  and  consciously  united 
in  a  higher  principle  the  truth  of  their  contradictory 
statements.  "The  Socratic  philosophy  of  concepts  was 
transplanted  by  him  into  the  fruitful  and  well-tilled 
soil  of  the  previous  natural  philosophy,"  says  Zeller, 
"thence  to  appropriate  to  itself  all  kindred  matter  ;  and 
in  thus  permeating  the  older  speculation  with  the 
spirit  of  Socrates,  purifying  and  refining  it  by  dialectic, 
which  was  itself  extended  to  metaphysical  speculation  ; 
in  thus  perfecting  ethics  by  natural  philosophy  and 
natural  philosophy  by  ethics,  Plato  has  accomplished 
one  of  the  greatest  intellectual  creations  ever  known." 
He  has  proclaimed  with  energy  and  enthusiasm  the 
deepest  principle  of  all  speculation,  the  idealism  of 
thought,  and  given  an  impulse  to  the  progress  of  philo- 
sophy, transcending  far  the  bounds  of  his  own  system. 

The  form  of  the  Platonic  exposition,  as  is  well 
known,  is  unique,  and  required  an  artistic  nature  for 
its  construction.  It  is  that  of  the  philosophic  dialogue, 
which  retains  the  reciprocal  kindling  of  thought  pecu- 
liar to  verbal  intercourse,  guided  by  a  scientific  pur- 
pose rather  than  contingent  motives.  Everything  is 
simple  and  plastic.  We  are  taken  to  the  halls  of  the 
Gymnasia,  or  to  the  Academy,  or  to  a  banquet,  or  to 
the  clear  waters  of  the  Ilyssus,  where  Socrates  and 
other  cultivated  men  are  conversing.  Each  concedes 
to  the  other  a  perfect  right  to  hold  and  to  utter  per- 


CHAKACTER   OF   PLATO's   PHILOSOPHY. 


Ill 


sonal  sentiments  and  opinions,  which  is  the  secret  of 
that  delightful  Greek  urbanity  whose  charm  we  all  ac- 
knowledge. Socrates  is  the  chief  speaker  and  his  per- 
sonality, idealized  by  Plato,  is  the  bond  of  artistic 
unity  between  the  dialogues.  Plato  realized  that  he 
owed  the  beautiful  fruit  of  his  thought  to  the  seed 
that  Socrates  so  generously  scattered,  and  his  writings 
are  one  grateful  acknowledgment  to  the  revered  and 
beloved  master. 

It   is    not   difficult    to   distinguish    in    the    dialogue 
what   belongs    to   Plato  and  what   belongs  to  Socrates; 
for  philosophy  is  one,  and  later  systems  of  thought  can 
only    develop    the    truth    implicitly   contained    in    the 
earlier.      Plato's   creative  genius  is  shown  by  the  man- 
ner in  which  he  uses  his  intellectual   material,  original 
and  inherited,  forming  it  into  a  plastic  whole  as  beautiful 
and  complete  as  a  work  of   Phidias.      Thought  to  him 
is  a  conversation  of   the  soul  with  itself,  and  the  form 
of  the  dialogue  is  essentially  connected  with  his  idea  of 
philosophy.      He  had  a  deep  conviction  of   the   advan- 
tages of  speech   as   compared  with  writing,  and  sought 
by  his  peculiar  method  to  compel   the  reader  to  an  ac- 
tive participation    in   philosophic    inquiries.      He    first 
arouses  interest   in    the   different  opinions  expressed  by 
various  speakers,  and  then,  after   a   rigid   analysis  and 
investigation  which  exhibits  their  incompleteness,  leaves 
the  reader  to  discover  for  himself   the   central  point  of 
unity  in  the  argument.     The  unfolding  of  the  dialogue 
IS  in  fact   the   development   of    a   philosophic   theme. 
The   speakers  not  only  give  their  opinions,  but  fill  the 
parts  prescribed  for  them  by  the  author.     Many  of  the 


112 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


questions  of  Socrates  are  so  framed  that  a  simple  yes 
or  no,  is  all  the  answer  required;  but,  with  few  ex- 
ceptions, the  art  is  so  perfect  as  to  preserve  the  life 
and  spirit  of  a  real  conversation. 

Philosophy  to  Plato  was  not  a  mere  doctrine,  but  a 
living  power  which  he  sought  to  communicate  to  others 
through  actual  personal  communion,  or  the  written 
speech  that  resembled  it  most  nearly.  The  philosophic 
dialogue  is  as  much  his  creation  and  peculiarity  as  the 
system  of  thought  it  embodies,  and  could  never  have 
reached  equal  perfection  earlier  or  later.  Philosophy 
demanded  a  sharper  discrimination  between  the  aesthetic 
impulse  and  scientific  cognition,  and  renounced  the 
plastic  beauty  of  Plato's  style  for  a  more  systematic 
exposition  of  its  principles  in  the  works  of  Aristotle. 

The  employment  of  myths  is  another  peculiarity 
of  Plato's  philosophy.  The  myth  is  an  exposition  by 
means  of  sensuous  pictures  addressed  to  imagination 
and  feeling  rather  than  to  the  pure  thinking  activity. 
It  is  a  poetic  presentment  of  that  which  the  author 
believes  to  be  true,  but  cannot  prove  scientifically. 
Like  all  symbolic  representation,  it  is  necessarily  ob- 
scure and  ambiguous.  To  interpret  it  strictly  would 
be  the  task,  and  not  a  very  enviable  one,  of  some 
person  who  had  plenty  of  time  on  his  hands,  says 
Plato  in  the  Phaedo.  Too  much  or  too  little  is  fre- 
quently found  in  it ;  its  hidden  meaning  is  either 
extended  to  utterly  foreign  subjects  or  lost  sight  of 
entirely.  It  was  the  poet  in  Plato  that  clothed  the 
myth  in  such  mystic  radiance,  but  its  use  was  a  neces- 
sity to  the  philosopher.     He   could    not    otherwise   fill 


CHARACTER   OF   PLATO'S    PHILOSOPHY. 


113 


up  the  gaps  in  scientific  knowledge  that  existed  in 
his  day,  or  express  those  higher  realities  of  religion 
and  faith  which  transcend  human  experience. 

But,  from  a  scientific  point  of  view,  Plato's  use  of 
the  myth  is  a  sign  of  weakness  rather  than  of  strength. 
The  idea  clothed  in  a  sensuous  form  is  neither  fully 
comprehended  nor  expressed.  Plato,  like  a  creative  art- 
ist, thinks  in  pictures  and  sees  the  truth  intuitively; 
but  this  is  poetry  rather  than  philosophy.  Philosophy 
must  confine  itself  strictly  to  the  domain  of  the  pure 
intellect,  and  leave  to  poetry  that  of  the   imagination. 

Plato  himself,  in  distinguishing  between  the  dif- 
ferent grades  of  knowing,  placed  the  truth  in  that 
alone  which  is  produced  through  thought.  In  oppo- 
sition to  the  view  of  ordinary  consciousness  and  that 
of  the  Sophists,  he  teaches  that  knowledge  is  neither 
perception  nor  correct  opinion,  but  the  activity  of  the 
soul  itself  in  the  sphere  of  ideas.  If  perception  were 
knowledge,  that  would  be  true  for  each  man  which 
appears  to  him  true  ;  if  correct  opinion  were  knowl- 
edge, there  would  be  no  possibility  of  false  opinion, 
for  we  can  only  know  or  not  know.  Opinion  is  in- 
termediate between  knowledge  and  ignorance,  and  is 
uncertain  and  variable  because  it  lacks  insight  into 
the  necessity  of  truth. 

Passing  from  the  theoretical  to  the  practical,  Plato 
teaches  that  the  virtue  which  is  guided  by  opinion 
IS  dependent  on  chance,  and  circumstances,  and  the 
subjective  will  of  the  individual.  But  virtue  in  its 
essence  is  immutable,  and  is  based  upon  knowledge. 
Against  the  view  of  the  Sophists,  who  consider  pleas- 


114 


A  STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


lire  the  highest  good,  Plato  argues  that  the  good  can 
only  be  the  just,  that  it  is  better  to  suffer  wrong 
than  to  do  it,  to  be  punished  for  evil  than  to  re- 
main unpunished.  '*The  philosopher  only  has  true 
happiness,"  he  says,  ^'for  his  pleasure  alone  consists 
in  being  filled  with  something  real;  that  is  the  sole 
pleasure  which  is  unalloyed  and  bound  to  no  condi- 
tioning pain.  The  question  whether  justice  is  more 
profitable  than  injustice  is  as  absurd  as  would  be  the 
inquiry,  'Is  it  better  to  be   sick   or  well?''' 

Philosophy,    according    to    Plato,    is    derived    from 
practical   necessity,    and    springs    from    inspiration    or 
enthusiasm,  the    philosophic    Eros,      This    enthusiasm 
assumes  the  form   of    love   on   account  of  the  special 
brightness  which  distinguishes  the  visible  copies  of  the 
beautiful.      The   soul,  through   love,  seeks  to  fill  itself 
with   what  is  eternal  and  imperishable.      Love  is  the 
striving  of  mortal  nature  after  immortality.      It  does 
not   at   first   reveal   its  true  nature,  but  rises  gradually 
from   the  love   of   beautiful  forms  to  the  love  of  beau- 
tiful  souls,  and  finally  to  the  love    of    that   which    is 
its  true  goal— the  Divine  Idea,  or  Beauty  in  Eternal 
Existence.      Love,  as  conceived  by  Plato,  is  the  philo- 
sophic impulse  which  seeks,  through  speculative  knowl- 
edge and  the  practice  of  virtue,  to  expand  the  finite 

to  infinity. 

When  we  ask  how  love  is  to  obtain  its  highest 
object  of  endeavor,  Plato  unexpectedly  supplements 
love  by  logic,  and  adds  to  the  philosophic  impulse  .a 
severe  training  in  the  dialectic  method.  ^*  Enthusi- 
asm  is  the   first  irregular   production    of    ideas,"  says 


CHARACTER   OF    PLATO  S   PHILOSOPHY. 


115 


Hegel,  **but  it  is  scientific  thought  that  brings  them 
into  a  rationally  developed  shape  and  into  the  day- 
light." Plato  declares  that  dialectic  is  the  true  fire 
of  Prometheus,  the  instrument  by  means  of  which 
the  pure  idea  is  developed.  It  is  a  recognition  of 
the  essence  of  things,  of  the  One  in  the  Many,  and 
the  Many  in  the  One.  It  proves  that  the  only  real- 
ity is  spirit,  and  that  thought  is  the  truth  of  the 
sensuous  world. 

Through  the  union  of  love  and  logic,  of  the  dia- 
lectic impulse  and  tlie  philosophic  method,  Plato  de- 
velops his  philosophy.  The  highest  object  of  thought 
is  the  Idea  of  the  Good,  and  the  chief  problem  of 
education  is  to  incline  the  soul  towards  this  Idea. 
In  a  brilliant  allegory  Plato  represents  men  as  dwell- 
ing underground,  in  a  cave,  with  a  long  entrance 
open  towards  the  light.  At  a  distance  above  and 
behind  them  a  fire  is  blazing,  but  they  are  fastened 
in  such  a  manner  that  they  cannot  turn  their  heads, 
and  can  only  see  the  shadows  cast  by  those  who  pass 
along  a  raised  way  between  them  and  the  fire.  They 
look  upon  these  shadows  as  realities ;  and  if  one  is 
freed  and  dragged  toward  the  fire,  or  upward  into 
the  full  blaze  of  the  sun,  he  is  filled  with  pain  and 
terror,  and  blinded  by  excess  of  light.  But  he  will 
come  at  last  to  recognize  the  truth,  and  will  see  that 
what  he  now  beholds  is  the  substance  of  the  shadow. 
Should  he  descend  again  into  the  darkness  of  the 
cave,  he  will  not  see  as  well  as  his  companions,  and 
will  be  mocked  as  one  who  went  on  a  visit  to  the 
sun  and  lost   his  eyes.      But  the  way   into  the  light 


116 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


is  the  way  to  knowledge,  and  those  who  attain  to 
the  beatific  vision  of  the  Idea  of  the  Good  are  always 
going  upward.  The  soul  must  be  turned  away  from 
the  transient  occurrences  surrounding  it  until  it  is 
able  to  contemplate  true  existence.  This  is  the  mean- 
ing of  education  ;  it  is  a  knowing  from  within,  and 
not  from  without.  He  alone  is  capable  of  philo- 
sophic cognition  who  has  learned  to  renounce  the 
sensuous,  and  to  direct  his  vision   towards  true  Being. 

Philosophy,  to  Plato,  is  the  royal  science  that  all 
others  must  serve,  the  realization  and  perfection  of 
human  nature,  the  absolute  consummation  of  the  spir- 
itual life.  "The  knowledge  of  the  most  excellent 
things  begins  through  the  eyes,'"  he  says  in  the  Tim- 
aeus.  ''  The  distinction  of  the  visible  day  from  the 
night,  the  lunations  and  revolutions  of  the  planets, 
have  produced  the  knowledge  of  time  and  given  rise 
to  the  investigation  of  the  nature  of  the  whole. 
Whence  we  have  gained  philosophy ;  and  a  greater 
good  than  it,  given  by  God  to  man,  has  neither 
come  nor  will  ever  come." 

Plato  recognizes  that  God  alone  is  wise,  and  does 
not  claim  for  man  divinity,  but  only  its  likeness. 
He  acknowledges  that  it  is  difficult  for  the  human 
soul  amid  its  earthly  surroundings  to  attain  the  pure 
intuition  of  truth,  but  sees  in  self-activitv  the  means 
of  development.  He  would  even  base  the  organism 
of  the  state  on  philosophy.  ''Until  philosophers  rule 
in  the  state,  or  the  now  so-called  kings  and  men  in 
power  philosophize  truly  and  perfectly,  and  thus  the 
ruling  power  and  philosophy  coincide  —  until  the  dif- 


'a 


CHARACTER   OF   PLATO  S   PHILOSOPHY. 


117 


ferent  dispositions  are  united  which  now  are  isolated, 
and  engaged  in  these  provinces  separately  for  them- 
selves, pursuing  the  one  or  the  other ;  until  then, 
oh  friend  Glaucon,  there  will  be  no  end  of  evil  for 
the  people,  nor,  think  I,  for  the  human  race  in  gen- 
eral." Plato's  thought,  so  far  as  it  means  that  uni- 
versal principles  should  direct  and  control  the  state, 
is  true,  and  is  generally  acknowledged  to-day  as  the 
substantial   basis  of  government. 

''Plato  has  indicated  every  eminent  point  in  spec- 
ulation," says  Emerson.  "He  wrote  on  the  scale  of 
the  mind  itself,  so  that  all  things  have  symmetry  in 
his  tablet.  He  put  in  all  the  past  without  weari- 
ness, and  descended  into  detail  with  a  courage  like 
that  he  witnessed  in  nature.  One  would  say  that 
his  forerunners  had  mapped  out  each  a  farm,  or  a 
district,  or  an  island,  in  intellectual  geography,  and 
that  Plato  first  drew  the  sphere.  He  domesticates 
the  soul  in  nature ;  man  is  the  microcosm.  All  the 
circles  of  the  visible  heaven  represent  as  many  cir- 
cles in  the  rational  soul.  There  is  no  lawless  par- 
ticle, and  there  is  nothing  casual  in  the  action  of  the 
human  mind.  *  *  *  *  Before  all  men  he  saw 
the  intellectual  values  of  the  moral  sentiment.  He 
describes  his  own  ideal  when  he  paints  in  the  Tim- 
a?us  a  god  leading  things  out  of  disorder  into  order. 
He  kindled  a  fire  so  truly  in  the  centre  that  we  see 
the  sphere  illuminated,  and  can  distinguish  poles,  equa- 
tor, and  lines  of  latitude,  every  arc  and  every  node ; 
a  theory  so  arranged,  so  modulated  that  you  would  say 
the  winds  of  ages   had   swept  through  this  rhythmic 


118 


A   STUDY  OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


I      \ 


structure,  and  not  that  it  was  the  brief  extempore 
blotting  of  one  short-lived  scribe.  *  *  *  xiis  sub- 
tlety commended  him  to  men  of  thought.  The  se- 
cret of  his  popular  success  is  the  moral  aim,  which 
endeared  him  to  mankind.  Intellect,  he  said,  is  king 
of  heaven  and  earth ;  but  in  Plato,  intellect  is  always 
moral." 


i 


:\ 


'- 


, 


CHAPTER  XX. 


THE     PLATONIC     DIALECTIC. 


THE  division  of  philosophy  into  dialectic,  physics, 
and  ethics,  is  that  which  is  generally  adopted  in 
the  exposition  of  the  Platonic  system.  This  classifi- 
cation cannot  be  distinctly  ascribed  to  Plato  himself, 
but  is  one  presupposed  by  Aristotle,  and  employed  by 
Plato's  disciple,  Xenocrates. 

Dialectic,  in  the  higher  sense  of  the  word,  is  the 
science  of  true  Being,  the  inquiry  into  Ideas.  The 
Idea  for  Plato  is  the  true  Universal,  the  essence  of 
things,  that  which  abides  uniform  and  self-identical 
amid  all  finite  changes  and  contradictions.  It  is  ap- 
prehended, not  by  the  senses,  but  by  reason  alone. 
All  that  the  senses  perceive  is  constantly  changing, 
becoming  ;  no  single  thing  exists  truly,  for  it  depends 
on  another,  and  is  self-contradictory  ;  the  true  is  not 
the  sensible,  but  the  intelligible  world.  ''There  are 
two  sorts  of  things,"  says  the  Timaeus,  ''one  that 
always  is  and  becomes  not,  and  one  that  always  be- 
comes and  never  is.  The  former,  that,  namely,  which 
is  always  in  the  same  state,  is  apprehended  through 
reflection  by  means  of  reason ;  the  other,  again,  which 
comes  to  be  and  ceases  to  be,  but  properly  never  is, 
is  apprehended  through  opinion  by  means  of  sensuous 
perception  and  without   reason."      One    is    the    arche- 

110 


120 


A   STUDY  OF  GREEK    PHII.(»OPHY. 


typal  Idea  ;  the  the  other  is  iu  imperfoct  copy.  Wo 
are  led  to  the  first  when  ^xe  look  for  the  ultimate 
end  of  the  second  ;  that  which  U  fair  and  good  in 
the  finite  world  can  only  heoome  bo  through  jKirtid- 
pation  in  Infinite  Beauty  and  GoodneM.  £\  ling 
points  to  the  idea  as  the  csliho  of  lis  exiKti^iicx! ;  tho 
Ideal  is  the  only  Real.  This  particular  r<i»>^  with  itt 
hloom  and  fragrance,  is  a  traiiKiton*  imago  of  the  ani- 
Torttl  tone  that   nartr  fuden. 

Ht«gi4  di:irtiiiguU)ietf  hctweoD  tlte  higher  form  of  dia- 
lectic employed  hy  PUto.  and  tluit  which  he  ti«od  in 
common  with  Socraltt  and  tl»o  SophJKts.  In  Komo  of 
tlie  dialojjpaes,  C  in   appanaitly  an    art  of  over- 

turning the  common  notions  of  moo  bj  eboving  what 
coiitnidictionN  thcj  contain  and  how  inadequate  tbej 
aro  as  scientific  knowledge.  Its  pnrpoee  is  to  direct 
men  to  se^irch  for  what  is  inst««d  of  what  appemrs;  bnt 
its  rwnlt  is  negative  and  dcetmctivi:.  That  Plato  ap- 
preciated the  danger  involved  in  this  nse  of  dialectic  is 
erident  from  the  advice  given  in  the  Republic^  that 
dtizena  should  not  be  initiated  into  the  art  before 
thej  had  completed  their  thirtieth  year.  But  ihf.n^  is 
a  pc(3itive  side  even  to  thi.t  form  of  dialectic.  It 
daasifles  under  one  general  riev  tlie  nottomi  analyxed* 
and  thus  brings  to  oonBcionsneas  the  Univeraal.  Plato 
seens  a  little  tedious  to  modem  thought  in  thii;  pro- 
oedure  becaaae  the  abatraetiona  at  uhich  lie  arrivea 
are  part  of  our  intellectual  inheritanco. 

''The  dialectic  aa  speculativo  i^  the  Platonic  dia- 
lectic proper/'  aays  H<^1 ;  "ii  does  UfOi  end  with 
a  negative  rf^alt,   hut  pneeente  the  union  of  antithn'.ic 


THK   PLATOXir   DIALBCTIC. 


121 


ddee  which  have  annulled  each  otlier.  What  Plato 
aeaka  in  the  dialectic  is  the  pure  thought  of  the  rear 
BOH,  from  uhti^h  he  verj  carefnllj  discriminates  the 
understanding.  One  can  have  tlionght  conceming 
many  thingi^,  if  ho  has  thought  at  all ;  but  Plato 
does  not  mean  this  sort  of  thoughtiL  The  true  spec- 
ulative gfeatnees  of  i  :it<>,  cliat  through  irhi<;h  he 
miikea  an  epoch  in  the  liistory  of  philoeophyy  and 
conacqnently  in  the  world-historj  in  general,  is  the 
more  definite  comprehenaion  of  the  Idea ;  an  infnght 
which  some  centuries  later  constitutee  tho  funda- 
mental element  in  the  formation  of  the  world-his- 
tor>*  and  in  the  new  organic  form  of  tho  human 
S|»iriL  ** 

Plato*<  dialectic  atarta  from  that  of  Socrates^  but 
bu  unitcK  in  hiN  thought  all  the  pnnoi|i]6a  of  the 
earlier  philoeophera^  diiKolving  tlunr  oontm  ms  by 
means  of  that  higher  insight  into  trutii  contained  in 
hu  theory  of  Ideas.  Ho  dcrivoi  from  Ileniolitus  the 
doctrine  tliat  seosnous  things  are  i)<rrj)ctually  chiuig- 
i^g;  to  the  Eleatks  he  owes  the  conception  of  abeo- 
late  Being;  from  Socrates  he  leama  to  eeek  the  nni- 
lersal  in  the  determination  of  concepts,  and  comae 
to  the  conolusion^  as  Aristotle  says,  thai  ''this  pix>- 
cednro  must  refer  to  something  different  from  sense, 
for  sensible  thingB^  being  always  liable  to  change* 
cannot  be  universally  defined/'  That  which  eziste 
ab&  y,  and  is  alone  the  object  of  knowledge,  be 
calls  Ideas,  The  sensuous  manifold  that  we  perceive 
is  what  it  is  by  virtue  of  partici)xition  in  Ideas.  The 
visible  is  but  an  adumbration  of  the  invisible;  senae 


122 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


reflects  imperfectly  the   reality  of  thought.     Ideas  are 
the  eternal   prototypes   of   Being;  from  them  all  other 
things  are   copied.     They   belong  to   the   spiritual   and 
not  to   the   material   world ;   they  are  accessible  to  the 
contemplation   of    reason    alone,    and    can    neither  be 
seen   nor    apprehended    by   sense    and    understanding. 
In  the   Symposium,    Plato  defines   the   Idea  of  the 
Beautiful,    and  shows  how  one  may  be    guided   from 
the   love    of    its    imperfect    copies    in    the    world    of 
sense,   on    and    on,    with    increasing    apprehension   of 
the  truth  until,   at    last,    purified  of    earthly    leaven, 
he   sees  what  the  essence  of    Beauty  is,    and  beholds 
its  divine   Idea,    the   Infinite   Cause   of  all  that  is  fair 
and   lovely  in  earth  or  heaven.     ''But    what    if   man 
had   eyes  to  see   the   true   beauty — the    divine  beauty, 
I   mean,   pure  and   clear    and    unalloyed,    not   clogged 
with   the  pollutions  of    mortality,    and  all    the    colors 
and    vanities    of    human    life  — thither    looking,    and 
holding  converse  with    the    true    beauty,    divine    and 
simple,   and   bringing  into  being    and    educating  true 
creations  of  virtue  and  not   idols  only?      Do  you  not 
see   that  in   that  communion   only,   beholding    beauty 
with   the  eye   sf    the   mind,    he    will    be    enabled    to 
bring  forth,   not  images  of  beauty,   but   realities;    for 
he  has  hold   not  of  an   image  but  of  a  reality,    and 
bringing  forth  and  educating  true    virtue    to  become 
the   friend   of   God  and  be   immortal,   if    mortal   man 


9^' 


may 

Ideas  are  present  in  the  mind  of  every  individ- 
ual, but  few  are  aware  of  their  existence,  or  know 
anything  of  their  nature  and  character.     The  special 


THE   PLATONIC    DIALECTIC. 


123 


function  of  dialectic  is  to  make  us  conscious  of  their 
presence,  and  to  purify  our  thinking  by  directing  it 
towards  the  true  aim  of  human  activity,  the  spirit- 
ual rather  than  the  material.  Education  is  not  only 
useful  information,  but  an  illumination  and  purifica- 
tion of  the  soul.  In  the  seventh  Book  of  the  Re- 
public, Plato  explains  the  nature  of  dialectic  and  the 
training  that  is  necessary  to  draw  the  soul  upwards. 
Arithmetic  and  geography  prepare  the  mind  for  true 
science  by  teaching  it  how  to  deal  with  abstractions 
apart  from  sensible  objects.  Yet  mathematics  is  but 
a  dream  and  a  hypothesis,  never  analyzing  its  own 
principles  in  order  to  attain  true  knowledge.  Dia- 
lectic, and  dialectic  alone,  is  the  only  science  which 
does  away  with  hypotheses  in  order  to  establish  them, 
and  teaches  the  eye  of  the  soul,  buried  in  the  slough 
of  ignorance,  to  look  upwards,  using  as  handmaids 
the  other  sciences.  Dialectic  may  be  further  defined 
/  as  the  science  which  explains  the  essence  of  each 
thing,  which  distinguishes  and  abstracts  the  concep- 
tion of  the  Good,  and  is  ready  to  disprove  all  ob- 
jections, not  by  appeals  to  opinion,  but  to  true  ex- 
istence. This  is  the  knowledge  without  which  man 
apprehends  only  shadows,  and  dreaming  and  slum- 
bering in  this  life  reaches  its  end  before  he  is  well 
awake. 

To  become  conscious  that  one  cannot  think  a 
sensation  without  passing  beyond  it  to  the  idea  that 
lies  at  its  basis,  is  a  discovery  that  summons  the  hu- 
man intellect  to  put  forth  its  utmost  capacities.  To 
think   is   to   pass  from   the   singular  and  particular  to 


124 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


the  idea  or  the  universal.  Before  me  lie  a  rose  and 
a  lily,  and  I  apprehend  that  each  is  like  and 
unlike  the  other.  But  whence  comes  this  appre- 
hension? Can  resemblance  or  difference  be  seen,  or 
touched,  or  perceived  by  any  of  the  senses?  Are 
they  not  universal  relations  which  can  only  be  appre- 
hended by  the  intellect?  Are  they  not  laws  of 
thought  without  which  intelligence  could  not  operate? 
Can  we  think  at  all  except  under  the  conditions  of 
resemblance  and  difference,  of  genus  and  species? 
Can  we  know  anything  of  a  world  that  is  not  con- 
structed in  conformity  with  these  ideas?  Are  not 
the  laws  of  thought  objective  as  well  as  subjective, 
universal,   necessary? 

Absolute  and  universal  truth,  according  to  Plato, 
must  address  itself  to  all  intellect,  and  he  therefore 
argues  that  ideas  are  the  truest  realities  because  they 
are  the  principles  without  which  there  could  be  neither 
intelligence  nor  the  object  of  intelligence.  The  world 
of  thought  is  the  actual  Avorld  itself ;  it  alone  exists 
truly  and  is  capable  of  being  known.  It  does  not 
lie  outside  of  reality,  it  is  not  beyond  in  heaven  or 
elsewhere,  it  is  here  and  now,  eternal  and  divine  in 
its  nature.  To  become  conscious  of  its  presence  we 
have  only  to  develop  our  inner  capacities,  to  see  with 
the  eye  of  the  mind.  "  Ideas  are  to  be  reached  only 
in  and  through  scientific  cognition, "  says  Hegel, 
*'they  are  immediate  intuitions  only  in  so  far  as  they 
consist  of  the  simple  results  which  scientific  cognition 
arrives  at  by  its  processes.'^ 

Science,  the  knowledge  of  that  which  is  in  truth, 


THE    PLATONIC   DIALECTIC. 


125 


is  therefore  distinguished  from  opinion.  Plato,  in  the 
Republic,  says  that  opinion  is  the  middle  ground 
between  ignorance  and  knowledge,  and  that  its  con- 
tent is  a  mingling  of  Being  and  Nought.  The 
subject  matter  of  opinion  is  the  world  of  sensuous 
objects,  the  individual  thought  which  at  the  same 
time  is  and  is  not,  since  it  only  participates  in  ideas 
and  reflects  them  imperfectly.  Can  we  say  of  any 
finite  thing  that  it  is  absolutely  large  or  small,  light 
or  heavy?  It  is  not  merely  one  of  these  opposites 
but  the  other,  as,  for  instance,  in  the  Phaedo,  Sim- 
mias  is  large  in  comparison  with  Socrates,  small  in 
comparison  with  Phsedo.  But  the  idea  of  largeness 
remains  what  it  is  permanently,  and  is  never  at  the 
same  time  identical  with  smallness.  Only  the  idea 
can  be  known ;  for  of  thought  which  is  constantly 
changing,  we  may  have  opinion  but  not  knowledge. 
Opinion  refers  to  the  material,  knowledge  to  the  im- 
material. To  assume  that  the  two  are  identical  is 
to  become  a  materialist ;  to  distinguish  between  them 
is  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  Ideas,  unchangea- 
ble and   imperishable. 

The  nature  of  knowledge,  as  opposed  to  perception, 
is  considered  at  length  in  the  Theaetetus.  The  definition 
that  **  Knowledge  is  sensible  perception/'  is  first  ana- 
lyzed. This  is  soon  identified  with  the  saying  of 
Protogoras  that  '*Man  is  the  measure  of  all  things." 
**  Things  are  to  me  as  they  appear  to  me  and  to  you 
as  they  appear  to  you.''  Suppose  the  same  wind  blowing 
in  our  faces  ;  it  is  hot  or  cold,  according  to  your  feeling, 
or  to  mine.     Feeling,  perception,  appearance,  are  identi- 


126 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


cal  with  being  and  knowledge.  But  if  truth  is  only  sen- 
sation and  one  man's  discernment  is  as  good  as  another's, 
and  every  man  is  his  own  judge,  and  everything  that 
he  Judges  is  right  and  true,  why  should  we  go  for  instruct- 
ion to  Protagoras,  or  know  less  than  he,  or  refuse  to 
believe  the  contradictory  proposition,  that  every  man 
is  not  the  measure  of  all  things  ?  What  need  of  discus- 
sion, or  debate,  or  scientific  inquiry,  if  subjective  feeling 
is  the  criterion  of  knowledge  ?  Would  not  Prota- 
goras have  to  contradict  himself  and  admit  the  truth  of 
what  his  opponents  advance,  if  every  man  perceives  and 
feels  correctly  ?  How  could  there  be  any  difference 
in  the  judgments  of  men  about  the  future  ?  Yet  we 
admit  practically  that  only  the  wise  man  knows  what 
is  expedient  for  the  future.  The  farmer  is  a  better 
judge  of  the  prospective  harvest  than -the  man  who 
knows  nothing  of  farming;  Protagoras  himself  is  a 
better  judge  of  the  probable  effect  of  a  speech  than 
an  indifferent  person.  Finally,  if  the  objects  of  sen- 
sation are  constantly  moving  and  changing,  as  Protagoras 
asserts,  how  is  it  possible  to  fix  them  even  for  an  instant  ? 
Is  not  perception  itself  annihilated  ?  What  can  be  pre- 
dicted of  that  which  is  in  a  perpetual  flux  ? 

It  has  been  objected  that  Plato  is  not  wholly  fair  to 
Protagoras  and  interprets  him  one-sidedly.  But  the 
truth  remains,  that  knowledge  is  not  sensible  perception, 
or  in  Plato's  words,  ''Knowledge  does  not  consist  in  im- 
pressions of  sense,  but  in  reasoning  about  them  ;  in  that 
only,  and  not  in  the  mere  impression,  truth  and  being  can 
be  attained.''  '*We  cannot  apprehend  either  through 
hearing    or  through    sight    that   which    they    have  in 


THE    PLATONIC    DIALECTIC. 


127 


common.  To  compare  one  sensation  with  another  im- 
plies a  principle  which  is  above  sensation.  To  com- 
bine perceptions  in  the  unity  of  self-consciousness 
is  a  purely  intellectual  act.  Through  what  organ  of  the 
body  would  oqe  perceive  mathematical  and  other  abstrac- 
tions, unity  and  multiplicity,  sameness  and  difference, 
likeness  and  unlikeness,  and  the  most  universal  of  all, 
being  ?  We  know  a  thing  to  be  hard  or  soft  by  the  touch, 
but  the  essential  being  of  hardness  or  softness,  their  op- 
position to  one  another  and  the  nature  of  the  opposition, 
is  slowly  learned  by  reflection  and  experience. 

Knowledge,  then,  is  not  perception,  and  must  be 
sought  elsewhere.  Is  it  correct  opinion  ?  The  Greek 
word  for  opinion  (rfo;ta),  like  the  German  Meinung  and 
Vorstellufig,  is  difficult  to  translate.  It  is  used  in  various 
senses  by  Plato,  and  is  explained  by  one  commentator  as 
crude  conception,  feeling,  instinctive  conviction.  But 
these  terms  do  not  exhaust  its  meaning,  as  is  evident 
from  the  following  passage  :  '*  The  soul  when  thinking 
appears  to  me  to  be  just  talking — asking  questions  of 
herself,  and  answering  them,  affirming  and  denying. 
And  when  she  has  arrived  at  a  decision,  either  gradually 
or  by  a  sudden  impulse,  and  has  at  last  agreed,  and 
does  not  doubt,  this  is  called  her  opinion."  Plato 
proves  that  opinion  is  not  knowledge,  and  the  dialogue 
ends  without  reaching  the  definition  sought.  The 
light  thrown  on  the  subject,  though  indirect,  is  none 
the  less  valuable. 

The  work  begun  in  the  Theaetetus  is  continued 
in  the  Sophist,  where  Plato  investigates  the  ideas  of 
movement  and  rest,   of    Being  and  Non-Being.      The 


128  A    STUDY    OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 

Sophist  is  an  imaginary  representative  of  false  opinion. 
But  falsehood   is  that  which   is  not,  and  therefore  has 
no  existence.     If    we  admit  that  falsehood   exists,   we 
presuppose  the  conception   of    Non-Being;    -for  only 
that  opinion  can  be  named  false  which  asserts  the  non- 
existence   of    things  which   are,   and    the  existence  of 
things   which   are  not.-     The    same    difficulty    occurs 
if    we    define  the   Sophist   as   the   imitator   of  appear- 
ance and   not  of    reality.      How   can  he  imitate   that 
which   is  not  ?    The  argument   again  asserts  the  exist- 
ence   of    Non-Being,    which    is    positively    denied    by 
Parmenides  and  the  Eleatics. 

Parmenides  affirms  that  all  things  are   one,    that  we 
cannot  perceive  the  many  because  the  many  are  not, 
that  plurality  and   change,  space  and  time,  are  merely 
illusions  of    the    senses.      Plato,   on    the    other  hand, 
seeks  to  establish   the   reality  of    Non-Being,    explain- 
ing it  as  the  other  of   Being,   both  of    which  belong 
to  all  things.      Non-Being   is  negation,   and   is  essen- 
tial to  any   distinction.     It  becomes,  as  it   were,  posi- 
tive in  relation   to   that  to  which   it  is  opposed.     The 
not  large  is  as  real   as  the  large,  darkness  is  as  real 
as  light,  cold   as  heat.      In   relation   to  itself  light  is, 
in  relation  to   darkness,   is    not ;    to   know   what   it  is 
we  must  know  what  it  is  not;  negation  is  as  neces- 
sary as  affirmation.     True  being  contains  difference  a^ 
well   as  identity,  being  for  others   as   well   as  for  self. 
The  being  of  the   Eleatics  is  altogether  exclusive  ;  the 
being  of  Plato  is  altogether  inclusive. 

In  opposition    to    the    Eleatics,   the    Sophists    hold 
fast  to  Non-Being,  which  is  the  standpoint  of  sensa- 


THE    PLATONIC    DIALECTIC. 


129 


tion,  or  the  many.  This  view  leads  to  materialism, 
to  the  belief  of  those  who,  according  to  Plato,  *'are 
dragging  down  all  things  from  heaven  and  from  the 
unseen  to  earth,  and  seem  determined  to  grasp  in 
their  hands  rocks  and  oaks  ;  of  these  they  lay  hold 
and  are  obstinate  in  maintaining  that  the  things  only 
which  can  be  touched  or  handled  have  being  or  es- 
sence, because  they  define  being  and  body  as  one, 
and  if  any  one  says  that  what  is  not  a  body  exists 
they  altogether  despise  him  and  will  hear  of  nothing 
but  body."  Plato  represents  their  opponents  as  cau- 
tiously defending  themselves  from  above  out  of  an  un- 
seen world,  mightily  contending  that  true  essence  con- 
sists of  certain  intelligible  and  incorporeal  ideas ;  the 
bodies  which  the  materialists  maintain  to  be  the  very 
truth  they  break  up  into  little  bits  by  arguments  and 
affirm  them  to  be  generation  and  not  essenice.  These 
*'  Friends  of  Ideas,''  as  Plato  terms  them,  assert  that 
neither  motion,  nor  life,  nor  soul,  nor  mind,  are  pres- 
ent with  absolute  Being,  that  to  it  belongs  neither 
activity  nor  passivity. 

Against  this  doctrine  of  ''  an  everlasting  fixture  in 
awful  unmeaniugiiess,"  Plato  argues  forcibly  that  the 
Divine  Reason  could  exist  nowhere,  nor  in  any  one, 
if  it  were  unmoved,  and  had  neither  life,  nor  soul,  nor 
thought.  If  we  are  to  participate  in  Being,  we  must 
act  upon  it  or  be  acted  upon  by  it ;  if  we  are  to  know 
Being;  a  capacity  of  being  known  must  correspond  to 
our  faculty  of  knowledge.  It  is  as  difficult  to  conceive 
Being  as  Non-Being  if  the  two  are  held  in  utter  isola- 
tion,    Non- Being  is  the  principle  of   the   other  which 


130 


A   STUDY   OF  GKEEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


runs  through  all  things.  In  spite  of  Parmenides  who 
says,  '*  Non-Being  never  is  and  do  thou  keep  thy 
thoughts  from  this  way  of  inquiry/'  Plato  proves  that 
*' there  is  a  communion  of  classes,  and  that  being,  and 
difference,  or  other,  traverse  all  things,  and  mutually 
interpenetrate,  so  that  the  other  partakes  of  being 
and  is  by  reason  of  this  participation,  and  yet  is  not 
that  of  which  it  partakes,  but  other,  and  being 
other  than  being,  is  clearly  and  manifestly  not-be- 
ing. And  again,  being,  though  partaking  of  tlie  other, 
becomes  a  class  other  than  the  remaining  classes,  and 
being  other  than  all  of  them,  is  not  each  one  of 
them  and  is  not  all  the  rest,  so  that  there  are  thou- 
sands and  thousands  of  cases  in  which  being  is  not 
as  well  as  is,  and  all  other  things,  whether  regarded 
individually  or  collectively,  in  many  respects  are, 
and  in  many  respects  are  not." 

The  concept  of  motion,  for  instance,  excludes  that 
of  rest,  but  both  participate  in  being.  Each  is  identi- 
cal with  itself,  but  the  other  of  the  other.  So  far 
as  concepts  are  alike,  the  being  denoted  by  one  be- 
longs to  the  other  ;  so  far  as  they  are  different,  the 
contrary  is  the  case,  and  the  being  of  one  is  the 
non-being  of  the  other.  The  concept  man,  for  in- 
stance, includes  all  those  concepts  which  distinguish 
man  as  an  animal,  and  those  also  which  separate  him 
from  other  animals,  but  it  excludes  an  infinite  num- 
ber of  concepts  which  are  other  and  different  from 
man.  Thus  in  every  being  there  is  also  a  non-being, 
the  difference.  He  is  the  master  of  dialectic  who 
gees  clearly    the    reciprocal    relatipu  of    concepts,   and 


THE   PLATONIC   DIALECTIC. 


131 


knows  what  classes  have  and  have  not  communion 
with  one  another.  But  he  who  is  always  bringing 
forward  oppositions  in  argument  is  but  a  little  way 
in  the  investigation  of  truth.  The  attempt  at  uni- 
versal separation  is  the  annihilation  of  reason,  for 
thought  consists  in  the  uniting  of  ideas. 

The  identity  of  Being  and  Non-Being  constitutes, 
according  to  Hegel,  the  true  point  of  interest  in 
Platonic  philosophy.  *'As  for  the  imagination,''  he 
says,  "it  is  well  enough  to  arouse  it  and  animate  it 
with  representations  of  the  Beautiful  and  the  Good  ; 
but  the  thinking  cognition  asks  after  a  definite  state- 
ment regarding  the  nature  of  the  Eternal  and  Divine. 
And  the  nature  of  this  Eternal  and  Divine  is,  es- 
sentially, free  determination  alone,  and  the  being  de- 
termined does  not  in  any  way  interfere  with  its 
universality  ;  a  limitation  (for  every  determination  is 
limitation)  which  nevertheless  leaves  the  Universal  in 
its  infinitude  free  by  itself.  Freedom  exists  only  in 
the  return-into  itself,  the  undistinguished  is  lifeless ; 
the  active,  living,  concrete  universal  is,  therefore,  that 
which  distinguishes  itself  within  itself,  but  remains 
free  in  the  process.  This  determination  consists  only 
in  this;  that  the  one  is  self-identical  in  its  Other,  in 
the  Many,  in  the  Different." 

The  Parmenides,  through  a  more  abstract  and 
elaborate  dialectic,  attains  the  same  result  as  the 
Sophist.  Parmenides  is  the  chief  speaker,  and  his 
conclusion  that  the  one  is  not  thinkable  without  the 
many,  nor  the  many  without  the  one,  is  opposed  to 
the  Eleatic   doctrine.      But   Plato   may   have  regarded 


132 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


his  theory  of  ideas  as  a  development  of  the  Eleatic 
conception  of  being,  and  a  conciliation  of  its  contra- 
dictory elements.  Parmenides  certainly  assails  Plato's 
theory  in  the  first  part  of  his  discourse,  anticipating 
in  the  most  wonderful  way  the  criticism  of  after  ages. 
Plato  here  touches  on  the  deepest  problem  of  philoso- 
phy, the  connection  between  the  Ideas  in  us  and  the 
Absolute  Idea,  between  the  human  and  the  Divine. 

Concerning  the  unity  of  the  one  and  the  many, 
Socrates  says;  ''I  should  be  surprised  to  hear  that 
the  genera  and  the  species  had  opposite  qualities  in 
themselves ;  but  if  a  person  wanted  to  prove  to  me 
that  I  was  many  and  one,  there  would  be  no  mar- 
vel in  that.  When  he  wanted  to  show  that  I  was 
many  he  would  say  that  I  have  a  right  and  a  left 
side,  and  an  upper  and  a  lower  half,  for  I  cannot 
deny  that  I  partake  of  multitude  ;  when,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  wants  to  prove  that  I  am  one,  he  will  say 
that  we  who  are  here  assembled  are  seven,  and  that 
I  am  one  and  partake  of  the  one,  and  in  saying 
both  he  speaks  truly.  •  •  •  If,  however,  as  I  was 
suggesting  just  now,  we  have  to  make  an  abstrac- 
tion, I  mean  of  like,  unlike,  one,  many,  rest,  motion, 
and  similar  ideas  and  then  to  show  that  these  in 
their  abstract  form  admit  of  admixture  and  separation, 
I  should  greatly  wonder  at  that."' 

Parmenides  admires  the  noble  ardor  with  which 
the  youthful  Socrates  pursues  philosophy,  not  holding 
fast  to  the  sensuous,  but  to  concepts  which  are  seized 
by  thought  alone.  But  he  recommends  Socrates  to 
practice  dialectic,   and  to  consider  not  only  what  fol- 


THE    PLATONIC    DIALECTIC. 


133 


lows  from  assuming  a  determination,  but  what  follows 
from  assuming  its  opposite.  This  leads  to  the  second 
and  most  important  part  of  the  dialogue,  the  dialecti- 
cal treatment  of  the  one  and  the  many  by  Parme- 
nides himself.  It  is  first  proved  that  the  one  that  can- 
not be  many  is  not  even  one,  that  it  is  '*  neither 
named  nor  uttered,  nor  conceived,  nor  known,"  and 
that  the  reality  of  the  many  apart  from  the  one  is 
also  unthinkable.  The  hypothesis  that  the  one  is  not 
is  equally  impossible  to  thought,  and  the  conclusion 
is  reached  that  *'  whether  one  is  or  is  not,  one  and 
the  other  in  relation  to  themselves  or  one  another, 
all  of  them,  in  every  way,  are  and  are  not,  and 
appear  and  appear  not." 

*'The  One  is  the  Totality — All  that  is — Being  and 
Non-Being — One  and  Many,"  to  quote  the  words  of 
Mr.  S.  H.  Emery,  in  his  exposition  of  the  Parme- 
nides, published  in  the  Jourfial  of  Speculative  Philoso- 
phy. ''The  negative  series  of  propositions  contains  the 
first  negation  of  a  negation,"  says  Prof.  Jowett.  ''Two 
minus  signs  in  arithmetic  or  algebra  make  a  plus. 
Two  negations  destroy  each  other.  This  subtle  notion 
is  the  foundation  of  the  Hegelian  logic.  The  mind 
must  not  only  admit  that  determination  is  negation, 
but  must  get  through  negation  into  affirmation.  • 
•  •  That  Plato  and  the  most  subtle  philosopher  of 
the  nineteenth  century  should  have  lighted  upon  the 
same  notion  is  a  singular  coincidence  of  ancient  and 
modern  thought." 

True  Being  must  be  defined  as  a  unity  which  in- 
cludes in    itself    multiplicity.      All    things  draw   their 


134 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


existence  from  the  one  and  the  many,  and  contain 
the  finite  and  the  infinite  as  a  part  of  tlieir  nature. 
The  phenomenal  world  derives  its  reality  from  that 
which  shines  through  it — Ideas.  Plato  does  not  deny, 
but  explains  actual  existence.  The  plurality  of  the 
phenomenon  is  sustained  and  comprehended  by  the 
unity  of  the  idea. 

In  the  Philebus,  Plato  distinguishes  four  determi- 
nations of  existence ;  the  infinite,  or  unlimited,  the 
limited,  the  union  of  the  two,  and  the  cause  of  the 
union.  To  the  cause  he  ascribes  reason  and  wisdom  ; 
it  is  the  Divine  Providence  everywhere  adapting 
means  to  ends  ;  the  Absolute  comprehending  in  itself 
the  finite  and  the  infinite.  **The  distinction  of  the 
absolute  and  relative  forms  the  logical  ground-work 
of  Plato's  whole  system,"  says  Zeller ;  '*for  the  idea 
exists  in  and  for  itself ;  the  phenomenon,  and  to  the 
fullest  extent,  matter,  only  in  relation  to  something 
else.'' 

In  bridging  the  chasm  between  thought  and  sense, 
between  ideas  and  phenomena,  Plato  is  not  always 
consistent  with  himself.  At  one  time  he  describes 
the  outward  world  as  if  it  were  mere  subjective  ap- 
pearance ;  at  another,  he  demands  that  the  meanest 
material  existence  shall  not  be  left  without  an  idea. 
He  struggles  against  this  dualism,  but  does  not  over- 
come it  wholly.  That  the  essence  of  things  is  the 
same  as  the  divine  essence,  is  implied  in  his  specu- 
lations, although  in  the  Timaeus,  as  Hegel  says,  **the 
two  appear  distinct  from  each  other — God,  A7id  the 
essence  of  things." 


THE    PLATONIC    DIALECTIC. 


135 


Plato  also  expressed  the  union  of  the  one  and  the 
many  by  describing  the  ideas  as  numbers.  That  ideas 
are  nothing  but  numbers  is  a  view  ascribed  to  Plato 
by  Aristotle,  but  not  found  in  the  dialogues  and 
therefore  unsubstantiated. 

The    Platonic    Ideas    are    so    related   as  to  form  a 
graduated   series  and   organism,    combining,  excluding, 
or    participating    in    one    another    in    all    conceivable 
ways.    The  lower  presuppose  the  higher,  and  the  high- 
est  of  all,    without   presupposition,  is   the   Idea  of  the 
Good,    which   gives   to    everything  whatever    worth    it 
possesses.     As   the  sun   in  the  visible  world  enlightens 
the  eye    and   reveals    things   seen,   everywhere  causing 
growth   and    increase,   so    in  the   invisible    world    the 
Good    is    the    source  of    truth  and   knowledge.     It  is 
represented  as  the  goal  of  human  activity,  that  which 
all   men    pursue    under  different  names,   the  ultimate 
end  of    the  world,    the  source  of    reality  and   reason. 
It  is   higher   than   the  idea  of   Being  ;   everything  that 
is  and   is   knowable    has   received   from   God   its  exist- 
ence and   its  ability  to   be   known.      Plato  clearly  as- 
serts in   the   Philebus  that  the  Divine   Reason  is  none 
other  than   the   Good,  and  identifies  it  in  the  Timseus 
with   the   Creator  and   world-builder.     He  seems  never 
to  have    separated    in    his    thought   God   as  a  person 
from  the  Idea  of  the  Good. 

Plato  identifies  religion  with  philosophy;  God  in 
an  absolute  sense  is  not  distinct  from  the  highest  of 
the  Ideas.  He  recognizes  the  gods  of  the  popular 
religion,  but  places  above  them  One  who  is  all-wise 
and  all-powerful,   creating    the    world     because   He   is 


136 


A    STUDY    OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


good  and  ruling  it  by  the  supremacy  of  His  reason. 
From  His  goodness  he  deduces  His  unchangeableness  ; 
for  that  which  is  perfect  can  neither  be  changed  by 
another  nor  alter  in  itself.  God  is  wanting  in  nothing 
that  is  fair  and  excellent  ;  He  is  able  to  do  whatever 
can  be  done  at  all ;  His  wisdom  is  seen  in  the  per- 
fect adaptation  of  means  to  ends;  He  is  absolute 
goodness  and  justice.  To  worship  God  is  to  seek  to 
be  like  Him,  to  create  in  ourselves  His  image. 
Philosophy  is  not  mere  abstract  specuhition,  it  is 
love  and  life,  the  filling  of  the  soul  with  the  true 
and  the  infinite. 

Dialectic,  the  development  of  the  method  by  which 
the  truth  is  ascertained,  is  inseparably  united  with 
moral  culture.  Plato  teaches  us  to  open  the  inward 
eye  and  see  that  which  is  in  reality,  turning  away 
the  thought  and  inclination  from  the  sensible  to  the 
intelligible.  The  discipline  of  dialectic  is  moral  as 
well  as  intellectual  ;  the  highest  insight  which  it 
enables  us  to  attain  is  the  object  of  religion  as  well 
as  of  philosophy— the  Idea  of  God  as  Absolute  Good- 
ness. 


CHAPTER   XXI. 


THE    PLATONIC    PHYSICS. 


PLATO'S  discussions  concerning  the  world  of  phe- 
nomena, the  Cosmos  and  man,  are  included  un- 
der the  name  of  Physics.  But  he  tells  us  that  in 
this  field  of  investigation  we  must  be  content  to 
take  probability  for  our  guide,  and  not  look  for 
the  same  accuracy  of  treatment  as  in  dialectic.  His 
themes  are  set  forth  in  the  Timaeus,  the  most  diffi- 
cult and  obscure  of  his  dialogues,  and  the  one  most 
strongly  colored   with   Pythagoreanism. 

Nature,  the  world  of  phenomena,  is  that  which 
is  always  becoming  and  never  is ;  it  is  apprehended 
not  by  reason  and  reflection,  but  by  opinion  with 
the  help  of  sense.  As  visible  and  tangible  it  must 
have  been  created ;  and  that  which  is  created  must 
have  a  cause.  This  cause  is  the  Father  of  all  who 
looked  to  an  eternal  archetype,  for  the  world  is  the 
fairest  of  creations,  and  God  is  the  best  of  causes. 
He  created  the  world  because  He  was  good,  and  de- 
sired that  all  things  should  be  as  like  Himself  as 
possible.  He  brought  order  out  of  disorder,  and  re- 
flecting that  of  visible  things  the  intelligent  is  su- 
perior to  the  unintelligent.  He  put  intelligence  in 
soul,  and  soul  in  body,  and  framed  the  universe  to 
be   the  best  and  fairest  work  in  the  order  of  nature. 

137 


138 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


Thus,   through   the  providence  of    God,   the    world 
became  a  living  soul   and   truly  rational.     He  created 
it  before   the    body,     compounding    out    of     the    un- 
changeable  and    indivisible    essence    and    also    out    of 
the  divisible    and    corporeal   a   third    nature  interme- 
diate  between  them   which  partook   of    the  same   and 
the  other.       The   whole  was  divided    lengthwise,    and 
the  two  halves  were   bent    into  an  outer  and  an   in- 
ner circle;    the  outer  is  the  circle    of    the  same,    or 
the  sphere  of  fixed  stars;    the  inner  is  the  circle  of 
the    other,    which    forms    the    seven    spheres    of    the 
planets.     In   the    circular  revolution  of    these  spheres 
the  soul   turning  on   itself  moves,   and    at    the    same 
time  moves  the  corporeal,  interfused   everywhere  from 
the  centre  of  the   universe  to  the  circumference.    Its 
form,   that   of    a  sphere,     is     the    most    perfect    and 
uniform    of    shapes,    comprehending    all    others;    and 
its  motion  is  circular  because,   as    return    into  itself, 
it   is  most   appropriate   to  mind   and   intelligence.      It 
is  divided   according  to   the  cardinal    numbers  of    the 
harmonic  and  astronomical  systems,   for  numbers    are 
the  mean   between   mere   sensuous    existence    and    the 
pure  idea,   and  the  soul  of    the   world   must   compre- 
hend   in    itself    all    proportion    and    measure.        The 
mythical   element   is  at  once  apparent  in  this  descrip- 
tion.      The  immaterial  is  confused  with  the  material ; 
imagination  seeks  to   picture    that    which    cannot    be 
pictured,    but    which    can    only    be    thought    by    the 
pure   reason. 

Plato  believed  the  Cosmos  to  be  a  living  creature 
with  a  soul.    All  that  is  moved   by  another  must  be 


THE   PLAT6nIC    physics. 


139 


preceded   by   the  self-moved ;    the  corporeal  is    moved 
by  another,  the    soul    is    self-moved.       If    we    regard 
the  universe,    it    is    impossible    to    doubt    that  it    is 
ruled   by   intelligence,  and  where,    except   in   the   soul, 
can  this  intelligence   dwell  ?      The  soul    is    therefore 
prior  to   the   body,  both   in   man  and   in  the  Cosmos. 
And  as   the    body    of    the    Cosmos    is    more    glorious 
and   mighty   than   ours,  its    soul    transcends    our  soul 
in   perfection.      The   soul   of    the   world    is  the   inter- 
mediate principle   between   the   Idea  and  the  phenom- 
enon,  participating    in    the    Divine    Reason    and    im- 
parting it   to   the   corporeal.     It  is  not  only  the  cause 
of    material    motion,     but    it    is    also    the    source    of 
spiritual   life  and   knowledge.     Never  growing  old   nor 
passing  away,    it    is    the    perfect    copy    of    the    ever- 
lasting and   invisible    God,  itself  a  blessed  god   exalt- 
ed above  all   other    created    deities.      ''Even   Plato  is 
too  deeply    penetrated    with    the    glory  of    nature   to 
despise   her  as    the    non-divine,"    says    Zeller,    ''or   to 
rank  her  as  the  unspiritual,    below    human     self-con- 
sciousness." 

Hegel  finds  a  profound  meaning  underlying  Plato's 
doctrine  of  the  world-soul.  The  nature  of  the  Ab- 
solute Idea  is  shown  in  forming  out  of  the  undi- 
vided and  the  divided  a  mixture,  partaking  of  the 
nature  of  the  self-identical  and  of  the  other,  and 
uniting  all  into  one  whole  which  is  "  the  true  mat- 
ter, the  absolute  stuff  (material)  which  is  sundered 
in  itself,  as  an  abiding  and  indissoluble  unity  of  one 
and  many.  Phito  finds  the  soul  to  be  the  all-in- 
cluding simple  in  the  ide»  of  the  corporeal  universe; 


140 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY 


to  him   the  essence  of  the   corporeal  and  of  the  soul 
is  that  of  the   Unity    in    the    Difference.     This   two- 
fold  Essence,  posited  in   and  for  itself  in  the   Differ- 
ence, systematizes    itself    within    the    One    into   many 
moments,    which,   how^ever,    are    movements;     so    this 
reality   and  the  mentioned  essence  are,  taken  together, 
the   whole   in    the    antithesis   of    soul   and   body,    and 
the  antithetic   sides  are  again   one.     Spirit   is  the  all- 
penetrating   to   which   the  corporeal  is  opposed,  though 
the  former   (spirit)   is,   in   fact,    this  extension  itself." 
The    archetype    of    the   world-soul    exists    alone    in 
thought,   in    eternal    self-identity;    but    entering    into 
antithesis    a    copy    arises    and    becomes    visible.      The 
archetype  is  the  life  eternal ;   the  copy  is  the  system 
of  sidereal   motion,   a  self-moving  image  of  the  eter- 
nal.    Moved   according  to   number  it  is  what  we    call 
time.       The   true    time    is    eternal,     or    the    present. 
Every  thought  exists   in   time  ;    like   space,   it   is   sen- 
suous and  not  sensuous,    the    form    in    which    spirit 
becomes  objective.       Opposite    to    true    time,    or    the 
eternal   present,   the  form  of   the   self-identical,  is  that 
of  the  self-changing,    the  phenomenal   world   of    mat- 
ter.     Space  is  its  ideal   essence,  as  time  is  the  abso- 
lute   principle    of     the     immediate     image     of     the 

Eternal. 

That  Plato  believed  matter  to  be  eternal,  indepen- 
dent, existing  as  chaos  before  the  creation  of  the 
world,  might  be  inferred  from  certain  passages  of  the 
Tim^us.  But  to  interpret  literally  what  was  only 
meant  figuratively  would  contradict  other  statements 
of  a  deeper  philosophic  import,   and   would  place   be- 


THE   PLATONIC   PHYSICS. 


Ul 


side  the  Idea  of  the  Good  another  entity,  equally 
permanent  and  self-identical.  Plato  seems  rather  to 
conceive  matter  as  the  unlimited,  the  condition  of 
separation  and  division,  the  objective  which  has  the 
power  of  receiving  the  idea  and  reflecting  it  in  the 
phenomenon.  It  is  the  ground  of  change  and  of  ex- 
tension, and  must  be  different  from  the  Idea,  because 
it  is  that  in  which  its  copy  exists. 

Plato  enters  into  details  concerning  the  derivation  of 
the  four  elements,  and  classifies  animated  beings  accord- 
ingly into  those  of  fire  or  light,  of  air,  of  water,  and  of 
earth,     lie  describes  the  earth  as  at  rest  in  the  centre 
of   the   universe,   and   conceives   the  stars  as  immortal 
deities.     His  discussions  concerning  organic  nature  and 
the  structure  of  the  human  body  remind  us  that  science 
was  yet  in  its  infancy.     He  distinguishes  between  two 
causes,  the  divine  and  the  necessary.      The  divine  ap- 
pertains to  the  eternal,  the  necessary   to  the  finite  and 
mortal.     God  himself  is  the  author  of  the   first  ;    but 
the  second  He  commits  to  His  assistants  for  the  produc- 
tion and  regulation  of  mortal  things;   ''an  easy  mode 
of    transition    from    the    divine    to    the    finite,"    says 
Hegel. 

Plato's  theory  of  the  human  soul  is  the  completion 
of  his  physics.  Conceived  apart  from  its  union  with 
the  body,  the  essence  of  the  human  soul  is  the  same  as 
that  of  the  world-soul.  Reason  cannot  impart  itself  to 
man  except  through  its  instrumentality  ;  participating 
in  the  idea  of  life  it  can  never  participate  in  the  op- 
posite idea,  that  of  death.  It  is  self-moved  and  the 
source  of  motion  in  all  other  things;  it  is  indestruct- 


142  A  STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 

ible,   Without  end  or  beginning,  free  from  change  and 
multiplicity.      Its  connection  with  matter  is  expressed 
mythically  as  a  lapse  to  a  lower  condition.    The  soul  .s 
represented  under  the  figure  of  two  winged  steeds  and 
a  charioteer.      The  white  horse  is   the   symbol  of    Us 
higher  aspirations,  the  black   horse  is    the    symbol    of 
appetite  and  impulse,   the  charioteer  is  the  reason.     If 
perfect  and  fully  winged  it  soars  upward  and  regulates 
the  world,    if     imperfect    it  droops    and     receives    an 
earthly  form,   which  appears  to  be  self-moved,  but  is 
really  moved  by  the  soul.     The  immortal,  according  to 
Hegel's  interpretation  of  Plato's  thought,  is  that  whose 
soul  and  body  are   indivisibly  in  one,  the   identity  of 
the  real  and  the  ideal,  of  the  finite  and  the  infinite. 

"Now  the  chariots  of  the  gods,  self-balanced,  upward 
glide  in  obedience  to  the  rein ;  but  the  others  have  a 
difficulty,  for  the  steed  who  has  evil  in  him,  if  he  has 
not  been  properly  trained   by  the  charioteer,  gravitates 
and  inclines  and  sinks  towards  the  earth  ;  and  this  is 
the  hour  of  agony  and  extremest  conflict  in  the  soul 
For  the  immortal  souls,  when  they  are  at  the  end  of 
their  course,  go  out  and  stand  upon  the  back  of  hea- 
ven,  and    the  revolution  of  the    spheres  carries  them 
round  and  they  behold  the  world  beyond.       *       *       * 
The  colorless  and  formless   and  intangible    essence    is 
visible    to    the    mind,   which  is    the  only  lord  of  the 
soul.       *      *      During  the  revolution  she  beholds  jus- 
tice   temperance,   and  knowledge  absolute,  not  in  the 
form  of  generation  or  of  relation,  which  men  call  ex- 
istence, but  knowledge  absolute  in  existence  absolute. 
This  is  the  life  of  the  gods.    But  other  souls,   trying 


THE   PLATONIC   PHYSICS. 


143 


.7i, 


to  reach  the  same  heights,  fail,  and  fall  upon  the 
earth,  occupying  a  higher  or  lower  station  as  they  have 
more  or  less  truth.  But  memories  of  the  glories  of 
heaven  remain  as  reminiscence,  and  the  soul  by  con 
tinuous  effort  and  aspiration  may  again  soar  upward 
to  regain  its  lost   inheritance." 

The  allegorical  character  of  this  description  must  not 
be  forgotten.     That  Plato  believed  in  the  pre-existence 
of  the  soul,  and  that  its  life  on  earth  is  a  lapse  from  a 
perfect  condition,  is  generally  assumed,  but  rests  princi- 
pally o„  mythical  statements.     The  soul  that  looks  upon 
true    being  is  the    pure    thinking    activity  itself,   the 
d.vmity  withm  man  ;  the  soul  that  falls  to  earth  takes 
appearance  for  reality,  opinion  for  knowledge.     Plato 
affirms  that  the  soul  must  be  freed  from  the  dominion 
of  the  senses  before  it  can   behold   that   which   truly 
exists,   that  to  which   change  and  death  are  foreign 
Ihrough  Its  union  with  a  mortal  body,  it  is  subject  to 
sensuous  needs  and  greeds,  but  in  its  essence  it  is  divine 
Accordingly,  he  distinguishes  within  it  the  mortal  and 
irrational  from   the   immortal  and  rational.     The  irra 
tional  IS  again  divided  into  two  parts ;  the   first,  the 
white  horse  of  the  myth,  is  courage,  or  will ;  the  second 
IS    mere    sensuous    appetite    and    desire.      Reason,    or 
thought  has  its  dwelling  in  the  head;  courage,  in  the 
breast ;  desire,  in  the  lower  regions.     Courage  is  nobler 
than    appetite,  but  acts  frequently  without  reflection 
and  belongs  to  the  physiological,  natural  side  of  man 
A  curious  theory  accounts  for  the  way  in  which  desire 
18  ruled.     Reason   mirrors  pleasant  or  terrible  pictures 
on  the  smooth  surface  of  the  liver,  and  by  means  of 


144 


A   STUDY   OP  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


imagination  alarms  or  quiets  the  lower  appetites.  The 
liver  is  the  organ  of  presentiments  and  of  prophetic 
dreams,  which  are  ascribed  to  the  irrational  side  of  the 
soul. 

Plato  constantly  teaches  that  corporeal  existence  is 
not  true  life,  and  that  the  soul  proclaims  its  divine 
origin  in  its  conflict  with  the  body,  its  love  for  beauty, 
its  longing  for  knowledge,  its  aspiration  towards  the 
good.  To  educate  the  soul  is  to  bring  to  consciousness 
what  it  is  in  itself.  Plato  asserts  that  what  we  seem  to 
learn  is  nothing  but  reminiscence,  that  learning  is  a 
process  of  recalling  that  which  we  possess  already. 
**The  soul,  as  being  immortal,  and  having  been  born 
again  many  times,  and  having  seen  all  things  tliat  there 
are,  whether  in  this  world  or  in  the  world  below,  has 
knowledge  of  them  all ;  and  it  is  no  wonder  that  she 
should  be  able  to  call  to  remembrance  all  that  she  ever 
knew  about  virtue  and  about  everything;  for  as  all 
nature  is  akin,  and  the  soul  has  learned  all  things,  there 
is  no  difficulty  in  her  eliciting,  or  as  men  say,  learning 
all  out  of  a  single  recollection,  if  a  man  is  strenuous  and 
does  not  faint ;  for  all  inquiry  and  all  learning  is  but  a 
recollection." 

Hegel  thinks  that  Plato  conceives  the  true  nature  of 
consciousness  in  the  doctrine  of  reminiscence.  Spirit 
includes  both  subjective  and  objective,  the  thinking  sub- 
ject and  the  object  thought.  But  the  two  appear  sun- 
dered at  first  as  the  inner  and  the  outer,  and  must  be 
identified  in  thought  to  produce  knowledge  and  science. 
Images  of  individual  tranfiilon*  thiogs  conic  from  witli* 
ou(  and    are   tho    subject  of   opinion ;  but    anivcrtal 


THE   PLATONIC    PHYSICS. 


145 


thoughts,  which  alone  are  true,  have  their  birth  in  the 
soul  and  belong  to  its  essence.  We  convert  what  is 
sensuously  perceived  into  something  internal  and  uni- 
versal through  the  act  by  which  we  go  into  ourselves 
and  recall  it  in  the  depths  of  consciousness.  There 
dwells  in  each  man  as  an  immanent  faculty  of  his  soul, 
the  organ  with  which  he  learns;  and  the  art  of  in- 
struction is  that  of  turning  the  soul  away  from  tran- 
sient sensations  and  i!nax<^«  lowardn  the  contemplation 
of  the  true  and  the  good.  But  80  far  as  Plato  r(»])rc8ent8 
all  knowledge  as  pObKcwed  by  tho  individual  conscious- 
ness in  a  previous  state  of  oxiHtonce,  it  belongs  to  his 
figurative  way  of  imagining,  by  means  of  the  myth,  re- 
lations of  pure  thought.  T\w.  individual  consciougness, 
not  as  a  mere  exclusive  individual,  but  as  inclusive, 
universal  and  divine  iii  its  ('nwuicc,  has  in  itKelf  poten- 
tially the  content  of  knowing,  which  can  bo  developed 
only  through  its  own  uc^tivity, 

Plato's  doctrine  of  tho  imm.  r*!ty  of  the  BOol  ii 
based  on  its  essential  naturo,  which  excludes  iht  poiii* 
bility  of  its  destruction.  The  soul  in  the  priuciplc  of 
motion,  and  is  inscpimiblj  combined  with  the  idea  of 
life.  The  composite  alone  is  subje<!t  to  di8eolui)i>u  and 
decay;  but  the  soul  in  it«  eaw&ce  in  Kimple,  self-iden- 
tical, incapable  of  any  ohango.  It^  subetance  ..  iliat 
which  remains  ever  the  aaine  trmk  vhen  inTolred  irith 
external  material  which  «wm»  foreign  to  it«elf.  I 
represent  by  myself  one  eensuoas  image  afttsr  jDolhcr> 
but  their  changes  do  not  affect  mj  thinking  acUntj, 
wliich  ramoins  in   permanent  self-idei  ixogniang 

all  the  iiniigee  as  my  production. 


146 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


Plato's    belief  in   retribution  after  death  is  closely 
connected   with   his  doctrine  of  immortality.     As  it  is 
impossible    to    determine    the    precise   way    in     which 
souls  are    punished,    he    represented    it   mythically  as 
transmigration,  a  theory  borrowed  from  the  Pythagor- 
eans.     The  soul   which   has    yielded    to    appetite  and 
sensuous  desire  must   enter  lower  forms  of  existence  ; 
the  soul   which,    through  conflict  and    aspiration,   has 
risen    above  the  corporeal,   attains  a  state   of    blissful 
repose.      "The   process   of    the   world,    the   history  of 
the   universe,    has   no   other  import   than  this  perpet- 
ual  transition  of  Psyche  between   the  higher  and   the 
lower,  the  divine  and  the  human  world,''  says  Schweg- 
ler.     At   once  spiritual   and  unspiritual,  free    and    un- 
free,  the   two   contradictory  elements  of    the   soul  are 
manifested   as  a  succession  in  time.     Man  is  the  union 
of  sense  and  reason  ;   the  soul,    therefore,    is  inclined 
both   to  the  sensuous  and   the  ideal.     The  solution  of 
this  enigma  can   only   be   found   in  its  ethical  nature 
and   destiny,  which   is  the  central    point  of    the  Pla- 
tonic philosophy. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


THE    PLATONIC   ETHICS. 

rpo  SOCRATES  Plato  owed,  in  part,  the  purity  and 
-J-      fervor  of  his  strivings,  his  conviction  of  the  ne- 
cessity of   moral   knowledge.      His  lofty  idealism  lifted 
ethics  to  a  height,  transcended   only  by    Christianity. 
He  sought   first  to  ascertain    and    establish    the    ulti- 
mate aim  of  moral  activity,  or  the  supreme  good ;   he 
treated  next  of  its  realization  in  individuals,  or  virtue; 
and  finally  of  that   toward   which  all   morality   tends, 
the  objective   actualization   of    the  good   in   the  state. 
The  good   is   what   all    men   desire  ;   to  possess  it  is 
happiness:    in    what    does    it    consist?     Not    in    this 
changing  and    perishable    sensuous    existence,    but    in 
the  life  of   thought,  pure  contemplation,  the  endeavor 
of  the  soul  to    become     like    God.      "Evils,    Theodo- 
rus,    can    never    perish,"    says    Plato,     in    the    Thea?- 
tetus,  "for  there  must  always  remain  something  which 
is    antagonistic    to    good.       Of    necessity    they    hover 
around  this    mortal    sphere    and    the    earthly  nature, 
having  no  place  among  the  gods   in  heaven.     Where- 
fore, also,  we  ought  to   fly  away   thither,    and    to    fly 
thither  is  to  become  like   God,  as  far  as  this  is  pos- 
sible;  and   to  become   like    Him    is    to    become    holy 
and  just  and   wise." 

In  other  dialogues,  the  body  appears  as  a  fetter,  a 

147 


148 


A    STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


dungeon  of  the  soul,  the  grave  of  the  higher  life. 
The  task  of  the  soul  is  to  purify  and  emancipate  it- 
self from  corporeal  influence,  to  withdraw  from  the 
sensuous  into  the  life  of  thought.  The  appetites  and 
passions,  the  lower  element  of  the  soul,  seduce  us 
from  our  true  destiny,  degrade  the  human  into  the 
animal,  and  are  the  root  of  vice  and  misery.  Phi- 
losophy is  a  means  of  purification,  freeing  the  soul 
from  its  sensuous  fetters,  and  lifting  it  into  the  world 
of  Ideas  where  it  beholds  the  good  and  the  true, 
regaining  the  blessedness  it  had  lost  through  its  im- 
mersion  in    matter. 

But   this   withdrawal    from    finite    conditions    is    a 
negative  theory  of  morality,  which  Plato  completed  by 
other  views,  ascribing  more  importance  to  the  sensible 
world  as  that  which  reveals  the  Idea.     He  refutes  the 
doctrine  of  pleasure  as  the  highest  good,  becafise  pleas- 
ure is  relative  and  is    quickly  transformed    into  pain. 
It  is  also  changing  and  indefinite,  and  cannot  be  the 
aim   of  the  souFs  activity.     But  a  life  without   pleas- 
ure   or    pain    would   be  pure  apathy.     The  good   does 
not   entirely  exclude  pleasure,  but  it  must    be   guided 
by  reason  so  as  to  produce  order  and    measure.      The 
chief  constituent  of    the    Supreme    Good    is   participa- 
tion in  ideal  knowledge  ;  the  second,  the  formation  of 
that  which  is  harmonious,  beautiful  and  perfect;    the 
third,  mind  and  wisdom;   the   fourth,   the  special   sci- 
ences, the  arts  and  right  opinions ;   the  fifth  and  last, 
the  pure  and  painless  pleasures  of  the  senses.      *'We 
cannot  fail    to   perceive    the    moderation,    the    respect 
for  all  that  is  in  human  nature,  the  harmonious  cul- 


THE   PLATONIC    ETHICS. 


149 


ture  of  the  whole  man,  by  which  the  Platonic  ethics 
prove  themselves  such  genuine  fruits  of  the  Greek 
national  mind,"  says  Zeller. 

The  essential  means  of  happiness  is  virtue,  the  in- 
ternal harmony  and  health  of  the  soul.  If  passion 
and  appetite  rule,  the  human  and  divine  element  in 
our  nature  is  subjected  to  the  animal ;  the  soul  is 
miserable  and  enslaved.  The  virtuous  man  alone  is 
free  and  happy  ;  his  soul  takes  hold  of  the  Eternal, 
for  true  philosophy  and  perfect  morality  are  one. 
Plato  transcends  the  Socratic  doctrine  of  expediency; 
virtue  in  itself  is  its  own  reward,  vice  its  own  pun- 
ishment. Were  it  possible  for  the  righteous  to  be 
mistaken  by  God  as  well  as  by  man,  and  for  the 
wicked  to  conceal  their  wickedness  from  both,  the 
first  would  still  be  happy,  the  second  unhappy.  Vir- 
tue has  unconditional  worth,  independently  of  future 
retribution. 

Plato  followed  Socrates  at  first,  and  identified  vir- 
tue with  knowledge,  but  was  led  by  reflection  to 
modify  this  view.  Although  the  inclination  towards 
virtue  is  implanted  in  human  nature  itself,  he  recog- 
nized that  moral  disposition  varies  according  to  tem- 
peraments and  individuals.  Ordinary  virtue,  founded 
on  habit,  custom  and  right  opinion,  must  precede  the 
higher  morality,  he  says  in  the  Republic.  The  first 
is  presupposed  by  the  second,  and  the  second  is  per- 
fected by  philosophy.  He  believed,  with  Socrates,  in 
the  unity  of  virtue,  but  at  the  same  time  admitted 
a  plurality  of  moral  attributes,  assigning  them  to  dif- 
ferent parts  of    the    soul.     The    virtue   of    reason    is 


150 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


wisdom,  the  rule  of  the  soul's  life ;  the  virtue  of  the 
heart  is  courage,  or  valor,  whicli  helps  reason  in  the 
struggle  against  outward  and  inward  peril ;  the  virtue 
of  sensuous  appetite  is  self-control,  or  temperance ;  and 
finally,  the  virtue  which  unites  the  others  that  there 
may  be  perfect  internal  harmony,   is  justice. 

Plato  attempted  no  systematic  application  of  his 
principles  to  subjective  morality.  He  transcended  the 
ordinary  Greek  view  in  his  belief  that  the  just  man 
should  do  good  even  to  his  enemies,  and  ought  never 
to  commit  suicide,  because  his  life  was  not  his  own, 
but  a  gift  from  God. 

He  was  not  able  to  free  himself  altogether  from 
the  defects  of  Greek  morality.  He  exalted  woman 
mentally  and  morally,  yet  misunderstood  wholly  the 
ethical  import  of  marriage,  regarding  it  chiefly  from 
a  physiological  point  of  view.  He  shared  the  con- 
tempt of  the  Greeks  for  trade  and  commerce,  which 
relate  merely  to  the  satisfaction  of  bodily  wants,  and 
proceed  from  the  lower  appetitive  part  of  the  soul. 
He  insisted  on  a  just  and  humane  treatment  of  slaves, 
but  did  not  object  to  slavery  itself. 

'' Justice  in  large  letters,"  morality  actualized  in 
the  life  of  the  state,  objective  rather  than  subjective, 
is  the  fundamental  principle  of  Plato's  ethics.  Eter- 
nal right,  the  Good,  is  embodied  in  the  constitution  of 
society  itself,  to  which  individuals  must  conform, 
even  at  the  cost  of  self-sacrifice,  because  they  have 
no  other  way  of  self-assertion.  The  idea  of  political 
justice  is  inseparable  from  that  of  individual  justice, 
in    Plato's    thought.      The  principle    of    the    modern 


THE    PLATONIC   ETHICS. 


151 


world,  subjective  freedom,  the  right  of  the  individual 
to  his  own  moral  conviction,  appeared  to  Plato  an 
element  of  destruction. 

*'The    true    ideal    is    not    something    that    merely 
ought  to  be  actual,    but   that   is  actual,"  says  Hegel. 
**For  that  which   is  actual   is  reasonable.     *     •     •    If 
one    would    recognize    the    actuality    of    substance  he 
must  look  through   the   surface  on  which  the  passions 
contend   for    mastery.      The   temporal,    the  perishable, 
exists,   it  is  true,   and   it  can   make  needs  and  wants 
enough   for  any   one;    but    nevertheless  it   is  no  true 
actuality,  no  more  than  is  the  particularity  of  the  sub- 
ject,  his  wishes  and   inclinations.     If  we  consider  the 
content  of  the   Platonic  Idea,  we  shall  see  that  Plato 
has  portrayed   in   the   Republic  the   Greek  ethical  cul- 
ture in  its   most  substantial  form  ;   the   Greek  national 
life  is   what  constitutes  the  true  content  of  his  work. 
Plato  is  not   the   man   to  busy  himself   with  abstract 
theories  and   principles ;   his  true  spirit  has  recognized 
and   unfolded   the   true;    and    this    could   be    nothing 
else  than  the   true   in   the    world   in   which   he  lived, 
this  one  spirit  which   was  vital   in  him  as   well  as  in 
Greece.      No  one  can   transcend   his  time;  the  spirit 
of  his  time   is  also   his  spirit,   but   he   must  see  to  it 
that  he  does  not  fail  to   recognize  it  according  to  its 
content." 

Justice,  according  to  Plato,  is  the  order  of  the 
State,  and  the  State  is  the  outward  embodiment  of 
justice  under  the  conditions  of  human  society.  The 
ethical  is  held  fast  as  the  divine  substance  of  the 
State;    the  true  State  should    be    a    pattern  of    true 


152 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


virtue.  It  alone  can  secure  tlie  general  victory  of 
good  over  evil.  But  the  only  power  that  can  place 
morality  on  a  firm  foundation,  free  it  from  contin- 
gency, and  guarantee  its  existence  and  continuance, 
is  philosophy.  Proceeding  from  the  State  to  the  in- 
dividual, from  the  political  and  ethical  to  the  moral 
idea,  Plato  preserves  the  true  character  of  Greek 
thought.  What  he  seeks  to  discover  is  the  principle 
which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  society,  connecting  it 
with  the  individual  mind,  so  that  the  law  of  the  one 
must  be  the  law  of  the  other. 

He  divides  his  citizens  into  three  classes,  correspond- 
ing to  the  three  parts  of  the  soul.  The  highest  rank 
is  that  of  the  rulers,  or  learned  men,  the  State  guard- 
ians ;  the  second  is  that  of  the  warriors  who  protect 
the  State  and  maintain  its  laws  ;  the  third  and  most 
numerous  is  that  of  the  agriculturists  and  artisans,  who 
provide  the  necessities  of  life,  laboring  for  the  gratifi- 
cation of  sense  and  appetite. 

The  only  means  of  advancement  is  to  excel  others 
in  knowledge  and  virtue ;  exceptional  ability  of  this 
kind  is  always  rewarded  by  the  State.  The  ruling 
class  who  deliberate  concerning  the  general  interest  ex- 
press the  idea  of  wisdom  ;  the  warriors,  that  of  courage, 
fortitude,  steadfastness  of  spirit,  the  firm  assertion  of 
what  is  just ;  the  laborers,  that  of  temperance  or 
self-control.  The  qualities  of  each  class  interpene- 
trate the  rest,  and  are  brought  into  harmony  though 
a  deeper  principle,  that  of  justice,  which  determines 
the  true  relation  of  all  things  and  persons  to  each 
other,    and    itself  a  virtue  is  the   universal  substance 


THE    PLATONIC    ETHICS. 


153 


out  of  which  particular  virtues  arise.  To  the  indi- 
vidual as  to  the  State,  justice  is  so  related  as  to 
give  the  supremacy  to  reason,  subjecting  the  lower 
part  of  the  soul  to  the  higher,  the  principle  of 
sense  to  that  of  intelligence. 

*^  The  just  man  does  not  permit  the  several  ele- 
ments within  him  to  meddle  with  one  another,  but 
he  sets  in  order  his  own  inner  life,  and  is  his  own 
master,  and  at  peace  with  himself ;  and  when  he  has 
bound  together  the  three  principles  within  him,  which 
may  be  compared  to  the  middle,  higher,  and  lower 
divisions  of  the  scale,  and  the  intermediate  intervals, 
when  he  has  bound  together  all  these,  and  is  no 
longer  many,  but  has  become  one  entirely  temperate 
and  perfectly  adjusted  nature,  then  he  will  begin  to 
act  if  he  has  to  act,  whether  in  a  matter  of  prop- 
erty, or  in  the  treatment  of  the  body,  or  some  af- 
fair of  politics  or  private  business;  in  all  which  cases 
he  will  think  and  call  just  and  good  action  that 
which  preserves  and  cooperates  with  this  condition, 
and  the  knowledge  which  presides  over  this  wisdom ; 
and  unjust  action  that  which  at  any  time  destroys 
this,  and  the  opinion  which  presides  over  unjust  action, 
ignorance." 

The  Platonic  State  is  an  aristocracy  which  excludes 
part  of  its  citizens  from  any  direct  share  in  political 
power.  As  in  the  soul,  the  smallest  part  is  to  rule, 
so  in  the  State  the  minority  who  excel  the  rest  in 
virtue  and  intelligence,  are  alone  to  govern.  Their 
power  is  unbounded  and  unshared.  Nothing  is  more 
dangerous  to  a  State  than  to  entrust    public  matters 


154 


A   STUDY  OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


THE  PLATONIC   ETHICS. 


155 


to    the    mcompetent;    neither    the    artisans    nor    the 
warnors  are  to  step  outside  of  their  respective  spheres. 
Ihe  only  means  of  advancement  is  exceptional  abilitv • 
the   mass    of   the    people    are    not    to    meddle    either 
with  weapons  or  with  politics.     On    the    other  hand 
industrial  activity  is  prohibited   to    the    warriors  and 
rulers ;    they    are    even  forbidden     to    possess    private 
property,   but  must  devote  themselves  entirely   to   the 
State    and  derive  their  subsistence  from  the  labor  of 
the  third  class.      The   State  is  wise  when    the   rulers 
are  wise ;  courageous  when  its  warriors  are  courageous  • 
temperate    when    the  passions    of    the    multitude   are 
restrained  by  reason  and   the  striving  toward  the  good 
TVhen    everyone   fulfills   his   appointed   duty,   and   the 
different   classes    are    united  in  one  organism,   justice 

The  first  condition  and  final  aim  of  the  State  is  the 
virtue  of    Its   citizens.     In  order  to  secure  this  Plato 
would  regulate  their  whole  manner  of  life  and  educa- 
tion.    He   would  even  place  the  parentage  of  the  citi- 
zens under  State  control.     The  children  belong  to  the 
State  ak.ne :  they  are    to  be  separated  from  their  par- 
ents and  brought  up  publicly  from  the  first  moment  of 
their    existence.      The    magistrates   are    to    determine 
their  vocation,   placing  them    in    the  rank    for  which 
they  seem  fitted   by   natural   disposition  and  character. 
The  higher  class  are  to   receive  instruction  in   music, 
iterature,   and  gymnastics.     But   Plato  admonishes  us 
tha     even  in  studying  gymnastics   we  must  remember 
that  the  soul  is  related   to   the  body  as  a  cause  to  an 
effect,   and   that  the  first   should  be  considered  rather 


than  the  second.  Under  music,  which  Plato  calls  the 
fortress  of  the  State,  he  includes  poetry  and  moral 
culture  generally,  the  development  in  the  soul  of  that 
sense  of  order  and  harmony  which  will  keep  a  man 
steadfast  in  the  right  way  before  he  attains  scientific 
knowledge.  The  mere  athlete  becomes  a  savage,  the 
mere  musician  grows  effeminate ;  the  two  must  be 
mingled  in  fair  proportions  if  the  soul  is  to  be  duly 
attempered.  When  a  beautiful  soul  harmonizes  with 
a  beautiful  form,  that  will  be  the  fairest  of  sights  to 
him  who  has  the  eye  to  contemplate  the  vision. 

Art  is  subordinated  to  ethics  in  the  Platonic  state. 
The  poets.  Homer  and  Hesiod,  are  banished  because  their 
representations  of  God  are  unworthy.  In  so  far  as  their 
stories  of  the  gods  were  accepted  by  the  Greeks  as  uni- 
versal maxims  and  divine  laws,  Plato  is  justified,  al- 
though he  wholly  mistakes  the  ethical  idea  which  under- 
lies their  poetry  and  constitutes  its  real  substance.  True 
art  is  not  fanciful  and  imitative,  but  the  expression  of 
the  highest  moral  energy,  according  to  Plato. 

After  the  preparatory  discipline  in  music  and  gym- 
nastics, the  highest  class  are  to  receive  intellectual  train- 
ing in  dialectic,  which  extends  far  into  manhood. 
Education  should  never  finish,  beginning  with  gymnas- 
tics in  youth,  and  ending  with  philosophy  in  maturer 
life.  Then,  when  nature  begins  to  decay,  the  soul  re- 
tires into  herself  and  is  the  ^'spectator  of  all  time  and 
all  existence.'' 

That  the  citizens  may  belong  wholly  to  the  state,  Plato 
lays  down  a  rule  of  life  for  the  two  higher  classes.  They 
are  to  have  common  dwellings  and  common  meals,  a 


156 


A   STUDY   OF   GKEEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


community  of  property,  and  of  wives  and  children.  They 
can  possess  neither  gold  nor  silver,  but  receive  a  moderate 
maintenance  provided  by  the  third  class.  Women  are 
to  share  the  education  of  men  in  war  and  in  political 
affairs.  Lawyers  and  physicians  will  have  little  to  do  on 
account  of  the  virtue  of  the  citizens  and  their  healthy 
mode  of  life.  If  one  cannot  be  cured  quickly  and  simply, 
it  is  better  to  die  than  to  live  for  the  care  of  a  sickly 
body  The  physician  shall  have  personal  experience  of 
disease,  for  he  cures  with  his  mind  and  not  with  his  body. 
The  lawyer,  on  the  other  hand,  controls  mind  by  mind, 
and  should  have  no  experience  of  evil.  The  ideal  judge 
should  be  advanced  in  years,  should  have  passed  an  in- 
nocent youth  and  acquired  experience  of  evil  late  in  life 
by  observation.  Virtue  can  know  vice,  but  vice  can 
never  know  virtue. 

As  to  the  great  mass  of  citizens,  the  artisans  and  the 
agriculturists,  they  are  left  to  themselves  ;  ''  for  it  is  not 
of  much  importance  where  the  corruption  of  society  and 
pretension  to  be  what  you  are  not  extends  only  to  cob- 
blers ;  but  w^hen  the  guardians  of  the  laws  and  of  the 
government  are  only  seemers  and  not  real  guardians,  that 
is  the  utter  ruin  of  the  state."'  Plato  probably  believed 
that  a  certain  amount  of  culture  would  be  diffused  from 
the  higher  classes  to  the  lower.  With  his  Greek  preju- 
dice against  industrial  activity,  he  fails  to  see  the  eco- 
nomical importance  of  the  laboring  classes,  just  as  he 
ignores  their  political  significance.  His  government  is  an 
aristocracy,  but  an  aristocracy  based  on  the  possession  of 
intelligence  and  virtue. 

He  foresees  the  ridicule  that  will  be  directed  against 


THE   PLATOi^lC    ETHICS. 


157 


his  proposition,  that  the  rulers  of  a  state  must  be  phi- 
losophers.    He  explains  why  it  is  that  the  study  of  phi- 
losophy unfits  one  to  be  a  practical  politician.     The  phi- 
losopher is  one  whose  mind  is  fixed  upon  the  end  and 
meaning  of  things,  their  substance  and  reality.     The  rest 
of  the  world  are  following  images  and  shadows,  blindly 
feeling  after  the  good.      The  philosopher  must  either 
descend  to  this  pursuit,  where  he   necessarily  stumbles 
and  deserves  contempt,  or  he  must  keep  his  own  high 
course,  which  as  unintelligible  is  despised.       But  how 
would  it  be  if  when  he  has  come  out  into  the  light  where 
he  sees  all  things  as  they  are,  he  neither  glorifies  himself 
by  living  apart  from  men,  nor  confuses  his  light  with 
their  darkness,  but  dwelling  in  the  midst  of  them  seeks 
rather  to  lead  them  upward  by  the  same  path  which  he 
has  followed  ?    Philosophy,  tlien,  would  harmonize  with 
politics  ;  the  moving  spring  of  the  state  would  not  be 
the  self-seeking  principle,  but  the  divine  Idea  leading 
men  towards  the  good. 

The  most  striking  peculiarity  of  the  Platonic  re- 
public is  the  entire  subordination  of  the  individual  to 
the  state,  the  exclusion  of  subjective  freedom.  That 
individual  inclination  should  be  ignored  in  the  choice  of 
a  vocation,  is  opposed  to  modern  thought.  It  is  not  for 
one  man  to  prescribe  for  another  that  he  shall  follow  this 
or  that  vocation,  that  he  shall  become  a  shoemaker,  or  a 
lawyer,  or  a  soldier.  It  is  his  right  as  a  person  to  decide 
the  matter  for  himself  without  regard  to  external  circum- 
stances. 

To  do  away  with  the  principle  of  private  property  is 
another  violation  of  subjective  freedom.     Property  is  a 


158 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


possession  which  belongs  to  me  as  this  particular  person, 
and  through  it  I   exist  as  an  abstract    individual  self. 
The  laborers,  tradesmen  and  agriculturists  of  the  Platonic 
state  produce  the  necessaries  of  life  for  all,  and  the  pro- 
ducer like  the  rest  uses  from  the  common  store  whatever 
he  needs.     The  objection  brought  by  Aristotle   against 
this  view  is  still  valid,  that  it  would  take  from  men  the 
stimulus  to  activity.      Property,  according  to  Hegel,  is 
an  object  into  which  I  have  introduced  my  will,  and  by 
this  act  I  have  made  it  mine,  so  that  he  who  touches  it 
touches  me,  and  touches  that  will  which  is  the  substance 
of  my  personality.     '*  The  essential  point  is  that  my  free- 
will takes  the  first  necessary  step  toward  becoming  ob- 
jectively real  in  the  possession  of  actual  objects,''  says 
Professor  Morris,  in  his  interpretation  of  Hegel's  thought, 
"and  the  essential  truth  is  that  just  as  the  free-will  can- 
not be  conceived  as  a  mere  means  to  an  end  foreign  to 
itself,  so  property,  being  according  to  its  true  conception 
and  definition  only  the  primary  form  in  which  the  free- 
will renders  itself  objectively  real,  has  something  of  the 
like  character  of  an  absolute  end,  and  is  proportionately 
sacred  and  inviolable." 

The  doctrine  in  Plato  that  has  excited  most  horror  is 
not  a  community  of  property,  but  a  community  of  wives 
and  children.  How  could  this  great  moral  teacher  have 
so  misunderstood  and  violated  the  sanctity  of  the  family  ? 
There  is  no  sentiment  or  imagination  in  his  conception 
of  marriage  ;  his  one  aim  is  to  improve  the  race  without 
regard  to  individual  inclination.  The  Greek  exalted 
friendship  above  love,  and  looked  upon  the  family  as  a 
customary  institution,  necessary  but  not  sacred  like  the 


THE   PLATONIC   ETHICS. 


159 


State.  Professor  Jowett  reminds  us  that  the  side  from 
which  Plato  regarded  the  social  problem  is  one  from 
which  we  habitually  turn  away.  **  That  the  most  im- 
portant influence  on  human  life  should  be  wholly  left  to 
chance  or  shrouded  in  mystery,  and  instead  of  being  dis- 
ciplined or  understood,  should  be  required  to  conform 
only  to  an  external  standard  of  propriety,  cannot  be 
regarded  by  the  philosopher  as  a  safe  or  satisfactory  con- 
dition of  human  things." 

Plato  felt    the    necessity    of  a   universal    community 
in  the  life  of  man,  the  truth  implied  in  the   existence 
of  society  and   realized   historically   in  the  doctrines  of 
Christianity.     The  ends  for  which  he  strove  were  high 
and    noble,   but   he   fell    into   grave   errors   as   to    the 
means  that  should  be  used  for    their   attainment.     The 
self-will   of   individuals   had    been   the  ruin  of  Athens 
and  of  Greece,  and  in  excluding  it  from  his  Eepublic, 
he  did  not  see  that  he  was    converting  the    individual 
into   a  mere    instrument   of   the   state,    and   that    the 
subjective  side  is  as  essential  to  the  realization  of  free- 
dom  as   the   objective.     This   is   the   limit    of    Plato's 
thought  of  the  state,  and  it  was   the  limit  of   his  age. 
*'The  deficiency  of  subjectivity  is  the  deficiency  of  the 
Greek  ethical  idea  itself."    (Hegel.) 

Plato  sought  to  stifle  the  passions  and  inclinations 
of  men  and  exclude  selfishness,  by  excluding  property 
and  family  life  and  the  choice  of  occupation ;  all  of 
which  relate  to  the  principle  of  subjective  freedom. 
He  clearly  recognized  that  when  individuals  pursue 
private  aims  and  interests  without  regard  to  the  com- 
mon welfare,  the  destruction  of  the  state  is  imminent 


160 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


But  the  soul  of  man  is  in  itself  an  absolute  end  and 
aim,  and  justice  demands  that  each  individual,  by  his 
own  self-conscious  knowing  and  willing,  shall  enter 
into  harmony  with  other  individuals  through  institu- 
tions, the  family,  society  and  the  state. 

Plato  condemned  the  particular  interest  of  the  indi- 
vidual as  an  unworthy  factor  in  the  ethical  organism 
of  the  State.  But  this  is  abstract  rather  than  concrete 
freedom.  The  opposite  of  his  principle,  the  setting  up 
of  the  private  will  of  the  individual  as  a  supreme  au- 
thority, has  been  advocated  in  modern  times  by  Rous- 
seau and  others.  But  this  view  is  equally  one-sided 
and  abstract. 

The  State  must  not  ignore  the  particular  opinions 
and  volitions  of  individuals,  but  must  realize  through 
them  the  universal  will  and  interest  of  man.  The 
individual,  on  the  other  hand,  must  not  devote  him- 
self exclusively  to  that  which  is  private  an<l  special, 
but  must  comprehend  the  public  interest  as  his  inter- 
est, obeying  the  law  not  as  an  external  but  an  internal 
command.  To  constitute  true  freedom  the  particular 
interests  of  the  individual  must  harmonize  with  the 
universal  aims  of  man.  Either  alone,  abstracted  from 
the  other,  is  but  one  side  of  the   truth. 

ESTHETIC. 

A  famous  side  of  the  Platonic  philosophy  is  the 
iEsthetic,  the  science  of  the  Beautiful.  •  The  two  ele- 
ments which  constitute  the  beautiful  are  the  sensuous 
phenomenon  and  the  idea  ;  that  which  is  beautiful  in 
the  sensuous  is  spiritual,  the  idea  shining  through  it 
visibly.     Fairer  than  the  beautiful  body   is  the   beauti- 


THE   PLATONIC   ETHICS. 


161 


ful  soul  ;  fairest  of  all  is  the  pure  Idea  of  the  Beauti- 
ful to  which  nothing  material  clings.  All  that  is  good 
is  beautiful  ;  Truth,  Beauty  and  Goodness,  three  in 
one,  constitute  the  Platonic  Trinity. 

CONCLUSION. 

'^This  may  be  given  as  the  chief  content  of  the 
Platonic  Philosophy, ''  says  Hegel  ;  ''  first,  the  acci- 
dental form  of  discourse  in  which  noble  free  men  con- 
verse without  other  interests  than  that  of  the  spiritual 
life  of  Theory  ;  secondly,  they  come,  led  only  by  the 
content,  to  the  deepest  ideas  and  most  beautiful 
thoughts  like  precious  stones  which  one  finds,  if  not 
exactly  in  a  desert,  yet  upon  a  dry  journey ;  thirdly, 
there  is  found  no  systematic  connection,  though  all 
flows  from  one  common  interest ;  fourthly,  the  sub- 
jectivity of  the  Idea  is  everywhere  lacking  ;  but,  fifthly, 
the  substantial  Idea  forms  the  basis.'' 

THE      OLDER      ACADEMY. 

Plato's  instructions  had  assembled  in  the  Academy 
a  numerous  circle  of  hearers,  many  of  whom  attracted 
by  his  fame  came  from  distant  countries.  It  is  due 
to  him  more  than  to  any  other  individual  that  Ath- 
ens retained  her  intellectual  supremacy  even  after 
her  loss  of  political   power. 

Plato's  immediate  successor  was  his  nephew  Speu- 
sippus,  followed  after  eight  years  by  Xenocrates,  and 
later  by  other  disciples.  These  various  teachers  pro- 
fessed to  maintain  Plato's  doctrine  unaltered,  but 
seem  to  have  neglected  dialectic  and  the  theory 
of  Ideas,  and  to  have  inclined  more  and  more  to 
Pythagoreanism     and    religious    mysticism.       But   we 


162 


A   STUDY  OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


know  SO  little  of  their  teachings  that  we  cannot  speak 
of  them  authoritatively.  -Only  a  portion  of  Plato's 
spiritual  legacy  descended  with  his  garden  to  the 
Academy,-  says  Zeller ;  -the  full  inheritance  passed 
over  to  Aristotle,  who  was  thereby  qualified  to  trans- 
cend his  master/' 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

LIFE  AND   WRITINGS   OF   ARISTOTLE. 

''  A  RISTOTLE  is  one  of  the  deepest  and  richest 
-^-^  scientific  geniuses  that  ever  lived.'' says  Hegel, 
"a  man  without  equal  in  ancient  and  modern  times. 
To  characterize  in  brief  his  labors  one  would  say  that 
he  has  traveled  over  the  whole  range  of  human  knowl- 
edge, has  pushed  his  investigations  on  all  sides  into  the 
real  universe,  and  has  brought  into  subjection  to  Ideas 
the  wealth  and  untamed  luxuriance  of  the  realms  of 
nature.'* 

He  was  born  in  the  year  384  B.  C,  at  Stagira,  a 
city  in  Thrace,  colonized  by  Greeks.  To  his  birthplace 
he  owes  the  famous  appellation  of  -The  Stagirite," 
given  to  him  in  later  days.  His  father,  Nicomachus,  was 
the  physician  and  friend  of  the  Macedonian  King  Amyu- 
tas.  All  his  ancestors  were  physicians,  tracing  their  ped- 
igree to  the  son  of  Esculapius.  We  have  no  means  of 
knowing  how  far  this  inheritance  influenced  his  scientific 
activity,  much  of  the  testimony  concerning  his  early  life 
being  untrustworthy. 

He  came  to  Athens  in  his  seventeenth  year,  and  en- 
tered the  school  of  Plato,  where  he  remained  for  twenty 
years  until  his  master's  death.  We  cannot  doubt  that 
during  this  time  he  laid  the  foundation  of  that  won- 
derful knowledge  and    erudition    which    enabled    him 

168 


164 


A   STUDY  OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


afterward  to  comprehend  in  his  system  of  thought  all 
earlier  speculations,  enriched  by  multifarious  allusions 
that  prove  he  was  as  keen  a  student  of  nature  as  of  men 
and  books.  It  is  said  that  Plato  called  Aristotle  the 
'^mind  of  the  school.^'  Aristotle  regarded  Plato  as  a 
revered  and  honored  teacher,  notwithstanding  his  ap- 
parent unfairness  in  the  criticism  of  Plato's  philosophy. 
''The  bad  may  not  even  praise  Plato,''  he  says. 

It  is  not  known  why  Speusippus  rather  than  Aristotle 
was  chosen  as  Plato's  successor  in  the  Academy.     On 
account   of  this  slight,  or  for   other   reasons,  Aristotle 
left  Athens   immediately   after   the   death   of   Plato  to 
reside    at   the   court  of   Hermias,   prince   of  Atarneus, 
in  Mysia.     He  was  accompanied  by  Plato's  faithful  dis- 
ciple Xenocrates,  a  proof  of  the  friendly  relations  subsist- 
ing between   Aristotle  and   his   master.      Hermias  was 
afterward  betrayed  into  the  hands  of  the  Persians  and 
crucified,  and   Aristotle  fled  to  Mitylene  with  his  wife. 
From  Mitylene  Aristotle  was  called  by  Philip,  King 
of  Macedon,   to  superintend  the  education   of   his  son 
Alexander,   then  thirteen  years   old.     "  The  culture  of 
Alexander  is  a  sufficient  reply  to  all  the  prating  about 
the  practical  usefulness  of  speculative  philosophy,"  says 
Hegel.     Aristotle  sought  to  develop  and  strengthen  the 
inborn  greatness  of    Alexander's   mind   and    character, 
to  lead  him  to  perfect  self-possession  and  independence. 
It   is  in  part  owing  to  his  wise  teacher  that  Alexander 
was  a  thinker  and  a  student  as  well  as  a  world-conqueror, 
and  that,  even  amid  his  later  excesses  and  temptations, 
he  never  ceased  to  reverence  moral  truth  and   beauty. 
He  was  enabled  through   his  conquests  to  scatter  far 


LIFE   AND   WRITINGS   OF   ARISTOTLE. 


165 


and  wide  the  germs  of  Greek  culture,  with  the  conscious 
purpose  of  elevating  those  whom  he  subjugated.  He 
never  forgot  the  interests  of  art  and  science,  sending 
to  Aristotle  either  specimens,  or  drawings,  or  descrip- 
tions, of  whatever  new  animals  and  plants  he  found 
in  Asia.  He  always  regarded  Aristotle  with  love  and 
respect,  although  a  certain  coldness  sprang  up  between 
the  two  in  later  years. 

After  Alexander's  departure  for  Asia,  Aristotle  re- 
turned to  Athens,  and  opened  a  school  of  philosophy 
in  a  gymnasium  called  the  Lyceum.  His  school  derived 
the  name  Peripatetic  from  the  avenues  of  shade  trees 
where  the  great  teacher  walked,  as  he  conversed  on 
philosophy  with  a  few  favorite  disciples.  He  is  said 
to  have  delivered  acroamatic  (or  technical)  and  exoteric 
discourses,  the  first  on  abstract  metaphysical  doctrines 
to  a  chosen  circle  of  hearers,  the  second  on  educational 
topics  to  the  general  public.  But  it  is  clear  that  the 
discourses  of  a  pl^ilosopher,  whether  technical  or  pop- 
ular, are  the  product  of  his  thought,  which  alone  gives 
significance  to  his  utterances.  ''One  may  see  for  him- 
self which  works  of  Aristotle  are  really  speculative  and 
philosophic,"  says  Hegel,  "and  which  ones  are  to  a 
greater  extent  of  a  merely  empirical  nature  ;  they  are 
not  for  this  reason,  however,  to  be  looked  upon  as  op- 
posite in  content  as  though  Aristotle  wrote  some  things 
for  the  people  and  other  things  for  his  intimate  disci- 
ples." 

The  work  that  he  accomplished  during  the  twelve 
years  that  he  taught  in  Athens  appears  incredible.  All 
his  writings  belong  to  this  period.     The  stupendous  task 


166 


A  STUDY  OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


Which  he  achieved  was  nothing  less  than  to  found  and 
elaborate  the  deepest  and  most  comprehensive  system 
of  philosophy  that  the  world  has  ever  known. 

On  the  death  of  Alexander,  a  sudden  storm  of  op- 
position against  his  successor  broke  out  in  Athens 
Aristotle  was  regarded  as  a  member  of  the  Macedonian 
party,  and  from  political  reasons  was  accused  of  impiety 
He  fled  to  Chalcis  in  Euboea,  that  "the  Athenians 
might  not  have  a  second  opportunity  to  sin  against 
philosophy."  He  died  there  in  his  sixty-third  year,  fol- 
lowing in  death  one  great  contemporary,  Alexander, 
and  preceding  another,  Demosthenes. 

The  moral  personality  of  Aristotle  as  it  is  revealed 
in  his  writings,  in  his  last  will  and   testament,  and  in 
the  few  facts  that   we  possess  concerning  his  life    is 
high  and  pure.      He   was  grateful  to  his  benefactors, 
gentle  and  humane  in  his  treatment  of  slaves  and  depen- 
dents, a  loyal   friend,  and  a  loving   husband.      In   his 
noble  conception   of  marriage  he  went  far  beyond  the 
views  of   his  countrymen.     His  morality  was  supported 
by  a  comprehensive   knowledge    of   humanity  and   the 
deepest  reflection ;  it  had  nothing  in  it  one-sided  and 
exaggerated. 

Never  has  the  world  seen  such  great  and  different 
gifts  united  m  one  person  as  in  Aristotle.  He  was  both 
a  scientist  and  a  speculative  philosopher,  a  close  observer 
of  the  empirical  facts  of  nature  and  an  interpreter  of 
their  hidden  significance,  analyzing  rigidly  individual 
differences  and  particularities  without  losing  sight  of 
their  relation  and  unity. 

His  style  of    exposition    is  less    artistic    but  more 


LIFE  AND   WKITINGS   OF  ARISTOTLE. 


167 


scientific  than  that  of  Plato.  Exactness  and  definite- 
ness  are  his  aim  rather  than  beauty  ;  he  limits  him- 
self strictly  to  the  problem  of  knowledge.  He  lacks 
the  Platonic  fervor  and  enthusiasm,  but  surpasses  his 
master  in  the  ripeness  of  his  judgment  and  his  many- 
sided  and  thorough  investigation  of  every  domain  of 
knowledge. 

Whatever    may  have  been   his   means  of    help,   we 
must  regard   with    awe  the  achievements  of  Aristotle, 
executed   in  one   brief  human   life,    the    conquest  of  i 
strong  soul   over  a    weakly    body.      He  designated  to 
philosophy   its  course  for  centuries,    and   mapped  out 
for  the  Greeks  the  points  they  had  reached  in  scientific 
culture,  illuminated  by   his  own    original  thought  and 
inquiries.      Seldom    has  one   so    truly  fulfilled  his  his- 
torical    mission,     so    gloriously    solved     the    scientific 
problems  bequeathed  to  him   by  his  predecessors;   and 
we  cannot  but   believe  from   the  evidence  of  his  work 
that  the  man  was  as  great  and  admirable  as  the  phil- 
osopher. 

Aristotle  left  behind  him  a  great  many  manuscripts, 
but  It  18  uncertain  whether  we  possess  a  single  one  in  a 
genuine  and  uninjured  shape.     A  strange  story  is  told 
of   their  fate  for    two  centuries.     Aristotle,  it  is  said 
bequeathed   his  library,  including  these  manuscripts,  to 
Theophrastus.     It  was  the  first    important    library  in 
Greece,  collected   by   means   of    Aristotle's  wealth  and 
the  assistance  of  Alexander.    Theophrastus,  in  his  turn 
bequeathed  it  to   his    pupil   Neleus,   and    the  heirs  of 
Neleus,    fearing    that   the    king    of    Pergamus    would 
seize  Aristotle's   writings    for   his    own    royal    library 


168 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


concealed  them  in  a  cellar,  where  they  were  forgotten 
and  badly  injured.  A  century  later,  they  were  discov- 
ered and  sold  to  Appelicon  of  Teos,  who  filled  up  the 
gaps  to  the  best  of  his  ability  and  gave  them  to  the 
public.  Soon  after  Appelicon's  death  the  Roman  Sulla 
conquered  Athens,  and  the  writings  of  Aristotle  were 
among  his  spoils.  From  Sulla  they  passed  into  the 
possessicrh  of  a  Greek  grammarian,  Tyrannion  ;  from 
Tyrannion  copies  were  received  by  Andronicus  of 
Ehodes,  the  Peripatetic,  who  made  a  catalogue  of  their 
contents,  and  sent  them  forth  in  a  new  and  improved 
edition. 

The  story  assumes  that  the  writings  of  Aristotle  were 
inaccessible  to  students  for  nearly  two  centuries,  and  is 
refuted  by  Zeller  and  other  authorities,  who  find  in  the 
works  of  these  same  centuries  traces  of  an  acquaintance 
with  their  principal  doctrines. 

What  cannot  be  denied  is  the  fact  that  many  of 
Aristotle's  manuscripts  are  badly  disfigured,  that  they 
are  incomplete  and  full  of  omissions,  that  individual 
parts  are  disconnected,  that  verbal  repetitions  occur, 
all  going  to  prove  the  injury  they  have  suffered.  Zel- 
ler thinks  this  is  due  in  part  to  the  circumstances 
under  which  they  were  composed  and  published,  to 
the  use  that  was  made  of  them  in  instruction,  and  to 
the  ignorance  of  editors  and  copyists.  Fortunately 
we  have  enough  that  is  genuine  to  enable  us  to  form 
a  definite  idea  of  the  Aristotelian  philosophy,  not  only 
in  its  extent  and  compass,  but  in  many  of  its  de- 
tails. 

The    writings   of    Aristotle   passed    from   the   Greeks 


LIFE   AND   WRITINGS   OF   ARISTOTLE. 


169 


. 


into  the  hands  of  Arabian  scholars  and  commentators. 
They  became  known  to  the  western  world  in  the 
twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries,  and  formed  the  basis 
of  Scholasticism.  *^To  the  ancients,  Aristotle  was 
*  Nature's  Private  Secretary;'  to  the  middle  ages, 
after  1150,  he  was  simply  'The  Philosopher,'  or  'The 
Master  of  those  that  know ; '  and,  though,  for  a  brief 
period,  his  sun  was  eclipsed  by  reactionary  influences, 
philosophers  of  nearly  all  modern  schools,  as  well  as 
scientists  and  poets,  have  vied  with  each  other  in  do- 
ing him  honor.  Among  these  may  be  mentioned  Leib- 
nitz, Lessing,  Goethe,  Hegel,  Cuvier,  Bain." 

In  point  of  subject-matter,  the  writings  of  Aristotle 
may  be  divided  into  physical,  metaphysical,  logical 
and  ethical.  This  classification  is  made  for  conven- 
ience, and  was  not  adopted  by  Aristotle  himself,  who 
nowhere  supplies  any  scheme  or  skeleton  or  general 
division  of  his  system  of  philosophy. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

GENERAL    CHARACTER     OF    THE    ARISTOTELIAN 

PHILOSOPHY. 

-rpHE     subject-matter   of   philosophy    is    the    most 
knowable,-  says    Aristotle;     -to-wit,     principles 
and  causes.    For  through  these,  and  by  these,  all  other 
thmgs  are  known ;    principles   are,   however,    not  to  be 
known  through   substitutes.^'    Aristotle   here   takes  his 
stand  against  the  ordinary  mode   of  view ;   the  knowl- 
edge he  seeks  to  gain  is  the  knowledge  of  final  causes. 
Man   has  come   to  philosophy   through   wonder,-  he 
says.     -Wherefore    if   men    began    to   philosophize    in 
order  to  escape  ignorance,  it  is  clear  that  they  pursued 
scientihc  knowledge  for  the  sake   of    knowing    it     and 
not    for  any  utility    it    might    possess.      This  is    also 
shown  by   the  entire   external   course  of  events.      For 
first  after  men    have    supplied    their    necessary  wants 
and    those  requisite  for  ease  and    comfort,    they  have 
begun  to  seek  philosophical  knowledge.     Therefore  they 
seek  It  for  no   ulterior   utility ;   and   as  we  say   that  a 
free  man    is   one   who    exists    only   for  his  own  sake, 
and   not   for   the   sake   of   another,  thus   is   philosophy 
the  free  science    among    sciences,   for    it  alone    exists 
for  itself-a  knowing  of  knowing.       *      *      *      Qt^er 
sciences  may  be   more   necessary   than  philosophy,    but 
none  is  more  excellent 

170 


CHARACTER  OF  ARISTOTELIAN   PHILOSOPHY.       171 


This  doctrine  is  like  that  of  Socrates  and  Plato. 
But  Aristotle  differs  from  ^  his  master  in  connecting 
philosophy  more  closely  with  experience.  Plato  denies 
any  real  worth  to  the  world  of  the  changing  and 
becoming  except  so  far  as  its  contradictions  lead  us 
away  from  it  to  the  contemplation  of  pure  Ideas ;  eter- 
nity, the  supra-sensible  world,  are  more  real  to  him 
than  the  affairs  of  this  life.  Aristotle,  on  the  other 
hand,  finds  a  more  positive  relation  between  thought 
and  experience,  not  holding  them  apart  abstractly, 
but  comprehending  both  in  concrete  unity.  Plato 
cared  little  for  the  individual  appearance,  the  variety 
and  multiplicity  of  things,  seeking  only  to  know 
concepts.  Ideas.  Aristotle  agrees  with  Plato  that 
knowledge  has  to  do  with  the  universal  essence  of 
things,  but  he  regards  it  as  his  especial  problem  to 
derive  the  individual  from  the  universal,  to  explain 
appearances.  He  declares  that  science  relates  to  the 
customary,  what  usually  happens,  as  well  as  to  the 
necessary,  and  must  seek  to  reach  approximate  truth, 
the  greatest  possible  probability,  where  absolute  cer- 
tainty is  unattainable.  -  Why  should  he  who  thirsts 
after  knowledge,'' he  says,  '-refuse  to  seek  some  where 
he  cannot  have  all  ?" 

To  identify  Aristotle's  method  with  empiricism  is 
incorrect,  although  his  procedure  might  warrant  such 
an  assumption.  ''But  he  is  in  the  deepest  sense  spec- 
ulative," says  Hegel.  ''  All  sides  of  knowing  enter  his 
mind,  all  interest  him  ;  all  are  handled  by  him  with 
depth  and  exhaustiveness.  Abstraction  may  easily  get 
confused  in    the    empirical   extent    of  a   phenomenon. 


172 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


and  be  at  a  loss  how  to  find  its  application  and  veri- 
fication, and  be  obliged  at^  last  to  take  up  with  a  par- 
tial procedure  without  being  able  to  exliaust  all  the 
phases  of  the  phenomenon.  Aristotle,  however,  in  that 
he  takes  into  consideration  all  sides  of  the  universe 
seizes  the  whole  of  each  individual  sphere,  as  a  spec' 
ulative  philosopher,  and  treats  it  in  such  a  manner  as 
to    arrive  at  its   deepest  speculative  idea/' 

His  method,  like  that  of  Socrates  and  Plato,  is  dia- 
lectic, but  he  unites  with  it  the  observation  of  a 
natural  scientist.  He  examines  the  thoughts  of  the 
earlier  philosophers,  corrects  their  one-sidedness,  in- 
vestigates  the  subject  from  contradictory  points  of  view 
and  finally  passes  to  the  speculative  consideration  of 
the  whole  matter.  He  thus  seems  to  be  empirical 
while  he  is  really  philosophical;  -for  the  empirical 
comprehended  in  its  synthesis,  is  the  speculative 
idea.  " 

^^  Aristotle  moves  essentially  on  the  ground  and  in 
the  direction  of  the  Socratic-Platonic  dialectic/'  says 
Zeller ;  -  he  developed  the  Socratic  induction  to  con- 
scious technique,  completed  it  by  the  doctrine  of  dem- 
onstration, whose  especial  creator  he  is,  and  by  all  the 
discussion  therewith  connected,  and  gave  in  his  writ- 
ings the  most  perfect  model  of  a  dialectic  investigation, 
strictly  and  sharply  carried  through  from  one  side  to 
all  sides.  If  we  did  not  know  it  otherwise,  we  should 
recognize  in  his  scientific  procedure  the  pupil  of  Plato  '' 

Aristotle  unites  with  dialectic  a  close  and  rigid  scru- 
tiny of  the  facts  of  the  physical  world.  The  philoso- 
pher, according  to  his  thought,  must  not  lose  sight  of 


CHARACTER    OF   ARISTOTELIAN    PHILOSOPHY.        173 


the  efficient  and  material  causes  of  things  while  seek- 
ing their  concept  and  final  end.  Aristotle  is  not  merely 
one  of  the  most  speculative  thinkers,  but  a  careful  and 
unwearied  observer,  a  diligent  and  erudite  scholar. 
Experience  is  for  him  material  to  be  developed  into 
thought.  He  supports  his  philosophic  structure  upon 
a  basis  of  i)liy6ical  knowledge,  attained  through  a 
many-sided  examination  and  study  of  facts  and  appear- 
ances. We  shall  not  find  in  him  the  exactness  of 
procedure  demanded  by  empirical  science  in  modern 
times ;  the  world  was  yet  too  young,  means  of  help 
were  wanting  to  exact  observation,  the  science  of  math- 
ematics was  not  far  enough  advanced.  Aristotle's  work 
in  this  field  was  that  of  a  pioneer ;  he  could  not  be 
expected  to  discriminate  as  carefully  as  later  investiga- 
tors between  the  empirical  and  the  philosophical  me- 
thods of  inquiry. 

His  style  is  severely  logical,  and  therefore  lacks  the 
dramatic  and  artistic  perfection  of  the  Platonic  dia- 
logue. He  verifies  every  step  of  his  process  with  rigid 
exactness,  and  clothes  his  thought  in  dry  technical 
prose  rather  than  in  poetic  myth  or  graceful  conversa- 
tion. His  speech  is  purely  scientific,  and  in  this  re- 
spect surpasses  that  of  his  master. 

If  we  take  a  general  view  of  his  system  of  thought 
we  shall  find  it  resting  upon  a  Socratic-Platonic  basis, 
yet  at  the  same  time  original  and  independent,  offering 
an  entirely  new  solution  of  the  way  in  which  thought 
is  related  to  matter.  Essential  being,  according  to 
Plato,  is  only  to  be  found  in  the  world  of  eternal 
ideas,  apart  from  appearances ;    but,  for  Aristotle,   the 


174 


A   STUDY  OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


dea  as  the  essence  of  things  cannot  be  separated  from 
things  themselves,  it  is  the  form  toward  which  th^ 
sensuous  strives  with  inner    necessity.     It  is  one  am 

he  same  being  that  exists  undeveiopid  as  p  tent  al  tJ 
developed  as  actuality.  The  worW  of  the  ch  ^ ': 
and  becoming  is  thus  explained,  and  at  the  heTrf  of 
things  we  find  infinite  energy. 

ArSoTlV'  K,  '^'',""*""  '"»««'fi'='»tion  and  division   of 
An  totles  philosophy.     He  goes  from  particular  to  pnr 
ticular  und  seems  always  to  be  philosophizing  o„    tie 
ndividual,  the  special.     -<He  obtains  tL.s  a^ural  tv 
of  coordinated    sciences  "   save    «  k       i  I'luwicy 

of  wb.vi.  I,         ""'ences,     sd>s    bchwegler,    "each  one 
of  which  has  Its  independent  foundation,  but  no  hid, 
est  science  which  should  comprehend  all  "  ^ 

According  to  the  later  Peripatetics,  Aristotle  divides 
philosophy  into  theoretical  and  practical,  the  one  tr  a 
ing  of    knowledge  whose  end    is  found   in   itself    the 
other  of    knowledge  relating  to   action    and      onduet 
Theoretical  philosophy  is  again  subdivided   into  mth 

speaks  of  a  third  form  of  knowledge,  relating  to  the 

tt: ;:  :t7  :\  r''  -^  ''''■  «-'  *^>« '- « - 

rnfsh  us        'I      ''  ^"^*°"*'  ^'"«^"'  -r  does  he 

;  ;te:  ^^^'"'"^  ^  ^^-^^^^^  ^""'-  -  — y  of 


CHAPTER    XXV. 


Aristotle's  logic. 


A  RISTOTLE  is  the  father  of  logic,  as  Euclid  is 
■^-^  the  father  of  geometry.  He  has  discovered  and 
described  the  formal  activity  of  the  pure  understand- 
ing for  all  time.  His  writings  on  this  subject  are 
comprised  under  the  name  Organon.  Aristotle  himself 
did  not  use  the  word  Logic,  which  was  probably  in- 
vented afterwards  by  the  Stoics  ;  he  spoke  of  Analytic, 
by  which  he  meant  the  science  of  analyzing  the  forms 
of  reasoning.  *'  There  is  the  same  course  to  be  pur- 
sued in  philosophy,  and  in  every  science  or  branch  of 
knowledge,"  he  says.  **  You  must  study  facts.  Ex- 
perience alone  can  give  general  principles  on  any  sub- 
ject  When  the  facts  in  each  branch  are 

brought  together,  it  will  be  the  province  of  the  logician 
to  set  out  the  demonstrations  in  a  manner  clear  and 
fit  for  use.  When  the  investigation  into  nature  is 
complete,  you  will  be  able  in  some  cases  to  exhibit  a 
demonstration ;  in  other  cases  you  will  have  to  say  that 
demonstration  is  not  attainable." 

Aristotle  treats  first  of  the  universal  predicates  of 
being,  the  Categories.  The  object  of  our  thinking 
must  fall  under  the  following  heads :  Substance,  quan- 
tity, quality,  relation,  where,  when,  position,  posses- 
sion,   ac^tion,  passion.      These    categories    present    the 


175 


176 


STUDY  OF  GEEKK   PHILOSOPHY. 


'    different  sides  from  which  things  can  be  regarded,  but 
do  not  describe  their  real  nature. 

The  most  important  category  is  substance,  which  in 
a  strict  sense  is  the  individual.  It  is  the  original  un 
changeable  essence  in  each  thing,  different  from  everv- 
thmg  derived.  All  the  other  categories  lead  back  to 
substance,  and  express  either  its  attributes  or  deter 
minations.  The  treatment  of  this  question  is  therefore 
ontological,  and  belongs  to  metaphysics  as  well  as  to 
logic. 

Knowledge  relates  to  the  essence  of  things  the 
universal,  to  final  causes.  But  the  universal  can'  only 
be  known  through  the  individual  ;  causes  can  only  be 
known  through  effects.  The  soul  carries  in  itself  the 
ground  of  its  knowing,  but  this  knowing  is  devel- 
oped only  through  experience.  What  in  itself  is  first 
18  for  us  last.  The  first  for  us  is  sensuous  perception, 
which  sees  the  individual  ;  but  in  the  individual  the 
universal  is  implicit.  We  are  thus  led  from  the  ap- 
pearance to  the  essence,  from  effects  to  causes. 

The  concept  is  an  expression  of  the  essence  of  that 
which  It  denotes.  But  essence  relates  only  to  form  • 
we  can  have  no  concept  of  the  sensuous  in  "itself  We 
can  define,  not  this  sensuous  object,  but  this  definite 
manner  of  sensuous  existence,  the  general  form  of  the 
object.  Every  concept  includes,  or  may  include,  many 
single  things;  thought  and  its  interpreter,  language, 
seek  ever  the  universal. 

The  concept  forms  the  starting  point  for  all  scien- 
tific investigation,  and  is  at  the  same  time  the  aim 
toward    which    it   strives.     Knowing   is   nothing    more 


ARISTOTLE  S  LOGIC. 


177 


than  insight  into  the  ground  of  things,  and  this  in- 
sight is  completed  in  the  concept ;  the  tuhat  is  the 
same  as  the  why,  we  cognize  the  concept  of  a  thing 
when  we  cognize  its  cause. 

The  concept  in  itself  is  neither  true  nor  false  ; 
something  must  be  affirmed  or  denied  of  it  in  order  to 
constitute  a  proposition.  To  the  concept,  or  the  noun, 
a  verb  must  be  added.  When  this  is  done  we  have  a 
judgment,  which  is  necessarily  true  or  false.  Every 
affirmation  is  opposed  to  a  denial,  so  that  either  the 
one  or  the  other  must  be  true,  and  no  third  is  pos- 
sible. Hence  the  principle  of  contradiction  and  of 
excluded  third  or  middle.  *' Of  the  affirmation  and 
the  negation  of  the  same  thing,  the  one  is  always 
false,  the  other  true.'*  Between  the  two  terms  of  a 
contradiction  there  is  no  mean  ;  it  is  necessary  either  to 
affirm   or  to  deny  every   predicate   of    every   subject. '^ 

**  Aristotle  was  the  first  to  name  the  syllogism,"  says 
Zeller,  "and  to  observe  that  every  connection  and  ad- 
vance of  our  thinking  rests  on  the  syllogistic  joining  of 
judgments.  The  word,  indeed,  existed  before,  but 
Aristotle  stamped  it  with  the  technical  meaning  which 
it  has  ever  since  borne.  '*In  introducing  the  word,  it 
must  not  be  supposed  that  he  introduced,  or  invented, 
the  process  of  reasoning  to  which  he  applied  it,  or  that 
he  even  pretended  to  do  so,"  says  Sir  Alexander  Grant. 
**The  grammarian  who  first  distinguished  nouns  from 
verbs  and  gave  them  their  names,  did  not  invent  nouns 
and  verbs,  but  only  called  attention  to  their  existence  in 
language  ;  and  he  who  first  made  rules  of  syntax  was 
only  recording  the  ways  in  which  men  naturally  speak 


178 


A    STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


and  wnte,  not  making  innovations  in  language  ;  and  so 
Anstotle  with  his  syllogism  only  clearly  pointed  out  a 
process  which  had  always,  though  unconsciously,  been 
earned  on.  There  is  no  doubt  that,  ever  since  they  have 
possessed  reason  at  all,  men  have  made  syllogisms, 
thougl,  hke  M.  Jourdain  speaking  prose,  they  ha^e  tor 
the  most  part  been  unconscious  of  it." 

Aristotle  defines  the  syllogism  as  a  form  of  ratioci- 
nation in  which,  from  certain  premises  and  through 
their  means,  something  farther  and  different  from 
them  necessarily  follows.  Every  syllogism  must  contain 
three  concepts,  and  only  three,  one  of  which,  the 
middle  term  is  either  subject  in  one  of  the  premises 
and  predicate  m  the  other  (first  figure),  or  predicate 
n  both  premises  (second  figure),  or  subject  in  both 
(third  figure). 

Upon  the  basis  of  the  syllogism  is  built  the  theory  of 
scientific  demonstration,  which  Aristotle  established  in 
the  second  Analytic.     Knowing  consists  in   the  knowl- 
edge  of  causes,  and  the  cause  of  an  appearance  is  that 
from  which  It  necessarily  proceeds.     Proof  is  a  conclusion 
from   necessary  premises,  but  may  include    in    a  con- 
ditioned way  that  which  occurs  usually.       The  purolv 
accidental  can  neither  be  proved  nor  known.     But  the 
necessary  is  only  that  which  belongs  to  the  essence  and 
the  concept  of    the  object ;     therefore  the  concept  of 
everything  is  that  from  which  demonstration  proceeds 
and  toward  which  it  strives.     "Its  problem  consists  in 
th  8,    says  Zeller,  "  it  must  not  only  show  the  determi- 
nations that  belong  to  every  object  by  virtue  of  its  con- 
cept, but  also  the  mediations  through  which  they  are 


ARISTOTLE  S   LOGIC. 


179 


brought  to  it ;  it  must  derive  the  particular  from  the 
universal,  appearances  from  their  causes." 

Aristotle  maintains  that  there  is  a  necessary  limit  to 
this  mediatory  knowing.  Whether  we  ascend  from  the 
particular  to  the  universal,  from  the  subject  which  is  not 
a  predicate  to  ever  higher  predicates,  or  descend  from  the 
most  universal,  the  predicate  which  is  not  a  subject,  to 
the  particular,  we  reach  a  point  where  further  progress  is 
impossible  ;  otherwise,  there  could  be  neither  demon- 
stration nor  concept.  To  prove  everything  is  impossible: 
**  Science  must  commence  with  something  which  is  not 
proved  at  all,"'  says  Aristotle.  It  must  start  from  im- 
mediate principles  which  cannot  be  established  by  any 
syllogistic  reasoning.  The  axioms  of  Euclid  are  a  speci- 
men of  such  principles.  But  every  science  has  its  own  ; 
its  first  truths  must  consist  of  indemonstrable  definitions. 
Their  certainty  is  recognized  by  an  immediate  activity 
of  the  reason,  an  activity  that  is  only  gradually  de- 
veloped by  experience,  according  to  Aristotle. 

All  scientific  knowing  proceeds  either  deductively 
from  the  universal  to  the  individual  or  inductively 
from  the  individual  to  the  universal.  **The  prior  and 
more  cognizable  for  us,''  is  what  lies  nearest  to  the 
sphere  of  sensation,  but  ^*the  absolutely  prior  and 
more  cognizable"  is  what  is  most  remote  from  that 
sphere.  That  which  is  clear  in  itself  is  the  intelligible  ; 
that  which  is  more  evident  to  us  is  the  sensible.  The 
limits  of  knowledge  are,  on  the  one  hand,  the  individual; 
on  the  other,  the  most  general.  It  is  more  scientific  to 
pass  from  the  ''prior  in  nature"  to  the  *'  prior  for  us," 
from  the  condition  to  the  conditioned  ;  but  for  those  who 


180 


A   STUDY  OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


cannot  follow  this  order  the  inverse  one  must  be  em 
ployed.     ^<  Plunged  in  the  world  of  the  senses/we  m"" 
learn  by  degrees  to  discern  the  object  of  reason  " 

Induction   is  necessarily  imperfect  because  it   is  im- 
possible  to  know  all  individuals.     This  lack  of  l^no  W 

He  finds  ,n  d.alect.c  a  means  of  help  so  far  as  it  considers 
1  e  hfferent  s.des  from  which  an  object  may  be  regarctd 

It  IS  not  strange  that  his  procedure  is  open  to  critic; 

from  the  standpoint  of  the  modern  scientist  when  w    con 

■er  the  means  at  our  disposal  for  empirical  in^st  -" 
t'on.  To  appreciate  lus  real  service  in  the  observation 
and  collection  of  facts,  and  his  acuteness  in  t  J 

nation   we  mnst  judge  him  by  the  knowledge  and    c^ 
tiflc  instruments  of  help  possessed  by  his  age 

"To  have  reorganized  and  defined   the  forms  that 

Stlf         '  n  ";  '^  '""^  ""'"-^'''  achievement  o 
Anstot  e,    says  Hegel.     "  For  what  interests  us  other- 
wise IS  the  concrete  thinking  absorbed  in  outer  intu    o,  ■ 
those  forms  constitute  a  net  of  infinitp  ^„    k,  '*'"' 

therein    <,„^  f    «     .,,  "Umite  movableness  sunk 

everything    is    a    masterpiece  of    empiricism,  and  this 
consciousness    is  of  absolute  worth  " 

the'ictivrr/  T'''.  '''*  ^"^'^^'^  "^p'--  '°g'-»y  - 

as  if  th  nL  ""'^-^'-'^-g-     It  therefore  appears 

meiely  formal,  without  content.     The  thing  in  itself  mav 

thought.     It  IS  what  Hegel  calls  the  logic  of  the  finite 
and  must  add  to  itself  the  logic  of  the  fnfinite  hi  or  I; 
to  attain  truth.    The  forms  of  thought  must  bo  "garded 


Aristotle's  logic. 


181 


in  their  totality,  which  is  at  the  same  time  subjective  and 
objective.  Their  content  is  then  the  speculative  idea, 
and  the  logic    of   understanding   becomes  the  logic  of 


reason. 


CHAPTER  XXVl 

Aristotle's  metaphysics* 

JN  the  "First  Philosophy,"  or  the  -  Metaphysics  >' as 

IS  unfolded.     Ihe  work  is  not  a  connected  whole    bnt 
several  sketches  which  foiled  one  main  idea,  not  aiw 
clearly  written  or  well  arranged  ^  ^ 

whallS  t'""/"'  P'""''^'^^  ^  "*he  science  of 
wtiat  exists  in  so  far  as  it  exists,  and  what  pertains 
to  it  m-and-for-itsAlf "     t..  ^-i         i  -  r^i  tains 

ed^e  that  iTv.    I    u  '^^''^  ""^  '"'''''-'^'^  J'l'owl- 

causes  of    things,   and  is    therefore    First   Philosophy 

iTt'cs  Z'  ^^^^Av--things  that  foS;^; 

after  physics-was  first  used  by  Aristotle's  scholars. 

subject    which    IS    demonstrated,    the    attribute    which 

demonstrates,   and  the  iTiAm    +1,        •     •  , 

stration       Tt    t  ,  '   ^^"^  principle  of  demon- 

attnbute  m  a   thesis  of  which    it   is  the  only  jud^e 

Metaphysics    co-ordinates  all   these  thesp^    h/  ' 

axinmo .  ii^  •   ii,         •  tneses    by  superior 

axioms ,  ,t  IS  the  universal  science.     The  categories  are 

ts    genera;    Being-in-itself    is    the    common    basis 

Aristotle    begins    with  a  sketch    of    the    history  of 
philosophy.     This  is  necessary  in  order  to  explain  its 

182 


ARISTOTLE  S    METAPHYSICS. 


183 


terms,  the  result  of  the  theories  of  former  ages.  He 
carefully  examines  the  views  of  his  predecessors,  who 
began  by  inquiring  after  the  material  principle,  then 
advanced  gradually  to  the  idea  of  motive  power  or 
efficient  cause,  but  never  clearly  developed  form  or 
essence  and  the  final  cause.  He  censures  the  old 
lonians  for  having  made  a  single  element  the  primitive 
substance,  when  the  sensuous  changes  of  bodies  are 
conditioned  by  the  opposition  of  elements.  Heraclitus 
committed  the  same  mistake  in  representing  his  first 
principle  as  fire,  and  in  his  more  important  affirmation 
of  the  Becoming,  *'the  flow  of  all  things",  he  overlooked 
the  fact  that  change  itself  presupposes  a  substratum 
which  is  unchanged   and    unchangeable. 

Empedocles  first  introduced  the  principle  of  motion, 
but  did  not  make  clear  the  difference  between  his 
two  efficient  causes,  love  and  hate,  since  love  not 
only  unites  but  also  separates,  and  hate  not  only 
separates  but  also  unites.  To  the  views  of  Empedocles 
concerning  substance,  Aristotle  objects  that  they  would 
make  qualitative  change  impossible.  Against  the  Atom- 
ists  he  proves  that  atoms  which  are  only  quantitatively 
different  and  do  not  influence  each  other  cannot  ex- 
plain the  reciprocal  action  of  bodies,  becoming  and 
change.  The  physics  of  Anaxagoras  is  related  to 
that  of  Empedocles  and  the  Atomists ;  but  Aristotle 
acknowledges  the  great  service  of  this  philospher  in 
positing  710US,  or  intelligence,  as  the  principle  of 
all  things. 

As  to  the  Eleatics  Aristotle  asserts  that  their  the- 
ories contain   no  principle   for    the   explanation   of   ap- 


184 


A   STUDY  OP  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


pearances.     They  deny  becoming  and  the    muUipIicitv 
of    things,  overlooking    the    fact    that    while   nothing 
becomes      from    absolute     non-being,     everything     be- 
comes   from     relative     non-being.      Zeno's    arguments 
against   motion   are    equally    one-sided    with    thosb    of 
Parmenides   against    non-being,  change  and    becoming  • 
space  and  time  are   treated  as  discrete   quantities,  and 
not  as  continuous,  whereas  they  are  both.       The  prin- 
ciple of  Pythagoras,    number,   is  also  defective  in  not 
explaining  motion  and  change,  the  basis  of  all  natural 
occurrences. 

Aristotle^s  view  of  the  Sophists  is  already  known  • 
their  wisdom  was  but  apparent,  and  concerned  only 
the  transient  and  unreal.  He  acknowledged  the  great- 
ness of  Socrates,  but  sought  to  prove  that  his  work  as 
a  philosopher  was  limited'  to  ethical  inquiries,  and  did 
not  include  the  setting-up  of  a  metaphysical  principle. 

It  IS  in  Aristotle's  criticism   of   the    Platonic   Ideas 
that  we  discover   the   essential    difference    between    his 
system  of  thought  and  that  of  Plato.     Aristotle  agrees 
with  Plato  that    only    the    universal   essence    of  things 
can   be   known,  that   it  is  necessary   to  go   beyond  the 
transient  appearance  to  its  underlying  reality.     But  he 
denies  that  the  universal  is   something   substantial   for 
Itself  outside  of  appearances,  for   how    can   an   essence 
and  that  of  which   it   is   the  essence   exist  apart  ?  He 
says  that   Plato's    ideas    are     only   -things    of    sense 
immortalized   and    eternized,"  incapable   of  explaining 
the   world   of  appearances,    and   furthermore  making  it 
impossible.      What    is    the    imperishable    substance  in 
the  idea  man  outside  of  the   individuals  who  partici- 


Aristotle's  metaphysics. 


185 


pate  in  this  idea  ?  How  are  we  to  conceive  this 
participation  in  the  idea  if  the  individual  is  wholly 
sundered  from  the  universal  ?  In  every  case,  says 
Aristotle,  we  shall  have  to  assume  a  third  man,  a  pro- 
totype of  the  supersensuous  idea  of  man,  and  of  its 
sensuous  manifestation,  individual  man.  In  assuming 
a  double  series  of  sensuous  and  non-sensuouFj  sub- 
stances under  one  and  the  same  name,  the  adherents 
of  the  ideal  theory  resemble  men  who  increase  their 
numbers  in  order  to  fucilitate  the  process  of  counting. 
Aristotle  criticises  especially  the  immobility  of  the  idea, 
its  entire  lack  of  causality  to  produce  change  or  to  ex- 
plain nature.  We  recognize  the  spirit  of  the  natural 
scientist  who  seeks  to  determine  actuality  through  a 
full  and  complete  elucidation  of  facts. 

With  Aristotle  as  with  Plato  the  idea  is  related  to 
an  objective  reality  ;  but  the  one  teaches  its  transcend- 
ent existence,  the  other  its  immanence  in  the  the  sen- 
suous appearance,  the  noumenon  in  the  phenomenon. 
Socrates,  through  his  investigation  of  the  nature  of 
concepts,  led  the  way  to  the  theory  of  Ideas ;  but 
Socrates  never  separated  the  universal  from  the  in- 
dividuals included  under  it,  or  set  it  outside  of  the 
world  of  real  things.  Aristotle  represents  clearly  the 
weakness  of  the  Platonic  theory,  though  some  of  his 
objections  rest  on  misinterpretations.  He  unites  the 
realism  of  the  natural  scientist  with  Plato's  logical 
idealism,  and  the  more  he  finds  to  disapprove  in 
his  predecessors  the  more  he  seeks  to  answer  their 
unsolved  problems. 

Hegel  explains  clearly  and  decisively  the  nature  of 


186 


A  STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


AKISTOTLES   METAPHYSICS. 


187 


the  antithesis   between    the  Ideas  of  Plato    and  Aris 
totle.      The  Idea  in  Plato  is  in  itself  essentially  con- 
crete and  determined ;  its  defect,  or  one-sided  ness    is 
that  It  IS  only  in-itself,  or  potential ;   it  is  inert,  and 
does    not    yet    express   the  activity   of    the  process  of 
actualization.     The  Idea  in  Plato  is  the  objective    the 
good,   the  final    cause,    the    universal    in    general'-    it 
lacks  the  principle  of  vital  subjectivity  as  the  moment 
of  actuality,  although  this  principle  is  implicitly  con- 
•   tamed  in  his  definition  of  the   Absolute  as  the  unitv 
of  opposites.      But  Aristotle  defines  it  more  i,recisely 
as  Energy,  whose  nature  it   is  to  dirempt.    or   dunli- 
cate  this  being-for-itself ;  for,  as  Aristotle  says,  "The 
Entelechy  sunders." 

The  affirmative  principle,  mere  abstract  self-identity 
IS  the  highest  with  Plato ;  Aristotle  develops  the  prin- 
ciple of  negativity,  or  individualization,  as  distinction 
or  difference,   not   in  the  sense  of  a    contingent    and 
merely  special  subjectivity,   but  of  the  pure  subjectiv- 
ity.     Aristotle  asserts   that  being  and    non-being    are 
not  the  same,  but  he  does  not  mean  by  this  pure  be- 
ing or  non-being,   the    abstraction   which    is    but    the 
transition  of  the  one  into  the  other ;   he  understands 
under  that  ^ohich  is  substance,   idea.   Reason,   in    tho 
sense  of  an  active  final   cause.     On  the  one  hand  he 
sets  up  the  Universal  against   the   principle    of    mere 
change ;  on  the  other  he  defends  the  principle  of  ac- 
tivity   against    the    Pythagorean    system    of    numbers 
and  the  Platonic  system  of  ideas.     "Aristotle's  cate- 
gory of  activity  is  change,  but  a  change  posited  within 
the    Universal,  change    remaining    self-identical ;    con- 


J 


sequently  a  determining  which  is  self-determining,  and 
therefore  the  self-realizing,  universal  final  cause;  in 
mere  change,  on  the  contrary,  self-preservation  is  not 
necessarily  involved.  This  is  the  chief  doctrine  added 
to  philosophy   by   Aristotle." 

Aristotle  defines  and  investigates  four  metaphysical 
principles :  First,  Form  or  Essence ;  secondly,  Mat- 
ter or  substance  ;  thirdly,  the  principle  of  Motion,  or 
Efficient  Cause ;  and  fourthly,  the  Final  Cause,  or  the 
Good.  Closely  examined,  the  four  resolve  themselves  * 
into  the  single  antithesis  of  matter  and  form.  Thus, 
in  a  house,  the  building  materials  are  the  matter,  its 
architectural  idea  the  form,  the  efficient  cause  the 
builder,  the  completed  structure  the  end  or  final  cause. 
The  efficient  cause,  the  builder,  converts  the  matter 
(potentiality)  into  form  (actuality).  The  efficient  cause 
is  therefore  identical  with  the  formal ;  the  form  of 
the  statue  in  the  mind  of  the  sculptor  is  the  cause  of 
the  motion  through  which  it  is  produced.  Form  and 
end  also  coincide,  as  both  are  united  in  the  actual 
statue. 

In  the  relation  of  form  to  matter  Aristotle  dis- 
covers the  possibility  of  the  becoming.  His  predeces- 
sors argued  that  what  becomes  can  neither  originate 
from  what  is  nor  from  what  is  not ;  Aristotle  seeks 
to  prove  that  what  becomes  is  and  is  not  relatively 
at  the  same  time.  The  uneducated  man  who  becomes 
educated  must  contain  in  himself  the  ability  for  cul- 
ture ;  all  becoming  is  a  transition  of  potentiality  into 
reality.  That  which  becomes  warm  must  have  been 
formerly    cold,    that    which    becomes    knowledge    must 


'".iT't^B^aBBJa-BfjJiBrKg- 


188 


A   STUDY   OF   GKEEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


have  been  formerly  ignorance  ;  but  cold  in  itself  can- 
not  be  transformed  into  warmth,  nor  ignorance  into 
knowledge ;  the  becoming  is  a  transition  from  one 
condition  into  the  opposite  condition. 

The  presupposition  of  the  becoming,  the  substrate 
of  change,  Aristotle  calls  matter.  It  is  that  which 
remains  when  we  abstract  from  all  which  is  the  re- 
sult of  becoming,  substance  without  determination  or 
distinction,  that  which  is  everything  potentially  and 
nothing  really,  pure  potentiality.  It  is  as  little  non- 
bemg  as  being,  it  is  rather  possible  being.  In  itself 
it  is  unknowable  because  it  is  without  determination  ; 
we  can  only  attain  to  its  concept  through  analogy.' 
Conceived  as  a  counterpart  to  form  it  is  a  positive 
negative. 

The  concepts  of  the  real  and  the  potential  are 
applied  by  Aristotle  in  the  same  way  as  those  of 
form  and  matter.  One  and  the  same  thing  may  be 
related  to  another  as  matter  and  form,  in  that  the 
potential,  in  this  the  real ;  wood  to  the  finished  house 
is  matter,  to  the  growing -tree  form. 

In  the  development  of  potentiality  (matter)  to 
actuality  (form),  different  degrees  are  to  be  distin- 
guished. The  lowest  degree  is  matter,  absolutely 
formless,  pure  potentiality ;  the  highest  is  form  with- 
out matter,  pure  actuality,  absolute  Spirit.  Between 
the  two  extremes  is  a  gradation  of  existences  which 
are  both  matter  and  form,  the  first  continually  trans- 
lating itself  into  the  second. 

Matter,  as  the  formless  and  indefinite,  is  that  from 
which    chance    in    nature    proceeds.     Aristotle   under- 


K<f 


ARISTOTLE  8   METAPHYSICS. 


189 


stands  by  the  accidental  that  which  may  or  may  not 
happen  to  a  thing,  which  is  not  contained  in  its  es- 
sence and  does  not  therefore  occur  necessarily.  He 
finds  the  ground  of  the  accidental  in  the  nature  of 
the  finite,  or  of  matter,  which  as  the  indefinite  con- 
tains the  possibility  of  opposite  determinations.  The 
accidental  happens  through  the  influence  of  external 
circumstances.  A  man  digs  a  hole  in  the  ground  for 
the  purpose  of  finding  water,  and  discovers  a  hidden 
treasure ;  the  final  aim  of  the  digging  is  disturbed 
by  a  mediate  cause. 

But  Aristotle  finds  something  more  positive  than 
the  accidental  in  the  nature  of  matter  or  substance; 
he  regards  it  as  the  seat  of  motion  or  change,  of  a 
striving  after  form,  and  finally  as  the  ground  of  in- 
dividual existence.  It  is  difficult  to  comprehend  what 
he  means  by  this  since  he  regards  the  individual 
alone  as  something  substantial,  and  yet  places  the 
ground  of  actuality  in  form.  On  the  one  side,  he 
recognizes  with  Plato  that  the  object  of  knowledge  is 
the  concept,  the  universal ;  on  the  other,  he  asserts 
that  the  universal  does  not  lie  outside  of  the  indi- 
vidual. He  does  not  explain  how  the  two  are  related 
as  form  and  matter,  or  how  the  individual  that  is 
both  form  and  substance  should  appear  real  if  the 
ground  of  reality  lies  in  form  alone. 

He  has  been  interpreted  differently  by  different 
commentators,  l)ut  the  explanation  of  Hegel  is  the 
clearest.  Hegel  finds  in  the  Aristotelian  substance 
three  movements,  the  first  of  which  has  a  matter 
differing    from    its    actual    form,    and   is   consequently 


190 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


finite.  The  second  contains  the  activity  which  is  the 
object  of  its  process.  ''This  is  the  in-and-for-itself 
determined  understanding  whose  content  is  the  final 
cause  which  it  actualizes  through  its  activity  without 
undergoing  change  like  the  mere  sensuous  substance. 
For  the  soul  is  essentially  entelechy,  a  general  pro- 
cess of  determination  which  posits  itself  ;  not  a  merely 
formal  activity  whose  content  comes  from  elsewhere.'* 
The  third  and  highest  substance  is  that  in  which 
potentiality,  activity,  and  entelechy  are  united,— the 
Absolute  Substance. 

Through  his  distinction  of  form  and  matter,  of 
the  real  and  the  potential,  Aristotle  was  able  to 
solve  many  of  the  difficulties  of  earlier  philosophers. 
He  could  explain  how  one  can  be  at  the  same  time 
many,  how  soul  and  body  are  one  being,  how  finally 
becoming  and  change  are  possible.  If  matter  and  form 
are  related  as  the  potential  to  the  actual  it  lies  in  the 
concept  of  the  first  to  become  the  second,  and  the 
second  is  the  reality  of  the  first.  Matter  moves  towards 
form  and  develops  itself  to  reality ;  form  on  the  other 
hand  makes  the  potential  real,  and  is  the  energy  of 
matter. 

But  the  energy  of  matter  is  motion,  the  transition 
from  the  possible  to  the  real.  "Motion  is  the  perfec- 
tion of  matter  through  the  determination  of  form,  for 
matter  as  such  is  mere  potentiality  which  has  in  no 
respect  attained  reality.''  Nothing  comes  from  that 
which  is  neither  potential  nor  active.  Motion  is  a 
mediator  between  potential  and  actual  being,  a  possi- 
bility that  stiives  toward   reality,    a  reality  bound    in 


/■■■'-s 


Aristotle's  metaphysics. 


191 


possibility  and  therefore  incomplete.  The  merely  po- 
tential cannot  produce  motion,  for  it  lacks  energy : 
the  actual  cannot  produce  motion,  for  there  is  nothing 
in  it  imperfect  and  undeveloped  ;  motion  can  only  be 
comprehended  as  the  working  of  the  actual,  or  form, 
upon  the  potential,  or  matter. 

Motion,  with  Aristotle,  is  as  eternal  as  form  and 
matter,  whose  essential  relation  it  represents.  It  pre- 
supposes a  moving  cause,  itself  unmoved.  Absolute 
Spirit, — Ood.  Without  this  first  cause  motion  would 
be  impossible,  since  that  which  exists  potentially  may 
or  may  not  become  actual  and  could  not  be  a  principle 
of  movement.  Aristotle  defines  the  Absolute  Essence 
a^  pure  activity,  the  actus  purus  of  scholastic  philos- 
ophy. ''  God  is  the  substance  that  contains  within  His 
potentiality  also  his  actuality  inseparably  united."-— 
(Hegel). 

The  actual  in  the  highest  sense  can  only  be  pure 
form  without  substance,  the  moving  force  and  aim  of 
the  world.  There  is  that  which  is  moved  and  does  not 
move,  matter  ;  that  which  is  at  once  mover  and  moved, 
nature;  and  God,  the  unmoved  mover.  The  universe 
forms  a  continuous  system  of  ascending  progression 
from  the  first  formless  substance  to  its  final  end  and 
aim— Absolute  Goodness  and  Perfection,  or  Deitv. 

Nature  is  permeated  by  the  substantial  thought  which 
gives  it  life  and  moves  it  with  constant  unrest  and  de- 
sire ;  it  works  unconsciously  for  the  sole  and  single  aim 
of  divine  reason.  It  is  disposed  in  an  ascending  series 
of  terms  more  and  more  individualized,  each  of  which 
includes  the  preceding  and  points  to  a  superior  activity 


192 


A   STUDY    OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


and  soul.  Kature  consists  in  the  spontaneity  of  move- 
ment, desire  ;  desire  implies  a  final  end,  a  first  good 
which  engenders  it  and  attracts  it  to  itself,  eternal  ob- 
ject of  love,  immovable  in  the  absolute  perfection  of 
its  action. 

God  is  Absolute  Good,  without  degrees  and  without 
differences ;  every  being  receives  from  Ilim  good  with 
life  according  to  its  power.  The  inequality  of  beings 
in  their  participation  of  good  results  from  the  invin- 
cible and  fatal  necessity  of  matter.  Matter  is  the  po- 
tential which  includes  imperfection.  Everything  aspires 
and  advances  towards  Good  as  its  end.  In  the  measure 
that  natur^  breaks  away  from  the  necessity  of  matter 
it  is  less  subject  to  chance  and  change  ;  its  freedom 
consists  in  the  desire  which  attracts  it  towards  the 
good.  Evil  has  its  source  in  potentiality  and  is  only 
manifested  in  the  development  of  the  opposition  which 
it  encloses,  an  opposition  that  does  not  pass  beyond 
the  world  of  contingency  and  change.  The  world  is 
Hot  divided  between  two  hostile  principles ;  Absolute 
Good  has  no  contrary,  it  is  the  final  end  of  every- 
thing. 

The  beauty  of  the  world,  the  harmonious  relation  of 
its  parts,  the  glory  of  the  stars  and  the  immutable  or- 
der of  their  courses, — all  point  to  a  higher  Being  from 
whom  the  uniform  motion  and  intelligent  design  of  the 
universe  proceed.  Aristotle  compares  the  relation  of 
God  to  the  universe  to  that  of  a  general  to  his  army. 
'*  The  good  of  an  army  is  in  its  order,  but  above  all 
in  its  chief,"  he  says;  *'for  order  is  through  the  chief, 
and  not  the  chief  through  order/' 


^>c 


ARISTOTLE  S   METAPHYSICS. 


193 


God  is  pure  activity,  energy  itself,  prior  to  poten- 
tiality, not  according  to  time,  but  logically.  Time  is 
a  subordinate  element  of  that  which  is  universal  ;  the 
Absolute  Essence  is  timeless.  God  is  in  'Hhe  eternal 
heavens,''  and  in  the  thinking  reason  of  man.  He  is 
the  final  cause  whose  content  is  desire  and  thought. 
''  For  the  final  cause  of  anything  resides  in 'those  things 
of  which  the  one  is  in  existence  and  the  other  is  not. 
Now,  that  which  first  imparts  motion  does  so  as  a  thing 
that  is  loved,  and  that  which  has  motion  imj^ressed 
upon  it  imparts  motion  to  other  things/' 

The  activity  of  the  divine  nature  is  the  activity  of 
pure  thought,  thought  thinking  itself.  Nature  is 
continually  elevating  itself  from  formless  matter  to- 
ward this  activity,  at  every  step  manifesting  more  and 
more  clearly  the  end  of  its  being.  The  term  of  its 
progress  is  man,  a  being  who  thinks;  whose  intelligence 
is  able  to  disengage  itself  little  by  little  from  the  senses 
and  from  imagination  until,  freed  from  everything  ex- 
ternal, it  possesses  and  comprehends  itself.  The  sover- 
eign good  for  the  human  soul  is  pure  thought ;  active 
intelligence  is  absolute  immateriality. 

Potentiality  is  found  in  human  thinking  because  it 
is  to  a  certain  extent  in  a  material  subject  limited 
by  finite  conditions.  ''If  a  man  thinks  nothing," 
Aristotle  asks,  ''  what  advantage  has  he  over  one  who 
sleeps?"  If  he  thinks,  and  is  controlled  by  another, 
his  thinking  is  not  an  activity,  but  a  potentiality. 
It  makes  a  difference  also  whether  the  object  of  his 
thought  is  that  which  is  accidental  and  transient, 
or   that    which    is    permanent    and    eternal.     In    one 


194 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


case  the  activity  is  wasted  on  that  which  is  inferior 
to  itself;  in  the  other  the  thinking  and  the  object 
of  thought  are  identical.  Thought,  therefore,  that 
thinks  itself,  is  the  highest  and  most  excellent.  It 
is  the  absolute  final  cause,  or  the  Good.  It  cannot 
have  its  object  outside  of  itself  ;  it  is  not  the  mani- 
festation of  a  substance  and  the  product  of  an  ac- 
tivity  different   from   itself. 

The  essence  and  the  dignity  of  intelligence  lie 
not  .in  the  power,  but  in  the  act  of  thinking. 
Every  good,  every  perfection,  is  in  action  ;  it  is  bet- 
ter and  sweeter  to  love  than  to  be  loved,  to  be  the 
subject  than  the  object  of  thought,  better  to  act 
than  be  acted  upon.  Pure  intelligence  must  be  its 
own  object,  thought  thinking  itself,  the  thought  of 
thought. 

For  us,  as  individuals,  the  activity  of  pure  think- 
ing is  permitted  only  for  a  short  time,  and  is  most 
excellent  :  ''  It  is  on  this  account  that  waking,  feel- 
ing, thinking,  and  hopes  and  memories,  produce  the 
richest  pleasure.''  The  moments  of  speculative  con- 
templation in  which  our  thought  rediscovers  itself  in 
the  object  of  its  thought  are  the  ones  in  which  we 
attain  to  a  feeble  conception  of  divine  blessedness. 
''If  God,  now,  is  always  in  this,  as  we  are  at 
times,  then  He  is  admirable;  if  still  more,  then 
more  admirable.  But  He  is  thus.  Life,  too, 
is  His;  for  the  actuality  of  thought  is  life.  He, 
however,  is  activity;  the  activity  returning  into  it- 
self is  His  most  excellent  and  eternal  life.  We  say, 
therefore,   that   God   is  an   eternal   and  the  best   life/' 


Aristotle's  metaphysics. 


195 


All  thinking  obtains  its  worth  from  what  is 
*  thought ;  divine  thinking  can  have  only  the  best  for 
its  content,  and  the  best  is  itself.  God,  therefore, 
thinks  Himself ;  the  energy  of  thinking  and  the  ob- 
ject which  is  thought  are  one  and  the  same ;  in 
this  consists   His  absolute   perfection  and    blessedness. 

The  world  is  the  manifestation  of  thought,  par- 
ticularized, multiplied,  diversified  in  potentialities  of 
matter  which  seek  to  attain  reality.  On  one  side 
we  have  pure  activity.  Absolute  Being  ;  on  the  other 
potentiality,  relative  being  and  non-being,  existing 
only  in  movement,  the  source  of  multitude  and  diver- 
sity. Thought  is  the  actuality  on  which  all  depends, 
to  which  all  relates,  present  to  all  as  the  soul  to 
the  body,  unequally,  diversely,  according  to  all  possi- 
ble differences. 

But  how  does'  God,  buried  in  eternal  contempla- 
tion of  Himself,  move  the  world  ?  How  does  the 
pure  activity  of  divine  thought  enter  into  relation 
with  nature,  matter,  potentiality  ?  The  divine  prin- 
ciple by  its  essence  is  separated  from  potentiality 
and  the  instability  of  movement ;  it  is  the  end  to- 
ward which  they  strive.  But  whence  come  the 
striving,  and  desire,  and  movement  ?  How  attribute 
to  potentiality  any   reality  ? 

Aristotle's  propositions  concerning  Deity  contain 
the  scientific  foundation  of  theism  in  philosophy,  bnt 
they  do  not  escape  the  difficulty  which  is  the  final 
problem  of  all  theistic  speculation — a  concept  of  God 
in  which  neither  His  personality  nor  essential  dif- 
ference from  the  finite  is  lost.    God  is  defined  as  the 


19G 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


First  Mover,  Himself  unmoved,  immaterial,  free  from  all 
relation  to  time  ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  how 
that  which  is  unmoved  can  be  a  moving  cause,  or 
how  the  immaterial  can  act  upon  a  material  universe. 
The  difficulty  is  partly  in  our  own  thinking,  for  it 
is  certain  that  a  profound  insight  into  the  nature 
of  the  Divine  lies  at  the  basis  of  Aristotle's  philos- 
ophy. His  God  is  not  mere  abstract  Being,  or  dead 
Identity,  but  living,  eternal  Energy.  In  this  princi- 
ple Greek  philosophy  reached  its  culminating  point— 
a  principle  that  finds  its  justification  and  complement 
in  the  doctrines   of   Christianity. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 


Aristotle's  physics. 


ARISTOTLE'S  Philosophy  of  Nature  includes  its 
metaphysics  in  so  far  as  he  investigates  the 
problem  of  existence  and  the  final  causes  that  lie  be- 
hind sensuous  phenomena.  This  method  is  rejected 
by  the  empirical  science  of  modern  times,  which  holds 
fast  to  the  facts  given  in  experience,  but  waives  all 
inquiry  into  their  speculative  origin.  Aristotle  did  not 
neglect  the  empirical,  he  sought  to  make  facts  the 
basis  of  every  theory  ;  but  his  materials  were  scanty, 
and  he  worked  without  those  aids  for  the  advance  and 
verification  of  science  which  exist  to-day.  What  he 
accomplished  was  wonderful  as  a  mere  map  of  the 
sciences  in  the  fourth  century,  B.  0.  He  stated  in 
outline  at  least  the  questiiDus  which  each  science  must 
answer,  and  through  his  very  mistakes  cleared  the  way 
for  their  solution.  *'  It  is  half-w^ay  to  knowledge  when 
you  know  what  you  have  to  inquire." 

His  philosophic  view  of  nature  was  broad  and  com- 
prehensive. He  traced  a  continuous  thread  of  evolution 
throughout  its  ascending  scale  of  life,  from  the  inorganic 
to  the  organic,  on  to  the  animal,  and  lastly  to  man. 
He  considered  Nature  both  as  final  cause  and  as  necessity. 
Material  causes  are  only  the  indispensable  condition 
of  natural  existence ;  the  true  cause  is  its  internal,  im- 


197 


198 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


manent  conformity  to  design,  which  constitutes  its  final 
end.     -  That  which  happens  in  nature  happens  always 
or  nearly  always  the  same,  but  nothing  which  is  througli 
chance  or  accident  reproduces  itself.     In  the  next  place, 
that  which  contains  a  purpose  conforms  to  this  as  well 
in  Its  antecedents  as  in  its  consequences ;   so  that   the 
nature  of  a  thing  may  be  inferred  from  its  constitution 
and  conversely  its  constitution  from  its   nature  ;    this 
follows  from  the  idea  of  design.'^    ....     '^  Who- 
ever  assumes  an  accidental  origin  of  things  denies,  in 
sodomg,   nature   and  the  natural  order  of  things;  for 
the  natural  involves  a  principle  in  itself,   by  means  of 
which  a  continual  progress  is  made  until  the  attainment 
of  Its  end  and  aim.-    The  oak  is  produced  from  the 
acorn,   the  acorn  from    the   oak  ;    plants  produce  seed, 
yet  presuppose  seed  as  their  own  origin.     :r^ature  as  life 
IS  final  cause ;  the  living  being  changes,  but  preserves 
Itself  through  its  own  activity. 

Nature  is  twofold,  matter  and  form,  form  being  the 
end  and  aim  on   account   of  which   all  changes  occur. 
The  end  is  not  always  attained  by  reason  of  the  obstacles 
offered  by  matter.     This  is  the  ground  of  chance  and 
necessity.     Nature  works  according   to   design,    but  in 
Its  realization  produces  much  from  mere  necessity.     The 
origin  of  necessity  is  sometimes  explained  -as  if  one 
should   suppose   that  a   house   is   through  necessity  for 
the  reason   that  the   heavy  is   placed   underneath  and 
the  light  on  top,  so  that  the  foundations  and  the  rocks 
are  placed    lowest  and    then    the    earthy  matter,   and 
lastly  the  wood   above  all   because  it   is  the  lightest.- 
Ihe  material  is  necessary  to  the  house,  but  the  house 


Aristotle's  physics. 


199 


is  not  made  for  the  material,  but  for  shelter  and  pro- 
tection. 

The  necessary  in  nature  is  limited  to  matter  and  its 
movements ;  the  final  cause  is  nature's  reason  and  higher 
principle.  Necessity  is  present  in  matter,  but  must  be 
worked  upon  by  the  free  activity  of  form  in  order  to  con- 
stitute natural  existence.  Chance  is  a  mere  exception 
thwarting  the  reason  which  guides  and  has  ever  guided 
the  operations  of  nature.  Nature  as  a  w^hole  is  a  gradual 
overcoming  of  matter  through  form,  more  and  more 
perfect  development  of  life  ;  what  is  first  in  itself  is 
last  according  to  temporal  origin,  the  beginning  is  also 
the  end. 

The  universal  conditions  of  natural  existence  are 
motion,  space,  time.  Metaphysically,  motion  is  defined 
as  the  realizing  of  that  which  a  thing  is  potentially. 
Aristotle  illustrates  this  by  saying  that  metal  is  the 
possibility  of  a  statue  ;  but  the  movement  required  in 
it  to  become  a  statue  is  not  a  movement  of  the  metal 
as  metal,  but  as  this  possibility  itself.  The  merely 
potential  whose  activity  is  motion  is  not  self-end,  and 
is  therefore  imperfect.  The  mover  in  the  movable  is 
the  final  cause,  the  principle  and  aim  of  the  motion. 
Activity  and  passivity  are  the  same  in  movement,  but 
differ  in  idea,  in  so  far  as  one  is  an  activity  in  the  moved, 
the  other  an  activity  by  the  mover. 

Aristotle  distinguishes  three  kinds  of  motion  :  quan- 
titative motion,  or  increase  and  decrease ;  qualitative 
motion,  or  alteration  ;  and  spatial  motion,  or  change  of 
place,  to  which  the  other  two  if  examined  closely  may 
be  traced  back.     Quantitative  motion,   or  increase  and 


200 


A   STUDY    OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


decrease,  presupposes  partly  a  qualitative  change,  partly 
a  change  of  place.     Qualitative  change,    or  alteration, 
is  possible  only  through  spatial  contact,  for  the  passive 
must  be  touched  by  the  active.     Beginning  and  ending, 
as  regards  the   individual   thing,  coincide   partly   witli 
combination  and  separation,  partly  with  the  transforma- 
tion  of  substances,    both   of  which   depend  on   spatial 
motion.     Only    this    definite    thing   begins  and   ends; 
absolute  beginning  and  ending  would  leave  no  substrate 
of  motion   or  change.      Becoming  presupposes  and    is 
preceded  by  being,  and  must  be  conceived  as  a  transi- 
tion from  the  possible  to  the  real,  as  development. 

The  concept  of  space  with  Aristotle  is  neither  the 
form   nor   the    limit  of  individual    bodies ;   if  it   were, 
bodies  would  move  ivith  space,  and. not  in  space.     It 
is  not  the  matter  of  bodies,  nor  the'  distance   between 
them,  but  rather  the  boundary   of   the  enclosing   body 
against  the  enclosed.     -There  is    nothing   external  to 
the   universe,  all  is  contained  in  the  heavens ;  for  the 
world   is  the  whole.      But  place   is   not   the    heavens ; 
It  IS   only  the    outermost   limits    at    rest   which   touch 
moving  bodies.      Therefore  the  earth  is  in   water,    the 
water    in   air,    the    air    in    ether,    the    ether    in    the 
heavens.^' 

Time  is  not  motion  although  related  to  it ;  motion 
is  sometimes  slower,  sometimes  swifter,  while  time  is 
ever  the  same.  Whatever  is  determined  by  the  now 
we  call  time;  it  is  the  measure  of  movement  in  re- 
spect of  the  before  and  after.  It  is  a  continuous  as 
well  as  a  discrete  quantity,  continuous  in  so  far  as 
this  present  now  is    the    same  as  in  the  past;  discrete 


>c 


ARISTOTLE'S   PHYSICS. 


201 


in  so  far  as  its  being  changes  every  moment.  The 
past  and  the  future  are  different  from  the  now,  but 
it  is  their  limit;    it    is    both    their    union    and    their 

distinction. 

Aristotle  maintains  that  motion  is  ^thout  begin- 
ning or  end,  and  from  this  concept  derives  his  theory 
of  the  universe.  The  absolute  motion  is  circular, 
without  antithesis,  uniform,  self-complete.  God  moves 
the  world  from  its  circumference,  acting  directly  on 
the  firmament  of  the  fixed  stars.  Each  motion  of  a 
surrounding  sphere  is  communicated  to  those  included 
in  it,  but  the  degree  of  perfection  varies  as  they  are 
more  or  less  removed  from  the  direct  influence  of  the 
divine   Mover. 

Aristotle  calls  the  sphere  of  the  fixed  stars  "the 
first  Heaven."  As  nearest  God  it  consists  not  of  per- 
ishable matter,  but  of  imperishable  ether,  the  divine 
element  in  creation.  Its  motion  is  the  pure  circular, 
unbecome,  unchangeable,  that  from  which  all  other 
motion  springs.  Touched  by  no  earthly  trouble,  com- 
prehending all  space  and  all  time,  the  fixed  stars 
rejoice  as  the  most  perfect  of  created  beings. 

Lower  than  the  stars  is  the  sphere  of  the  planets, 
including  the  sun  and  the  moon.  Lowest  of  all  is 
the  earth,  the  farthest  removed  from  God  and  there- 
fore the  most  imperfect  of  created  things.  This  is 
the  sphere  of  movement  in  a  straight  line,  upward, 
downward,  as  the  elements  are  heavy  or  light.  Earth, 
water,  air,  fire,  all  pass  over  into  each  other  and  form 
one  whole,  a  circle  whose  parts  ceaselessly  change  but 
the  law  of  whose  process  is  uniform  and    eternal,    ex- 


203 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


hibiting   th„s    a   copy   of  heaven.       "That   which  is 
hanged  m  things    is  only  the  sensuously  perceivable 
and  the  forms  and    shapes,  as  well  as  the  properties 
are  not  changed ;  they  originate  and  vanish  in  th  „! 
but  do  not  change/^  •''iings, 

cap^llitr'of '  k"   '''  '^""^  "'    "'^'"'<'"-'    -    the 
capab  hty  of  a   being    to    produce  a  change   in    itself 

even  though  that  change  be  limited  to  growth,    ^  „ 

shment  and   decay.       That    which    is    Led    in    tl.e 

mng  :s  .ts  body,  or  matter;   that  which  moves  is 

soul,  or  form,  called  by  Aristotle  entelechy.      He  di 

tingu,shes   in    theory  at   least,  between  entelechy  and 

energy ;  entelechy  contains  the  end    (telos)   of  a  prj 

cess,  and  is  not  only    form,    but   principle    of   modon 

eat    to  ,   .  explanation    of    body.      Soul    gives 

eah  y  to  body  just  a.  vision  gives  reality  to  the  eye. 

body  are  one  than  ask  whether  the  wax  and  the  fig- 
uie  impressed  upon  it  are  one,  or  generally  inquife 
whether  the  material  and   that  of  which  it   is  the  I 

Sndl  T-;    'f   ''-'"'''  ''^  -"'  -"  -  com- 
prehend the  body ;  the  mental  functions,  although  the 

:r^rLrr::r^'^^-"^''-^^^^ -"---" 

zatit-tt"tf"''r'  '"'■^''  ^*'"'  '^  '^«    perfect  reali- 

it  mav\;     ""^^^"^''«°»  i«   "^ot  necessarily  explicit, 

he  'fir  t      f\:    ^■■"*°"^'  '''''''''''  -defines  soul  a 

ttest  l"i     ?'     "'  '"'■^•-      ««    --g--  three 

Inf  he      I  trfT'''''  ""  ^"Se*'*"^^'  the  sensitive, 
and   the  intellectual  soul,  corresponding  to  the  life  of 


aeistotle's  physics. 


203 


plants,  of  animals,  and  of  man.  His  psychology 
rests  upon  the  biological  conception  of  a  progressive 
development  of  life  on  earth.  Man  is  the  end  of  cre- 
ation, the  perfect  development  of  all  that  is  contained 
implicitly  and  imperfectly  in  lower  forms  of  existence. 
The  inorganic  precedes  the  organic ;  the  functions  of 
nutrition  are  the  basis  for  the  faculties  of  sense  ;  the 
exercise  of  the  senses  is  necessary  to  provide  material 
for  thought. 

We  must  not  neglect  the  distinction  between  what 
is  prior  in  time  and  prior  in  order  of  thought.  Aristotle 
repeatedly  asserts  that  as  the  idea  of  reality  precedes  that 
of  potentiality,  the  more  developed  form  stands  first  in 
thought  and  real  being,  although  the  lower  form  has  the 
priority  in  time.  Soul  is  the  unity  which  embraces  life, 
sense-perception,  and  thought ;  it  is  the  true  universal, 
containing  within  itself  the  individual  and  the  particular. 
It  is  not  abstract  but  concrete  unity,  developing  and  an- 
nulling its  own  multiplicity,  as  vegetative,  sensitive,  in- 
tellectual, reaching  a  higher  and  higher  synthesis  in  its 
progress  towards  perfect  realization. 

Among  living  beings  plants  are  the  lowest.  The 
work  of  the  vegetative  soul  is  reduced  to  two  functions, 
nutrition  and  reproduction.  It  is  related  to  matter  in 
a  material  manner,  employing  it  as  nutriment  ;  it  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  form  of  the  object  as  in 
sensation.  **  The  reaction  of  the  life  of  the  plant  upon 
the  external  world  is  not  sufficient  to  constitute  a 
fixed,  abiding  individuality,''  says  Dr.  Wm.  T.  Harris, 
in  an  article  on  "  Educational  Psychology,"  published 
in    The    Journal   of   Speculative    Philosophy:     **With 


204 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


each  accretion  there  is  some  change  of  particular  indi- 
viduality. Every  growth  to  a  plant  is  by  the  sprouting 
out  of  new  individuals— new  plants— a  ceaseless  multipli- 
cation of  individuals,  and  not  .the  preservation  of  the 
same  individual.  The  species  is  preserved,  but  not  the 
particular  individual.  Each  limb,  each  twig,  even  each 
new  leaf  is  a  new  individual,  which  grows  out  from  the 
previous  growth  as  the  first  sprout  grew  from  the  seed. 
Each  part  furnishes  a  soil  for  the  next.  When  a  plant  no 
Jonger  sends  out  new  individuals,  we  say  it  is  dead.  The 
life  of  the  plant  is  only  a  life  of  nutrition.'' 

We  reach  a  higher  grade   of  life  in  the   faculties  of 
sense  which  first  constitute  the  animal.     Sense  receives 
the  form  of  things  and  is  so  far  passive,  acted  upon  from 
without  ;  but  to  produce  sensation  it  must  in  its  turn  act 
upon  and  assimilate  this  passive  content.     **  The  sensible 
object  is  not  so  much  the  condition  as  the  occasion  of 
sensation,''  says  Mr.    Wallace,   in    his    introduction  to 
Aristotle's  De  Anima.    ^'  Perception  is  something  internal 
and  immanent,  only  called  out  into  action  by  an  external 
object.    ...    To  Aristotle,  therefore,  we  may  say  that 
matter  is  not  a  permanent  possibility  of  sensation  realized 
in  perception  but  sensation  a  permanent  possibility  of 
perceiving  what  as  perceived  is   the  realization  of^he 
sensitive  capacities." 

Aristotle  explains  the  general  character  of  sense- 
perception  by  comparing  it  to  the  manner  in  which  wax 
receives  the  form  or  impress  of  the  seal,  but  not  its 
material,  the  iron  or  the  gold  of  which  it  is  composed. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  soul  like  wax  has  no  form  or 
activity  in  itself  j  it  is  simply  a  metaphor  to  illustrate 


Aristotle's  physics. 


205 


that  what  is  sensuously  perceived  in  so  far  as  it  is  form 
is  the  object  as  universal,  not  as  individual. 

Touch  is  the  most  common  of  the  perceptive  faculties; 
it  is  the  sense  which  all  others  presuppose.  Touch  and 
taste  contribute  only  to  our  animal  existence  ;  sight  and 
hearing  are  directed  to  our  spiritual  development.  The 
heart  rather  than  the  brain  is  the  seat  of  sensation. 
This  evidently  means  that  it  is  through  the  heart  that 
the  soul  compares  and  distinguishes  sensations  ;  to  inter- 
pret it  otherwise  would  contradict  Aristotle's  theory  of 
the  relation  between  mind  and  matter. 

Imagination  (  Vorstelhing)^  the  picture-making  faculty, 
is  closely  connected  with  sensation.  But  its  testimony  is 
less  trustworthy.  As  a  copy  of  early  impressions  we  call 
it  remembrance  ;  as  their  conscious  reproduction  we  call 
it  re-collection.  Re-collection  implies  reason,  and  be- 
longs to  man  alone.  The  laws  according  to  which  the 
mind  works  in  this  process  are  those  of  the  Association 
of  Ideas,  which  is  one  of  Aristotle's  contributions  to 
mental   science. 

Man  includes  in  himself  the  vegetative  soul  of  the 
plant,  the  sensitive  soul  of  the  animal,  and  the  cogni- 
tive soul,  or  the  power  of  thinking,  which  distin- 
guishes him  from  all  other  beings.  The  soul  in  itself 
is  the  divine  in  man,  independent  of  bodily  conditions, 
immaterial,  self-subsistent.  But  so  far  as  it  is  related 
to  sensation  it  is  passively  determined,  and  is  in  a 
process  of  development.  Aristotle,  therefore,  distin- 
guishes between  what  he  calls  the  active  and  the  pas- 
sive reason,  a  distinction  whose  interpretation  has 
given  rise  to  wide  divergencies  of  view  among    Aris- 


206 


A  STUDY   OF  GKEEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


totehan  scholars.      On    one  hand  he  could  not   over 

on  the    other    he    could    not    think    pure    reason    a 

m   the  soul   of  man   he  sought  to  explain  and  recon 
cle    by    means    of    his    theory,    and    considering    tl 
d.&  ulty  of  the  problem   it   is  little   wonder   that  h 
meaning  ,s  sometimes  obscure. 

Reason  contains   within   itself    potentially  the   .en 

Zi   itle  f  ?  '    "  ""'^  ""^  *°    "I-^'OP    "'-e 

rom   Itself  ,n    order    to    apply    them    to    experience 

The  process  of  thought  is   like  that  of  wnting    on 

-.Ht ;  L  p-r:  o?thr:xtrair,d;': 

ctivitv  of  T  \:"*'"«-*-"''*  -  P-ivity,  since  the 
itsdf      The  ;""'*  "    '''"    ^^'^'•"'•^'    *"     but     within 

i-^P'ies  that  the    soul    ^JfllTZ^/Trf^ 
as  .t  .s  really  thought,    that  the    potentiality   "tht 

ieot    t^v  '"''  °^  immaterial  objects,  the  sub- 

he  same""':!  ^"/.^  °^i-*  thought  ^re' one    T^d 
s  e'ra'lentT  t^T '  "^■"*  "  speculative  science 
know ledi      rl'  t        ^  ^"'^  '*"'   ''^^^^  ">'    «P-"'-«ve 

Ss  of      '  '"'''''''  '"^   ™*"-'   -««h    of    the 

mplicitlv     Th  'L  '"""''   ''  ""'^     P«'-""»y    -' 
■mphctly.     And    thus    reason  is  not  to    be    regarded 


Aristotle's  physics. 


207 


as  belonging  to  and  governed  by  the  things  of  sense, 
but  the  world  of  thought  must  be  regarded  as  be- 
longing to   and   regulated   by   reason. 

This  reason  is,  on  the  one  hand,  of 
such  a  character  as  to  become  all  things ;  on  the 
other  hand  of  such  a  nature  as  to  create  all  things, 
acting  then  much  in  the  same  way  as  some  positive 
quality,  such  as  for  instance  light ;  for  light  also  in 
a  way  creates  actual  out  of  potential  color.  . 
And  thus,  though  knowledge  as  an  actually  realized 
condition  is  identical  with  its  object,  this  knowledge 
as  a  potential  capacity  is  in  time  prior  to  the  indi- 
vidual,  though   in   universal    existence  it   is  not   even 

in  time  thus  prior  to    actual    thought 

This  phase  of  reason  is  separated  from  and  uncom- 
pounded  with  material  conditions,  and,  being  in  its 
essential  character  fully  and  actually  realized,  it  is 
not  subject  to  impressions  from  w^ithout,  for  the  crea- 
tive is  in  every  case  more  knowable  than  the  pas- 
sive, just  as  the  originating  principle  is  superior  to 
the  matter  which  it  forms." 

'*The  first  key  to  understanding  Aristotle  is  to  know 
that  dunaviis  and  energeia  are  relative  terms,''  says 
Mr.  Wallace,  **  and  that  what  is  an  energeia  from  one 
aspect  may  be  a  dunamis  from  another.  And  thus 
Aristotle  may  perfectly  well  say  that  the  different  forms 
of  soul  must  exist  in  man  potentially  before  they  can 
do  so  actually  and  yet  hold  that  it  is  in  potential  forms 
that  reason  as  an  actual  or  rather  as  an  actualizing 
faculty  is  present  originally  in  man." 

Aristotle's   theory  of   knowledge  determines  directly 


208 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


his  theory  of  practical  activity.  What  in  the  one  sphere 
is  truth  and  error,  is  in  the  other  good  and  evil;  *'it 
is  when  the  sense  perceives  something  as  pleasant  or 
painful  that  the  mind  affirms  or  denies  it,  that  it  pur- 
sues it  or  avoids  it/"* 

Desire  arises  from  sensuous  feeling,  but  assumes  a 
different  character  according  as  it  is  or  is  not  dominated 
by  reason.  So  far  as  desire  is  influenced  by  reason, 
reason  is  practical,  and  desire  itself  becomes  will. 
Between  the  two  stands  the  human  soul  with  freedom 
of  choice,  spontaneity  of  action.  The  difficulties  that 
lie  in  the  concept  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  did  not 
exist  for  Aristotle.  He  looked  upon  reason  as  the 
basis  of  the  moral  and  the  intellectual  life.  Man  even 
in  yielding  to  his  animal  nature  is  conscious  of  a 
higher  ideal ;  this  consciousness  presupposes  reason 
whose  essence  is  freedom. 

Aristotle's  theory  of  reason  has  puzzled  both  ancient 
and  modern  commentators.  The  active  or  the  creative 
reason  transcends  the  body,  is  eternal  and  imperishable, 
unaffected  by  matter,  prior  and  subsequent  to  the  indi- 
vidual mind  ;  the  passive  or  receptive  reason  is  necessary 
to  individual  thought,  but  is  subjected  to  suffering  and 
change,  and  therefore  perishable.  Where  is  the  personal 
self  to  be  found,  in  the  active  or  in  the  passive  reason  ? 
Did  Aristotle  believe  in  the  immortalitv  of  the  indi- 
vidual  soui  ? 

Hegel  thinks  that  Aristotle  reached  the  highest  point 
of  speculation  in  identifying  the  subjective  and  the 
objective  present  in  active  or  creative  reason,  but  sep- 
arated in  finite  things  and  finite  mind  where  reason  is 


Aristotle's  physics. 


209 


only  a  potentiality.  As  this  unity  of  subjective  and 
objective,  reason  must  be  self-consciousness.  It  is  the 
true  totality,  the  activity  which  is  both  in  itself  and  for 
itself,  the  thinking  of  thinking,  that  which  constitutes 
the  nature  of  Absolute  Spirit,  and  in  so  far  as  we 
participate  in  it  it  is  the  consciousness  of  God,  perfect 
blessedness. 


CHAPTER  XXYIII. 


Aristotle's  ethics. 

TTTIIAT  is  the  chief  good  for  man  ?— is  the  question 
asked  and  answered  by  Aristotle  in  his  Ethics. 
As  physical  things  strive  unconsciously  towards  com- 
pletion and  perfection,  man  consciously  seeks  the  good 
attainable  in  life.  This  good,  according  to  Aristotle, 
IS  happiness,  which  can  only  be  realized  in  the  harmo- 
nious activity  and  development  of  his  especial  nature. 
It  differs  from  physical  good  in  so  far  as  it  exists  not 
only  for  man,  but  in  man.  The  end  of  the  physical  is 
an  end  not  recognized  by  the  physical  itself,  the  end  of 
the  moral  is  consciously  recognized  and  realized.  Aris- 
totle, in  his  Ethics,  views  the  final  cause  subjectively 
as  happiness ;  objectively,  as  the  morally  beautiful. 

The  activity  which  results  in  happiness  belongs  to 
man  as  man,  not  as  animal  ;  it  is  the  activity  of  reason. 
It  IS  not  mere  sensuous  enjoyment,  but  the  chief  human 
good,  containing  in  itself  all  that  lends  to  life  its  highest 
worth.  It  is  not  selfish  except  in  that  higher  sense  of 
the  word  where  egoism  becomes  altruism,  and  genuine 
self-culture  humanitarianism.  It  even  rises  above  the 
practical  sphere  of  morality,  in  its  highest  realization; 
It  IS  that  for  which  morality  exists,  the  divine  in  man, 
a  state  of  peace  and  blessedness,  the  summit  of  human 
perfection. 

210 


Aristotle's  ethics. 


211 


Aristotle  views  happiness  from  the  external  as  well 
as  the  internal  point  of  view.  Ideal  happiness  is  the 
attainment  of  a  state  wherein  man  would  live  above 
the  world,  participating  in  the  blessed  life  of  God.  But 
moral  activity  is  human  activity,  the  activity  of  beings 
limited  by  time  and  space.  Aristotle,  therefore,  regards 
happiness  as  partly  dependent  on  certain  external 
advantages,  health,  moderate  means,  friends,  children, 
etc.  He  was  led  to  this  second  view  by  his  empirical 
tendencies  and  the  facts  to  which  universal  experience 
seemed  to  testify.  **  The  work  of  man  is  a  conscious 
and  active  life  of  the  soul  in  accordance  with  reason,'' 
he  says  :  **this  is  the  virtuous  and  therefore  the  happy 
life."  IIapi)iness  implies  virtue  and  a  life  favorably 
situated  as  regards  external  fortune  ;  but  it  depends  on 
mental  rather  than  on  bodily  conditions,  and  is  an 
activity  or  enevgeia  as  distinguished  from  dunamis  or 
potentiality. 

''  No  conception  equally  plastic  with  e?iergeia,  and  at 
all  answering  to  it,  can  be  found  in  modern  thought," 
says  Sir  Alexander  Grant.  ''  Energy,  as  we  use  the  word, 
does  not  convey  the  meaning  fully ;  nor  does  actuality, 
which  gives  more  nearly  its  philosophical  import-  To 
comprehend  energeia,  we  must  study  its  various  appli- 
cations in  Aristotle's  system  of  philosophy.  It  is  every- 
where th^  correlative  and  opposite  of  dunamis.'' 

We  have  seen  its  significance  in  physics  ;  in  ethics, 
it  is  not  only  identified  with  happiness,  but  expresses 
moral  action  and  the  development  of  the"  moral  powers. 
The  moral  dunamis,  or  potentiality,  differs  from  the 
physical;  it  is  not  restricted  to  one  of   two   contraries 


213 


A   STUDY  OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


which  it  must  produce,  as  the  capacity  of  heat  pro- 
duces heat  alone,  but  it  can  develop  into  either  con- 
trary and  is  therefore  freed  from  physical  necessity. 
The  moral  dicnamis  is  not  a  gift  of  nature  inde- 
pendent of  any  effort  on  our  part ;  it  does  not  exist 
previous  to  moral  action.  It  arises  gradually  througli 
exercise ;  good  acts  produce  good  habits,  and  con- 
versely good   habits  produce  good  acts. 

If  man  had  a  capacity  for  virtue  as  irresistible  as 
the  force  which  makes  the  stone  full  to  the  ground, 
he  would  have  no  choice,  no  responsibility,  no  moral- 
ity. All  men  are  born  with  certain  capacities  of 
growth,  of  feeling  pleasure  and  pain;  but  to  acquire 
the  disposition  of  virtue  we  must  first  of  all  be  virtu- 
ous. This  seems  paradoxical,  but  Aristotle  compares 
the  acts  by  which  we  acquire  virtue  to  the  first  at- 
tempts of  the  artist  in  the  acquirement  of  his  art. 
They  are  merely  external  and  lack  morality  until 
they  express  internal  and   developed   character. 

Man  is  a  free  and  intelligent  agent,  according  to 
Aristotle,  accountable  for  his  good  or  evil  action. 
The  basis  of  morality  is  found  in  natural  tendencies, 
but  morality  itself  consists  in  their  transformation 
through  rational  insight  and  will.  Aristotle  reversed 
the  proposition  of  Socrates  that  no  one  is  voluntarily 
bad,  finding  in  the  will  itself  the  decisive^  proof  of 
moral  choice  and  responsibility.  Virtue  is  an  endur- 
ing quality  of  the  will  acquired  only  through  con- 
tinued virtuous  activity ;  that  which  was  first  a  matter 
of  free  choice  becomes  a  permanent  element  of  charac- 
ter. 


Aristotle's  ethics. 


213 


If  we  ask  what  quality  of  the  will  is  virtuous,  Aris- 
totle answers  that  moral  activity  must  observe  the  just 
mean  between  the  too-much  and  the  too-little,  must 
avoid  both  excess  and  defect.  This  thought  is  essen- 
tially Greek ;  it  is  the  law  of  moderation  applied  to 
moral  action.  What  is  too  much  for  one  man  may 
not  be  for  another ;  the  virtue  of  a  free  man  is  one 
thing,  that  of  a  slave  another.  The  external  circum- 
stances and  moral  problems  of  individuals  differ  and 
thus  determine  their  virtue.  Whenever  there  is  uncer- 
tainty the  mean  to  be  observed  is  decided  by  practical 
insight. 

Virtue  is  a  certain  harmony  of  life.  In  so  far  as  it 
is  connected  with  the  control  of  the  passions  it  is 
moral ;  in  so  far  as  it  is  connected  with  the  order  of 
the  intellect  it  is  intellectual,  or  diancetic.  Moral 
virtue  includes  courage,  temperance,  generosity,  cour- 
tesy, loftiness  of  spirit,  and  chief  of  all,  justice. 
Courage  is  the  mean  between  rashness  and  cowardice ; 
temperance  is  the  mean  between  sensuality  and  as- 
ceticism ;  generosity  is  the  mean  between  avarice  and 
prodigality.  Justice,  finally,  is  the  mean  between  the 
doing  of  wrong  and  the  suffering  of  wrong,  between 
selfishness  and  weakness.  Upon  justice  rests  the 
maintenance  of  the  community.  It  is  therefore  the 
connecting  link  between  ethics  and  politics.  All  the 
passions  tend  toward  excess,  but  guided  by  reason 
they  are  the  springs  that  move  the  world,  the  source 
of  human  greatness. 

Intellectual  virtue  is  prudence,  good  sense,  practical 
wisdom.      It   is   our   duty   to   acquire    knowledge    that 


214 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


.^»o 


knowledge  may  guide  and  mould  our  conduct.  Virtue 
and  insight  condition  each  other;  one  gives  to  the 
will  the  direction  towards  the  good,  the  other  defines 
the  good.  In  intellectual,  or  diancetic  virtue,  ethics 
finds  its  complement  in  philosophy. 

Aristotle's  theory  that  the  distinction  between  virtue 
and  vice  is  merely  quantitative  has  been  greatly  criti- 
cized in  modern  times.  It  contains  truth,  and  expresses 
the  Greek  idea  of  virtue  as  beauty  in  action.  But  it 
leaves  unexpressed  the  law  of  right  binding  on  the 
moral  subject,  the  conception  of  duty.  *^To  some  ex- 
tent this  is  supplied  by  Aristotle's  doctrine  of  the 
telos/'  say  Sir  Alexander  Grant,  **  which  raises  a  beau- 
tiful action  into  something  absolutely  desirable,  and 
makes  it  the  end  of  our  being. ^' 

Another  point  that  has  been  frequently  discussed  in 
Aristotle's  ethics  is  the  relation  of  happiness  to  self- 
consciousness.  The  idea  of  consciousness  is  implied  in 
the  ethical  application  of  energeia  ;  energeia  exists  not 
only  for  the  mind,  but  in  the  mind  ;  it  is  not  only 
life,  but  the  sense  of  life  ;  not  only  thought,  but  the 
consciousness  of  thought.  Nevertheless  we  must  not 
identify  energeia  as  applied  to  the  mind  with  self-con- 
sciousness ;  one  is  an  ancient,  the  other  a  modern  term, 
implying  in  part  but  not  wholly  the  same  idea. 

Aristotle  regards  the  chief  good  as  existing  in  man 
and  for  man,  in  the  development  and  fruition  of  his 
own  powers.  Let  him  ''energize,"  ''actualize''  that 
which  is  potential  or  latent  in  his  own  nature,  and 
the  result  is  happiness.  Virtue  must  be  active,  not 
passive ;    positive,   not    negative.      It    is    the   doing  of 


AKISTOTLE  S   ETHICS. 


215 


^ 


right,  which    is   very   different   from   the  not  doing  of 
wrong. 

The  general  striving  for  pleasure  is  the  impulse  of  life 
itself.  The  nobler  an  activity  the  higher  the  pleasure 
united  with  its  exercise  ;  the  source  of  the  purest  enjoy- 
ment is  thinking  and  moral  action.  Pleasure  is  not  to  be 
the  aim  and  motive  of  our  acts,  but  only  a  result.  It  is 
associated  with  virtue  in  so  far  as  virtuous  activity  is  self- 
satisfaction.  True  self-love  consists  in  striving  to  be  in- 
telligent, loving,  helpful,  in  the  highest  sense.  It  is 
better  to  suffer  than  to  do  injustice,  because  in  one  case 
the  injury  is  external,  in  the  other  internal.  Even  life 
itself  is  but  the  means  to  a  higher  end  when  it  is  sacri- 
ficed by  the  brave  man  for  friends  and  country. 

Pleasure  differs  from  happiness  in  so  far  as  happiness 
is  essentially  moral  and  ideal,  extending  over  an  entire 
life ;  whereas  reality  and  brevity  of  duration  belong  to 
pleasure.  The  one  is  a  blessed  state  of  the  internal  life  ; 
the  other  depends  on  favorable  external  circumstances. 
But  in  so  far  as  pleasure  consists  in  the  exercise  of  the 
highest  faculties  it  is  identical  with  happiness.  For  hap- 
piness is  not  a  means  to  something  else  but  the  end  in 
itself,  the  morally  worthy  in  which  the  mind  rests  self- 
satisfied. 

In  his  classification  of  the  virtues,  Aristotle  omits  the 
Christian  graces,— charity,  humility,  self-renunciation. 
He  separates  ethics  from  religion,  and  does  not  consider 
man's  relation  to  God  except  so  far  as  it  is  included  in 
man's  relation  to  his  fellow-men.  The  highest  virtue  is 
diancetic  rather  than  ethical,  an  excellence  of  the  intel- 
lect to  which  the  doctrine  of  the  mean  is  inapplicable. 


M 


216 


A   STUDY  OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


rrn 


Wisdom  is  what  is  best  and  uoblest,  and  its  attainment  is 
the  supreme  degree  of  felicity. 

Friendship  is  treated  by  Aristotle  as  ''  either  a  virtue, 

or  closely  connected  with  virtue  ;  "  it  is  the  middle  term 

which  leads  from  ethics  to  politics.   ''  Now  to  the  solitary 

individual  life  is  grievous ;  for  it  is  not  easy  to  maintain 

a  glow  of  mind  by  one's  self,  but  in  company  with  some 

one  else,  and  in  relation  to  others,  this  is  easier."    A 

friend  int<!ngiflee  tlie  sense  of   personiil  oxiRtonce.  ihr 

vitnlitj  on  which  hap|)iiK-j5«  depends.      Friendahip  U  the 

bond  that  unites  man  to  man,  not  merely  extenially,  as 

cwnmiinity  of  rights  b<it  in  the  innermoet  e«6nee  of  hU 

bcinj:.      True  friendship  is  wholly  disinterestiHl.      It 

irideiu  the  morality  of  the  individuAl,  but  is  an  anoci- 

ation  limited  by  aocidciital  personal  roUtions.    The  state 

embracoea  larger  circle,  and  heoro  fii^t  in  iU  laws  and  in- 

siitutioTis  morality  liiid*  a  periimncni  basis ;  ethics  rests 

upon  politics. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

ARISTOTLE'S  FOUTICgt,   PHTIX>9K>PHT  OF  ART,   WC. 

THE  state,  according  to  AriKtotU^  is  as  OSMsntial  to 
man^N  vxintcnco  as  t)i€  act  of  birth ;  without  it 
bis  potentiaiitic*  ^«  n  spiritual  being  could  not  bo  real- 
ised. Ho  defines!  uniu  as  a  political  animal,  destined 
bv  nature  for  association  vith  otiicnc.  The  state  is  the 
condition  of  moral  ficrfection ;  it  is  the  moral  irhde 
whoso  hmm  u  ins;  family,  and  thoagh  later  in  temp- 
oral derelopmcnt  is  in  HboK  prior  to  tho  family  and 
tbe  individual,  as  tho  whole  h  prior  to  the  pari.  Cut 
off  from  the  social  oonunnnity  man  is  either  ''a  god 
or  a  bcasf  It  is  the  state  that  reveals  and  actnalises 
his  ott-n  better  self;  it  is  at  once  the  back-ground  and 
the  rsealt  of  his  specbil  activities.  I'olicit:^,  therefore^ 
is  the  indispensable  presupposition  and  completion  of 
sihici. 

The  aim  of  the  state  is  not  merely  the  pbysioal 
welfare  of  its  citiseosy  but  their  vlrtnous  activity  and 
consequent  happiness.  The  state  comprehends  in  itself 
all  monU  aims ;  it  mast  secare  by  its  institutions  tbe 
best  life  for  maD»  and  that  life  is  best  which  utiit<a 
theoretical  and  practical  activity. 

According  to  temporal  origin  tbe  family  must  pre* 
cede  tlie  state  as  the  condition  of  its  begiuuiug.  The 
fiimilf  ezSsta  in  a  thi^eefold  relation^  the  relation  of  bna- 

S17 


218 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


band  to  wife,  of  parents  to  children,  of  master  to  slave. 
Aristotle  treats  marriage  as  a  moral  relation,  but  looks 
upon  the  wife  as  rightly  dependei)t  upon  her  husband, 
becausa  woman  is  inferior  to  man  in  strength  of  char- 
acter. That  is,  he  regards  •  woman  as  passive  rather 
than  active,  and  therefore  inferior  to  man.  She  is  so 
far  free  that  she  has  her  own  domestic  sphere  in  which 
the  husband  must  not  interfere. 

A  relation  of  greater  dependence  is  that  of  children 
to  parents ;  one  of  complete  dependence  is  that  of  slave 
to  master.  Aristotle  regards  slavery  as  necessary  in 
order  to  give  the  master  leisure  to  lead  a  noble  life. 
He  would  base  it  on  superiority  of  virtue  alone.  It  is 
fitting  that  those  who  are  capable  of  spiritual  activity 
should  command  and  guide  those  who  are  not ;  the 
relation  is  beneficial  both  to  master  and  slave.  Aris- 
totle defends  slavery,  but  would  change  its  character. 
Underlying  his  sanction  of  it  as  an  institution  is  the 
idea  that  he  who  is  by  nature  a  slave  will  be  enslaved. 
In  order  to  be  free  man  must  develop  his  own  internal 
activity  and  make  himself  independent  of  everything 
external.  The  political  slave  may  be  the  freeman. 
Aristotle  overlooks  the  truth  that  to  hold  one  in  bond- 
age is  not  to  encourage  the  desire  for  spiritual  growth 
and  excellence.  He  held  that  a  slave  might  earn  his 
freedom  by  showing  himself  worthy  of  it,  and  went  so 
far  practically  as  to  free  his  own  slaves.  But  he  re- 
garded society  without  slavery  something  as  we  should 
view  it  to-day  without  domestic  service.  The  Greek 
thought  did  not  recognize  the  essential  freedom  of  man 
as  man.      It  made  clear  one  side  of  the  truth,  the  ob- 


aristotle's  politics,  etc. 


219 


jective  freedom  of  the  state,   but  neglected  the  other, 
the  subjective  freedom  of   the  individual. 

Aristotle  had  the.  Greek  prejudice  against  trade  and 
traffic.  He  draws  a  sharp  distinction  between  neces- 
sary and  noble  work.  He  asserts  that  commodities  are 
made  for  man,  not  man  for  the  multiplication  of  com- 
modities. He  undervalues  work  for  pecuniary  gain,  and 
does  not  believe  in  lending  money  on  interest. 

Aristotle  does  not  share  Plato's  communistic  views. 
His  arguments  are  nearly  the  same  as  those  of  modern 
opponents.  The  state  like  the  body  of  man  has  many 
members  and  cannot  be  reduced  to  an  unmeaning  unity, 
a  levelling  process  that  in  destroying  difference  would 
destroy  the  organism.  Communism  would  impoverish 
human  life,  render  impossible  those  virtues  which  con- 
sist in  a  right  relation  to  possessions,  rob  men  of  oppor- 
tunities of  virtuous  action,  and  diminish  happiness. 

Aristotle  recognizes  not  only  the  industrial  value  of 
the  institution  of  private  property,  but  the  part  it  plays 
in  the  subjugation  of  nature  by  man.  Considered  as 
representing  this  subjugation  by  free  individuals,  differ- 
ing in  gifts  and  capacities,  or  as  a  means  for  their  ful- 
fillment of  social  functions,  property  must  be  unequal. 
Men  cannot  have  all  things  in  common,  but  they  can 
have  more  in  common  than  at  present.  The  instinct  of 
ownership  is  implanted  by  nature,  but  should  be  tem- 
pered by  liberality  and  benevolence.  The  legislator 
should  seek  to  inspire  the  love  which  is  the  fulfilling 
of  the  law,  but  should  not  take  away  the  freedom  of 
virtuous  action  on  the  part  of  the  individual.  Prof. 
Jowett  has  thrown  the  ancient  thought  into  this  modern 


220 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


ARISTOTLE'S   POLITICS,    ETC. 


221 


form;  *'More  good  will  be  done  by  awakening  in  rich 
men  a  sense  of  the  duties  of  property  than  by  the  viola- 
tion of  its  rights." 

**  We  see  in  this  contrast  to  Platonic  Socialism/'  says 
Zeller,  ''not  only  the  practical  sense  of  Aristotle,  his 
clear  glance  open  to  the  conditions  and  laws  of  reality, 
his  horror  of  all  ethical  one-sidedness,  his  deep  under- 
standing of  human  nature  and  the  life  of  the  state, 
but  also,  as  in  Plato,  the  connection  of  his  political 
views  with  the  metaphysical  basis  of  his  system.''  Plato 
would  have  cancelled  private  possessions  and  destroyed 
individual  interests,  because  he  recognized  the  Idea 
only  in  the  Universal,  the  State  as  the  substance  of  the 
Individual ;  Aristotle,  on  the  other  hand,  regarded  the 
Individual  as  essentially  the  Universal.  The  activity 
which  seeks  the  welfare  of  the  state  must  proceed  from 
individuals  and  their  free  will ;  only  from  within  through 
culture  and  education,  not  from  without  through  com- 
pulsory institutions  of  Socialism  or  Communism,  can 
the  life  of  the  state  be  maintained  and  jireserved. 

Aristotle's  ideal  state  is  an  organism  of  limited  size, 
a  body  of  men  not  too  large  nor  too  small,  able  to  rule 
and  be  ruled  wuth  a  view  to  the  common  advantage, 
the  realization  of  the  highest  type  of  life.  Every  citizen 
is  to  be  a  landowner,  but  no  great  accumulation  of 
property  is  to  be  allowed.  The  essential  aim  of  the 
state  is  the  moral  perfection  of  its  citizens,  whose  result 
is  happiness.  Those  who  contribute  to  this  most  have 
the  justest  claim  to  political  influence.  With  the  Greek 
scorn  of  manual  labor  and  trade,  agriculturists,  artisans, 
and  tradesmen  are  excluded  from  the  rights  and  duties 


of  citizenship.  The  attainment  of  virtue  and  happiness 
by  the  higher  natures  has  its  accompanying  shadow ; 
it  implies  the  existence  and  recognized  inferiority  of 
the  lower.  Only  the  few  inherit  the  earth,  but  the 
condition  of  this  inheritance  with  Aristotle  is  an  active 
life  of  moral  and  intellectual  greatness.  So  far  as  any 
individual  or  class  of  citizens  contribute  to  the  existence 
of  the  state  and  the  common  good  of  the  whole,  just 
so  far  should  their  influence  extend.  The  few  are  to 
elevate  the  masses,  and  develop  in  all  the  best  type  of 
life  of  which  they  are  capable. 

The  state  is  both  an  outcome  of  the  past  and  a  re- 
flection of  the  present ;  its  constitution  is  its  mode  of 
life,  varying  with  varying  circumstances,  but  exerting 
always  an  ethical  influence  over  character.  The  hap- 
piness which  is  its  aim  consists  essentially  in  the 
virtue  of  its  citizens,  a  work  of  conscious  activity,  of 
free-will  and  of  insight.  The  state  must  therefore 
educate  its  citizens,  men  must  be  formed  who  know 
how  to  exercise  the  virtue  of  the  free.  Education 
must  develop  the  whole  man,  physical,  intellectual, 
moral.  Its  aim  should  be  spiritual  rather  than 
material,  culture  rather  than  utility;  the  development 
of  the  lower  nature  should  be  adjusted  to  the  ultimate 
development  of  that  which  is  highest  in  man.  Educa- 
tion must  tend  not  only  towards  practical  activity,  but 
to  a  right  use  of  leisure.  Some  things  are  to  be 
learned  for  practical  activity ;  others  on  their  own 
account.  The  one  has  an  aim  outside  of  itself  in 
something  to  be  attained  ;  the  other  in  its  exercise  is 
a  beautiful  and  satisfying  activity.     To  be  always  seek- 


232 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


ing  the  useful  does  not  become  free  and  exalted 
minds.  Both  Plato  and  Aristotle  believe  that  school 
is  the  place  for  inspiring  a  love  of  all  that  is  noble 
and  beautiful  rather  than  for  pouring  in  knowledge. 
Let  one  first  learn  to  love  what  is  right,  then  learn 
why  it  is  right.  Aristotle  declines  to  give  a  direct 
training  to  the  intellect  until  he  has  first  laid  a 
solid  foundation  of  character.  He  postpones  the  ap- 
peal to  reason  that  it  may  be  the  more  effectual 
when  it  is  made.  To  be  educated  in  the  best  sense 
is  to  be  rational. 

Greek  education  differed  from  modern  education 
in  placing  a  higher  value  on  a  general  aptitude  of 
knowing,  an  interest  in  human  relations  generally, 
than  on  special  acquirements  which  may  be  one- 
sided and  tend  towards  work  in  a  groove.  Gymnas- 
tics, music  and  literature  were  its  chief  branches. 
The  aim  of  gymnastics  with  Aristotle  was  not  so  much 
technical  skill  as  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  har- 
moniously developed  being,  healthy  and  undisturbed 
in  body  and  mind.  So,  too,  with  music;  its  chief 
value  for  Aristotle  was  its  power  to  influence  the 
character  and  mould  it  to  virtue.  Music  inclines  the 
child  through  his  emotions  to  take  pleasure  in  the 
good,  and  to  reject  what  is  evil,  disposing  the  soul 
to  virtue.  For  we  are  not  really  virtuous,  according 
to  Aristotle,   until   we  love   virtue  for  its    own    sake. 

The  high  place  assigned  to  music  by  the  Greeks 
is  one  that  we  can  only  partly  comprehend  ;  to  their 
thought  it  produced  an  elevation  of  the  soul  by 
harmonizing  all  its  discordant  elements.     Through  its 


I 

1 


ARISTOTLE'S   POLITICS,    ETC. 


223 


influence  man  was  lifted  above  himself,  and  ''  caught 
up  into  a  sort  of  heaven/'  There  must  have  been 
in  Greek  music  some  spiritual  union  of  mind  and 
sense  which  found  a  way  to  the  inner  place  of  the 
soul,   experienced    by  us  only   in   rare   moments. 

The  aim   of  Aristotle's    education   is  to   develop    a 
many-sided     moral    being,     capable    of    fulfilling     the 
duties  of  the  perfect  citizen,   and   of    playing    differ- 
ent parts,  as    soldier,   statesman,    judge,    philosopher. 
Not  wise  laws,    but   wise    men,   are    the    basis   of  his 
state;    men   who   will    always  prefer   virtue   to  wealth 
and   distinction.      The   best  state   is  a  brotherhood    of 
men,  limited   it   is  true  to  a  few   chosen  ones  of  the 
Greek   race,   but  animated    by    the    noble    purpose  of 
living  and   helping    each   other  to  live   a  life  of  vir- 
tue.    Man   must  join    with   his    fellows    and    live    for 
their  welfare  ^  well   as   his  own   in   order  to    realize 
himself  as  a    spiritual    being.      Society    must  elevate 
and    ennoble,    not    warp    and    distort    the    individual. 
For  this   the    state    exists,   and    not    for    empire    or 
wealth.     Its  end   is  spiritual,  not  material.      Men  are 
always  losing  sight  of  the  true  and   the  good  in  the 
pursuit    of    material    interest.     To    correct   this  tend- 
ency,   ethics    must    be    infused    into     politics.       The 
ultimate    identification   of    the    two    by    the    greatest 
thinkers  of  Greece,   is  a  truth  to  be    constantly    en- 
forced. 

PHILOSOPHY   OF    ART. 

Aristotle's  theory  of  art  is  found  in  his  Poetics,  a 
little  work  devoted  chiefly  to  the  discussion  of  trag- 
edy.    He  places  art  as  a  means  of  spiritual  enjoyment 


224  A   STUDY   OF   GRKKK    Pill  I.OflOPU  Y. 

in  the  most  intimate  connection  with    spiritual   devel- 
opment.    The  aim   of  tragedy    i«    to  purify   thcomo- 
tions  of  pity  and  fear,  to    make   men    «ee    hfe    m  lU 
true  light.     Purification  (KatharKlH)  is  a  quieting  pro- 
duced    through    excitement,    a    homa^opathic    heahng. 
How  is  it  effected  ?    Not  u«   in    real    lifo.  where    the 
single  thing   ruled    by    accident   is    placcxl    before   the 
cTt^  but  by  showing  ub  the  iiniv.r«il    in    the  emgle. 
the  common  human  lot  guided  by  the  law  of  ^n^\ 
jutlice.    The  f«le  in  trag^y  mn«t  be  wlf-dewrwl ;  a 
work  of  art  muKl  diwlow  the  unchanging  order  of  Uw 
moral  unit^wo.    In  thi«  liw  it*  power  to  purge  the 
miwl  of  Uie   wiittiouB,    -  enabUng   iib   to   iee  nmlllj 
truly  and  correctly."  comprdwDding  iia  apiritual    pur- 
poeo  and  rigmficaiH>e. 

TUR  PERIPATETIC^  S<:U00L. 

Theophr^MuB,  F.tKlemuB  and   Slrabo  are   thf J»<;*^ 
£amou«  lenders  of    the  •diool  of  Ari^le,    billed  the 
PerinatMic.      Theophrautus    waa    bU    immodiaU>   snc- 
«flsor,  but  m^B  like  tho  other,  to   have   been   htt^e 
more  than  a  commentator.       There  wt  so  much  to 
oxponud  and  elaborate  in  Ariatotle'e  syitem  of  thonght 
thaT  we  find  in  his  di^iplcti  a  Uck  of  iudependeni  re- 
«arch  and  origiiu^Uty.    Their  work,  therefore,  w  of  but 
gliirht  importance.    The  eaHy  loa  of  Aristotle',   writ- 
ings may  have  led  to  their  mUinterpreiation ;  ranoas 
Ibeories,    incon«iatent    with  their  siwrit,  were  handed 
down  tiaditioiwlly. 


CIIAI>TER  XXX. 

TKAXSITIOK  TO  THK   POftT-Altl.STOTKLIAX   PHILOBOF'RT. 

ARLSTOTLE  was  both  a  Bclentist  iui<i  a  philcao. 
pher.  He  therefore  aought  in  hl»  system  of 
thought  to  unite  t)u«  iiioet  cum]>rehenaiT€  obeenation 
witli  the  dialectic  dcTelopment  of  tho  oonoepU  The 
school  of  Socratee  and  Plato  neglocted  the  outer  world 
of  experience  for  the  inner  world  of  thought;  Aria- 
totle  reoogniied  tiiat  tliought  is  not  independent  of 
experience,  altliough  it  is  that  onlj  which  is  known, 
the  enence^  the  form  of  things,  their  immanient  idea. 
Hid  gystem  thtii;  completes  and  contradiota  tho  Platonic, 
as  Zctller  obsarres ;  completes  it  in  so  far  as  be  main- 
tains the  reality  of  thought  alone»  oontmltots  it  in  eo 
far  as  ho  places  its  activity  within  and  not  outside  of 
matter.  Matter  is  the  not-yet-bftng  of  form,  the  pcteii* 
tial;  fonn  is  the  actual.  Tlie  relation  Mween  the  two 
is  positive  instead  of  negative,  prxxluoiog  motion  and 
life^  liecoming  and  obange.  Tho  presupposition  of 
this  rotation  is  pore  form,  a  self-morrr,  seli-lhiuk- 
ing  Reason. 

Gn^rk  philoeopbj  reaches  its  cnlminatuig  point  in 
tbe  clear  enunciation  of  thiM  principle,  although  it 
is  Do4  able  to  eecape  dualism  in  its  application.  How 
is  matter,  the  potential,  derived  from  and  related  to 
pure  form,  pare  actuality,  purs  thou{[ht?    How  oan 


226 


A   STUDY    OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


the  circle  of  the  known  world  of  experience  be 
explained  and  comprehended  as  an  organization  of 
self-thinking  thought  ?    This  is  the  problem. 

The  idea  with  Aristotle  is  thought  as  the  unity  of  the 
subjective  and  the  objective,  the  true  universal.  But  it 
is  applied  dogmatically  in  the  systems  of  Stoicism  and 
Epicureanism ;  sceptically,  in  Scepticism  and  the  New 
Academy;  mystically,  in  Neo-Platonism.  All  these 
systems  neglect  the  objective  and  emphasize  the  sub- 
jective. The  essential  being  of  man,  according  to 
Aristotle,  is  reason  ;  its  highest  activity  is  pure  thinking, 
which  turns  away  from  everything  external  to  employ 
itself  with  concepts  alone.  It  is  only  a  step  farther  in 
this  direction  to  turn  away  entirely  from  the  external 
world  to  the  internal  world  of  consciousness.  This  step 
was  taken  by  the  post- Aristotelians  ;  with  all  their  con- 
tradictions they  agree  in  this  common  feature  of  abstract 
subjectivity.  The  Stoics,  the  Epicureans,  and  the 
Sceptics  all  agree  in  preferring  the  practical  to  the 
theoretical  interest,  and  in  seeking  its  satisfaction  in 
mental  serenity  and  independence. 

The  philosophy  of  Greece  was  closely  connected  with 
her  political  life.  Nothing  remained  after  her  loss  of 
independence  but  to  oppose  one's  inner  self  to  her  hope- 
less condition  and  seek  contentment  in  the  recesses  of  the 
soul.  The  need  of  the  time  was  not  so  much  theoretical 
knowing  as  moral  strength.  The  apathy  of  the  Stoics, 
the  self-contentment  of  the  Epicureans,  the  equanimity 
of  the  Sceptics,  reflected  the  spirit  of  the  age.  When, 
too,  the  barriers  were  broken  down  that  separated  the 
West  from  the  East,  the  Greek  from  the  barbarian,  man 


POST-ARISTOTELIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


227 


became  conscious  that  moral  life  is  a  relation  of  man  to 
man  independent  of  nationality,  and  this  consciousness 
found  expression  in  philosophy. 

The  deepening  of  self-consciousness,  characteristic  of 
post-Aristotelian  philosophy,  is  expressed  one-sidedly  as 
the  abstract  universality  of  thought— Stoicism,  or  as  the 
abstract  individuality  of  feeling— Epicureanism,  or  as  the 
negation  of  this  one-sidedness— Scepticism.  Stoicism 
seeks  happiness  by  suppressing  all  selfish  feelings  and 
inclinations,  subordinating  the  individual  to  the  law  of 
the  whole  ;  Epicureanism,  in  the  absence  of  suffering, 
painlessness,  imperturbability.  Finally,  Scepticism  con- 
cludes from  the  contradictory  systems  of  thought  that 
knowledge  is  impossible,  and  deduces  from  this  conclu- 
sion serene  indifference  towards  everything.  All  three 
strive  towards  tlie  same  end,  though  in  different  ways ; 
the  internal  freedom  of  self -consciousness,  imperturba- 
bility of  spirit,   abstract   independence. 

Transplanted  to  Roman  soil  in  the  first  century  B.C., 
Greek  philosophy,  especially  Stoicism  and  Epicureanism, 
found  many  adherents.  Touched  by  the  Roman  breadth 
of  empire  and  the  Roman  spirit,  it  became  eclectic  in 
character,  and  wholly  practical  in  its  aim.  The  Roman 
world  was  the  world  of  abstraction,  crushing  out  and 
deadening  all  spiritual  beauty  and  spontaneity.  Hence 
its  need  in  philosophy  to  tear  itself  loose  from  the  external 
and  find  within  the  soul  the  freedom  it  could  not  other- 
wise enjoy. 

In  Alexandria,  the  West  and  the  East  touched  each 
other  in  deep  and  lasting  contact.  Here  Greek  phil- 
osophy came  to  a  close  in  Neo-Platonism— a  final  attempt 


228 


A  STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


to  solve  the  dualism  between  the  subjective  and  the  ob- 
jective. Neo-Platonism  with  all  its  differences  bears  the 
same  character  of  subjectivity  as  the  earlier  systems  of 
Stoicism,  Epicureanism,  and  Scepticism.  Its  great  aim 
is  to  mediate  between  God  and  man,  to  exalt  the  indivi- 
dual subject  to  the  Absolute  Subject,  not  through  knowl- 
edge, but  through  ecstasy — a  divine  illumination  of  the 
soul. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 


STOICISM. 


ZENO,  the  founder  of  the  Stoic  School,  was  born 
about  the  year  340  B.  C,  in  Citium,  a  town  of  Asia 
Minor.  His  father  was  a  Phoenician  merchant  who  in 
his  frequent  trips  to  Athens  collected  a  large  number 
of  the  writings  of  the  philosophers,  especially  of  the 
Socratists.  Their  perusal  awakened  in  Zeno  the  love  of 
knowledge,  and  the  resolve  to  dedicate  his  life  to  its 
pursuit.  It  is  said  that  the  loss  of  his  worldly  goods  in 
a  shipwreck  turned  his  activity  from  commerce  to  phil- 
osophy, but  his  character  and  life  prove  that  inward 
inclination  had  more  to  do  with  it  than  outward  acci- 
dent. He  removed  to  Athens  and  received  instruction 
from  Xenocrates,  from  Crates  the  Cynic,  from  Stilpo 
the  Megaric,  and  from  Polemo  the  Academic.  After 
studying  and  listening  to  others  for  twenty  years  he 
opened  a  school-  of  his  own  in  the  Stoa  Poecile,  a  por- 
tico adorned  with  paintings  of  Polygnotus,  whence  the 
name  **  Philosophers  of  the  Porch,"  or  '*  Stoics."  He 
taught  here  for  fifty-eight  years,  and  then  in  undis- 
turbed health  ended  his  life  voluntarily.  He  was  greatly 
honored  by  the  Athenians  for  his  simplicity  and  tem- 
perance and  the  strictness  of  his  morality.  On  the 
monument  to  his  memory,  erected  at  public  expense,  was 
this  inscription  :  *'  His  life  corresponded  to  his  precepts." 


i^ 


229 


230 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


Zeno's  successor  in  the  Stoa  was  Cleanthes,  a  native 
of  Asia  Minor.  When  summoned  by  the  Athenian  court 
to  give  an  account  of  his  manner  of  life,  he  testified 
that  he  carried  water  for  a  gardener  nightly  that  he 
might  devote  his  days  to  the  study  of  philosophy. 

Cleanthes  was  followed  by  Chrysippus  of  Cilicia,  who 
is  sometimes  considered  the  second  founder  of  Stoic 
philosophy,  because  he  so  elaborated  and  extended  its 
doctrines.  He  is  said  to  have  written  daily  five  hun- 
dred lines  and  to  have  composed  seven  hundred  and 
five  books.  This  is  not  so  wonderful  as  it  seems  when 
we  consider  that  his  works  were  partly  compilations  and 
repetitions  of  doctrines  previously  enunciated.  Not  a 
single  one  remains,  but  it  would  be  hard  to  choose 
between  their  utter  loss  and  the  preservation  of  all. 

Other  celebrated  Stoics  are  Zeno  of  Tarsus,  Diogenes 
the  Babylonian,  Posidonius  of  Rhodes,  and  Pan^tius, 
the  principal  disseminator  of  Stoicism  in  Rome.  These 
later  teachers  blended  other  doctrines  with  their  Stoic- 
ism, and  proceeded  eclectically.  The  most  celebrated 
Roman  Stoics  are  Seneca,  the  slave  Epictetus  of  Phry- 
gia,  and  the  Emperor  Marcus  Aurelius. 

The  essential  aim  of  philosophy  with  the  Stoics 
IS  the^exercise,  the  learning  of  virtue.  The  centre  of 
human  activity  and  striving  is  the  moral  life.  Physics, 
according  to  Chrysippus,  is  only  necessary  because  it 
gives  us  a  means  of  deciding  concerning  good  and  evil, 
what  we  shall  do  and  what  we  shall  avoid.  Philosophy 
is  itself  a  virtue  and  guides  us  to  right  acting.  The 
virtuous  man  is  he  who  subordinates  himself  to  the  laws 
of  the  universe.     To  do  this  he  must  know  the  laws; 


STOICISM. 


231 


virtue  is  knowledge  with  the  Stoics,  as  with  Socrates. 
They  insist  on  strength  of  will,  but  strength  of  will  is 
inseparably  united  with  right  knowledge.  Philosophy 
is  in  the  closest  union  with  practical  life  ;  it  is  not  merely 
a  virtue,  but  without  it  virtue  is  impossible. 

The  Stoics  divide  philosophy  into  logic,  physics,  and 
ethics.  Logic  is  an  outwork  of  the  system,  the  method 
for  attaining  true  knowledge.  Ethics  is  the  final  aim 
of  philosophic  activity,  the  guidance  to  virtue ;  but 
virtue  consists  in  subordinating  one's  self  to  the  eternal 
order  of  the  universe,  investigated  by  physics.  The 
study  of  physics  or  logic,  outside  of  their  significance  for 
ethics,  is  superfluous. 

THE   LOGIC   OF  THE   STOICS. 

The  Stoics  regard  sensuous  perception  as  the  original 
source  of  all  our  knowledge  ;  the  soul  is  a  blank  until 
written  upon  by  impressions  from  the  outside  world. 
Sensuous  perception  of  itself  is  not  knowledge  ;  to  it 
must  be  added  the  activity  of  the  understanding.  But 
the  understanding  has  no  other  matter  except  that  which 
is  given  to  it  by  sensuous  perception.  Zeno  compared 
sensation  to  the  outstretched  fingers  ;  assent,  as  the  first 
mental  activity,  to  the  closed  hand;  conception  to  the 
fist;  and  knowledge  to  one  fist  firmly  grasped  by  the 
other.  The^difference  between  .sansation  and  knowledge 
is  in  the  greater  or  less  strength  of  conviction7~Tt  is 
merely  subjective  and  gradual^-one  of  degree^  not  of  kind. 

The  bulwark  against  doubt  is  practi€al  need  ;  knowl- 
edge must  be  possible,  or  man  could  not  act  morally. 
The  criterion  of  truth  is  the  concept  which  produces  in 
the    mind    immediate    certainty  of    its  correspondence 


232 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


and  identity  with  the  object.  Hegel  praises  the  insight 
of  the  Stoics,  the  witness  of  the  subjective  reason  to 
the  objective  reasonableness  of  the  world.  But  he  finds 
the  unity  which  it  expresses  merely  formal  because  it 
does  not  contain  difference  as  well  as  identity.  The  true 
criterion  is  thought  as  self-determination,  developing 
and  at  the  same  time  annulling  its  own  antithesis  of 
subjective  and  objective. 

The  Stoics  contradict  themselves — seeking  on  the 
one  hand  a  solid  basis  for  a  scientific  process  of  proof, 
and  on  the  other  turning  to  the  immediate,  the  sensu- 
ous, as  the  ground  of  certainty.  They  lose  sight  of 
the  especial  problem  of  logic — an  exposition  of  the  real 
laws  and  operations  of  thought — to  busy  themselves 
with  empty  forms  and  abstractions.  The  chief  value  of 
their  work  lies  in  their  recognition  of  the  principle  that 
the  universal  as  thought  is  the  true  universal,  although 
they  are  not  able  to  show  its  self-separation  and  self- 
identification  in  the  particular  and  the  individual. 

THE   PHYSICS  OF  THE   STOICS. 

The  Stoics  assert  that  nothing  exists  except  the 
corporeal,  widening  its  concept  so  as  to  include  the 
soul,  virtue,  truth,  God.  According  to  Plato  a  man 
is  just  when  he  participates  in  the  idea  of  justice ; 
according  to  the  Stoics  a  man  is  just  when  he  has 
in  him  the  material  producing  justice.  This  mater- 
ialism is  not  wholly  consistent  inasmuch  as  they  do 
not  deny  the  existence  and  incorporeality  of  thought, 
or  space,  or  time.  It  seems  foreign  to  the  ideal 
moral  tendencies  of  their  philosophy,  but  is  never- 
theless grounded. m  its  practical  character. 


STOICISM. 


233 


Their  point  of  view  is  that  of  ordinary  common 
gense  which  knows  of  nothing  real  except  the  sensible 
and  the  corporeal.  JVVhat  they  seek  tQ_  discover  is  a 
fi^'basis  foj:  humanactivity.  In  actiqn_man  is  brought 
intq_direct  contact  with  the  external  world,  and  its 
existence  is  taken  for  granted.  Hence  the  Stoics  in- 
fer" that  the_onlx_reality  is  that  which  acts  upon  us 
or"^  acted  _upon  by  us,  the  corporeal.  It  follows 
from  this  that  the  individual  perception  is  alone  true; 
and  yet  the__Stoics  inconsistently  ascribe  higher  truth 
to  the  general  concept. 

Their  view  of  nature  isdynamic^ They   separate 

the  moment  of  activity  from  that  of  passivity;  the 
concept  of  force  is  higher  than  that  of  matter. 
Matter  alolie  is  real,  but- 4ha^oh^racteri stir,  of  reality, 
is  causation,  capacity  to  act  and  be  acted  upon. 
Matter  cannot  move  except  as  it  is  penetrated  by 
force  ;  force  is  the  energy  of  God,  the  soul  of  the 
world.  Matter  and  force,Jhe  pasdye^^nd  the  active, 
are  manifestafions  of  one  and  the  same  Being.  The 
second  is  not  independent  of  the  first  as  with  Aris- 
totle, but  the  two  are  inseparable.  God  and  the 
world  are  identical ;  the  world  is  God,  God  is  the 
world.  The  Stoics  will  not  admit  any  distinction 
between  the~two,  hence  their  pantheism.  The  spiritual 
to  them  is  always  clothed  in  the  sensuous;  God  is 
represented  ideally  as  the  Providence  of  the  world, 
carmg  for~air  his  creatures  ;  as  the  perfect,  gracious, 
all-Tfnowing  Reason,  living  a  life  of  eternal  blessed- 
ness;  but  he  is  also  Fire,  Ether,  Air,  the  Breath, 
Nature,    Destiny,    the    Whole    and    the    Law   of    the 


234 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


\ 


Whole.  He  is  the  Universal  Substance  changing  into 
definite  forms  of  matter,  whose  divine  life  is  an 
eternal  circular  process,  flowing  out  into  the  world 
to  return  into  itself  again.  However  regarded,  as  in- 
cluding everything  or  but  a  part  of  real  existence, 
He  is  indissolubly  united  with  the  corporeal. 

Following  Heraclitus  the  Stoics  believed  that  the 
world  originated  from  primitive  fire,  changing  into 
air,  then  into  earth  and  water.  Everything  results 
from  a  natural  and  inflexible  connection  of.  causes  and 
effects,  otherwise  the  Divine  Force  that  rules  the 
world  would  not  be  its  Absolute  Cause.  This  necessity 
as  the  law  of  Nature  is  Destiny  ;  as  the  ground  of 
development  according  to  design.  Providence.  Matter 
is  in  constant  transition,  but  the  law  within  it^  its 
formative  energy,  never^  changes.  This  energy,  this 
divine  activity,  is  directed  immediately  to  the  whole; 
mediately  to  the  individual,  a  part  of  the  whole. 

The  Stoics  affirm  a  certain  freedom  of^_the  will, 
although  according  to  their  theory  the  actions  and 
destinies  of  men  must  be  predetermined.  The  law  that 
works  in  the  whole  works  differently  according  as  its 
material  is  inorganic,  or  organic,  or  intelligent  and 
reasonable.  Our  action  may  be  due  to  our  own  im- 
pulse and  decision,  although  determined  by  forces 
that  lie  in  the  nature  of  the  universe  and  of  our 
character.  It  is  so  far  free  as  it  springs  from  our 
will  co-operating  with  external  causes ;  upon  this  de- 
pends moral  responsibility.  The  soul  cannot  escape 
the  divine  law  of  its  being ;  its  freedom  consists  in  be- 
ing determined,   not  from    without    but   from   within. 


STOICISM. 


235 


through  its  own  nature.  It  is  the  soul  itself  that  turns 
to  truth  orerror ;  intellectual  conviction  as  well  as 
moral  action  result  from  and  are  due  to  the  exercise  of 
our  will.  What  proceeds  from  my  will  is  my  deed, 
whether  it  is  or  is  liot  possible  for  me  to  think  and 
act  differently.  I  can  obey  the  law  of  the_  whole  wiU- 
ingly  or  unwillingly,  freely  or  under  compulsion. 

The"  whole  is  perfect ;  whence  come  imperfection 
and  evIlT'The  Hfoicslike  ofher  philosophers  find  their 
justification  difficult.  Moral  evil  is  the  only  real  evil, 
and  ^8  referred  to  a  necessity  of  human  nature  which 
in  order  to  be  human  could  not  be  created  differently. 
Evil  will  in  the  long  run  be  turned  to  good,  on  whose  ac- 
count it  exists  as  a  means  of  development  and  realization. 

The  human  soul  is  described  as  vital  warmth  dif- 
fused throughout  the  body  which  it  sustains  and 
holds  together.  It  is  related  to  the  soul  of  the  world 
as  the  part  to  the  whole,  and  will  be  absorbed  into 
the  Universal  Reason,  of  which  it  is  a  dependent  por- 
tion, at  the  end  of  the  world-process. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  how  a  philosophy 
like  Stoicism,  whqse^  chief  characterisjic  is  its  moral 
tendency,  could  deny  the  freedom  of  the  will  and  ^l 
tiie  immortality  of  the  soul.  But  the  same  position 
is  taken  by  a  great  modern  thinker,  Spinoza.  Doubtless 
they  discerned  some  kind  of  unity  underneath  the 
contradictory  aspects  which  the  problem  presents  to 
our  limited   vision. 

THE   ETHICS   OF  THE   STOICS. 

The  central  point  of  Stoicism  and  its  chief  glory 
is  ethics.    The  highest  good  cm  only  be  found  in  that 


236 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


which  is  conformable  to  nature,  and  notjjiing  Jfi  conform- 
able to  nature  unless  it  is  in  harmony  with  the  law  of 
the  universe,  its  divine  reason.  The  reason  in  man 
must  consciously  cooperate  with  this  law,  must  trans- 
form into  final  cause  what  is  only  impulse  with  the 
animal,  the  impulse  of  self-preservation.  To  live  in 
harmony  with  nature  is  to  live  reasonably,  according  to 
the  Stoics.  Rational  activity  is  virtue  and  happiness. 
Happiness  consists  exclusively  in  virtue ;  the  good  and 
the  useful  coincide  with  duty  and  reason.  The  thought 
that  in  moral  activity  I  recognize  myself  as  a  conscious 
intelligence  obeying  the  divine  intelligence  of  the  uni- 
verse exalts  human  personality  to  its  supremest  height. 
The  human  will  is  deified  in  its  identification  with 
universal  law  through  self-conscious  obedience. 

The  activity  of  man  is  directed  to  the  individual, 
the  particular;  but  to  make  these  its  final  aim  is  to  con- 
tradict its  divine  nature.  The  individual  and  the  par- 
ticular must  be  subordinated  to  the  universal ;  appetite 
and  emotion  must  be  subordinated  to  reason.  It  is  the 
gioryof  the  Stoics,  the  source  of  their  moral  energy 
and  austerity,  that  they  hold^  strictly  to  the  universal ; 
that  they  define  it  abstractly  is  a  defect  and  shortcom- 
ing. There  is  a  sense  in  which  reason,  virtue  and 
happiness  are  identical;  but  there  is  also  a  sense  in 
which  they  differ,  and  this  the  Stoics  disregard. 

What  is  not  good  in  and  for  itself  is  not  good  at 
all.  It  may  be  simply Jnd iff erent,  something  that  can 
be  used  either  for  good  or  evil,  as  health,  richej,  honor, 
life  itself.  Pleasure  is  not  a  good  ;  to  make  it  the  aim 
oTiife  fs  to  turn  aside  from  reason,  virtue,  and  hap- 


STOICISM. 


237 


piness.  It  is  no  proof  to  the  contrary  that  peace  of 
mind  follows  moral  conduct,  and  inner  dissatisfaction 
its  opposite.  Pleasure  is  noi  the  aim,  but  a  result  of 
moral  activity,  different^ Jrom  .virtue_  in. jessence  and 
kind.  *'We  do  not  love  virtue  because^Jt  gives  us 
pleasure,"  says  Seneca,  **but  it  gives  us  pleasure  be- 
cause we  love  it."  And  again:  *' In  doing  good  man 
should   be  like  the    vine  which  has  produced  grapes, 

and  asks  for  nothing  more To  ask  to  be 

paid  for  virtue  is  as  if  the  eye  demanded  a  recompense 
for  seeing,  or  the  feet  for  walking."  Pleasure  in  its 
very  nature  is  perishable  ;  virtue  is  enduring  and  eternal. 
Pleasure  is  dependent  on  something  external  to  itself  ; 
virtue  is  independent,  its  reward  lies  in  its  own  nature, 
Tt  possesses  in  itself  every  condition  of  happiness.  But 
happiness  with  the  Stoics  is  negative  in  so  far  as  it  is 
freedom  from  disturbance,  mental  tranquillity  rather 
than  positive  enjoyment. 

Grounded  in  the  universal  order  of  the  world,  virtue 
opposes  man  as  law,  but  as  the  law  of  his  own  being 
and  its  final  cause.  Obedience  to  law  is  imposed  upon 
him  by  his  own  inmost  self.  His  recognition  of  the 
reason  within  him  is  his  recognition  of  moral  respon- 
^iHty.  The  good  alone  is  worth  striving  for,  it  is 
that  to  which  he  naturally  aspires.  Were  he  purely 
rational  no  struggle  would  be  required  for  its  achieve- 
ment. But  he  is  not,  he  possesses  emotions  and  passions 
contrary  to  nature  and  reason.  Their  source  is  false 
opinion.  From  an  irrational  view  of  what  is  good  arise 
pleasure  and  desire,  one  referring  to  the  present,  the 
other  to  the  future;  in   the  same  way   care   and  fear 


I 


'r 


238 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


spring  from  an  irrational  view  of  what  is  evil.  True 
virtue  consists  in  their  complete  subjugation  and  sup- 
pression. The  wise  man  will  be  free  from  pleasure  and 
pain,  from  desire  and  fear ]_he  will  feel  no  joy,  no 
suffering,  no  pity.  Virtue  as  this  negative  ideal  is 
apathy  rather  than  rational  activity  ;  the  universal  is 
seTzed^aEstractly  and  contradicts  itself.  The^motional 
life  of  man  belongs  to  the  side  of  his  separate  existence ; 
to  ignore  it  is  to  lose  sight  of  his  humanity. 

But  for  all  its  abstractness  the  grandeur  of  the  Stoic 
principle  is  not  to  be  disputed.  Stoicism  was  a  system 
of  discipline,  restraining  the  pas^iimfi_.^aiid  emotions, 
dignifying  and  strengthening  the  _will.  Man  was  to 
seek  and  find  within  himself  freedom^  and  independence, 
In  the  will  to  be  virtuous.  Suffering  was  no  evil  be- 
-cause  it  could  not  penetrate  to  this  stronghold  ;  even 
though  it  might  be  felt,  it  could  not  disturb  his  jn- 
ward  p^eace_and^  harmony.  This  was  happiness,  a  per- 
manent condition  of  the  soul. 

AiJisl^Ml-*^^^^^^^  reason,  virtue  is  tiised  upon  knowl- 
edge. The  only  guide  to  virtue  is^knowledge ;  the 
only  aim  of  knowledge  is  rational  action.  Neither  can 
be  conceived  without  the  other.  Virtue  can  be  taught, 
but  it  can  never  be  attained  by  mere  exercise  or  habit. 
It  lies  wholly  in  the  in.tentionj__the  will  to_j)erform  a 
good  action  is  worth  as  much  as  its  execution.  An 
evil  desire  is  evil  though  it  may  not  be  gratified.  Virtue 
does  not  admit  of  degrees ;  we  have  it  wholly,  or  not 
at  all.  '^In  order  to  drown  it  is  not  necessary  to  be 
five  hundred  leagues  under  water  ;  an  ell  is  sufficient.'' 

Who,  then  is  virtuous  ?    The  ideal  wise  man,  say  the 


STOICISM. 


239 


Stoics,   landing  us  in   another   paradoxical  abstraction  ; 

the  rest   of    the  world  are  fgols.       The  wise  man is 

absolutely  good  ;  he  who  lacks  wisdom  is  absolutely  evil. 
To  pass  from  folly  to  wisdom  is  instantaneous  conver-  \ 
sion. 

Practically,  the  Stoics  were  obliged  to  deviate  from 
this  rigid  ideal  in  the  direction  of  the  ordinary  view 
of  life,  admitting  relative  as  well  as  absolute  good.  But 
as  expressing  their  philosophy,  it  has  a  peculiar  signifi- 
cance. Ilegel  explains  it  as  the  will  of  the  subject  that 
wills  itself  only  as  the  good  because  it  is  good,  wills  its 
own  freedom,  and  as  the  inner  consciousness  withdrawn 
into  itself  is  wholly  separated  from  and  unmoved  by  the 
external.  It  is  a  personal  ideal  because  virtue  to  the 
Stoics  consists  in  the  preservation  and  maintenance  of 
self-consciousness  as  reason.  The  one  is  defined  by  the 
other,  and  there  is  no  way  out  of  the  circle.  ''The 
goodness  of  man  lies  in  devotion  to  the  ideal  of 
humanity,"  says  Prof.  T.  H.  Green,  '*  and  the  ideal 
of  humanity  consists  in  the  goodness  of  man.'' 

Virtue  is  tje^  moral  essence  of  the_indiYiduaL  but 
of  the  individual  conscious  of  self  as  universal  reason. 
This  is  the  truth  of  Stoic  morality.  Self-consciousness 
reaches  the  negative  moment  of  abstraction  from  real 
existence,  comprehending  its  own  essence  as  reason 
and  therefore  freedom,  giving  up  everything  but 
preserving  itself  in  this  surrender  by  making  it  volun- 
tary— an  act  of  self-conscious  intelligence.  The  sub- 
jective becomes  the  objective,  but  the  Stoics  compre- 
hend the  two  merely  as  self-identity,  not  as  self- 
distinction  and  self-determination  in  a  concrete  world 


240 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


of  real  existence.     The  ideal  wise  man  is  released  from 


every  sensuous  limitation ;  ''he  is  free  even  in  fetters, 
for  he  acts  from  himself,  unmoved  by  fear  or  desire. '^ 
'*He  alone  is  king,  for  he  owes  allegiance  to  no  one 
but  himself,  and  is  not  bound  by  the  laws."  Whatever 
he  does  is  virtuous.  From  this  point  of  view  the  basest 
action  might  be  justified.  But  the  deeper  insight  would 
be  that  such  an  action  is  impossible  to  the  wise  man, 
who  is  and  must  remain  ideal. 

That  the  ideal  is  duty  for  its  own  sake,  a  categori- 
cal  imperatiyejllie.  Stoics,  like  Kailt>  emphasize.  But 
^they  do  not  show  that  it  is  a  process  of  realization  in 
human  society  and  human  conduct,  reaching  upward 
continually  to  an  ever  higher  summit  of  self-realization 
and  self-perfection.  Man  is  conscious  of  himself  as  the 
final  end  of  his  own  action,  but  he  is  also  conscious 
of  himself  as  a  progressive  being,  passing  from  possi- 
bility to  realization,  and  again  to  possibility.  Otherwise 
morality  would  be  impossible. 

We  can  reach  no  higher  ideal  than  the  Stoic,  that 
virtue  is^_genuine  onlj^  when_  resting^  on  a  pure  will, 
the  will  to  do  good,  directed  not  tqjanything  external, 
but  to  its  own  perfection.  Its  negative  aspect  is  its 
complete  renunciation  of  the  sensuous  and  the  emo- 
tionaTTn  human  life,  whose  relative  worth  they  admit, 
practically  requiring  only  their  subordination  to  reason. 
Individual  man  is  to  seek  for  himself  moral  independ- 
ence in  the  development  and  perfection  of  his  own 
inner  being,  recognizing  himself  as  reason,  which  he 
does  not  possess  exclusively,  but  shares  with  all  men. 
On^one  hand,   he  is  required   to.  live  for  the  common 


STOICISM. 


241 


good  and  for_society:;.jaEutha-oth£r».lie^i8  required  to 
live  for  himself  onjy  in  the  inward  consciousiifigs  of 
virtue.  He  is  led  by  the  firat  la.  seak.  companionship  ; 
by  the  second,  to^ispense  with  it  wholly.  The  first 
culminates  in  citizenship  of  the  world  ;  thesecoiid  in 
the  self-sufficingness  of  the  wise  man.  Virtue  is  the 
surrender  of  the  individual  to  the  whole,  obedience  to 
the_common  law  ;  but  itJu3__al80_Uie_harmpny  of  man 
with  himself,  the  rule  of_  his  higher  nature  over  the 
lower,  elevation  above  everything  which  does  not  belong 
to  his  true  being. 

Individual  self-culture  and  the  social  well-being  of 
the  community  are  not  elements  which  oppose  each  other 
absolutely,  they  are  rather  parts  of  one  great  whole. 
Man  must _live_ for  his  fellow-men,  or  he_cannot^  truly 
live  forjiim self.  ''The  whole  universe  which  you  see 
around  you,  comprising  all  things,  both  divine  and 
human,  is  one.  We  are  members  of  one  great  body. 
Nature  has  made  us  relatives  when  it  begat  us  from  the 
same  materials  and  for  the  same  destinies.  She  planted 
in  us  a  mutual  love,  and  fitted  us  for  a  social  life.'^ 
Human  virtue  culminates  in  social  virtue,  justice ;  to 
love  other  men  is  to  be  more  truly  natural  than  to  love 
one's  self.  We  must  at  the  same  time  love  and  be  just 
to  our  fellow  men.  Justice  does  not  exclude  beneficence, 
benevolence,  a  readiness  to  forgive.  "Men  were  born 
for  the  sake  of  men,  that  each  should  assist  the  others. '^ 
"Nature  has  inclined  us  to  love  men,  and  this  is  the 
foundation  of  the  law.*' 

The  action  of_the  wise  man  benefits  all  other  men ; 
to  lift  a  finger  reasonably  is  to  serve  the  whole  world. 


242 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY 


The  wise  man  alone  knows  how  to  love  rightly,  because 
he  alone  loves  not  for  external  advantage,  but  for  inner 
worth.  Genuine  friendship  is  a  fraternal  union  of  the 
wise  and  the  good  ;  its  value  is  in  itself  alone.  Seneca 
tells  us  that  we  must  love  our  friend  not  because  he  can 
help  and  cherish  us,  but  as  one  whom  we  can  help  and 
cherish,  and  for  whom,  if  need  be,  we  can  suJffer  and  die. 
Man  as  man,  a  citizennot  of  the  sj-ate  bu^t  of  the 
worldTTslhe  object  of  interest  with  Jhe  Stoics ;  politics 

is~su^ordinated_to_ethic^ We  are  no  more  related  to  one 

than  together;  we  are  all  limbs  of  one  body,  or, 
according  to  Epictetus,  we  are  all  brethren  and  children 
of  one  father.  The  moral  consciousness  is  here  widened 
to  universality ;  withdrawn  into  his  own  interior  being, 
man  recognizes  its  spiritual  essence  as  universal,  the 
divine  in  all  men.  The  Stoics  proclaim  with  energy  a 
universal  human  brotherhood. 

Man's  ethical  relation  to  the  world  is  predetermined 
by  destiny,  the  law  of  the  universe,  to  which  he  must 
submit  unconditionally.  This  dogma  springs  necessarily 
from  the  Stoic  point  of  view,  but  is  also  the  product  of 
an  age  when  Rome  like  an  iron  fate  dominated  the  world 
of  external  reality.  There  is  only  one  way  to  happiness 
and  independence,  to  will  nothing  except  that  which  is 
in  the  nature  of  things,  and  which  must  therefore  be 
realized.  Manjnust  submit  his  will  to  the,  divine  will, 
must  jield  to^jiestinixi"^  ^^  ^^  ^^^  prerogative  as  a 
reasonable  being  to  submit  voluntarily.  Active  resist- 
^ce  is  justified  only  when  he  is  placed  in  .circumstances^ 
that  force  him  to  unworthy  conduct.  Suicide  is  the 
highest  expression  of  moral  freedom.      Life  in  itself  is 


STOICISM. 


243 


not  regarded  as  good,  nor  death  in  itself  as  evil ;  they 
are  only  so  relatively.  *^A  philosopher  should  never 
commit  suicide,"  says  Seneca,  '*in  order  to  escape  suf- 
fering, but  only  to  withdraw  from  restraints  in  following 
out  the  aim  of  his  life.'' 

The_  mpxaL  tlifi^ii^  Q^—tlie  Stoics  begins  with  the 
recognition  of  the  divine  as  reason  controlling  the 
activity  of  mani  it  ends  with  the  requirement  that 
man  shall  submit  his  will  to  the  will  of  God.  Moral 
duty  springs  from  a  basis  of  religion,  from  the  com- 
mon relation  of  all  men  to  God.  Stoicism,  likeJPlaton- 
ism,  is  in  part  a  religious  system  as  well  as,  a  philosophy. 
Whatever  harmonized  with  his  thought  in  the  popular 
faith  the  Stoic  accepted,  but  without  criticism.  The 
old  myths  were  interpreted  anew.  A  natural  connec- 
tion was  seen  between  the  oracle  and  the  gift  of 
prophecy.  This  gift  rests  on  the  relationship  between 
God  and  the  human  soul ;  purity  of  heart  is  its  essen- 
tial condition.  The  spirit  of  man,  wholly  withdrawn 
from  the  sensuous  and  external,  is  open  to  the  revela- 
tion of  the  spirit  of  God. 

Stoicism  expresses  the  ^character  of  an  age  that 
cared  little  for  scientific  research  or  the  joy  resulting 
from  practical  action.  But  it  was  an  age  _tljat  in  the 
overthrow  of  states  recognized  more  fully  the  idea  of 
humanity.  Man  was  to  become  free  and  happy  through 
the  reasonable  exercise  of  will.  But  he  was  regarded 
only  as  the  organ  of  universal  law,  which  he  must 
obey.  The  common  moral  obligation  was  recognized, 
but  not  the  right  of  the  individual  to  act  conformably 
to  his  own  peculiar  character.     The  part  was  depressed 


244 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


;y}?l_y?e  whole    might    be    exalted    as    universal    hu- 
manity. 

''The  Stoic  principle  is  a  necessary  moment  in  the 
idea  of  absolute  consciousness,"  says  Hegel ;  **  it  is  also 
a  necessary  appearance  of  the  time.     For  if,  as  in  the 
Roman  world,  the    life   of   real   spirit  was   lost   in   the 
abstract    universal,    so    must    the   consciousness  whose 
universality  is  destroyed  go  back  into   its   individuality 
to  maintain    itself   in    thought."     Right   and   morality 
were  disappearing  from  the  common  life  of  men ;   con- 
sciousness  was   thus   led   to    maintain   their   subjective 
existence  as  its  own  inner  freedom,  giving  up  all  rela- 
tion  to   the   outer  world.     The    Stoics   did    not   reach 
the     higher    insight     which    would    make    the    outer 
the  realization  of  the  inner,  expressing  subjective  free- 
dom   objectively   in    laws   and   institutions.      Self-con- 
sciousness  of   their  universal   validity  is  the  harmony 
between  the   reasonable  will  and  reality.     On  one  side, 
the  objective  system  of  freedom  exists  as  external  laws 
and  duties  that  I  must  obey;   on  the   other,  obedience 
is  freedom  when  I  recognize   their  source  in  myself  as 
reason  constituting    their    reality   and    my  own.     The 
Stoics  made  the  inner  freedom  of  self-consciousness  the 
basis  of  morality,  but  did  not  develop  its  concrete  form 
wherein  the   two   antithetical   sides,  the  external  world 
and  the  internal   conscience,  annul    and  complete  each 
other  in  one  harmonious  whole. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 


EPICUREANISM. 


SIDE  by  side  with  the  Stoic  school  of  philosophy 
flourished  its  adversary,  the  Epicurean.  Epicurus 
was  born  342  B.  C.  Little  is  known  of  him  until  in 
his  thirty-sixth  year  he  began  to  teach  philosophy  in 
Athens.  The  seat  of  his  school  was  his  garden  ;  its 
spiritual  centre  was  his  own  personality,  y^ver  did 
teacher  inspire  more  love  and  veneration.  His  disciples 
were  devoted  friends  who  lived  with  him  in  a  perma- 
nent social  union,  bound  by  ties  of  affection  so  strong 
that  Epicurus  refused  to  permit  a  community  of  goods, 
saying  that  it  would  indicate  mistrust,  and  that  friends 
should  confide  in  one  another.  That  he  was  worthy  of 
the  love  and  esteem  which  he  inspired,  his  contempor- 
aries testify. 

After  his  death,  which  took  place  in  his  seventy- 
first  year,  he  was  so  deeply  honored  and  revered  that 
no  one  ever  ventured  to  make  a  single  change  in  his 
system  of  thought.  His  maxims  and  doctrines  were 
committed  to  memory  ;  philosophy  to  the  Epicureans 
was  a  body  of  mechanical  tradition  rather  than  a  living 
process  of  development.  The  ground  of  this  is  found 
in  the  system  itself,  whose  only  activity  is  the  negation 
of  thought  by  thought. 

Epicurus  was  a  voluminous  writer,    surpassing   even 


246 


A  STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


V 


the  Stoic  Chrysippus  in  the  number  of  his  works. 
Most  of  them  are  lost,  but  among  those  whicli  are  pre- 
erved  are  the  summaries  of  his  system,  which  he  him- 
self composed.  Among  his  disciples  none  were  more 
famous  than  the  Roman  poet  Lucretius,  who  has  em- 
bodied in  didactic  verse  the  Epicurean  doctrines. 
Other  sources  of  information  are  Diogenes  Laertius, 
Sextus  Epicurus,  and  the  Stoic  Seneca. 

The  aim  of  philosophy,  according  to  Epicurus,  is  to 
promote  happiness  by  means  of  thought  and  speech. 
He  goes  to  the  extreme  in  subordinating  theoretical  to 
practical  interests;  all  knowledge  is  useless  that  does 
not  minister  to  practical  need.  Nature  is  to  be  studied, 
not  for  itself,  but  to  free  the  soul  from  the  terror  of 
superstition.  So,  too,  with  human  instinct  and  desire. 
They  are  to  be  investigated  only  that  we  may  control 
and  limit  them  to  natural  need.  Philosophy  is  divided 
into  canonics,  or  logic,  physics,  and  ethics;  but  the 
first  two  exist  for  the  third,  to  which  they  are  wholly 
subordinated. 

LOGIC. 

Epicurus  referred  everything  to  the  feeling  of  pleas- 
m;ejDr  pain;  the  test  of  truth  is  sensuous  perception. 
His  point  of  view  is  that  of  common  life  ;  what  I  see, 
hear,  feel,  experience  through  the  senses,  is  real.  Sen- 
sation is  always  to  be  trusted ;  a  delusion  of  the  senses 
is  a  mistake  of  judgment.  Error  lies  not  in  sensation, 
but  in  opinion.  Sensuous  perception  is  itself  clear  evi- 
dence. Through  its  repetition  a  general  picture  of 
what  has  been  perceived  is  retained  by  the  mind.  This 
is  the  concept,  or  notion,    which,    like    perception,    is 


EPICUREANISM. 


247 


true  in  itself,  needing  no  proof.  The  two  are  the  neces- 
sary presupposition  and  criterion  of  knowledge.  We 
must  admit  their  validity  in  order  to  escape  universal 
doubt.  The  aim  of  logical  inquiry  is  simply  to  estab- 
lish a  test  of  truth. 

PHYSICS. 

In  natural  science  Epicurus  followed  Democritus  as 
the  Stoics  followed  Heraclitus.  He  places  the  end  of 
action  in  each  individual  taken  by  itself,  and  what  is 
so  absolutely  individual  as  atoms  ?  Nothing  exists  ex- 
cept atoms  and  empty  space  ;  there  is  no  third,  as  mind 
or  intelligence.  The  atoms  have  weight  as  well  as 
shape  and  size,  and  are  moved  by  natural  necessity. 
But  they  have  also  the  smallest  degree  possible  of  self- 
motion,  and  as  they  fall  are  able  to  swerve  aside 
slightly  from  the  perpendicular  line,  the  strict  law  of 
gravity.  Upon  this  curious  doctrine  rests  the  freedom 
which  Epicurus  attributes  to  the  human  will.  There 
is  no  design  in  nature ;  its  appearance  is  merely  an 
accidental  result  of  material  causes.  We  see  because  we 
have  eyes,  but  we  do  not  possess  eyes  in  order  to  see. 

The  human  soul  is  composed  of  the  lightest  and 
most  easily  moved  atoms ;  this  is  evident  from  the 
speed  of  thought.  The  soul  consists  of  two  parts,  the 
rational  and  irrational.  The  rational  has  its  seat  in 
the  breast ;  the  irrational  is  diffused  through  the  body 
as  a  principle  of  life.  This  is  but  another  way  of 
distinguishing  between  mind  and  matter,  according  to 
Zeller.  The  soul  dies  with  the  body ;  the  time  when 
we  shall  no  longer  exist  affects  us  as  little  as  the  time 
before  we  existed. 


u^ 


248 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


V 


Hegel  says  that  Epicurus  may  be  regarded  as  the 
inventor  of  empirical  natural  science  and  empirical 
psychology.  He  made  analogy  the  principle  of  ex- 
planation, reasoning  from  the  known  to  the  unknown ; 
he  opposed  efficient  to  final  cause ;  experience  to  him 
was  sensuous  reality.  All  this  was  developed  super- 
ficially, but  its  result  as  a  knowledge  of  natural  causes 
tended  to  free  men  from  belief  in  omens,  divination, 
and  superstitious  rites  generally.  Epicurus,  like  the 
modern  scientist,  argued  that  the  explanation  of  the 
natural  would  banish  all  fear  of  the  supernatural.  He 
criticized  the  gods  of  the  popular  faith,  but  believed  in 
their  eternal  existence  and  happiness,  withdrawing  from 
them  only  what  was  unfitting  to  their  divinity. 

ETHICS. 

The^  study  of  physics  is  intended  to  overcome  the 
prejudices  that  stand  in  the  way  of  happiness;  the 
study  of  ethics  explains  the  nature  of  happiness 
and  the  means  for  its  attainment.  The  only  uncon- 
ditional good,  according  to  Epicurus,  is  pleasure,  which 
may  result  from  motion  or  from  rest ;  the  only  uncon- 
ditional evil  is  pain.  This  conviction  is  presupposed 
in  all  our  activity ;  from  the  first  moment  of  existence 
the  living' Jpeing  seeks  pleasure  and  avoids  pain. 

But  there  is  a  difference  of  degree  in  pleasure  and 
pain ;  we  must  consider  their  relation  one  to  the  other, 
must  renounce  pleasure  to  escape  greater  pain,  and 
endure  pain  to  attain  greater  pleasure.  In  order  to 
compare  and  choose  between  the  two  intelligence  is 
necessary,  insight  into  their  real  nature.  The  state  of 
the   mind    is    more   important   than   the   state  ^oT  the 


EPICUREANISM. 


249 


body.  Sensuous  enjoyment  is  but  for  a  moment  and 
contains  much  that  is  disturbing ;  mental  enjoyment 
is  pure  and  lasting.  So,  too,  bodily  pain  is  less  se- 
vere Than  mental  suffering,  which  stretches  over  the 
past  and  the  future  as  well  as  the  present.  The  only 
distinction  that  Epicurus  makes  between  the  mental 
and  the  physical,  is  the  addition  of  memory  or  hope 
or  fear  to  the  present  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain.  The 
supreme  good  is  not  to  suffer  ;  for  the  body  no  pain, 
for  the  soul  no  trouble. 

How  are  we  to  attain  the  tranquillity  that  nothing 
can  disturb  ?  Through  free  choice.  Though  the  soul 
is  but  an  assemblage  of  atoms  it  has  the  power  of 
deviating  from  its  natural  inclination.  This  power 
intelligently  directed  enables  man  to  evade  the  law  of 
destiny,  to  break  through  the  chain  of  causes  and 
effects,  to  free  himself  from  outward  and  inward 
necessity.  The  superior  is  derived  from  the  inferior ; 
the  origin  of  freedom  is  found  in  the  physical,  and  not 
in  the  nature  of  divine  activity,  as  with  Aristotle. 

Epicurus  bases  his  moral  theory  on  pleasure,  but  pleas- 
ure arising  from  the  exercise  of  virtue.  The  two  are  iden- 
tified, but  in  a  manner  opposed  to  that "1)1  the  Stoics ; 
virtue  is  never  an  end  in  itself,  it  is  simply  the  means  to 
anjBxternal  aim,  pleasure.  The  source  of  pleasure  is  not 
the  consciousness  of  duty  fulfilled,  or  virtuous  activity 
itself ;  it  is  freedom  from  fear,  danger,  and  all  that 
disquiets  the  soul.  A  wise  self-control  will  teach  us 
how  to  enjoy  the  most  and_ suffer  the  least.  But,  with 
an  inconsistency  that  attracts  us  and  leads  us  to  believe 
in  the  genuine  unselfishness  of  human  nature,  Epicurus 


u 


^ 


y 


250 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


insists  that  we  must_do  good,  not  from  compulsion,  nor 
from  regard  to  others,  but  from  jp^  in  the  good  itself  ; 
that  we  must  obey  not  the  letter,  but  the  spirit  of  the 
law. 

Real  wealth  consists  in  limiting  our  wants  ;  not  to  use 
little,  but  to  7ieed  little,  is  the  true  source  of  self- 
satisfaction.  The  Epicurean  wise  man,  unlike  the  Stoic, 
is  not  wholly  free  from  desire  and  emotion,  but  through 
moderate  self-restraint  prevents  their  exercising  an 
injurious  influence  over  his  life.  lie  is  neither  a  cynic 
nor  a  beggar.  But  Epicurus  asserts  that  he  will  be 
happy  under  all  circumstances,  and  this  is  the  paradox 
of  the  Stoics,  which  seeks  to  make  man  free  in  himself 
as  infinite  thought  or  self-consciousness  independent  of 
everything  external. 

Epicurus  ascribes  little  worth  to  the  state  and  civil 
society.  He  asserts  that  they  are  organized  merely  for 
an  external  purpose,  mutual  safety  and  protection  ;  that 
justice  is  binding,  not  in  itself,  but  for  the  general 
good.  Political  activity,  unless  for  personal  security, 
is  regarded  as  a  hindrance  to  the  true  aim  of  life,  the 
attainment  of  happiness.  Zeller  thinks  it  fitting  that 
the  soft,  timid  spirit  of  the  Epicurean  should  seek  the 
protection  of  a  monarchical  form  of  government,  while 
the  stern,  unflinching  moral  teaching  of  the  Stoic  should 
express  itself  in  the  unbending  republicanism  so  often 
encountered  in  Rome. 

The  highest  form  of  social  life  with  Epicurus  is 
friendship.  This  was  the  logical  outcome  of  his  theory 
of  atomism,  his  view  of  the  individual  as  a  social  atom 
rather  than  a  member  of  an  organic  whole.     Friendship 


EPICUKEANISM. 


251 


is  a  voluntary  relation  based  on  individual  character 
and  inclination,  unlike  that  of  the  state  which  does 
not  admit  of  personal  choice  It  is  to  be  cultivated  on 
account  of  its  utility,  but  it  is  also  maintained  that  it 
exists  for  itself  in  so  far  as  self-love  and  the  love  of  a 
friend  are  equally  strong.  We  need  the  help  and 
approval  of  those  whom  we  love  to  give  firmness  to 
conviction,  to  rise  above  the  changing  circumstances  of 
life.  The  aim  of  friendship  is  the  self-enjoyment  of 
cultivated  personality.  It  is  the  highest  earthly  good ; 
the  wise  man  will  even  die  for  his  friend  if  necessary. 
Friendship  was  not  only  taught  but  practiced  by  the  ^ 
Epicureans,  with  a  depth  and  ardor  of  sentiment  char- 
acteristic of  a  philosophy  based  on  feeling  rather  than 
on  thought. 

The  Epicurean  ethics  reflect  the  gentle,  humane 
spirit  of  their  founder.  Epicurus  insisted  on  compas- 
sion and  forgiveness,  and  even  declared  that  it  is  bet- 
ter ^fo^  give  than  to  receive.  If  he  did  harm  by  his 
theory  of  the  utility  of  virtue,  he  at  the  same  time 
taught  men  that  true  happiness  is  mental  serenity,  and 
can  only  be  attained  through  self-culture  and  self-de- 
velopment. If  he  riiade  pleasure  the  end  of  action,  it 
wflS"  pleasure  watched  over  and  weighed  by  understand- 
ing and  reflection,  the  result  of  thought  rather  than  of 
feeling.  His  ethical  principle  seems  to  culminate  in 
selfishness  and  egotism,  and  is  diametrically  opposed  to 
the  Stoic;  yet  both  aim  towards  inner  independence  of 
everything  external,  an  ideal  freedom  of  self-conscious- 
ness.  The  Stoic  cannot  separate  happiness  from  virtue; 
the  Epicurean  cannot  separate    virtue   from   happiness. 


252 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


Both  agree  that  passion  must  be  held  in  check  by  rea- 
son ;  but  with  the  Epicurean  the  restraint  is  from  a 
prudential  motive ;  with  the  Stoic  the  restraint  is  it- 
self virtue.  Both  presuppose  as  the  basis  of  their 
thought  subjectivity  limited  to  itself,  expressed  in 
their  highest  aim  as  the  ideal  wise  man,  self-suffi- 
cient in  solitude. 

It  is  one  and   the  same    principle  which  we  view 
from   opposite   sides,    in   Stoicism    and    Epicureanism, 
says    Zeller,   the    principle    of    abstract    self-conscious- 
ness developed  to  universality.     To  produce   this  self- 
consciousness  is    the    aim    of    philosophy.     The    Stoic 
seeks  to  realize  it  by  subordinating  the  individual  to 
the  universal  law ;  the   Epicurean,   by  freeing  the  in- 
dividual from   dependence  on  anything  external.     The 
subject  is  conceived  by  the  Stoic  as  thought,  by  the 
Epicurean  as  feeling.      To  one    the   highest    good    is 
therefore  virtue;  to  the    other,    pleasure.     But    pleas- 
ure   regarded    as  a    whole,   and    conditioned    through 
insight    and    the    action    corresponding  to    insight,    is 
not  unlike  virtue    in    its    result.     Happiness,    to    the 
Epicurean  as  to  the   Stoic,   is  an  inward  harmony  of 

the  soul. 

Both  Epicureanism  and  Stoicism  turn  from  meta- 
physics to  ethics,  from  Plato  and  Aristotle  to  Socra- 
tes and  the  Socratic  schools.  Yet  both  look  for  in- 
dependence of  the  senses  in  self-consciousness,  in  sub- 
jective activity,  which  is  a  one-sided  application  of 
the  idealism  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Both  express  a 
certain  stage  in  the  development  of  Greek  thought, 
a  necessary    one    in    philosophy,   according    to  Hegel. 


EPICUREANISM. 


253 


The  abstract  universality  of  thought  is  the  principle 
of  the  Stoics  ;  the  abstract  universality  of  feeling  is 
the  principle  of  the  Epicureans.  Both  argue  that 
knowledge  must  be  possible,  or  there  could  be  no  cer- 
tainty of  action.  But  Scepticism  annuls  their  one- 
sidedness  and  carries  to  the  extreme  the  withdrawal 
of  man  into  himself,  renouncing  all  claim  to  knowl- 
edge and  all  interest  in  the  external  world.  Sub- 
jectivity reaches  complete  abstraction;  scepticism  is  a 
negative  that  remains  negative  and  knows  not  how 
to  transform   itself   into  something  affirmative. 


CHAPTER   XXXIII. 


SCEPTICISM. 


"PHILOSOPHY,  according  to  Hegel,  contains  in 
-■-  itself  the  negative  of  scepticism  as  its  own  dia- 
lectic, a  negative  that  becomes  affirmative  in  the  living 
process  of  knowledge.  The  seed  is  negated,  destroyed, 
yet  re-affirmed  in  the  plant.  The  negative  is  not  the 
final,  but  a  necessary  element  of  concrete  reality.  Scep- 
ticism regards  it  as  the  contradictory  appearance,  a 
negative  that  destroys  the  possibility  of  knowledge. 
Neither  the  Stoic  nor  the  Epicurean  principle  are  valid  ; 
we  cannot  prove  the  existence  of  virtue  or  pleasure,  the 
truth  of  reason  or  of  the  senses,  the  physics  of  pan- 
theism or  of  atomism.  Everything  wavers  amid  uni- 
versal uncertainty  except  abstract  personality  content 
with  itself. 

Three  schools  appeared  in  succession,  the  Old  Scep- 
ticism, the  New  Academy,  and  the  Later  Scepticism. 
The  last  was  in  part  a  revival  of  the  first,  but  the  New 
Academy  was  distinct  from  both,  not  only  because  it 
claimed  to  follow  the  teachings  of  Plato,  but  as  directed 
principally  against  the  dogmatism  of  the  Stoics,  and  less 
radical  in  its  sceptical  doctrines  than  the  other  schools. 

The  most  eminent  leaders  of  the  New  Academy  were 
its  founder,  Arcesilaus,  and  his  successor,  Carneades. 
Arcesilaus  affirmed  that  the  subjective  conviction  of  self- 

254 


SCEPTICISM. 


255 


consciousness  is  not  a  criterion  of  truth  ;  that  we  cannot 
attain  knowledge,  and  must  therefore  be  guided  by 
probability.  The  connection  of  this  principle  with  the 
dialectic  of  Plato,  regarded  negatively,  or  the  Ideas  as 
abstract  Universals,  is  apparent. 

In  his  polemic  against  the  Stoics  Arcesilaus  argued 
that  their  principle  is  contradictory,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
thought  thinking  something  other  than  itself.  This  is 
the  same  distinction  expressed  in  modern  philosophy  as 
the  contrast  between  thought  and  being,  ideality  and 
reality,  subjective  and  objective.  How  can  I,  the 
internal  thinking  subject,  know  the  external  object  ? 

Knowledge  to  Arcesilaus  is  incomprehensible  ;  we  can 
only  attain  to  probability  through  culture  and  under- 
standing. Probability  is  a  practical  guide,  enabling  us 
to  choose  the  good  and  avoid  the  evil ;  it  is  the  basis  of 
virtue. 

A  century  later,  Carneades  developed  more  completely 
the  negative  and  the  positive  side  in  the  teaching  of 
Arcesilaus.  On  a  foundation  of  absolute  doubt  he  built 
the  certainty  of  practical  conduct.  Truth  is  unattain- 
able, but  a  conviction  resting  on  its  appearance,  proba- 
bility, is  indispensable  for  practical  activity.  There 
are  three  degrees  of  probability:  the  first  and  weakest 
is  a  representation  which  produces  alone  and  for  itself 
the  impression  of  truth;  a  higher  degree  is  the  con- 
firmation of  this  impression  by  all  the  other  representa- 
tions which  are  connected  with  the  first;  the  highest 
of  all  is  a  thorough  investigation  of  their  relation,  which 
produces  perfect  conviction. 

The  Academic  principle  is  not  truth,  but  subjective 


256 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


certainty.  As  probability,  it  is  a  positive  principle,  the 
basis  of  moral  activity.  Its  scepticism  is  not  so  com- 
plete and  thorough-going  as  that  of  the  other  schools, 
which  precede,  accompany,  and  follow  its  own. 

Pyrrho  of  Elis,  a  contemporary  of  Aristotle,  is  re- 
garded as  the  head  of  the  old  Sceptics.  He  left  no 
writings;  what  we  know  of  his  thoughts  is  derived 
from  Timon  of  Phlius,  his  disciple.  It  is  probable  that 
his  doctrines  are  sometimes  confused  with  those  of  his 

followers. 

Scepticism,  like  Stoicism  and  Epicureanism,  is  prac- 
tical in  its  tendency  ;  the  aim  of  philosophy  is  hap- 
piness. To  be  happy  we  must  understand  how  things 
are  and  how  we  are  related  to  them;  what  we  can 
know  and  what  we  are  to  do.  They  appear  so  and 
BO,  but  we  can  never  say  what  they  are.  There  is 
nothing  concerning  which  men  agree ;  the  testimony 
of  reason  and  of  the  senses  is  contradictory ;  one  and 
the  same  thing  can  be  affirmed  or  denied.  We  must 
therefore  suspend  judgment  and  regard  everything  as 
undecided,  even  indecision  itself.  Our  mental  atti- 
tude must  be  one  of  sceptical  indifference.  We  can- 
not make  a  positive  assertion ;  we  can  only  say  ''  it 
is  possible,''  ^*  perhaps,''  or,  if  we  are  very  cautious, 
*'I  assert  nothing,   not    even  that    I  assert  nothing." 

From  the  renunciation  of  positive  conviction,  the 
certainty  that  we  can  know  nothing,  will  result  im- 
perturbability of  spirit,  mental  equanimity,  the  with- 
drawal into  inner  self-consciousness,  which  is  the  ideal 
happiness  of  the  Sceptic  as  of  the  Stoic  and  the  Epi- 
curean,    He  who  who  holds  that  things  in  their  na- 


SCEPTICISM. 


257 


ture  are  good  or  evil,  is  always  restless  either  because 
he  does  not  possess  the  good  or  fears  the  evil.  But 
he  who  is  sceptical  as  to  their  existence  neither  seeks 
the  one  nor  flees  the  other,  but  remains  mentally 
firm  and  undisturbed.  The  wise  man  is  free  from 
opinion,  from  prejudice,  from  desire,  from  emotion ; 
he  is  indifferent  to  sickness  and  health,  life  and  death; 
he  is,  in  fact,  divested  of  humanity.  This  is  the  ab- 
stract ideal  of  Scepticism,  but  in  so  far  as  it  is 
unattainable  in  ordinary  life  the  Sceptic  will  follow 
tradition   and   probability. 

The  various  ways  in  which  reason  and  feeling  con- 
tradict themselves,  justifying  doubt,  were  set  forth  by 
the  Sceptics  in  ten  tropes,  collected  by  ^nesidemus, 
who  lived  after  Cicero.  The  first  is  based  on  the 
difference  existing  in  the  animal  organism  which  re- 
sults in  difference  of  feeling  and  perception,  as  for 
instance,  when  one  sees  green  where  another  sees  yel- 
low. The  second  trope  deals  with  the  differences 
found  among  men.  Men  are  unlike  one  another  men- 
tally as  well  afi  bodily.  They  differ  in  taste,  in  phi- 
losophy, in  religion.  The  greatest  minds  of  the  ages 
do  not  agree;  Heraclitus  opposes  the  Atomists,  Aris- 
totle opposes  Plato,  the  Stoics  the  Epicureans,  etc. 
It  would  be  presumption  to  attempt  the  certainty 
which  they  could  not  reach.  Inactivity  of  reason  is 
therefore   virtue. 

Hereupon  Hegel  remarks  that  some  people  see 
everything  in  a  system  of  philosophy  except  philoso- 
phy itself.  The  different  systems  of  thought,  though 
relatively  opposed,   really  complete  one  another  in  so 


258 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY 


far  as  the  fixed  principle  in  each  becomes  an  or- 
ganic element  of  the  whole.  Truth  is  essentially  a 
living  process,  and  cannot  be  limited  to  one  system 
or  expressed   in  it  completely. 

The  third   trope   relates  to   the  different    functions 
of    the    organs    of    sense.       The    ear  cannot    perceive 
color,   nor  the  eye   sound  ;   how,  then,  can  they  agree 
regarding  any   object  ?      The    fourth    trope   notes  the 
different  circumstances  under  which  objects  appear  to 
the  same  subject,  when  he  is  asleep  or  awake,  drunk 
or  sober,  young  or  old,  etc.     Everything  appears,  but 
nothing  is.      The  fifth  trope  relates   to   the   diversities 
of  appearances  due    to  position,    distance,   and    place. 
One  and  the  same  thing  seems  large  or  small,  accord- 
ing to  its  distance    from    the    observer.      So,    too,   it 
appears  different  in  a  different  position  or  place.     The 
sixth  trope  is  derived  from  intermixture,  the  fact  that 
no  single  thing  is  isolated,   but    is  mixed  with  other 
things,   so  that  we  never  see  pure  light,  or  hear  pure 
sound.      The  testimony  of    sensation   is    therefore  ob- 
scure and  untrustworthy.      The   seventh   trope    relates 
to  the    quantity    and    modification   of    the    objects    of 
perception.      For    instance,    glass    is    transparent,   but 
loses  this    peculiarity  if  subjected  to   pressure ;    or,   a 
little    medicine    may  be  beneficial,    but  a    great    deal 
would  be  fatal. 

The  eighth  trope  is  general  relativity,  the  substance 
of  all  other  sceptical  tropes,  according  to  Sextus 
Empiricus.  Since  everything  is  only  in  relation  to 
something  else  we  can  know  nothing  of  its  real  nature. 
The  ninth   trope    relates  to  the  frequent  or  rare  oc- 


SCEPTICISM. 


259 


currence  of  a  thing  which  affects  our  judgment  con- 
cerning its  worth.  The  tenth  trope  is  ethical,  and 
treats  of  the  diversities  of  opinion,  culture,  customs, 
laws,  myths  and  scientific  theories,  which  make  it  im- 
possible for  us  to  judge  what  is  right  or  wrong.  If 
there  is  only  a  subjective  test  for  knowledge,  it  will 
go  over  into  scepticism,  when  its  ground  is  thought- 
fully investigated. 

All  the  tropes  are  directed  against  the  dogmatism 
of  human  understanding,  which  says,  ''This  is  so, 
because  I  find  it  so  in  my  experience."'  It  is  easy 
to  see  that  from  a  different  point  of  view  the  oppo- 
site can  be  affirmed  as  equally  valid.  To  find  a 
feeling  in  myself  is  not  a  proof  of  its  existence  in 
another ;  I  can  assert  that  it  appears,  but  not  that 
it  is,   because   to   him   it  is   not. 

Hegel  mentions  five  other  tropes,  supposed  to  have 
been  collected  by  Agrippa,  that  belonged  to  a  higher 
culture  of  philosophic  thinking  than  the  preceding. 
The  first  is  difference  of  philosophic  opinions ;  the 
second  is  infinite  progress ;  the  third  is  relativ- 
ity of  determinations;  the  fourth  is  presuppositions, 
or  setting  out  from  some  proof  illegitimately  assumed; 
the  fifth  is  proof  in  a  circle  where  that  on  which 
the  proof  rests  must  itself  be  established  by  that 
which  is  proved.  They  are  all  contradictions  into 
which  understanding  falls,  and  are  directed  against 
dogmatic  philosophy,  not  in  the  sense  that  it  has  a 
positive  content,  but  that  it  affirms  something  limited 
as  an  absolute.  The  consciousness  of  the  negative 
and  the  definition  of  its  forms  found  in  Scepticism, 
is  of  the  highest  importance  in  philosophy. 


260 


A   STUDY   OP  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


The  doctrines  of  Pyrrho  sank  into  obscurity  for  a 
time,  but  were  revived  by  the  later  Sceptics, 
iEnesidemus,  Agrippa,  Sextus  Empiricus,  and  others. 
To  the  works  of  the  Greek  physician  Sextus,  called 
Empiricus  because  he  belonged  to  the  empiric  sect, 
we  are  greatly  indebted  for  our  knowledge  of  the 
doctrines  of  Scepticism. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 


ECLECTICISM. 


*'QCEPTICISM    forms    the    bridge   from    the    one- 
O    «ided  dogmatiflm  of   the   i^toic   and    KplcurMn 
pliilo«eophy    to    Eclecticism,"  says    '/  Thou^jli   it 

DuirkK-  n  decline  of  philosophic  originality  it  preeop- 
poi6«  '  ndard    given    id    snbjoctire    ooiiacionaiictt 

vhirh  one  to  upprabeDd    th«  true  mid   reject 

the  falifjc.     In  the  \\v^  nae  of  the  wonl  it  deeks 

4v  unite  oonoret^ly    the    abatract  onc-sidcd   priTK^Iplee 
of  diffeirant  ajatama  of  thoujB:lit. 

An  external  inflnaocc  toward  Eclectictam  wm  the 
Btndj  of  (treck  pbilo<x)phy  in  Rome.  Rome  wiahed 
to  make  the  whole  world  one  Roman  nation,  to  unite 
iu  one  system  all  philofAiphy,  measuring  its  Talae  by 
the  teet  which  she  applied  to  everything,  practical 
utility.  Otoero  is  the  chief  repreaentatiTe  of  Roman 
EolcciieiBm.  But  ho  is  rather  un  interpreter  of  Greek 
|»)Liloaopby  to  his  countrymen  than  an  independent 
inToatigator.  llis  own  basis  in  doubt ;  we  can  not 
littain  positive  certainty,  bnt  ju«  much  as  we  need 
for  pruotical  life.  Tlie  conacioii^ncas  of  right  is  iin- 
idanted  in  us  by  nature  and  ia  immediate  knowledge. 
So,  too,  with  tlie  conaoioiiBnces  of  God,  the  freedom 
of  the  will,  and  the  immortality  of  the  notil ;  they 
are  inwardly  attaalad  and  need  no  other  proof. 

til 


262 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


The  writings  of  the  great  Roman  Stoics,  Seneca, 
Epictetus,  and  Marcus  Aurelius,  deviate  slightly  toward 
Eclecticism ;  the  principle  of  Stoicism  through  firmly 
held  approaches  more  and  more  the  principle  of 
universal  human  love.  The  aim  of  philosophy  is  not 
only  inner  freedom  and  independence,  as  in  older 
Stoicism,  but  healing  and  consolation. 

Seneca  dwells  upon  human  weakness  and  the  need 
of  help.  He  exhorts  us  to  be  clement  and  merciful, 
to  spare  rather  than  punish.  He  directs  us  to  strict 
self-examination  that  we  may  recognize  and  overcome 
error  and  imperfection. 

To  Epictetus  the  philosopher  is  a  physician  who 
helps  those  whom  he  teaches  by  awakening  the  desire 
for  spiritual  improvement.  The  beginning  and  end 
of  wisdom  is  to  know  what  is  and  is  not  in  our 
power.  The  first  is  the  sphere  of  activity ;  the 
second  is  that  of  submission.  Nothing  but  the  will 
to  be  good  depends  on  us  solely;  fate  can  not  touch 
us  if  our  only  striving  is  toward  moral  perfection. 
Epictetus  is  less  proud  and  more  loving  than  the 
older  Stoics;  he  extends  brotherly  sympathy  and  for- 
bearance to  all  men,  even  the  most  erring  and 
wretched. 

A  spirit  even  more  humane  and  gentle  pervades  the 
Meditations  of  Marcus  Aurelius.  **  There  is  but  one 
thing  of  real  value,''  he  writes;  ''to  cultivate  truth 
and  justice,  and  to  live  without  anger  in  the  midst 
of  lying  and  unjust  men.''  The  soul  can  find  re- 
pose only  in  itself ;  reason  is  the  citadel  to  which 
man  must  flee  if  he  would   be  invincible.     Reason   is 


SCEPTICISM. 


263 


in  all  men  ;  the  erring  err  involuntarily,  because  they 
do  not  recognize  their  true  interest.  He  who  commits 
injustice  injures  himself  more  than  others;  we  can 
only  pity  the  base  and  the  weak. 

The  character  of  Marcus  Aurelius  was  almost  per- 
fect. *'  Seldom  indeed  has  such  active  and  unrelax- 
ing  virtue  been  united  with  so  little  enthusiasm," 
says  Lecky,  ''and  been  cheered  by  so  little  illusion 
of  success."  "Never  hope  to  realize  Plato's  Republic," 
he  writes.  "  Let  it  be  sufficient  that  you  have  in 
some  flight  degree  ameliorated  the  condition  of  man- 
kind, and  do  not  think  that  amelioration  of  small 
importance." 

One  of  the  adherents  of  Eclecticism  in  Greece 
was  the  celebrated  biographer,  Plutarch.  To  create 
moral  character  was  his  aim  in  philosophy.  He  be- 
lieved, with  Aristotle,  that  practice,  the  cultivation  of 
the  habit  of  virtue,  precedes  actual  virtue.  One  must 
not,  like  the  Stoic,  root  out  passion  and  affection, 
but  moderate  and  guide  them  ;  they  are  the  matter  of 
virtue,  reason  is  its  form.  We  can  not  control  ex- 
ternal circumstances,  but  we  can  use  them  as  a  moral 
help  or  hindrance.  There  is  no  essential  difference 
among  men  except  that  of  virtue  and  vice.  Religion 
is  the  culmination  of  ethics.  There  are  not  different 
gods  for  different  nations,  but  One  Reason  rules  the 
world,  named  and  worshiped  differently  according 
as  the  holy  symbols  which  guide  the  human  spirit 
to   the  Divine  are   more  obscure  or  more   distinct. 

Plutarch    is    classed    with    the    Neo- Pythagoreans, 
among   the    precursors  of    Neo-Platonism.      The  same 


264 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


tendency  appears  in  the  Alexandrian  School,  especially 
in  Philo,  who  unites  Hebraic  theology  with  Hellenic 
philosophy.  His  moral  theory  resembles  the  Stoic, 
but  lacks  its  support  in  self-consciousness,  which  ac- 
cording to  Philo  is  sinful.  The  aim  of  pliilosophy 
is    the    moral    salvation  of  men ;    its   first  problem   is 

* 

self-knowledge.  The  deeper  we  penetrate  within,  the 
greater  is  our  distrust  of  self.  We  can  attain  wisdom 
only  through  self-renunciation,  complete  surrender  to 
God.  Philosophy  culminates  in  the  absolute  absorp- 
tion of  self  in  the  Divine  self,  immediate  union  with 
Deity. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 


NEO-PLATONISM. 


/^  REEK  philosophy  closes  in  Neo-Platonism,  a  final 
^^J  attempt  to  solve  all  its  problems,  not  by  setting 
up  a  new  principle,  but  by  restoring  and  interpreting 
Platonism  in  the  sense  and  according  to  the  spirit  of 
the  age,  an  age  that  cared  more  for  subjective  than 
objective  reality.  The  longing  after  a  higher  mediation 
of  truth  than  man  finds  in  himself,  is  the  root  of 
Neo-Platonism.  Intuition  of  Deity  attained  through 
self-intuition,  is  its  ruling  centre.  The  aim  of  philos- 
ophy is  placed  in  that  which  transcends  reason,  imme- 
diate unity  with  God.  Its  problem  is  to  derive 
everything  finite  from  Deity— yet  separate  Deity  abso- 
lutely from  the  finite.  To  bridge  the  chasm  between 
God  and  the  world  requires  mediation,  degrees  of 
ascent  and  descent.  Man  stands  on  the  limit  of  the 
sensuous  and  the  super-sensuous ;  he  must  elevate 
himself  through  self-activity  out  of  the  one  into  the 
other.  In  its  theory  of  the  transcendence  of  Deity 
and  a  graded  transition  from  the  infinite  to  the 
finite,  Neo-Platonism  resembles  Oriental  philosophy ; 
but  the  foreign  material  from  whatever  source  ob- 
tained is  so  blended  and  transformed  as  to  constitute 
an  integral  part  of  its  own  system. 

266 


260 


A   STUDY  OP   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


PLOTINUS. 

The  most  important  representative  of  Neo-Platon- 
ism  is  Plotiniis.  He  was  born  in  Egypt  in  the  third 
century  A.  D.  He  studied  Platonic  philosophy  in 
Alexandria  with  Ammonius  Saccas,  a  celebrated  teacher, 
who  is  regarded  as  the  founder  of  Neo-Platonism. 
After  traveling  in  Persia  and  India,  Plotinus  went 
to  Rome  in  his  fortieth  year  to  lecture  on  philoso- 
phy. He  produced  a  great  impression,  not  only  by 
the  extent  of  his  knowledge  and  the  originality  of 
his  thought,  but  by  his  modesty,  his  moral  earnest- 
ness and  religious  consecration.  He  was  so  pure,  so 
inspired,  so  lifted  above  worldliness,  that  even  his 
closest  friends  approached  him  with  awe  and  rever- 
ence. His  writings  were  collected  and  published  after 
his  death   by   Porphyry,    his  disciple  and  successor. 

Plotinus  posits  as  the  primitive  source  of  all  being 
that  which  lies  beyond  thought,  or  the  world  of 
ideas,  the  One  only.  Thought  is  a  duality  of  sub- 
ject and  object,  of  essence  and  activity ;  the  One, 
therefore,  is  not  thought,  but  its  transcendence.  De- 
fined negatively,  Primordial  Being  is  that  to  which 
we  can  ascribe  no  quality,  not  even  reason  ;  defined 
positively,  it  is  the  One,  the  Good,  Absolute  Caus- 
ality. But  no  concept  embraces  it,  we  can  say  what 
it  is  7iot,  but  not  what  it  is,  only  that  it  is,  as  the 
presupposition   of  thought  and   being. 

From  Primordial  Being,  expressed  by  Plotinus  fig- 
uratively as  out  of  its  fullness  necessarily  overflowing, 
though  in  itself  unmoved  and  undiminished,  the  finite 
proceeds  as  a  stream,   contained    in  but  not  contain- 


NEO-PLATONISM. 


267 


ing  or  in  any  way  affecting  its  source.  Primordial 
Being  is  the  sun  which  pours  through  the  universe 
its  circle  of  light,  a  light  that  gradually  pales  as  it 
reaches  its  limit  in  the  gloom  of  not-being.  The 
finite  is  but  a  shadow  of  the   Infinite. 

Zeller  characterizes  this  theory  as  dynamic  panthe- 
ism  rather   than   emanation,    if  by  emanation   we    un- 
derstand  that   the    Infinite    gives  any    portion   of    its 
substance  to  the  finite.      This   Plotinus  denies.      But 
in   the  progress   from   the   Infinite   to    the    finite    and 
its  decreasing   perfection,    his  doctrine   is  one  of  ema- 
nation.    God   is    not    in    the    many  substantially,    but 
dynamically ;    the    divine    immanence   of  things   is  an 
effect  produced   through   his    causality.     The   lower    is 
mediated    through    the     higher.      What    is  second   or 
produced   cannot  be  as   perfect  as   the   first.     The  first 
is  nothing  but   the   transcendent   Cause;    the    second, 
its    original    effect,    is    Nous,   or    mind,   not    thought 
whose  potentiality  is  separated   from   its  actuality,  but 
thought    thinking    itself,    its    own    changeless    being. 
This   being  is  not   pure    unity,     but    multiplicity    in 
unity.      The   many  are  contained   in  thought  as   con- 
cepts,  or  Platonic  ideas.     Ideas  are  regarded    as  spir- 
itual forces,    mediating   the  transition   from  the  super- 
sensuous   to  the    sensuous.      On   one  side  pure  reason 
comprehends  in   itself  the  archetypes  of  all  existence, 
it  is   that   which   moves  all  forces ;  on  the  other    the 
many   forces  are  but  one   force,   the   many  forms   but 
one   form,    the   many  gods   but  one   God. 

The  product  of  pure  reason    is  the   world-soul,    an 
emanation  proceeding  eternally  from   a  changeless  and 


268 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


undiminished  substance,  as  reason  proceeds  from  Prim- 
ordial Being.  The  world-soul  mediates  between  rea- 
son and  the  sensuous  appearance,  it  is  the  outermost 
circle  of  light  beyond  the  central  sun;  beyond  it 
begin  material  darkness  and  nothingness.  It  differs 
from  reason  as  the  word  from  the  thought,  the  ap- 
pearance from  the  essence.  It  is  the  universal  soul 
which  contains  in  itself  all  individual  souls ;  it  is  one 
and  indivisible,  but  each  single  being  receives  of  it 
all  that  it  is  able  to  comprehend. 

Matter  has  no  reality,  it  is  the  mere  possibility  of 
being,  pure  negation.  This  is  Platonic,  but  Plotinus 
goes  farther,  and  asserts  that  matter  as  privation  of 
good  is  evil.  He  regards  it  as  necessary,  and  traces 
it  to  the  law  which  conditions  the  descent  of  the 
imperfect  from  the  perfect,  the  fading  of  the  illum- 
ination from  the  cenh-al  light  into  outermost  dark- 
ness. The  soul  at  the  limit  of  the  supersensuous 
presses  into  that  which  lies  outside  of  itself — matter, 
out  of  the  eternity  of  reason  into  temporal  life.  It 
is  a  fall,  a  descent,  due  not  to  reason,  but  to  its 
partial  obscurity,  its  withdrawal  from  Primordial  Be- 
ing towards  nothingness. 

The  sensuous  world  as  a  whole  is  a  mere  copy  of 
the  supersensuous,  a  mirror  of  the  soul  in  matter.  It 
is  beautiful  and  perfect  as  this  mirror;  the  Greek 
sense  of  nature  is  too  strong  in  Plotinus  for  him  to 
view  it  as  altogether  evil  and  unreal.  It  is  not  a 
house  built  of  dead  matter,  but  a  living  being,  an  or- 
ganic body  moved  by  one  soul.  Each  part  is  in  per- 
fect harmony  with  the  whole,  a  harmony  that  is  main- 


KEO-PLATONISM. 


269 


tained,  as  in  music,  by  apparent  discord  and  contra- 
diction. Everything  is  guided  by  Providence,  not  as 
intelligent  foreseeing,  but  as  natural  necessity,  the  im- 
manent relation  of  the  sensuous  to  the  supersensuous. 
The  imperfection  of  the  part  is  necessary  for  the  per- 
fection of  the  whole  ;  the  finite  could  not  be  otherwise 
and  remain  finite.  We  have  but  to  cooperate  actively 
with  Providence,  and  that  which  appears  evil  is  trans- 
formed into  good. 

Lower  tlian  the  world-soul  are  the  souls  of  the 
stars,  visible  gods  who  lead  a  uniform  and  happy  life. 
Lower  yet  are  are  the  beings  whom  Plotinus  calls  de- 
mons, who  mediate  between  the  divine  and  the  earthly, 
who  are  eternal  aud  supersensuous,  yet  bound  to  mat- 
ter and  able  to  appear  at  need  in  bodies  of  fire  or  air. 
The  earth,  like  the  stars,  is  regarded  as  a  thinking 
being  and  a  god,  whose  soul  overflows  into  the  souls 
of  plants,  producing  their  life  and  growth.  The  ani- 
mal is  regarded  as  either  a  ray  of  the  world-soul, 
or  a  shadowy  picture  of  the  human  soul  bound  to 
an  animal  body. 

The  human  soul  has  fallen  from  the  sphere  of  the 
supersensuous  into  that  of  the  sensuous.  It  was  once 
a  part  of  the  world-soul,  free  from  all  suffering,  out- 
side of  time  and  change,  possessing  neither  remem- 
brance nor  self-consciousness  because  perfectly  trans- 
parent and  absorbed  in  primal  intelligence.  But  as 
original  unity  produces  multiplicity,  a  like  necessity 
compels  the  soul,  standing  on  the  limit  of  the  super- 
sensuous, to  illuminate  the  sensuous.  Through  exper- 
ience of  darkness  its  own  slumbering  forces  are  awak- 


I 

} 


270 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


ened,  and  it  realizes  for  the  first  time  the  full  glory 
and  perfection  of  light. 

In  so  far  as  union  with  a  body  springs  from  the 
nature  and  inclination  of  the  soul,  it  is  free  activity, 
but  free  activity  conditioned  through  universal  neces- 
sity, the  law  that  rules  the  whole  and  subordinates 
to  its  perfection  the  imperfection  of  the  part.  The 
descent  of  the  soul  into  the  sensuous  is  its  inherent 
weakness,  but  weakness  that  can  be  transformed  into 
strength  through  its  return  to  the  supersensuous.  It 
mediates  between  the  higher  and  the  lower,  and  thus 
leads  a  double  existence,  its  activity  directed  now  to 
one  now  to  the  other.  But  its  peculiar  distinction 
is  the  higher  nature  which  constitutes  the  spiritual 
reality  of  man,  enabling  him  to  apprehend  God  in- 
tuitively, and  to  live  in  time  as  if  in  eternity,  par- 
ticipating  in   divine   intelligence. 

The  soul  cannot  suffer,  but  perceives  as  a  shadowy 
picture  pain  and  pleasure,  which  come  from  the  body 
and  the  animal  principle  of  life.  So,  too,  the  sen- 
suous object  cannot  affect  the  soul  except  through  a 
mediate  impression.  Memory  is  the  first  spiritual  ac- 
tivity; but  an  activity  that  belongs  to  the  soul  as 
subjected  to  change  and  temporal  life.  It  is  con- 
nected with  the  faculty  of  imagination,  which  has  a 
concealed  duality,  a  higher  and  a  lower  function  as 
it  reproduces  thought  or  the  sensuous  image.  Con- 
sciousness is  the  reflex  of  spiritual  activity  in  the 
faculty  of  perception ;  it  is  mediated  through  the  sen- 
suous, and  is  therefore  not  the  highest  in  man.  *'The 
act    of  incarnation   is  coincident   with   the   attainment 


NEO-PLATONISM. 


271 


of    individual   consciousness,''  says    Erdmann ;    *'it    is 
freely   willed  and   at   the  same   time   punishment,'' 

Plotinus  and   the  whole   Neo-Platonic   school   main- 
tain   that   without    free-will    man  could    not    exist  as 
man,   that  to    be   a   self-active    and    independent    sub- 
ject  belongs  to   his  essence  as  a   human   being.      But 
they  do  not  explain   how  free-will   is   to    be    harmon- 
ized  with  Providence  and   the  necessity  that  rules  the 
whole,    how  each   creates   his  own    character    and    yet 
plays  the  role  in   the  world-drama  assigned  to  him  by 
the   Creator.     He   who  follows   his  own  nature  is  free 
because   he  depends  on    notliing    external   to  himself; 
he   who  strives  after   the    good    must    act   voluntarily. 
The  soul   in   itself  is  without  error,  yet  before  its  en- 
trance into  the  body  freely  chose  a  human  life.     This 
is  the  unsolved   contradiction    and    discord  of  earthly 
existence.      The   true  home   of  the  soul   is  the   world 
of    the  supersensuous;    the    body  is  a  prison   that  it 
would   fain  escape.     But  escape  is  not  through  death, 
only   through    inward   purification. 

When  the  body  dies,  the  soul,  according  to  its  will 
and  inner  condition,  sinks  into  matter  or  into  vege- 
tative or  animal  existence,  or  seeks  again  a  human 
body  or  that  of  a  demon,  or  is  raised  to  the  stars 
and  restored-  to  its  primal  purity  and  perfection. 
Plotinus  believes  in  transmigration  as  the  law  of 
eternal  justice;  the  oppressor  shall  become  the  op< 
pressed;  the  master,  the  slave;  the  rich,  the  poor; 
the  murderer,  the  murdered,  etc.  But  he  is  not  clear 
as  to  what  constitutes  the  especial  subject  of  retri- 
bution and    transmigration,    since    the    soul    'n    itself 


272 


A   STUDY   OF  GHEEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


knows  nothing  of  time  or  previous  existence.  It  is 
only  what  it  thinks  and   as  it  thinks. 

The  problem  of  the  soul  is  to  free  itself  from  the 
body  through  self-activity.  The  perfect  life  is  the  life 
of  thought,  a  relation  of  man  to  his  inner  being, 
independent  of  everything  external.  Virtue  is  not  a 
transformation  of  character,  for  the  true  self  is  with- 
out error,  it  consists  rather  in  turning  away  from  all 
that  is  disturbing.  The  source  of  evil  is  the  relation 
of  the  soul  to  the  body ;  purification  concerns  the 
relation,  and  not  the  soul  itself.  As  the  artist  needs 
only  to  chisel  away  part  of  the  marble  to  restore  its 
divine  beauty,  man  needs  only  to  rid  himself  of  the 
sensuous  to  restore  his  soul   to  its  unsullied   purity. 

Plotinus  would  not  annihilate  the  sensuous,  but 
subject  it  to  reason.  The  beauty  of  the  world  leads 
him  to  a  more  positive  ethical  affirmation  than  is 
implied  in  its  total  renunciation.  As  a  copy  of  the 
resplendent  Idea  it  reminds  the  soul  of  its  heavenly 
origin,  it  kindles  the  desire  for  the  good;  the  faint 
earthly  reflection  helps  its  ascent  toward  perfect  and 
absolute  beauty.  But  practical  activity  is  regarded  as 
subordinate  to  that  which  is  purely  theoretic.  So 
far  as  man  works  with  the  external  and  sensuous  he 
is  immersed  in  the  world  of  appearance,  his  activity 
has  but  a  relative  value  compared  with  the  absolute 
worth  which  the  soul  possesses  in  itself  in  thought 
or  theory.  Outward  activity  and  representation  are 
good  only  so  far  as  they  lead  to  spiritual  insight  and 
knowledge. 

The  attention  of  Plotinus  is  too  exclusively  directed 


NEO-PLATONISM. 


273 


. 


to  the  inner  world  of  thought  for  him  to  pay  much 
attention  to  the  state  or  the  organization  of  society. 
Political  virtue  has  its  worth  in  limiting  desire  and 
affection ;  but  true  wisdom,  bravery  and  justice,  are  a 
relation  of  the  soul  to  itself,  not  to  anything  external. 
The  highest  interest  of  man  is  to  live  in  the  world, 
not  as  man,  but  as  a  god,  withdrawn  from  it  entirely 
in  his  own  inner  being,  a  paradoxical  ideal  not  unlike 
the'  Stoic. 

Even   theoretical  activity  is  imperfect  if  it  rests  on 
sensuous   observation    and    experience.      The    thinking 
that   is   mediated,  that  separates   the   knowing  subject 
from   the  object   known,    is   lower  than   that  which  is 
immediate,  blending  the  two  without  distinction.     The 
highest  knowledge  is  the  self-intuition  of  reason;  with- 
drawn into  its  pure  essence,  human  thinking  is  united 
with  the  divine,  with  the  whole  of  which  it  is  a  part. 
Mystical   union   with   God   is  the  final  aim  of  philos- 
phy.      Thought  and   self-consciousness    disappear  in  a 
divine  ecstasy,  absorption  in  the  Absolute  One. 

Plotinus   explains   this  inward    illumination,   known 
to  him  from   his  own  experience,  as  the  sudden  and 
immediate  filling    of    the    soul    with   the  divine  light 
which   streams   from    Deity.      It   is   not   knowledge  of 
God,    but  an   ecstatic   union   of  the  soul   with   Primi- 
tive  Being,   a  union    so    perfect    as    to    annul    every 
distinction.      The    soul   is  absorbed  in  the  pure  light 
of    Deity;    there    is    no    part    but    only    the    whole. 
Thought    as    limitation,    self-consciousness  as  the  dis- 
tinction   between    subject    and    object,   belong  to  the 
finite ;  the  soul  exalted  to  the  Infinite  is  lifted  above 


274 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


wisdom  and   virtue  and   beauty  to  a  state  of  religious 
rapture  where  it  is  no  longer  soul,  or  self,  or  thought, 

but  God. 

This  condition  can  be  attained  only  through  abso- 
lute abstraction  from  the  external,  the  pure  absorption 
of  the  soul  in  itself.  We  are  not  to  seek  the  inward 
light  but  await  it  quietly;  we  can  not  say  it  comes 
or  goes,  but  it  is  here,  a  sudden  illumination  of 
perfect  bliss  and  peace.  It  is  of  short  duration  be- 
cause the  soul  bound  to  a  body  emerges  'from  this 
mystical  unity  into  the  duality  of  observer  and  ob- 
served ;  it  descends  from  the  enraptured  beholding 
of  God  to  consciousness  of  self.  This  contradiction 
belongs  to  its  essence  as  mediating  between  the  higher 
and   the  lower,   the  Infinite  and   the  finite. 

Religion  is  in  the  closest  union  with  philosophy 
to  Plotinus  as  to  Plato.  Plotinus  adapts  and  inter- 
prets the  myths  of  the  popular  faith.  He  explains 
prayer  through  its  sympathetic  influence  as  a  spiritual 
force  in  the  universe.  Every  effect  is  dynamic  rather 
than  physical  ;  the  chain  of  natural  causation  is 
magic,  sympathetic  attraction  and  repulsion.  Prophecy 
and   the  belief  in  enchantment  are  closely  related  to 

magic. 

Plotinus  could  not  escape  the  irresistible  tendency 
of  his  age,  but  sought  to  harmonize  its  way  of  think- 
ing with  his  own  deeper  insight.  He  is  not  so  much 
concerned  to  explain  external  reality  as  to  elevate 
the  spirit  to  the  good  and  the  true,  and  reveal  its 
heavenly  origin  and  destiny. 


NEO-PLATONISM. 


275 


PORPHYRY. 

Plotinus    was    succeeded   by  his   most   distinguished 
scholar,    Porphyry.      But    in    creative    force   Porphyry 
is  not  to   bo   compared  with  his  master.     His  especial 
characteristic    is    the     striving     towards     clearness     of 
thought    and    expression,    so    that,  as   Zeller  says,    he 
appears  as   the   most   sober  and  moderate   of  the   Neo- 
Platonists.     lie   taught   both   philosophy  and  eloquence 
in   Rome.     He  popularized   the  doctrines  of    Plotinus, 
and    sought    by    means  of    philosophy   to  purify   reli- 
gious  belief  and  produce   true  piety.     His  aim  was  to 
heal  and   console   men,   to  purify  and  stimulate  moral 
activity.     lie   regarded  asceticism  as  an   especial  means 
of  purification.     He   prohibited  the  eating  of  flesh  not 
only   because   it   promotes  sensuous  impulse,   but  from 
the  fact    that    animal    nature   is  akin   to  our  own  as 
bodily,  and  foreign   to  it  as  spiritual.     Fettered  by  the 
body,   we  are   to   implore  divine   help   in   the  struggle 
towards  virtue ;   religion   is   indispensable   to   men  who 
feel   their  finite   weakness.     Porphyry  subordinates  the 
theological  element  to  the  philosophic  ;   the  reverse  is 
true  of  his  disciple,  Jamblichus. 

JAMBLICHUS. 

Jamblichus  is  a  theologian  rather  than  a  philoso- 
pher;  what  he  seeks  is  the  speculative  basis  of  reli- 
gion. Convinced  of  the  inherent  weakness  of  human 
nature  he  declares  that  it  can  be  purified  only 
through  the  help  of  higher  beings,  of  heroes,  demons, 
angels  and  gods.  The  soul  is  free  to  choose  or  reject 
their  help,  free  to  turn  toward  light  or  darkness, 
good  or  evil.     We    can    not    know    how   the   gods  pro- 


276 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


duce  the  finite  ;  the  first  condition  of  knowledge  is 
faith  in  their  omnipotence.  Multiplicity  is  the  char- 
acter of  the  supersensuoiis  as  of  the  sensuous  ;  the 
polytheistic  tendency  in  the  philosophy  of  Jamblichus 
is  not  to  be  mistaken.  Historically,  it  stands  on  the 
limit  which  separates  Neo-Platonism  as  a  philosophy 
from  Neo-Platonism  as  a  system  of  theology. 

PROCLUS. 

Proclus  is  the  most  celebrated  of  the  later  Neo- 
Platonists.  He  was  born  in  Constantinople  412,  A. 
D.  He  studied  plilosophy  in  Alexandria  and  Athens. 
The  teacher  whom  he  honored  with  especial  venera- 
tion was  Syrianus,  his  immediate  predecessor  in  the 
Athenian  school  of  Neo-Platonism.  When  at  the 
death  of  Syrianus  Proclus  assumed  its  leadership,  he 
was  already  renowned  for  his  learning  and  piety. 
So  great  was  the  impression  he  produced  that  he 
was  revered  as  an  especial  favorite  of  the  gods,  a 
model  of  superhuman  moral  excellence.  He  renounced 
family  life  to  devote  himself  to  knowledge.  He  was 
distinguished  for  a  high  sense  of  friendship,  unselfish 
activity,   beneficence  and    humanity. 

AVhat  he  sought  in  philosophy  was  nothing  less 
than  to  unite  in  one  logical  whole  all  the  chaotic 
material  of  Neo-Platonism,  and  erect  for  it  a  scien- 
tific structure.  He  was  especially  fitted  by  specula- 
tive genius  and  religious  enthusiasm  to  grapple  with 
the  difficulties  of  this  task.  He  revered  so  piously 
the  authority  of  his  predecessors  that  he  wished  to 
be  only  their  interpreter.  He  united  to  a  wonderful 
degree  the    power  of    abstraction    with    phantasy,   the 


NEO-PLATONISM. 


277 


need  of  knowledge  with  faith.  He  represents  Schol- 
iisticism  in  Greek  philosophy.  His  remarkable  dia- 
lectic insight  was  fettered  by  reliance  on  authority 
and  tradition,  and  resulted  in  that  unfruitful  for- 
malism which,  according  to  Zeller,  forms  the  back- 
ground of  all  Scholasticism.  His  system  is  the  link 
that  mediates  the  transition  from  Greek  to  mediaeval 
philosophy;  the  close  of  the  one  and  an  anticipation 
of  the   other. 

His   chief  striving   was  to  find   the  law  which  con- 
nects everything    as  a    whole;    to    explain    how    the 
many    proceed    from    and    return    to   the   One.      Like 
Plotinus    he    derived     the     finite    from    the     Infinite 
through  dynamic    causality,   but    the    derivation    is  a 
spiral   process    instead    of  a  simple    line.       Being    as 
original   Cause,  as  the  effect  proceeding  from  and   re- 
turning to   it,   are  the   three  moments  which  eternally 
represent  the  process  of  finite    creation.      The  triune 
activity  that    rules    the    whole    is    reflected   in    every 
part ;  each  sphere  of  divided  being  is  one  in  its  totality 
as  cause,   but   proceeds  to  many  effects    whose  multi- 
plicity can   only  be  annulled   by   the   return   to   origi- 
nal  unity.     The   threefold  relation   is   thus   expressed  ; 
the  effect   in   so  far  as  it   is  like    the  cause    remains 
in  it,   in  so  far  as  it    is    unlike    the   cause    separates 
from    it   and   seeks   to    become  like   it,    which   consti- 
tutes  the  struggle   of  the   finite  and  its  return  to  the 
Infinite.     Both   derivation  and  return  are  a  spiral  de- 
scent and  ascent,  mediated  in  a  triune  process  through 
lower  or  higher  spheres   of   being. 

Proclus  asserts  that  the  human  soul  can  only  rise 


278 


A   STUDY   OF  GREEK   PHILOSOPHY. 


above  the  sensuous  to  the  supersensuous  through 
gradual  mediation,  which  apparently  contradicts  the 
fundamental  belief  of  Neo-Platonism  that  the  soul  is 
to  seek  immediate  unity  with  God.  The  basis  of 
higher  culture  is  ethical  virtue ;  through  it  one  must 
purify  himself  and  submit  to  be  ruled  by  reason  be- 
fore he  is  fit  to  turn  toward  the  divine.  But  faith 
is  worth  more  than  knowledge ;  we  cannot  in  our 
weakness  attain  the  higher  life  without  divine  help. 
The  ways  to  God  are  three:  love,  truth,  faith.  Love 
leads  us  through  beauty  to  truth ;  truth  shows  us 
the  world  of  the  supersensuous ;  faith  reveals  the 
highest,  the  deep  mystery  of  the  universe.  Not 
through  thinking  and  reflection,  but  through  that 
absorption  of  the  soul  in  itself  which  we  owe  to 
faith,  through  divine  ecstasy  and  illumination,  are 
we  united   mystically   with   God. 

This  altar  of  the  Absolute  One,  an  ardent  and 
luminous  centre  in  whose  divine  flame  all  is  consumed 
and  united,  is  the  final  aim  of  the  philosophy  of 
Proclus,  as  of  all  Neo-Platonism.  The  soul  has  only 
to  bury  itself  in  itself  to  find  there  the  living  God. 
But,  closely  examined,  this  religious  rapture,  this 
immediate  union  with  Deity,  is  not  feeling,  but 
thought  itself  in  its  pure  simplicity.  It  is  a  higher 
idealism,  but  the  idealism  of  thought,  an  inward 
illumination  that  reveals  God,  but  God  as  the  soul 
of  our  soul,  God  as  Infinite  Reason. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 


THE   CLOSE   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 

A    FTER  the  death  of  Proclus,  the  Athenian  school 
-^-^  rapidly  declined,  and  was  closed  529  A.  D.  by  an 
edict  of  the  emperor  Justinian.      No  farther  attempt 
was    made    by    the    Greek    mind    to  solve    the    great 
problem  of    the   relation   between   thought   and   being. 
Inner    exhaustion    coincided    with    external    force    to 
bring    to    a    close    the   magnificent   work   achieved   by 
human    reason    in    Greek    philosophy.      It    lasted    for 
nine   centuries  after   its  quick  and  glorious   bloom   in 
Socrates,    Plato,  and   Aristotle.     It   was  the  refuge  of 
the    noblest    minds    in    those   dark   days    of    political 
oppression    that   followed   the  downfall   of    Greek    in- 
dependence.    It  preceded  and   anticipated   in  part  the 
teaching    of    Christianity,    but    could    not    accept    it 
wholly  without  giving  up    its    peculiar  character  and 
leaving  the  ground  wherein  it  was  rooted. 

Many  of  the  Church  Fathers,  and  some  of  the 
ablest  modern  thinkers,  believe  that  it  fulfilled  a 
propedeutic  oflfice  for  Christianity.  ''Philosophy,  be- 
fore the  coming  of  the  Lord,  was  necessary  to  the 
Greeks  for  righteousness,"  says  Clement;  ''and  it  now 
proved  useful  for  godliness,  being  in  some  part  a 
preliminary  discipline  for  those  who  reap  the  fruits 
of  faith   through  demonstration.     Perhaps  we  may  say 

279 


280 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


it  was  given  to  the  Greeks  with  this  special  object ; 
for  philosophy  was  to  the  Greeks  what  the  Law  was 
to  the  Jews,  a  schoolmaster  to  bring  them  to  Christ/' 
'^Christianity  proceeded  along  lines  of  thought  that 
had  been  laid  through  ages  of  preparation,"  says  Dr. 
B.  F.  Cocker  in  ''  Christianity  and  Greek  Philosophy ;" 
"  it  clothed  itself  in  forms  of  speech  which  had  been 
moulded  by  centuries  of  education,  and  it  appro- 
priated to  itself  a  moral  and  intellectual  culture  which 
had  been  effected  by  long  periods  of  severest  disci- 
pline/' 

History  is  development  of  the  human  spirit  accord- 
ing to  Divine  Law ;  the  present  was  potentially  in 
the  past,  the  past  is  actually  in  the  present.  To 
comprehend  the  thought  of  to-day  we  must  know  the 
thought  of  yesterday,  and  be  able  to  recognize  their 
fundamental  unity.  Our  insight  must  be  deep  enough 
to  harmonize  what  seems  discordant  and  contradictory. 
The  divine  is  revealed  in  the  constitution  and  de- 
velopment of  the  human  mind,  in  the  history  of  its 
striving  after  truth  and  the  knowledge  of  God. 

Greek  philosophy  asserts  with  overwhelming  testi- 
mony that  the  divine  is  in  the  human,  that  the  only 
reality  is  spirit.  It  affirms  the  existence  of  God  and 
of  the  soul,  and  even  in  its  scepticism  finds  a  strong- 
hold which  is  proof  against  attack,  the  infinite  sub- 
jectivity of  human  consciousness.  In  Neo-Platonism, 
it  seeks  through  mystic  exaltation  the  perfect  identi- 
fication of  the  Divine  and  the  human;  its  ideal  ap- 
proaches the  ideal  of  Christianity,  the  perfect  love 
that  loses  self  to  find  it  in  the  self  of  God. 


- 


A 


THE  CLOSE  OF  GREEK    PHILOSOPHY.  281 

"For  thousands  of  years  the  same  Architect  has 
directed  the  work,"  says  Hegel,  "and  tliat  Architect 
IS  the  one  hving  mind  of  which  the  nature  is  thought 
and  self-consciousness."  The  content  of  religion  and 
philosophy  is  one  ;  faith  and  knowledge,  "  God's  revela- 
tion to  man,  and  man's  discoyery  of  God,"  coincide 
ultimately. 

Greek  philosophy  manifests  the  immanence  of  the 
divme  in  human   reason;    it    is  the  seeking  and  the 
finding    amid    finite    error    and    imperfection    of    the 
Infinite.     "  It  was  the  teacher  of  the  Middle  Ages  " 
says  Zeller;  "the  new  time  began  under  its  guidance- 
and   whenever  the  independent  modern   mind  needs  a 
fresii   stimulus  to  activity,   it  goes  back  gladly  to  its 
inexhaustible  sources.     Our  perceptions  have  widened 
our  moral    and    metaphysical  concepts  Iiave  changed 
our    science    has    investigated    more    thoroughly    the 
realm  of    nature    and    of    spirit,  than    the    Hellenic- 
but  the  clearness  of  glance,   the  unity  of  philosophic' 
character,    the    complete    surrender  of    individuals    to 
their  principles,   which    for    the    most  part  character- 
ize   the   masters    of   ancient    philosophy,    will    always 
command  admiring  wonder  and  emulation.     Regarded 
as  a  whole,   the   history    of    Greek  philosophy,   in  its 
uniform  and   regular  development,   in  the  ds'Initeaess 
with    which    each     school    compiehends    itc    especial 
principle,  in  the  purity  with   which   it  is  worked  ovi 
18  a  source  of  delight.     To  h.do  thie  great  cppea,-cncb 
vitally  in  the  consciousness  of  the  present,  to  nourish 
the  spirit  of   our  time  with  tho  fruits  of  !;he  mendly 


•w^^^^v* 


^W     '  ' 


282 


A   STUDY   OF   GREEK    PHILOSOPHY. 


Hellenic  spirit,  is  one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  grate- 
fill  problems  of  the  science  of  history/' 


THE  END. 


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